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SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc.
801 F.3d 412
4th Cir.
2015
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 showing of do not pretext a weak increasing does not prices real reason con- of a a reasonable inference support interde- real was reason whether show Granted, Therefore, we held that some spiracy. alle- conspiracy. or a pendence individually was insufficient this evidence accompanied by pretext gations more,” together, taken but “without evidence or traditional other provide not evidence does aforementioned a reasonable to create economic evidence summary “more” to survive necessary such conspiracy. Because of a inference short, all of this evidence is here, judgment. any evi- lacking is other evidence interdependence as with consistent with preclude is insufficient pretext dence such, not it does tend conspiracy, summary judgment. that the Choco- possibility to exclude the Summary as a lawfully. of the Evidence acted D. late Manufacturers

Whole exactly Although analysis does not our as a

Considering Court’s, evidence agree we mirror District whole, to create a failed the Plaintiffs the evi- the District Court’s conclusion: judg- the Chocolate summary reasonable inference calls for in this case dence likely more than not con Manufac- Manufacturers of the Chocolate ment favor chocolate to fix the U.S. spired prices turers. cases where to other Compared

market. summary should judgment

we decided y. Plaintiffs’ case granted, have been reasons, af- will foregoing For we Glass, Flat relatively weak. here Cf. judg- summary firm the District Court’s (reversing summary judg F.3d at ment. part on based ment the defendants re price increases

evidence about competitors

quired cooperation suspiciously price increases

coordinated meetings in time to and communica

close conspirators); Petruz involving the

tions

zi’s, (reversing at 1234-37 sum

mary judgment for defendants based LLC; LLC, SD3, Sawstop testimony a “code” about on witness Plaintiffs-Appellants, among compete not to defendants existing and about discussions of accounts meetings; fixing trade association

price (U.S.) INC.; Black BLACK & DECKER conspirator in which a taped conversations Chang Type Corporation; & Decker by the company “play told another Ltd.; Co., Delta Power Industrial rules”; showing and economic evidence Co., Equipment Corp.; Hitachi Koki explanation for the that the rational Ltd.; Ltd.; Hitachi Koki USA Makita conspiracy). data an unlawful price was U.S.A., Inc.; Corporation; Makita Corp.; Electric One foreign con- Milwaukee Tool Evidence of a disconnected Inc.; In Technologies, OWT possession of advance World spiracy, limited dustries, Inc.; GmbH; information, Robert Bosch opportunities mere pricing Ryo Corporation; Robert Tool conspire suspect meetings or con- Bosch without Inc.; Stanley Technologies, Black bi pricing, versations about conduct Inc.; Industries, Decker, conduct, Techtronic & pre-conspiracy consistent with *2 Co., Ltd.; Techtronic Industries North

America, Inc.; Group, Pentair Water

Inc.; Company; Emerson Electric

Pentair, Inc., Defendants-Appellees, Tools;

Dewalt Industrial Emerson Elec Company, Inc.;

tric Corpora Pentair

tion; Corporation; Porter-Cable Skil Tools,

Power Defendants. Institute;

American Antitrust National League,

Consumers Amici

Supporting Appellants.

No. 14-1746.

United Court of Appeals, States

Fourth Circuit.

Argued: May 2015.

Decided: Sept. 2015.

As Amended on Rehearing

in Part Oct. *5 Davidow, Joel

ARGUED: Cuneo Gilbert Laduca, LLP, D.C., & Washington, for Appellants. James Scott La- Ballenger, Watkins, LLP, D.C., & Washington, tham Appellees. for ON BRIEF: Jonathan W. Cuneo, Miller, Matthew E. Cuneo Gilbert Laduca, LLP, D.C., Washington, & Appellants. Harkrider, John D. Richard Axinn, B. Dagen, Veltrop & Harkrider LLP, D.C., Washington, Bernard DiMu- J. ro, PC, Alexandria, Dimuro Ginsberg Vir- ginia, Appellees Stanley Black Deck- & er, (U.S.) Incorporated, Black & Decker Incorporated, and Black & Corpo- Decker *6 ration; Yates, Christopher Christopher S. Chiu, B. Campbell, Aaron T. Latham & LLP, Francisco, California, Watkins San for Appellee Company; Emerson Electric Devinsky, Meisner, Paul Stefan M. LLP, Emery McDermott Will & Washing- ton, D.C., for Appellees Hitachi Koki USA Co., Ltd.; Ltd. Hitachi Koki and Lee H. Simowitz, Elizabeth A. Scully, Katherine McKnight, LLP, L. Baker Hostetler & D.C., Washington, Appellees for Makita Incorporated Corpora- USA and Makita tion; Foster, D.C., Washington, David M. Kruse, Layne Turner, E. Eliot Fielding LLP, Houston, Fulbright & Jaworski Tex- as, Appellees for Robert Bosch Cor- Tool poration GMBH; and Robert Bosch James Kress, L.L.P., G. Baker Washington, Botts D.C., Hansen, Bogart, W. Scott Steven P. Law, James N. Reinhart Boerner Van Milwaukee,' Wisconsin, any manipu- allege S.C., plausibly to. Deuren standards, safety affirm the late so we Corpo- Electric Tool Milwaukee Appellees court’s decision to dismiss SawS- district Incorpo- ration, Technologies, One World concerning standard-setting. top’s claims Industries, Ryo- rated, Incorporated, OWT Likewise, allege complaint any fails Incorporated, Techtronics Technologies, bi corporate par- against facts at all several Ltd., Co., and Indus- Techtronic Industries affiliates, so we affirm the district ents America, Seth Incorporated. tries North all claims decision to dismiss court’s Golden, Greenstein, D. Constan- David D. against those defendants. D.C., LLP, Washington, tine Cannon Amici Curiae. defendants, remaining But as suggest alleged enough to has WILKINSON, AGEE, Before in a engage group plausible agreement WYNN, Judges. Circuit may Although that claim boycott. trial, or even prove ultimately successful judgment, summary survive enough offers to survive the defendants’ well-pleaded com- motion to dismiss. “[A] may even if it strikes a plaint proceed savvy judge proof actual of those facts recovery improbable, very and that Corp. unlikely.”1 Bell Atl. remote and AGEE, Judge: Circuit 544, 556, Twombly, 550 U.S. S.Ct. SD3, SawStop, subsidiary, (2007). Thus, LLC and 167 L.Ed.2d we (together, “SawStop”), contend that LLC court’s vacate district decision dismiss- manufacturers claim major ing SawStop’s group-boycott several table-saw re- .and boycott SawStop’s safety proceedings. mand for further conspired to safety- technology corrupt a private Background I. all the aim standard-setting process, technology keeping that off the market. Relevant Facts A. nearly two Consequently, sued This concerns a decision appeal en dozen saw manufacturers and affiliated dismiss, motion to so we draw the relevant tities, § they 1 of the alleging violated allegations in SawStop’s facts Act, § 1. Sherman Antitrust U.S.C. incorporated complaint and from sources SawStop’s amend district court dismissed reviewing “In complaint. into *7 on, among based other ed complaint, of a we must assume dismissal SawStop that had failed to things, belief well-pled to be true and draw all all facts establishing agree facts an unlawful plead plain- in favor of the reasonable inferences SDS, Decker ment. See LLC v. Black & Futrell, Cooksey tiff.” (U.S.), Inc., 11:14-cv-191, 2014 WL No. (4th Cir.2013). Keeping that standard in (E.D.Va. 15, 2014). July SawStop mind, we now consider the relevant facts. appealed. 1. agree court

We with the district founder, 1990s, Dr. parts SawStop’s go SawStop’s cannot In the several case Gass, Stephen created a form “active SawStop’s complaint forward. does not opinion, any throughout unless otherwise quotation and this 1. We have omitted internal marks, alterations, emphasis, citations here noted. (“AIMT”) dents, injury mitigation technology” produced positive which results. ¶¶ 70, finger meant some' hand and J.A. 87-88' 74. prevent terms, In injuries table basic saws. Still, table-saw manufacturers also held technology Gass’ “detects contact between reservations, one of which product was person stops and then and and blade liability If exposure. some manufacturers mitigate injury.” the blade retracts adopted not, AIMT while others did then ¶ system J.A. 83 60. When this works as an issue could arise as to whether the non- should, user table-saw who makes adopters might producing be sued for will contact with the blade suffer ¶81. inherently unsafe product. J.A. 90 injury. small nick rather than more serious lawyer But a for one defendant noted the AIMT technology might be deemed sought Gass his initially and co-inventors infeasible, and therefore less relevant capitalize on their invention pursuing suits, product-liability if it did not enter licensing agreements major with the table- the market for period. some J.A. 8788 saw began manufacturers. The effort ¶ 72. August SawStop when took a first “prototype table saw” to a show trade Putting product liability, aside saw some publicly technology. demonstrate the J.A. concerns, manufacturers held other includ- ¶ spurred 66. That demonstration ing that engineering and cost factors could meetings some table-saw manufactur- technology By render the infeasible. all ers, including S-B Power Corp.; Tool accounts, not yet had tested its (U.S.), Inc.; Black & Decker Emerson technology marketplace. in the That test- Company; Ryobi Electric time, Technolo- ing would take some ¶ gies, During Inc. 86 67. J.A. these meet- itself estimated the device not could ings, SawStop sought royalties “typical fully implemented have been on all table ¶ commercial rates” of about “8% of whole- until late saws as 2008. J.A. 90. sale prices” any license agreement. industry least one At insider also believed ¶ J.A. 86 65. AIMT SawStop’s could induce con- dispense safety sumers to with other fea- The technology “impressed” manu- ¶ Furthermore, 87 71. tures. J.A. AIMT ¶ facturers. J.A. for in- Ryobi, 87 68. prevent certain other did common ta- stance, formed a team determine injuries, ble-saw like kickback. Id. incorporate SawStop’s whether it could SawStop’s licensing discussions did not technology products; Ryobi’s into its coun- produce any sel immediate results. man- adopt technology wanted to One “as ¶ ufacturer, Tool, fast S-B Power ended licens- they J.A. 87 S-B [could].” 69. ing in September discussions 2001. J.A. expressed Power Tool likewise interest ¶ ¶ 75. “going forward.” J.A. 88 73. One Black

