Rose v. SandyRose v. Sandy
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending is Defendant Donna Dean-Chrivia‘s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice the Third Amended Class Action Complaint [Doc. 1040], filed September 19, 2024, along with additional motions identified and adjudicated at the conclusion of this written opinion and order. Plaintiff Sabrina Eagle responded to the Mоtion to Dismiss on October 3, 2024, [Doc. 1076]. The matter is ready for adjudication.
I.
On September 22, 2022, Plaintiffs, former inmates and/or pre-trial detainees at Southern Regional Jail (hereinafter “SRJ“) in Beaver instituted this action on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated individuals for alleged violations of their constitutional and civil rights. [Doc. 1]. On July 30, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the operative Third Amended Class Action Cоmplaint (“Complaint“) naming Ms. Dean-Chrivia for the first time. [Doc. 946]. Plaintiffs’ counsel alleges Plaintiff Eagle -- a former “pre-trial detainee and/or inmate” at SRJ, [Id. at 50 ¶ 431] -- has four claims against Ms. Dean-Chrivia. [Doc. 1041 at 4; see generally Doc. 1076]. Count I asserts an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs pursuant to
Ms. Dean-Chrivia now moves pursuant to
II.
The required “short and plain statement” must provide “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); McCleary-Evаns v. Md. Dep‘t of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015). Additionally, the showing of an “entitlement to relief” amounts to “more than labels and conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. It is now settled that “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.; McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585; Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 616 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 209 L. Ed. 2d 122, 141 S. Ct. 1376 (2021); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 2008).
The complaint need not “forecast evidence sufficient to prove the elements of [a] claim,” but it must “allege sufficient facts tо establish those elements.” Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Est. Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Stated another way, the operative pleading need only contain “[f]actual allegations . . . [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (noting the opening pleading “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.“). In sum, the complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Robertson, 679 F.3d at 288.
The decision in Iqbal provides some additional markers concerning the plausibility requirement:
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that thе defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant‘s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief. . . .‘”
Determining whether а complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]“—“that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citations omitted).
As noted in Iqbal, the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the
III.
The entirety of the factual allegations pled against Ms. Dean-Chrivia, with some inference on the Court‘s part, are as follows:
92. Defendant Donna Dean-Chrivia was . . . a medical provider employed or contracted by Wexford to provide medical services to pretrial detainees and inmates at SRJ. . . .
95. Defendants Rashid; Perkins; Eastridge; Nicholson; Duncan, Mullens, Bolen, Pennington, Smith, Leedy, Vallandingham, Marshall, Blair, Martin, White, Stroup, Dean-Chrivia, and Brooks were healthcare providers responsible for the provision of medical services to pretrial detainees as Southern Regional Jail which was constitutionally adequate and which met the applicable standard of care.
. . .
442. During her time as a Wexford patient Plaintiff [Eagle] was under the care of Defendant Rashid; Defendant Ashley Stroup, LPN; Defendant Donna Dean-Chrivia; Defendant Brandy Eastridge, LPN; Defendant Brittani Marshall, RN; Defendant Taylor Brooks.
443. Defendants Stroup; Dean-Chrivia; Eastridge; Marshall; Brooks; and Rashid failed to ensure that Plaintiff Eagle received timely and adequаte mental health care.
444. During her June 25, 2022, intake screening, Plaintiff Eagle indicated that she was under the care of a mental health provider and/or psychiatrist.
445. Plaintiff Eagle‘s intake was neither reviewed by an RN within twenty-four hours, as required by NCCHC standards, nor reviewed by an RN at all prior to her release on September 30, 2022.
446. Rather, Defendant Stroup, and [sic] LPN, reviewed Plaintiff‘s intake.
. . .
448. On intаke, Plaintiff Eagle was set for a mental health sick call on June 26, 2022.
449. Plaintiff‘s June 26, 2022, mental health appointment was rescheduled on August 11, 2022.
450. Plaintiff‘s record indicates that a mental health call was completed on August 18, 2023, but the “Mental Health Sick Call” portion of her record reflects that no such appointment was carried out.