& employee Decker U.S. told that he Gass licensing felt a agreement was “inevit- ' able,” though even Black & Decker was October table-saw manufactur- being guys.” “used to able to crush met allegedly little ers how to “decide[d] *8 ¶ J.A. respond, 88 76. Emerson’s to then-president industry, SawStop ¶ in-person also meetings SawStop [technology.” meeting held with J.A. 80. to a potential conjunction discuss deal. 88-89 in with J.A. occurred the annual (cid:127) ¶ Institute, 77. Several manufacturers Tool meeting conducted' of the Power a SawStop’s technical studies to evaluate ef- annu- trade association. Like broader in preventing rep- fectiveness acci- meeting, table-saw al the table-saw session drew communications, SawStop’s to industry, sponding in- across the from resentatives Tool; Ryobi; explained Makita its failure to commu- Power and never cluding S-B Emerson; Corp.; USA, Porter-Cable Inc.; Similarly, Emerson nicate further. Id Ltd.; Black & Decker Koki USA Hitachi “offering pre- negotiations, ended abruptly Corp. Tool U.S.; Electric and Milwaukee its lack of interest.” textual reasons for ¶89 79. J.A. ¶88. & U.S. Black Decker J.A. 92 And and made “disingenuous a not 2001 offered alleges that the October SawStop group boycott royalty, paired 1% meeting good birth to faith” offer: a gave first manufacturers SawStop. The indemnification against provision with an take an “all” or to purportedly determined liability SawStop for placed have all “nothing” in which table-saw approach, ¶ risks.” 92 89. “various J.A. SawStop’s adopt

manufacturers would J.A. 89-90 none would.

technology or 3. ¶ Then, took latter they allegedly 80. purchase tech- “agree[d] not to path: they any Having sign failed to manufacturer [SawStop] from or other- nology licenses turned licensing agreement, SawStop to a ¶ J.A. 90 80. AIMT.” implement wise organi- safety-standard-setting to private contrary views articulated.” [were] “[N]o Laboratories, zation, Inc. Underwriters market, of the By SawStop out keeping Id. In (“UL”), AIMT product. to advance the that “it would hoped the manufacturers proposal December Gass submitted plausible for [them] ... at least remain organization suggesting to UL contend, defending liability law- product widely accepted safety stan- modify its suits, AIMT was not viable.” J.A. on all table saws. require dards to AIMT ¶ 81. ¶ in turn 104. referred J.A. 96 UL contends, Ultimately, SawStop Panel 745 to Standards Technical proposal succeeded.- Defen- group boycott “[T]hose (“STP 745”), a that sets subgroup UL negotiations with yet license dants not ¶ 104. for saws. J.A. 96 standards table li- requesting SawStop refrained SawStop’s modify the UL proposal cense, who al- Defendants were [while] failed, SawStop alleges standards ways found to abort ready negotiations conspiracy, failure traces to a second arose.” opportunities them J.A. “standard-rejection term the which we will ¶ 85. view, SawStop’s In STP conspiracy.” complaint, to the took According “under the firm control of the Defen- was months the few defendants a matter of dants,” comprised as its “either members negotiating with who had been pur- or ... employees the Defendants ways find to end those discussions. consultants ... who portedly unaffiliated instance, January Ryobi had Defendants.” J.A. 97 aligned agree- agreed licensing to a non-exclusive ¶ Thus, allegedly 106. the defendants royalty initial a 5% ment with an 3% to vote as a bloc” “thwart” “agreed ¶87. 91-92 to 8% escalator clause. J.A. ¶ vote, J.A. 105. After the proposal. however, identified “minor am- SawStop, “promul- are said the defendants Ryobi biguity” agreement in the and asked falsehoods, ¶ gated factual distortions “error.” Al- to correct the J.A. that STP product defamation” ensure assured though Ryobi’s counsel incorpo- any standard adopt 745 would happen, Ryobi that would instead ended ¶ 123. entirely; re- AIMT. J.A. 101 negotiations Ryobi stopped rating *9 4. SawStop further believes that the manu- trying facturers are to extend the con- Later, alleged the defendants are abroad, trived-standards additionally conspired develop they “control” International Electro-' standards, safety purportedly their own Commission, European technical coun- impose unnecessary SawStop costs on and ¶ terpart to UL. J.A. 122. any adoption foreclose wide of AIMT. SawStop says imple- that the defendants 5. conspiracy multiple mented in stages. this SawStop maintains that all of the al- First, in October several defen- leged conspiracies have through continued Hitachi; Corp.; dants —Black & Decker today, and the defendants purportedly Pentair, Inc.; Corp.; Robert Bosch Tool weekly communicate “to maintain” the GmbH; Ryobi; Robert Bosch One World ¶ conspiracies. J.A. 121. Nonethe- Inc.; Technologies and Techtronics Indus- less, SawStop eventually was able to enter Co., joint tries Ltd.—formed a venture to by making the market its own table saws develop technology. blade avoidance J.A. ¶ employing ¶ AIMT 2004. J.A. 101. SawStop 109. maintains this SawStop When filed its it complaint, sold venture was a mere “smokescreen” to types three of these J.A. saws. 95-96 “fend off” intervention the Consumer ¶ company represented The at oral Commission, Safety Products a federal argument it now makes additional safety agency, and an constituted “act of models. fraudulent The concealment.” Id. venture Later, produce any

failed to results. Proceedings B. Below November four defendants —Black & USA, Corp., Decker Makita Robert Bosch Based on three purported conspira- cies, Corp., Tool and Techtronic SawStop Industries filed a complaint Febru- joint ary North America—formed ven- another 2014 in U.S. District Court for the ¶ venture, too, ture. J.A. 98 111. This Virginia. Eastern original District The alleged develop was fake effort “to complaint against be three-count 22 separate guard pre- a uniform blade standard to defendants the manufacturer- quality competition guard defendants, clude on conspiring blade with UL and the Institute, § standards.” Id. Members of the Power Power Tool 1 of violated began Tool Institute also on a work new Act. After the Sherman defendants moved guard dismiss, however, design blade around the same time. filed a first plead- amended complaint operative —the conspiracy, This third which we will call ing appeal dropping some defendants — conspiracy,” “contrived-standards led adding three new counts under state two changes by adopted standards UL convenience, law. For we to the refer first in 2005 change and 2007. first added amended “the com- complaint simply certain anti-kickback devices. The second plaint.” “specified guard that the blade should not hood, but rather a design SawStop’s modular The district court dismissed top-barrier with a element two side- under Federal Rule Civil ¶ 12(b)(6) guarding identifying barrier elements.” J.A. 99 115. Procedure after change problems maintains that this number of that it perceived second ineffective; First, too designed-focused alleged. the facts “Plaintiffs’ con- change allegations deduces that therefore their spiracy [were] belied illegitimate purpose. history negotiating varying serve Defen- *10 422 v. 3500674, [SawStop].” .States Tri SDS, LLC, able to United 2014 WL

dants.” 628, Inc., 632 1 775 F.3d n. view, ple Canopy, SawStop court’s In the district *3. however, (4th Cir.2015). not, We do “ac a to deal allege refusal plausibly not could couched as a cept legal conclusion as true actually had of- several defendants when v. Ocwen Loan allegation.” factual Anand deal, alleged the facts did fered to (4th LLC, 195, 198 754 F.3d Servicing, explana- lawful to exclude” “tend[] not Cir.2014). accept do we “unwarrant Second, Nor failed SawStop Id. *4. tions. conclusions, inferences, unreasonable ed as to several defen- allege anything to rel. Oberg ex arguments.” United States lump them to- dants, choosing instead Agency, Higher Educ. Assistance v. Pa. explana- without complaint in the gether (4th Cir.2014). 131, We can 745 136 F.3d Third, SawStop allege did not tion. Id. any “naked assertions put further aside by refer- agreement evidence” “direct enhancement.” of further factual Ryobi devoid engineer, from a ring testimony Id. court found that Peot. The district David full read in its testimony, when