451. Plaintiff‘s September 23, 2022, 90-day mental health follow up was deleted with the change note reflecting that she was released seven days later on September 30, 2022.
452. Plaintiff‘s mental health medications were not verified or administered during her 97-day incarceration.
453. As a direct and proximate result of Wexford Defendants’ actions and inactions, Plaintiff Eagle suffered emotional distress, mental anguish, and increased risk of harm.
[Doc. 946 at 16, 51-52 (footnote omitted)].
A. Count I – Eighth Amendment Violations
“The Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments.” Anderson v. Kingsley, 877 F.3d 539, 543 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting
The Complaint falls grievously short of alleging a рlausible deliberate indifference claim against Ms. Dean-Chrivia. Indeed, Plaintiffs fail at the first step: they are silent as to the subject medical condition, alleging only “Plaintiff Eagle indicated that she was under the care of a mental health provider and/or psychiatrist . . . .” [Doc. 946 at 51 ¶ 444; see also id. at 52 ¶ 448] (noting “Plaintiff Eagle was set for a mental health sick call . . . .“); [Id. ¶ 452] (noting Plaintiff Eagle took “mental health medications . . . .“); [Id. ¶ 453] (stating “Plaintiff Eagle suffered emotional distress, mental anguish, and increased risk of harm . . . .“). These are the prototypical, conclusory allegations condemned by Twombly and its progeny. One cannot divine any objectively serious medical condition.
Assuming the missing medical condition was sufficiently serious, there are no allegations Ms. Dean-Chriviа knew of Plaintiff Eagle‘s mysterious condition or the risks accompanying any treatment failures. One is further left to guess on such material points as (1) Ms. Dean-Chrivia‘s involvement with Plaintiff Eagle, (2) the capacity in which she interacted with Plaintiff Eagle, (3) how she bore responsibility for Plaintiff Eagle‘s treatment, or (4) her healthcare credentials, if any.
The remaining pleading deficiencies nеed not be addressed. The foregoing abundantly demonstrates the pleading, at least as to Ms. Dean-Chrivia, is unsalvageable. Merely listing Ms. Dean-Chrivia as one of six individuals responsible for ensuring Plaintiff Eagle “received timely and adequate mental health care,” is insufficient to give “fair notice” of the particular unconstitutional acts Ms. Dean-Chrivia allegedly committed. Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 125 (4th Cir. 2023). Cf. SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015), аs amended on reh‘g in part (Oct. 29, 2015) (“At trial, a § 1 plaintiff will be required to make a ‘factual showing that each defendant conspired in violation of the antitrust laws.’ Thus, the complaint must forecast that factual showing, and if it fails to allege particular facts against a particular defendant, then the defendant must be dismissed. In other words, the complaint must ‘specify how these dеfendants [were] involved in the alleged conspiracy,’ without relying on ‘indeterminate assertions’ against all ‘defendants.‘“) (cleaned up). Allegations must be sufficient to “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct” based upon “its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The only allegations against Ms. Dean-Chrivia are precisely “the type of ‘unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]’ and ‘legal conclusions’ that are insufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Accordingly, Count I is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Ms. Dean-Chrivia for failure to state a claim, and the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED to the same extent.
B. Count II – Fourteenth Amendment Violations
The Eighth Amendment “has no application” where there has “been no
Though Plaintiff Eagle‘s status as either a pretrial detainee or post-conviction inmate is easily and readily ascertainable, “Plaintiffs are allowed to plеad in the alternative.” Rosa v. PSA Airlines, Inc., 80 F.4th 488, 495 n. 4 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing Hayes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 60 F.4th 848, 855 (4th Cir. 2023)); see also
(1) they had a medical condition or injury that posed a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed to act to appropriately address the risk that the condition posed; (3) the defendant knew or should have known (a) that the detainee had that condition and (b) that the defendant‘s action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm; and (4) as a result, the detainee was harmed.