Peot’s Parents Allegations Against III. context, only that certain defen- indicated and Affiliates develop joint venture to launched dants prevent table-saw accidents. technology begin by addressing problem com- We Fourth, SawStop had estab- not Id. at *5. complaint. mon to all counts any alleged any harm from lished § in a 1 case cannot plaintiff A “purported moti- conspiracies because collection of defendants assemble some conspiracy is non- alleged for the vation vague, non-specific allega make and then fifth, SawStop’s stan- Id. And existent.” group. tions all of as a At against them alleged nothing dard-setting conspiracies trial, required plaintiff §a 1 will be in trade ordinary participation than more showing a “factual that each defen make standard-setting organizations, groups, conspired dant violation of antitrust ventures, does not create joint which AD/SAT, Skylight, Div. Inc. v. laws.” at *6. liability. Id. (2d Press, 216, 181 234 Associated F.3d SawStop timely appealed, challenging Cir.1999); Foley, United States 598 cf. three court’s decision to its the district (4th Cir.1979) (examining F.2d Act claims. does Sherman charge jury in a criminal anti whether the district court’s decision to dis- address “require[d] involve trust case a sufficient remaining state claims. its three law miss defendant”). Thus, the com ment each claims, SawStop has forfeited As to those plaint showing, must forecast that factual review, and we not consider them. See do to allege particular and if it fails facts LLC, XVI, Acquisition v. Palisades Powell defendant, against then the particular Cir.2014). (4th F.3d We must be other defendant dismissed. § jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. words, “specify how involved these defendants [were] II. of Review Standard relying on “in conspiracy,” without all against of determinate assertions” “defen grant review the district court’s ‘We Agent de In re Travel Comm’nAnti motion dismiss dants.” defendants’ (6th Towers, LLC, Litig., 781 trust 583 F.3d Cir. novo.” Johnson v. Am. (4th Cir.2015). 2009); Planning accept see also Total “[W]e F.3d Benefits Cross & complaint Agency, in the Inc. v. Anthem Blue Blue well-pled as true all facts (6th Cir.2008); Shield, favor 552 F.3d light and construe them in the most Litig., to tie Elevator Antitrust tries other In re defendants *11 (2d Cir.2007). purported conspiracies the nothing 50-51 conclusory statements, more than even Nevertheless, SawStop to means though those defendants entered the table- corporate par some bring against claims industry saw well after conspiracies these Ltd.; Co., Hitachi Koki including ents— Decker, allegedly began. Stanley & Black Chang Type Indus Corporation; Makita Inc., instance, is purportedly liable be- Co., Ltd.; Industries trial and Teehtronic “persons cause speaking company] for [the Co., though allega no factual Ltd.—even understanding have affirmed its of the Instead, against tions are made them. of purpose conspiracies], and agreed [the of SawStop nakedly alleges only that all ¶ participate to 99 117. [them].” J.A. corporate are “dominated subsidiaries SawStop alleges the same to Delta Pow- of,” ego[s] these by, corpo alter [are] ¶ er Equipment, Inc. J.A. 99 116. “[U]na- parents. allegation rate J.A. 73-78. That conclusory allegations” dorned like these conclusion, only legal a offers Vitol, to at allegations akin no all. of alleged suggesting no the kind has facts Co., Shipping S.A. v. Primerose 708 F.3d usually require that we unity of interests (4th Cir.2013). 527, 543 plead to to party permitting before them reasons, SawStop For these pro- cannot See, ego theory. an e.g., advance alter against ceed all the defendants. In Trust, P’ship, Flight C.F. Inc. v. First Ltd. Co., Ltd.; particular, Hitachi Koki Makita (4th Cir.2002). “The 306 F.3d 134 Co., Corporation; Chang Type Industrial may separate legal fact that two entities Ltd.; Industries, Inc.; OWT Pentair Wa- corporate have a affiliation does not alter Inc.; Decker, Group, Stanley ter Black & requirement” separately pleading [the] Inc.; and Equipment, Delta Power Inc. pleading require each identify .defendant’s must be dismissed as to all counts. The separately identify ment each defen group-boycott against claims Teehtronic Litig., dant’s Antitrust No. 13-md-2481 America, Industries North Inc. and Teeh- (S.D.N.Y. (KBF), *2 WL Co., tronic Industries Ltd. must also be 23, 2015). Mar. correctly dismissed. The district court any allege also fails to because, dismissed these defendants certain pertaining corporate facts them, “complaint least as to was vague, discussing case, subsidiaries. explained never and lumped boycott, group example, SawStop never together without sufficient detail.” [them] City Chicago, mentions Teehtronic Bates v. 726 F.3d Industries North (7th Cir.2013). America, Inc.; Industries, Inc.; or OWT Group, Pentair Water Inc. OWT Indus- We now consider whether has tries, Inc. Group and Pentair Water also an properly alleged conspiracy antitrust go SawStop’s allegations unmentioned in remaining against manufacturers. safety A as to the UL standards. defen- § Pleading Conspiracy IV. obviously may pursue

dant not antitrust against claim a defendant who is not al- Section of Sherman Antitrust leged have done at all. Anti- anything contract, “[e]very prohibits Act combina recognize guilt by trust law doesn’t mere ..., tion or in restraint of association, imputing corporate liability to § 1§ 1. “To trade.” U.S.C. establish unlucky violation, any company enough affiliate a plaintiff prove (1) bystander contract, combination, company’s be a to its conspiracy; sister (2) imposed restraint alleged misdeeds. an unreasonable . ade- facts point supply fied does [also] Bd Dental N.C. State of trade.” (4th illegality.” Id. FTC, quate show Exam’rs Cir.2013). bottom, Twombly long- applies At plead principle in antitrust law to held principally concerns appeal This conduct, alone, standing stage: parallel ing element, conspiracy. “[Sec first required agreement not establish does against restraint prohibition one’s tion lawful consistent with equally because action, to concerted applies only trade Twombly plaintiffs asked conduct. The *12 relationship of a requires evidence which reject that idea and assume a the Court to per legally at two distinct least between “exclusively” action that Robertson v. Sea Pines or entities.” sons in coincidentally to be too similar seemed (4th 278, Cos., F.3d 284 Estate 679 Real 11, 565 n. 127 S.Ct. dependent. Id. at Cir.2012). actionable, the defen To be refused, good 1955. Court a “con made specifically must have dants interdepen conduct reason. “Parallel or ato common scheme commitment scious dence,” all, “just much in after as line objective.” to an designed achieve unlawful competi a wide of rational and swath Corp., Spray-Rite v. Serv. Monsanto Co. unilaterally strategy prompt tive business 1464, 752, 764, 79 104 465 S.Ct. U.S. market.” by perceptions ed common of the (1984). Not L.Ed.2d 775 even “conscious 554, Thus, com at 127 1955. Id. S.Ct. enough, Grp., Brooke Ltd. parallelism” is Twombly failed it rested plaint because Corp., Tobacco v. Brown & Williamson parallel of “descriptions conduct” 227, 2578, 209, 113 S.Ct. 125 509 U.S. just explained by could as easily that be (1993), action “independent 168 as L.Ed.2d “natural, unilateral from each reaction[s]” 1,” Vermiculite, §by Va. proscribed not 564, 566, 1955; defendant. Id. at 127 S.Ct. Inc., Springs, v. 307 Ltd. Historic Green Robertson, 679 at see also F.3d 289 Cir.2002). (4th 277, F.3d 280 (“Twombly required evidence to contextual speculative claim about the substantiate a plaintiff a Accordingly, bringing of conspiracy.”). existence and substance a plead agreement § 1 claim must first an a Corp. survive, then, § In Bell v. For 1 claim to to restrain trade. Atlantic conduct, 544, 556, parallel 127 plaintiff plead U.S. S.Ct. must Twombly, 550 (2007), 1955, Supreme something Twombly, “more.” 550 U.S. at 167 L.Ed.2d 929 557, 127 “more” explained plaintiff that such a must 1955. That must Court S.Ct. (taken point circumstance[s] factual matter consist “further plead “enough true) agree meeting of requisite] ing to that toward a the minds.” Id. suggest [the words, suffice, instance, Allegations ment was made.” other could plaintiff fact that complaint “enough must contain where demonstrates probably discov “would not re expectation parallel raise a that behavior reasonable coincidence, chance, illegal agree independent sult from ery will reveal evidence reason, stimuli, “allegations responses common or mere in ment.” Id. For this un part terdependence the defen unaided an advance parallel conduct [on parties.” derstanding among ... in context Id. at placed must be dants] 4, preceding agree of a 556 n. 127 S.Ct. 1955. Often “character suggestion raises ” factors,’ ment, parallel ‘parallel merely plus’ ‘plus conduct ized Evergreen Partnering Grp., v. just independent be action.” Inc. Pactiv could as well (1st Cir.2013), 33, conclusory Corp., Id. at 127 S.Ct. F.3d these “[A] holistically, unidenti- see allegation agreement some facts be evaluated v. complaint. Cont’l Union Carbide & Carbon the facts of Ore Co. Houck v. Sub 690, 699, Inc., Servs., Corp., 370 U.S. 82 S.Ct. 8 stitute Tr. 791 F.3d (1962) (4th Cir.2015). (cautioning courts not L.Ed.2d Posh-Twombly appellate “compartmentaliz[e] the various factual courts been have often called upon cor case). components” of rect mistakenly district courts that en gaged premature this sort of weighing take approach We do not See, exercise in e.g., antitrust cases. Ever dissent which pursues, parse seems 50; green Partnering Grp., 720 F.3d individually each factor” “plus ask Salt, Inc., Erie v. Cnty., Ohio Morton factor, alone, whether that standing (6th Cir.2012); F.3d 868-69 Anderson to provide be sufficient “more.” Cf. News, Media, Inc., L.L.C. v. Am. Tellabs, Rights, Inc. Makor Issues & (2d 162, 189 Cir.2012). Ltd., 308, 310, 551 U.S. 127 S.Ct. (2007) L.Ed.2d 179 (explaining “courts Similarly, courts must care must consider the in its entire ful not import the summary-judgment ty” to determine whether “all of the facts *13 standard into the stage. motion-to-dismiss alleged, collectively,” give taken rise to summary judgment case, At § in a 1 a inferences, asking relevant rather than plaintiff must summon tending “evidence any allegation, “whether individual scruti possibility independent to exclude the standard”). isolation, nized in meets that Twombly, 554, action.” 550 at U.S. 127 might Actions that seem otherwise neutral 1955; Monsanto, S.Ct. see also at 465 U.S. in isolation can take on a different shape 764, 1464; 104 S.Ct. Elec. In Matsushita in conjunction when considered with other dus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 475 Corp., U.S. surrounding circumstances. See William 574, 588, 1348, 106 S.Ct. 89 L.Ed.2d 538 al., Kovaeic, E. Agree et Plus Factors and (1986). But stage the motion-to-dismiss Law, ment in Antitrust 110 Mich. L.Rev. an question,” concerns “antecedent Twom (2011) 393, (explaining why plus 426-34 bly, 554, 1955, 550 at 127 U.S. S.Ct. analyzed factors be groups ‘plausibly suggesting’ for “[t]he threshold “constellations”). conspiracy complaint considerably remains Twombly’s Importantly, possibil re less than the to rule ‘tends out the quirement to “more” plead something ity’ than standard summary judgment,” for parallel Entm’t, proba conduct does not impose Sony Starr v. BMG Music 592 (2d Cir.2010). bility 314, Thus, at standard the motion-to-dismiss F.3d 325 “[a]l- stage. 662, Iqbal, though See v. 556 U.S. Twombly’s articulation of the Ashcroft 678, 1937, 129 pleading § S.Ct. 173 L.Ed.2d for 1 868 standard cases draws (2009). careful, then, must be summary judgment Courts jurisprudence, 12(b)(6) subject complaint’s allegations to to applicable standards to Rule “preponderance familiar the evi and Rule 56 motions remain distinct.” In dence” Messaging standard. Text Brokerage Litig., Anti re Ins. Antitrust (7th (3d 622, Cir.2010). Litig., 300, trust Cir. F.3d n. “[T]here 323 21 2010). a court ... probability authority extending When confuses is no for begins it plausibility, inevitably weigh standard [Monsanto/Matsushita] ing competing that can pleading stage.” Cnty., inferences be Erie F.3d at complaint. Indeed, drawn from the But it is not such an extension would our stage wholly unrealistic, may task at the motion-to-dismiss as “a plaintiff determine disposal “whether lawful alternative have so much at at information his Robertson, explanation likely” appear[s] more from the outset.” at 291. F.3d twice cited judgment. The district court instance, SawStop three Here, was defining the “tends case had not Matsushita —the into its case and conducted months summary judg- moved to exclude” standard for discovery when the defendants any SD3, ruling. See hardly it to ment —as a basis expect can dismiss. We LLC, *3, *4. It at then early 2014 WL case so on. its entire have built claims mistakenly certain be- dismissed whether the dis- therefore consider We facts did not “tend[ ] cause the this properly applied plausibili- trict court Id. at It independent action. *4. exclude” standard. ty-focused findings including a explicit made of fact— “nonexistent”— that motive was finding Boycott Group V. by plainly were contradicted initially alleges group complaint. See J.A. 89-90 terms of constitutes boycott, generally which ¶¶ motive). The (alleging district 80-81 deal traders refusal[ ] “concerted required SawStop to court further defini- Klor’s, Inc. Broad traders.” other with SD3, LLC, agreement,” tively “show Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. way-Hale *3, rather than ask- 2014 WL (1959). Most 3 L.Ed.2d 79 S.Ct. ing allegations “plausibly sug- whether often, involve “horizontal group boycotts gested]” Twombly, an agreement, such among competitors” direct agreements 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955. And U.S. injuring a rival. NYNEX the aim summary judgment looked erroneously Inc., 128, 135, Discon, 525 U.S. Corp. v. standards. cases to define relevant (1998). 493, 142 L.Ed.2d 510 119 S.Ct. LLC, See, SD3, 3500674, at e.g., 2014 WL concerted refusal oc This sort of “naked *14 Energy & (citing *3 Gtr. Tech. Rockford engaged are not the defendants curs when Co., 391, Corp. v. Oil 998 F.2d 396 Shell integration production any significant (7th Cir.1993)). distribution, rationale for or restraint is the elimination addition Second, a applied the district court stan- lower-cost, in al, more higher-quality, than probability plau- dard much closer Phillip output from the market.” novative instance, sibility. For the district court’s Hovenkamp, Areeda & Herbert Funda E. opinion adopts defendants’ characteriza- (4th § Law 22.02a mentals Antitrust licensing and then negotiations tions of the agreements ... supp.). “[S]uch ed.2014 unsurprisingly draws adverse inferences thereby the freedom of traders and cripple against SawStop them. based on The dis- ability their to sell accordance restrain noted, trict that example, court Emer- with, judgment.” their own Kiefer-Stewart pre-conspiracy a son had made offer Sons, E. Joseph Seagram & 340 U.S. Co. license, SawStop but believed that had (1951). 259, 211, 213, L.Ed. 71 S.Ct. 95 219 allegation Emerson made “no that rescind- LLC, SD3, ed that offer.” WL A. 3500674, *4. al- SawStop specifically had SawStop The district court held leged “Emerson cut contrary to the agreement adequately alleged negotiations SawStop, off with all license However, reaching that con- boycott. for its lack of offering pretextual reasons clusion, court committed the district interest, and did not renew them.” J.A. 92 we earlier cautioned two errors ¶ way, it In much the same concluded against. license “disingenuous” offer to First, it the motion-to-dismiss Black & Decker USA was inconsistent confused LLC, SD3, summary conspiracy, with with WL standard the standard Cir.2014) *4, why an explaining without (considering whether the defen “uniform”). pled was dants’ were SawStop offer that intended actions rejected unavoidably inconsistent with was SawStop adequately alleged par whole, On these refusal to license. allel conduct. The similar or uniform ac inferences seem to have been colored tions are obvious: none of the the district court’s belief that was ultimately defendants took license or commercial technology “a uncertain implemented SawStop’s otherwise tech viability Id. at safety.” *5. result, nology. As a SawStop could not pursue its initial strategy business short, en imposed the district court tering the market through license heightened pleading requirement —but agreement major with a table-saw manu such a apply standard does not on a Rule facturer. Such classically actions are 12(b)(6) motion, even an antitrust case. anticompetitive, “parallel action that Sports, See Marucci L.L.C. v. Colle Nat'l new excludes entrants both facilitates (4th Ass’n, giate Ath. 751 F.3d price elevation and can slow innovation.” Cir.2014); Penn Health Allegheny W. Wu, Hemphill C. Scott & Tim Price Ex UPMC, (3d Sys., Inc. v. clusion, (2013). 122 Yale L.J. Cir.2010). heightened pleading This stan Instead, dard was error. court district incorrectly manufacturers insist should have whether has asked that their conduct must be deemed dissim alleged parallel something action and ilar at stage this licensing because some agreement, “more” that indicates negotiations continued after the conspiracy Twombly provides. formed. The district agreed. court See SD3, LLC, (“The WL at *4 Our de novo standard of review means sequence all of these events undermines that we can decide the matter without the Plaintiffs’ group boycott allegations.”). Thus, deference lower to the court. we So does the dissent. may apply appropriate, Twombly- argument But that misunderstands the based standard ourselves rather than re- alleged boycott, again nature of the while manding to the district court for another *15 confusing “probability” “plausibility.” with See, attempt Houck, of e.g., its own. 791 The manufacturers could have achieved 484-86; F.3d at Triple Canopy, 775 F.3d objective alleged their of keeping SawStop Further, at enjoy 637-40. we the benefit off any ways: the market of number briefs, parties’ of the and can read and they any licensing could refuse discussions complaint way understand the in the same all, at could they engage in licens- spurious Thus, could the court. pro- district we ¶ discussions, see, 94, ing e.g., 93 they J.A. ceed to consider whether SawStop has ad- a sign agreement could license and then equately alleged boycott. a group it, implement they never could scare commercially SawStop off with unreason- B. All able of these offers. actions could be plaintiff A parallel establishes con boycott’s consistent with the ultimate al- duct pleads when it facts indicating leged objective, that exclusion from the market- “similarly.” defendants acted place. Evergreen Partnering Petruz Grp., See Supermarkets, Darling- zi’s IGA Inc. v. 51 (faulting 720 F.3d at district court Co., (3d 1224, Delaware F.2d “improperly 998 1243 for weighting] [the] defen- Cir.1993); Hyland see also v. allegedly] responses”); HomeSer dants’ inconsistent Am., (6th Inc., News, vices 771 F.3d 320 (holding Anderson 680 F.3d at 191 against presumption never embraced a during “varied” actions that defendants’ Much of agreements. business stages alleged initial conspira- premised agreements. on such the existence of law did not render position importantly, More we in no cy implausible). stage make “estimates” of the sort this alleged that the manu- SawStop never hardly It dissent should need posits. manner of agreed on common facturers we again proceed to be said “on entry into the mar- SawStop’s preventing allegations that all the assumption Commercially surprising. That’s not ket. (even if are true doubtful in like the defendants sophisticated parties fact).” Twombly, U.S. flags the red could well understand 12(b)(6) not coun- S.Ct. 1955. “Rule does blanket, from a total re- be raised judge’s tenance dismissals based on dis- See, negotiate. Am. Tobacco e.g., fusal allegations.” of a factual complaint’s belief States, 781, 800-01, v. 328 U.S. Co. United Am., Hazel, LLC v. Colon Health Ctrs. of (1946) (detail- 1125, L.Ed. 1575 66 S.Ct. (4th Cir.2013). 733 F.3d price-fixing conspiracy in which the ing differing variety used a defendants rely on We must be careful not to our the same ultimate ob- methods achieve here, subjective as even the own disbelief jective, price and settled understood and the dis- acts the manufacturers tobacco). might have become say might are dissimilar also be read sent of the fled the suspicious if all defendants suggest Ryobi and deception. Emer- any pretex- negotiations en masse without son, example, suddenly negotia- ended em- tual cover. But if the defendants explanation tions without sufficient after action, then different courses of ployed way all the to a draft license proceeding ¶¶ avoid detec- conspiracy might their better agreement. See J.A. 92 87-88. alleges they exactly tion. did abrupt unexplained This sort shift ¶ (“Defendants that. See 94 96 fraud- J.A. suggest that a defendant’s behavior can ulently Boycott by, the AIMT concealed entirely independent, acts were not giving excus- among things, separate other came shift after the October 2001 licensef.]”); for not J.A. 95 taking See, es agreement boycott. e.g., to launch ¶ inquiries were (“[SawStop]’s met Us, FTC, “R” Toys Inc. silence, false denials ... and mislead- (7th Cir.2000) that the (explaining de-