Short, 87 F.4th at 611. A pretrial detainee need not “show that the defendаnt had actual knowledge of the detainee‘s serious medical condition and consciously disregarded the risk that their action or failure to act would result in harm.” Id. Rather, “it is sufficient that the plaintiff show that . . . the defendant should have known of that condition and that risk, and acted accordingly.” Id.
Free from the constraints of the subjective showing required under the Eighth Amendment, the Comрlaint nonetheless fails to present a plausible Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Ms. Dean-Chrivia. Assuming, once again, Plaintiff Eagle had a medical condition that posed a substantial risk of serious harm, Plaintiffs omit any allegations that Ms. Dean-Chrivia should have known of Plaintiff Eagle‘s condition or the risks of failing to treat her. Plaintiffs also include no facts explaining how Plaintiff Eagle suffered harm attributable to Ms. Dean-Chrivia. Those omissions alone doom the Plaintiffs’ claim on Twombly/Iqbal grounds.
Accordingly, Count II is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Ms. Dean-Chrivia for failure to state a claim, and the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED to the same extent.
C. Count III – Conspiracy
To establish a civil conspiracy under
Accordingly, Count III is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Ms. Dean-Chrivia for failure to state a claim, and the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED to the same extent.
D. Count IV – Medical Negligence
In West Virginia, the MPLA governs all “medical professional liability” actions “resulting from the death or injury of a person for any tort or breach of contract based on health care1 services rendered, or which should hаve been rendered, by a health care provider or health
care facility to a patient.”
Assuming Ms. Dean-Chrivia is a “Wexford Defendant” as that phrase is usеd throughout the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege she “deviated from the standard of care by operating understaffed, operating with chronic and excessive overdue tasks and nurse sick calls, and failing to provide timely care which resulted in Plaintiff Sabrina Eagle‘s mental health care and medication being delayed during her entire 97-day incarceration.” [Doc. 946 at 72 ¶¶ 590]. These allegations unquestionably relate to the provision of “health care.” Because Count IV is grounded in medical negligence,
(1) The health care provider failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and learning required or expected of a reasonable, prudent health care provider in the profession or class to which the hеalth care provider belongs acting in the same or similar circumstances; and (2) such failure was a proximate cause of the injury or death.
Plaintiffs simply allege “Wexford Defendants” owed to them -- and breached -- a duty of care. [Doc. 946 at 69 ¶¶ 571, 574]. They neglect mention of the precise duty owed by Ms. Dean-Chrivia to Plaintiff Eagle, much less how she breached and proximately caused injury. More importantly, they neither identify the type of “medical provider” Ms. Dean-Chrivia was, nor mention the applicable standard of care. Thus, the Complaint is insufficient to give Ms. Dean-Chrivia fair notice of what the claims are and the grounds upon which they rest.
Accordingly, Count IV is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE with respect to Ms. Dean-Chrivia, and the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED to the same extent.
IV.
Based upon the foregoing discussion, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 1040] and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Counts I through IV with respect to Ms. Dean-Chrivia. Ms. Dean-Chrivia‘s Motion to Modify Scheduling Order and Stay Discovery [Doc. 1042] is DENIED AS MOOT.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this written opinion and order to all counsel of record and to any unrepresented party.
ENTER: October 15, 2024
Frank W. Volk
Chief United States District Judge
Notes
(1) Any act, service or treatment provided under, pursuant to or in the furtherance of a physician‘s plan of care, a health care facility‘s plan of care, medical diagnosis or treatment;
(2) Any act, service or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider or person supervised by or acting under the direction of a health care provider or licensed professional for, to or on behalf of a patient during the patient‘s medical care, treatment or confinement, including, but not limited to, staffing, medical transport, custodial care or basic care, infection control, positioning, hydration, nutrition and similar patient services; and
(3) The process employed by health care providers and health care facilities for the appointment, employment, contracting, credentialing, privileging and supervision of health care providers.