ing explanations!)]”). stop “decision to fendants’ sudden deal- ing,” “abrupt which was an shift dissent, however, unwilling provided more to infer a past,” reason allegation' to credit factual SawStop’s agreement). part, horizontal For its Black paths negotiations the different were purportedly & Decker tendered USA *16 conspirato themselves of the claimed part “not “disingenuous” offer that was made that, in crediting rial ruse. It contends ¶92 good Assuming in faith.” J.A. 89. SawStop’s allegation, we “underestimate[ ] (as is accurate that characterization we difficulty competi of getting group the must), would benign purposes few agree tors to on a course of action that by served an offer. such separate negotiations may may contract or more, require not have in best com But the dissent would shown to be their stage of Dissenting op. early proceedings; mercial at even at this the interest.” 450. only when thing “parallel But the could be said about it would find conduct” same any lockstep, com move relative alleged agreement most between defendants anticompetitive yet achieving law their common peting businesses—and the has (exclusion) only by substantially way iden- to perfect ends close tandem: some defen tell, tical far as we can this means. So dants not act to implement did the com support any existing standard finds no mission-fixing agreement until months af authority. formed, ter it while at least one defendant implemented commissions the new before decisions that dis The three at formed. Id. 1332-34. support sent proposed cites do not Still other only “partially” defendants rule,- they all involved non-parallel joined, taking commissions higher when pricing “ends.” One involved inconsistent but available pursuing otherwise lower in an alleged price-fixing conspiracy, see Foley ones. Id. Had been decided under City Moundridge Corp., v. Exxon Mobil framework, the dissent’s “divergent these (D.D.C.2006), F.Supp.2d 131-32 paths to the same (higher end” commis wildly varying while another addressed sions) apparently required re (in surcharges timing) amount both Court, versal of the convictions. The alleged conspira an fuel-surcharge-fixing however, reached a different result —it af France, cy, Societe LaFlamme v. Air firmed all nine criminal convictions after (E.D.N.Y.2010). F.Supp.2d finding agreement. sufficient evidence of last, appeal summary an from a judgment Foley, then, Id. at effectively 1335. re decision, held that the had defendant jects proposed methodology. the dissent’s not parallelism established conscious we Lastly, disagree that defendant; assumed, dissent’s part it of one however, imposing definition needed to avoid anti- par that the actions were liability trust on innocent activities. The allel. Gallery, See Cosmetic Inc. v. (3d dissent if proceeds finding parallel Corp., Sehoeneman Cir.2007). inexorably best, liability. conduct leads to But At these cases stand for Twombly’s principle foundational is that proposition: parallel unremarkable con conduct, alone, parallel standing is not parallel duct must produce results. And enough impose liability. antitrust they recognize very further so point words,' plaintiffs other showing initial hotly parallel contested the dissent: parallel conduct is only step an initial exactly conduct “need not be simultaneous multi-step process. It is the additional give and identical in order to to an rise LaFlamme, steps required plaintiff of an agreement.” inference of are meant ensure that business 151; F.Supp.2d City Moundridge .innocent cf. activities are not tarred as antitrust viola- Corp., Exxon Mobil Civil 04- Action No. tions, 940(RWR), whether the motion-to-dismiss 2009 WL at *5 (D.D.C. 2009) stage later. Sept. (“Price-fixing can occur though price even increases Thus, think plain we identical in absolute or relative alleged parallel remaining conduct. The terms.”). question pleads is whether also requisite “point[s] “more” that toward precedent

Our own does not support of the Take, meeting Twombly, minds.” example, dissent’s view. United 557, 127 U.S. at S.Ct. (4th States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 Cir. 1979), in a group which of real estate C.

brokers 1 violating by § were convicted of conspiring to fix real estate commissions. has the “more” alleged It seems an that say necessary paral understatement to move its of allegations the Foley any defendants did not plausibility. move in lel conduct into the realm of

430 (4th Balt., 500, 791 F.3d 511 pled claim the Council group-boycott The Cir.2015) (“A not be dis- complaint should story. SawS- a detailed

complaint builds time, long provides as it sufficient place, missed particular the top identifies claim to that detail about the show the initially the boycott and manner in which has a more-than-conceivable plaintiff formed, separate meeting a describing merits.”). on the Detail chance success the Power purpose during held for that complaint in a of “further circumstances meet 2001 annual Tool Institute’s October minds” meeting ¶¶ a of the pointing toward com The See J.A. 89-90 ing. allays suspicion plaintiff The that the six individu specific at least plaint names merely a into exis- speculating conspiracy boycott, forming the part took als who coincidentally from action. tence similar each osten person which noting defendant 557, Twombly, ¶¶ at 127 S.Ct. 1955. 550 U.S. See J.A. 89 78-79. sibly represented. That, all, principal Twombly’s after was the complaint further tells us means Citibank, N.A., v. concern. See Swanson boy their by which the defendants sealed (7th Cir.2010) (“A F.3d 405 more majority a vote. See J.A. agreement: cott ... anti- complex involving [like one] case ¶ explains complaint the then 89 80. And detail, require trust will more violations[ ] implemented the manufacturers the how notice of give opposing party both to the respond boycott: refusing to to entreaties how, what the case is all about and to show long after ne SawStop, going silent least, the plaintiffs in the mind dots offering bad-faith terms gotiations, connected.”). should Thus, be rejected. were intended to that ..., Twombly plaintiffs “[u]nlike complaint The dissent contends that the express has [SawStop] clearly alleged liability. on a presumption” rests “casual Watson agreement to restrain trade.” complaint’s But that overlooks the view Covering, Inc. v. Mohawk Carpet & Floor detailed account of the events—an (6th Indus., Inc., 648 F.3d Cir. that, we take as again, account true N.A., 2011); v. Sorema Swierkiewicz 12(b)(6) Instead, purposes. Rule cf. 506, 514, 534 U.S. S.Ct. rely dissent seems to on series of factual (2002) (explaining that Title L.Ed.2d might explain that suppositions “perhaps” dis not have been complaint VII should But parallel the relevant conduct. the events lead missed where it “detailed approach ignore forces us to the factual termination, provided to his relevant ing allegations that form heart SawS- dates, ages nationali and included complaint: particular meeting top’s per of at least some the relevant ties day particular particular participants with termination”). his sons involved making particular agreement gener- by And fa- ated the issue. like SawS- complaints, Antitrust voring its of the perception relevant events allegations detailed fact top’s, “that include by over the narrative offered the com- what, ‘who, when and where’ of as to very makes plaint, dissent mistake not sur claimed antitrust misconduct made, court recasting district prisingly survive dismissal.” William “plausibility” “probability.” into Mangiaracina, Holmes & Melissa Antitrust (2014 supp.); § 9:14 see The dissent underscores Law Handbook Oyj, position in its mischaracteriz- Corp. Outokumpu also Carrier v. 673 weakness (6th Cir.2012); allegations SawStop’s ing Kendall v. the factual F.3d (9th U.S.A., Inc., “conelusory” in an effort to Visa Cir.2008); may be the dissent them. It Mayor City& avoid Goldfarb cf.

431 detailed al- not complaint’s believe the “forecast evidence” support doesn’t its theo Robertson, legations, skepticism that does not ry, 291, but 679 F.3d SawStop’s “conclusory.” allegations render the See complaint by referencing does so testimo (ex- 681, (the 556 U.S. at 129 S.Ct. 1937 Iqbal, ny from Peot former Ryobi engineer), allegations cannot be called “con- plaining agrees who that non-adopting manufactur clusory” merely judge because a views ers “could” have been in legal “real trou fanciful,” “extravagantly “unreal- them as if a major ble” manufacturer had adopted “nonsensical”). istic,” Indeed, just two 4-125, Transcript AIMT. of Trial at Osorio Twombly, Supreme weeks after the Court Techs., Inc., v. One World No. 06-CV- reversed one of our sister circuits for mak- (D.Mass. WL Feb. ing much the same error. Erickson v. See ¶ 2010), (cited 80). ECF No. J.A. Pardus, 89, 90, 551 U.S. 127 S.Ct. The complaint further describes state (2007) (reversing 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 dis- ments in which Black & Decker’s counsel complaint “conclusory” missal of a as product have said that liability complaint alleged only by where the harm could be “if lessened a couple years saying prison “endanger[ed] that officials passed implementation without of the by taking his life” away needed treat- ¶ SawStop [tjechnology.” J.A. ment). And, matter, a practical as de- The defendants insist that this alleged manding particularized more than alle- motive is implausible, and the dissent gations SawStop offered here would agrees. They that, theorize if SawStop’s compel an plaintiff plead evi- theory true, of motive were one would already expressly dence—and we have re- expected all of the manufacturers to impose fused to such a requirement. See a take license once began making Robertson, 679 F.3d at 291. its own AIMT-equipped saws in 2004. The any event, we observe that SawStop indicates course events “who, what, when, only alleges not did not occur. complaint, where” in its but also the more, Once argu- manufacturers’ “[Mjotivation “why.” for common action” ment —embraced the dissent —seems to a key circumstantial fact. Einer R. misconstrue complaint’s allegations. Elhauge Geradin, & Damien Global Anti SawStop entered the market a periph- as (2007); trust Law and Economics 837 see player. Appellant’s eral See Br. 44 Hyland, (listing also 771 F.3d at 320 “com ... (“SawStop’s sales did not even consti- conspire” mon motive to as a potential plus 1% industry tute of total sales table factor); Mayor City& Council Balt. v. States[.]”). Thus, saws the United (2d Inc., Citigroup, 709 F.3d Cir. conceptually manufacturers were still able 2013) (same). According complaint, to the argue peddling was here defendants were motivated to fringe technology, reflected in its “mar- conspire out of fear product-liability ginaliz[ed]” position. market J.A. exposure: See adopted if one manufacturer ¶ 81; see, Techs., e.g., Osorio v. One technology, then manufactur World non-adopting Inc., (1st Cir.2011) (de- 87-88 liability exposure ers could face from their Thus, scribing argument defendant’s employ failure to AIMT. that SawS- under viable). top’s Indeed, SawStop’s technology was not theory, the manufacturers con boycott fact group ceived AIMT that the keep off did include market, thereby every player industry its use in the im- preventing table-saw design alternative product-liability plies conspirators were concerned though license, cases. And even a complaint major need with taking manufacturers *19 432 Thus, Syrup 295 F.3d Litig., the Antitrust defendants’ tose Com ones.

not smaller (7th Cir.2002). event, which, any 651, “minds” in 656 Fewer post-2004 actions— in market. in the “meet” a concentrated complaint— must fully are discussed not evaluating complaint implies manu- that the table- help in the And the much not concentrated, is so the de saw market potential motives. facturers’ of purportedly here control 85% fendants “who, what, where, if Even the ¶¶44, see, 48; e.g., market. J.A. 81 when, enough, the com why” and were not Starr, (listing defen 592 F.3d at 323 the a number commu plaint also describes a of the market as dants’ control 80% Allega among the defendants. nications factor). Further, com plus relevant meetings tions of communications plaint ways in which the manu describes infer support can an among conspirators actions, attempted to hide their facturers they agreement provide ence of because “leave including agreement a not to mutual conspire. opportunity means ¶¶ 93-94 92-97. paper trail.” See J.A. See, Inc., Evergreen Partnering Grp., e.g., alleged attempts by the manufactur These 49; 320; Hyland, 771 F.3d at 720 at F.3d could suggest ers to hide their actions Balt., 709 at Mayor City Council F.3d & their actions “would defendants knew Here, discussing 136. addition Starr, scrutiny,” attract antitrust 592 F.3d alleged meeting October 2001 where words, 324; facts alleged at in other formed, complaint describes conspiracy guilt. ac suggest consciousness of Those calls, phone meetings, and discussions us reason conclude give tions further “al among conspirators. Such the various boycott plausibly alleged.2 group that a identify] illegal legation[s] practice, not itself, con that facilitates [an D. difficult for the spiracy] that would be to es Generally, “[i]n addition Messaging, Text authorities to detect.” plain tablishing conspiracy, successful 628; 630 at accord Todd v. Exxon F.3d also ... that the tiff must show (2d 191, Cir.2001); Corp., 275 F.3d 213 see adverse, produced anti-competitive effects Foster, Manipu E. also Sharon LIBOR product geographic within the relevant Allegations, lation 11 De- and Antitrust Fashions, Terry’s Inc. v. market.” Floor (2013) 291, Paul Bus. & Com. L.J. 304 Indus., Inc., 763 611 Burlington F.2d may ... (“Facilitating practices evidence (4th Cir.1985). complaint, n. In a 10 viable plus necessary factors to establish the allege, inju not plaintiff “the agreement.”). inference of an himself, ry injury but an to the market Agnew Collegiate Nat’l Ath. power A market in which sales well.” v. (7th Cir.2012); Ass’n, in the can F.3d 335 concentrated hands of few 683 Todd, See, e.g., 275 F.3d at 213. “Actual also facilitate coercion. Ever accord include, 48; are not green Partnering anticompetitive 720 at effects but Grp., F.3d Todd, to, 208; output, increase High In re Fruc limited reduction of "smoking gun” argued "ex- complaint al- direct evidence is also leged cases”). conspira- of a tremely sufficient direct evidence rare in antitrust As SawS- Robertson, cy avoid See 679 dismissal. complaint require- top’s “Twombly’s meets (holding F.3d at 289 that a can respect allegations illegal ments with alleges § state claim evi- if it "direct conduct,” Robertson, parallel F.3d itself); agreement Am. dence” of the but see whether has we need determine Healthcare, Inc., Trigon Chiropractic Ass’n v. adequately direct evidence. (4th Cir.2004) (indicating F.3d quality.” price, Despite or deterioration Jacobs the facial appeal SawStop’s Int’l, Inc., Tempur-Pedic per se argument, F.3d neither the manufactur (11th Cir.2010). er’s nor the brief district court’s opinion

directly it. address The court district re involving In viola “per only cases se” in passing marked SawStop that had Act, however, tions of the Sherman this boycott to establish a orga “fail[ed] naked anti-competitive essentially pre harm is nized for concerted refusal to deal.” SD3, LLC, agreements prac 3500674, sumed. or 2014 “[C]ertain at WL *5. It did “pernicious further, tices” have such a effect on not the discuss issue and offered competition” they conclusively- that “are cursory citation to Northwest to be unreasonable presumed and there similarly Wholesale. manufacturers illegal assert, fore elaborate as to inquiry without explanation, without that precise they the harm” that caused. allege any per “failed to se violation of the TFWS, 198, Schaefer, Inc. v. 242 209 F.3d Sherman Act.” Response Br. 58. (4th Cir.2001). agree that Claims such the competitive Because issue of harm is anticompetitive

ments ... “lacked effects briefed, inadequately and because dis- simply irrelevant.” In re Cardizem trict opinion gives court’s likewise us no (6th 896, Litig., CD Antitrust 332 F.3d 909 guidance, we cannot that decide issue or .2003). Cir affirm on that basis. If the manufacturers choose, however, they may again so raise Although the manufacturers contend competitive the issue of harm before the allege anticompeti that failed district court on it may remand so harm, al SawStop maintains that its tive. fully the question consider discuss leged group boycott violates the Sherman of proper argument. the benefit per separate allega Act se—such that no necessary. tions of harm were some “[I]n E. boycott circumstances a con group may be per Pip sum, SawStop’s sidered se violation.” Precision complaint very dif ing Instruments, & Inc. v. E.I. de in du Pont ferent from the one Twombly, seen (4th Co., 613, Nemours & 617 4 solely “descriptions n. which rested on of par Cir.1991). alleged agreement independent And the allel conduct and not on any “paradigmatic boy here comes allegation agreement.” close to actual Twom cott,” 564, 1955; group competitors” bly, which “a 550 U.S. 127 S.Ct. see manufacturers) (here, (“[T]he 548, take also 127 1955 “collective id. at S.Ct. (here, action” refusal to im 1 question complaint § license or ... is whether a plement) “may competitive inhibit the can when it ... alleges survive certain (cid:127) (here, vitality ..., SawStop). parallel rivals” some conduct absent factual Corp., NYNEX U.S. at S.Ct. suggesting agreement[.]” (empha context 493; Stationers, added)). see also Nw. Wholesale sis SawStop’s complaint alleges Co., Stationery agreement Inc. v. Pac. & 472 an Printing boycott actual detail rely, Twombly, U.S. 105 S.Ct. 86 L.Ed.2d not as in par does on (1985) illegal (explaining per se allel alone. The observa conduct dissent’s boycotts is, contrary simply “often cut off to a tion supply, respectfully, access to the facility, necessary Twombly. reading market enable inaccurate See boycotted firm compete Op. particular, 446. In frequently Dissenting Su boycotting possessed preme directly rejected firms the dissent’s dominant Court market”). position reading Twombly complaint: the relevant of the “Al nonsensical.”). com SawStop’s To dismiss stray a few statements though in form skepticism initial fair read because of some agreement, plaint directly sp[oke] mistakenly discov merely “collapse conclusions be to legal ing these [were] Twom trial into allegations.” ery, summary judgment^] and resting prior on the 564, 127 1955. The of a Petro bly, pleading stages S.Ct. case.” U.S. States, explicit finding Hunt, was Fed.Cl. Supreme Court L.L.C. v. United (2009). contain did not Twombly allegation of actual “any independent afford decision also is meant to Our Id. among ILECs.” agreement discovery. SawStop a license unlimited *21 court, by it erred As to the district dissent, of the Like the we are well aware summary-judgment standard applying in an anti- discovery substantial cost that by con- boycott claim and SawStop’s group Twombly, 550 U.S. impose, trust case can “probability.” fusing “plausibility” 1955, 558-59, recognize at 127 S.Ct. and complaint paral- pleads Again, because largely falls on the defen- cost conjunction with “circum- lel conduct in appropriately managed, When not dants. meeting toward a of the pointing effect, stanced that cost can have extortionate minds,” 557, 550 at 127 Twombly, U.S. early defendants to enter compelling some 1955, SawStop adequately al- has S.Ct. But settlements even meritless suits. support leged agreement needed Advisory are on we neither Committee course, conspiracy. § 1 Act Of Sherman Procedure, the Su- the Rules of Civil nor SawStop seen has remains to be whether Court, Congress. preme nor We harm alleged any requisite adequately also take the as we find them. rules to the market. of possess District a number courts discovery or including limitations tools— not mistak Our decision should be timely for sum- consideration of motion en for an endorsement of the ultimate mary judgment any combat sort —to point, At this SawStop’s merits of case. discovery. See Judicial predatory Federal large SawStop’s prospects success Center, Complex Litigation Manual for irrelevant, not ly as need “[a] lawsuit (“Effective (4th 2004) manage- § 30.1 ed. past proceed meritorious to the motion-to- litigation requires ment of antitrust identi- Ringgold-Lockhart v. stage.” dismiss fying, narrowing pivotal clarifying, 1057, Cnty. Angeles, Los 761 F.3d 1066 legal praeti- factual issues soon as (9th Cir.2014). fact, well-pleaded In “a cable[.]”). Although tools these do not like complaint may proceed if it strikes a even us to permit give the benefit of the doubt savvy judge proof that actual of those facts claims, groundless Twombly, 550 U.S. improbable, recovery very and that 559, 1955, they at S.Ct. confirm unlikely.” Twombly, remote and 550 U.S. jurisprudence our cannot be driv- antitrust 556, 1955; Cardigan 127 S.Ct. accord solely by expense en fears about the Co., N.H. Mountain Sch. v. Ins. 787 F.3d (1st litigation. modern have faith Cir.2015); We Carpenters N.J. possess that district the will courts both Royal Health v. Fund Bank Scotland 109, 125 (2d good make of avail- PLC, Cir.2013); ability and the use Grp., mechanisms, em- case-management able Iqbal, 556 U.S. 129 S.Ct. 1937 cf. (“[W]e preserve them a level reject allegations ploying as needed do these bald they in antitrust ground playing particularly on the are unrealistic field— complicated relationship with cases.3 antitrust law.

“[Mjembers of such associations often have Standard-Setting Conspiracies VI. economic incentives to competition restrain product [ ] set standards such group-boycott addition associations have serious potential for claim, alleges two but separate anticompetitive harm.” Allied Tube & concerning private conspiracies related Head, Inc., v. Corp. Conduit Indian standard-rejection standard-setting —the 492, 500, U.S. 108 S.Ct. 100 L.Ed.2d conspiracy and the contrived-standards (1988); Soc’y see also Eng’rs Mech. conspiracy. Industry participants alleged- Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. ly prevent used their influence over toUL (1982). 1935, 72 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. As a private organization adopting result, “private standard-setting associa safety AIMT a required device. The objects tions traditionally have been of an purportedly encouraged defendants then Tube, scrutiny.” titrust Allied 486 U.S. at to adopt imposed UL other standards that 500, 108 S.Ct. 1931. needless costs on and insulated liability. the defendants from Still, such ventures can also “decid- edly procompetitive by encourag- effects” We find that does not *22 ing “greater product interoperability,” plausibly conspiracy. establish either Al- effects,” generating “network and building though standard-rejection the and con- “incentives Corp. to innovate.” Princo v. conspiracies are sepa- trived-standards Comm’n, 1318, Int’l Trade 616 F.3d 1335 rately they fail alleged, for the same Co., (Fed.Cir.2010); accord Lotes Ltd. v. fundamental reason: the facts Co., Hon Hai Precision Indus. 753 F.3d nothing beyond ordinary partic- imply (2d 395, Cir.2014); 400 Corp. Broadcom v. ipation standard-setting pro- lawful Inc., 297, (3d Qualcomm 501 F.3d 308 Thus, cesses. in contrast its group- to Cir.2007). result, a can hardly “As one claim, boycott SawStop’s standards-fo- infer to anticompetitive intent exclude conspiracies allege cused fail to the making from rule ... Antitrust alone[.] “more” necessary raise an inference- seek exceptional therefore out the agreement. case, making where rule is used to facili- tate collusion or exclusion rivals A. competitiveness whose innovation Standard-setting organizations are vol threatens the relevant decision makers.” untary membership organizations whose § Hovenkamp, Areeda & 22.06b. supra, participants develop specifica “technical products tions ensure that from differ have Courts found standard-set ting organizations ent manufacturers with and compatible their members to other,” each address certain threshold have violated the antitrust laws in some safety concerns, cases, or serve beneficial relatively other but those cases are few Motorola, here, functions. far Corp. v. between. Of most relevance Microsoft Inc., (9th Cir.2012). 872, 696 F.3d 875 for entity may prosecuted “an an anti organizations These a enjoyed improper rather trust violation the basis 6, Many allegations carry (noting difficulty 3. of the same 560 n. 127 1955 S.Ct. SawStop's complaint past expense discovery a motion to dis- directed toward what, “who, when, illegal agreement” unspecif- miss—the where”—(cid:127) “some "between may discovery substantially way persons” point in a ic over focus "at some seven years.”). possible Twombly. that was not See id. at body.” and such exclu standards-setting products, Co exclude some a coercion of Inc. v. viola Transparency, ICANN sions are not themselves antitrust alition for (9th Inc., Tech., F.3d Cir. Bridge Inc. v. Moto VeriSign, tions.” Golden 2010). (5th Cir.2008); example rola, Inc., is oft-cited Allied Tube case, In that the defen concept. Energy of that Tech. see also Gtr. & Rockford deliberately packed (“The a standard-set dant a Corp., 998 at 396 failure of F.2d supporters who then ting panel paid private, standard-setting body certify Tube, product. competing Allied itself, banned not, by product a violation 108 S.Ct. 1931. Coalition 486 U.S. 1.”); § Fuel Plant Oil Powered Diesel ex Transparency is another ICANN Corp., Inc. ExxonMobil Sys., There, Ninth Circuit found ample. (D.N.M.2011) (hold F.Supp.2d potential liability power when plausibly al ing plaintiff did not lit used vexatious corporation allegedly ful lege an antitrust based on igation pressure and financial coerce opposition particular to a defendant’s mere ad organization providing into standards standard). hold stifle “To otherwise would vantages to that defendant. Coalition organiza beneficial functions of such F.3d ICANN Transparency, Tech., Bridge 547 F.3d at tions!.]” Golden 506. Similarly, problematic, is' not alone, standing participants for market thread the few common try standard-setting pro influence finding liability private in the stan cases ordinary through organization’s cess dard-setting unique, external context procedures. Clamp-All Corp., 851 See applied to an anti-com pressure achieve F.2d at 488. concern has petitive principal end. “[T]he setting been the use of standards *23 ...; normally

predatory there is device B. deliberately showing that the standard was alleges that normal never UL’s injured the competitors distorted of thwarted, procedures or that the de- were lies, bribes, through or party, sometimes engaged some form of external fendants influence, of improper other forms addi Instead, misconduct. it asks us to infer showing of market fore tion to a further Coll,. malfeasance defen- because some the Research, DM Inc. v. closure.” representative rele- dants’ served the (1st 53, Pathologists, Am. 170 F.3d 57-58 standard-setting panel. But vant Cir.1999). words, In plaintiff other must no provides authority drawing that sort of standard-setting the ordinarily show that inference, naked and we have found none. activity market-closing had a effect reasonably may believe that “Certifiers unfair, committed.“through use of was the (a they job job can do properly their improper practices procedures.” or or consumers) if all only benefits interested Pipe Iron Clamp-All Corp. Cast Soil parties are to present proposals, allowed (1st Cir.1988) 478, Inst., F.2d 488 851 views, frankly present their and vote.” Id. J.). (Breyer, ease, SawStop’s complaint usual the takes with the neither issue organization par largely nor standard-setting organiza- its UL’s actions because alleged rejecting will run afoul of law tion is to have erred ticipants selecting they ordinary processes adopt SawStop’s use standard and proposed when to assumption It is The unstated unexceptional standards. “axiomatic another one. that, setting argument lacking that a a valid “tech- organization standard this

437 justification, only remaining reasoning, nical” ex- SawStop’s create potential anti- conspiracy. be an planation must antirust liability. trust “Not would this tax courts, the abilities of the federal fear but Even if UL’s can ultimate decision damages judicial treble second- “wrong,” be called that mistake alone does guessing discourage would the establish- manipulate not indicate concerted action to industry ment of useful standards.” Id. the result. bodies “[S]tandard-setting Beyond its err,” allegations, error-based but simple sometimes error creates complaint’s only assertions of liability no reason for without further concerted some conclusory action are non-specific: “a organization’s indication activities made,” collective “merely ploy decision was or de- obscure a bloc,” fendants against competing producers.” “agreed vote as a Consol. or Prods., Inst., non-SawStop designs Metal Inc. v. were a Am. Petroleum “smokes- ¶¶ (5th 103, Cir.1988); 294 creen.” J.A. 96-97 846 F.2d see also 109. The Research, complaint identifies no fact (“Merely DM F.3d at 57 other than con- say against sistent votes SawStop’s proposal that the standards are or disputable (and designs) other general have some market effects has not establish agreements. ly enough illegal been to condemn as ‘un That them conduct, Act.”); parallel reasonable’ under but such equal- Sherman conduct is Ass’ns, ly with Boating legal Moore v. consistent Indus. behavior. After (7th Cir.1987) all, if SawStop right 711-13 even (finding no evi that technical support dence reasons did not conspiracy despite of an actionable the standard-set- ting decisions, jury’s finding organizations that the association was other non- See, anticompetitive explanations and arbitrary” setting “unreasonable remain. standards); Tech., e.g., Bridge Brookins v. Motor Golden 272- Int’l F.3d at cf. (8th (“[T]he Ass’n, Contest existence of an fi- independent F.3d Cir. 2000) (“So nancial long game- [change motive the standard] IMCA made might independent be an defining upon rules decisions reason each based Appellee company purposes sports organization, support an anti [the change].”); trust court need not be Advanced Tech. Inc. v. Corp., concerned Instron, Inc., decisions.”); rationality F.Supp.2d fairness those (D.Mass.2013) (dismissing M & H Tire Co. v. Racing Hoosier Tire *24 (1st Cir.1984) crux Corp., plaintiffs] F.2d where anti- “[t]he [the (“We duty simply no trust claim that provide competitors [wa]s discern to an abso in a to lutely objective support or scientific market declined a standard basis for deci sion.”). that promote competitor’s is not another “[Antitrust concerned with technology”). standard might whether a be unreasonable proposition.” as an abstract Areeda & Lastly, we note that not SawStop does supra, § Hovenkamp, 22.06c. allege objec- of anticompetitive the sort If go antitrust suits permitted ordinarily were to that tives are seen in standard- solely forward based on an allegation setting Usually, standard-setting cases. standard-setting body erred, the brought courts cases products are when are effec- cast would be into the role of tively standard- excluded from the market setting appellate safety Here, bodies. Metal adopted Consol. standards.

Prods., F.2d at Any disagree- 297. largely complains that it the could use ment small big adop- or with the ultimate standard-setting process to own impose its safety would, tion of a standard follow product everyone to on else. The anticom- law, law, give to make interpret and not impose” to of “refusal petitive harms Bacon, “Essay LVI: Of Francis Ju- Nothing that UL law.” identify. much harder (1625), dicature,” in Rich- Essays reported groups did barred standards-setting or the Anno- Essays Bacon’s With Whately, ard from the AIMT-equipped saws SawStop’s (1857). Here, judiciously the tations com- entry into the market, SawStop’s as opinion the majority resists well-reasoned market establishes. petitive table-saw beyond our limited temptation move SawStop remains appearances, all From policy. into the colorful realm role and seal of saws with the UL offer its free to dissenting opinion strays the Respectfully, perceived with market along approval, here and en- beyond our limited review on those' offering AIMT of also advantage on best left other policy croaches issues gen- if newer standards And UL’s saws. government. costs, branches those costs are additional erate some industry member of the to each common I. UL-compliant make a table chooses to

who anticompetitive or nothing We see saw. First, the rather than confront issues exclusionary in that. dissenting actually play, opinion not err in court thus did up points agreement The district dire dresses asserts, to dis- defendants’ motions granting example, The dissent rifts. standard-setting claims. through to achieve plaintiffs miss “seek product” for their litigation monopoly

VII. majority opinion “turns and claims above, the reasons described For the im- eye” “anticompetitive a blind correctly the stan- court dismissed district driving SawStop’s claims. Post pulséis]” all the defen- dard-setting claims as to opinion dissenting 454. The claims correctly The district court also dants. majority opinion “ignores all [the against group-boycott claims dismissed set- of ventures such standards benefits Co., Ltd.; Corpora- Koki Makita Hitachi trade in its rush flatten groups] ters and Co., Ltd.; tion; Chang Type Industrial standards, make communications pleading Industries, Inc.; Pentair Water OWT law to iso- perilous, consign Decker, Inc.; Inc.; Stanley Black & Group, Thus, lationist ends.” Id. Inc.; Equipment, Techtronic Delta Power today’s view that policy takes the dissent Inc.; America, Tech- Industries North companies” opinion will doom “American However, Co., Industries Ltd. tronic very at the “competitive disadvantage dismissing erred in court district global commercial interactions are be- time remain- against claims group-boycott Id. Non- commonplace.” more coming ing defendants. (beyond problem that a sense the obvious disadvantage meaningful competitive

Therefore, the district court’s decision comparison in the context of a dismissing SawStop’s complaint *25 global competitors, many of America’s PART, IN IN VACATED AFFIRMED laws). whom also have antitrust PART, REMANDED FOR PRO- AND fully accords majority opinion with THIS CONSISTENT WITH CEEDINGS ventures, “[j]oint standard- the view OPINION organizations, and trade association setting WYNN, concurring: Judge, Circuit meetings may allow individuals different each other’s ex- to benefit from ought specialties that their “Judges remember dicere, may prove invaluable jus These fora jus pertise. dare —to office is and not for efficient product and effective develop- necessarily to, (on limited Domeny ment.” Post at 455. majority As the behalf of Bosch), (on SBTC and Peot states, opinion plainly “such ventures” can behalf of Ryobi, affiliates), TIC and “decidedly procompetitive by effects (for Stanley Rodrigues Makita), Ray encouraging greater product interoperabil- (for Mayginnes Emerson), David Y. ity, effects, network generating and build- (of Keller Porter-Cable, who also ing incentives to innovate.” Ante at 455 spoke DICM), for Pentair and Steven omitted). (quotation marks and citations (for Karaga Hitachi), and representa- The majority opinion in no uncertain terms tives of B & D and Milwaukee Elec- affirms the district court’s dismissal of tric. Mr. Domeny, time, at the was SawStop’s standards-setting-related the Chair of the [Power Insti- Tool claims—a relegated crucial fact to a dis- tute]^ Product Liability Committee, senting footnote. and chaired the meeting.” J.A. 89

Second, ¶ rather than SawStop’s added). address 79 (emphasis complaint written, as it is the dissenting (cid:127) “At the meeting, Mr. Domeny and the opinion verbiage employs like “commercial other participants expressed concerns ” interactions to revise the complaint so if one manufacturer adopted as to omit allegations of a secret SawStop Technology, then all manu- agreement to refuse to deal. Again facturers subject would be greater sounding policy, the dissenting opinion liability in product future liability asserts that the majority “drapefs] inno- cases. Mr. Peot shared this concern. cent commercial activity garb” sinister [Power Tool Institute]’s table saw complaint because the “hardly bespeaks a manufacturers determined at agreement collective not to deal.” Post meeting that they would decide how to Thus, the dissenting opinion edi- respond, industry, as an to the SawS- torializes that due to majority opinion, top Technology. A consensus was “HOLDING OR ATTENDING [A] (1) reached that all take a should TRADE ASSOCIATION MEETING implement license and/or WILL INCREASE YOUR EXPOSURE AIMT, (2) none take it or other- TO ANTITRUST SUITS.” Id. at 443 implement AIMT; wise if one since added). (emphasis or more took a license offered and/or Yet, judicious when read with eye, product AIMT, with the others SawStop’s complaint clearly alleges that would be product more vulnerable to Defendants entered into a agree- secret liability. It agreed was also that col- ment to refuse to deal at a trade associa- lective action proceed only all, if tion meeting just that Defendants —not or at least a substantial majority, of “held” or “attended” meetings. such In- participants voted to participate. deed, the complaint plainly bespeaks a col- Members developing also discussed agreement lective not to deal. something like Technology,

Specifically, alleges, without having to pay royalty to Dr. among things: other Gass. The consensus reached (cid:127) conjunction “In attendees, Tool contrary [Power with no views meeting, separate articulated,

Institute] annual industry was that mem- meeting representatives of table collectively agree bers would not to *26 saw manufacturers was purchase held. Atten- technology from licenses included, dees at meeting but were implement Plaintiffs or otherwise It was fur- ¶ table saws. manufactured add- (emphasis 89-90 J.A. AIMT.” forward, that, omitted). going in- agreed ther citations and ed SawStop and to meet- relevant at the (cid:127) formation reached consensus “The liability defense product calculated econom- on a table saw based ing was among manufactur- that shared ic be would determination issues by fare collectively, better would, ers af- industry who participants those marginalize to agreeing collectively collectively agreed firmatively to act AIMT, allowing by than SawStop and SawStop.” J.A. response to to determine whether marketplace added). ¶ (emphasis with did business any manufacturers “At, period of months (cid:127) or within implemented otherwise SawStop or meeting, following October believed Defendants The AIMT. Bosch, Ryobi, Defendants each of market the mass into AIMT bringing Pentair, and Hitachi, Emerson Makita, liabil- catastrophic product would Electric, affili- and entities Purchas- Milwaukee for them. ity consequences agreed to enter them, invento- prior and had existing ated with their ers of (and, (the other perhaps, boycott Boycott’) ‘AIMT saws of table into a ries viability point would by col- products) property, SawStop’s intellectual prod- that other as evidence of AIMT (1) to license SawS- refusing lectively because inherently unsafe ucts were (2) not to agreeing technology, and top be- Defendants AIMT. lacked they J.A. 90- implement AIMT.” otherwise term, that, if SawS- short lieved added). ¶ (emphasis 91 83 man- major obtain unable to top was frame, (cid:127) in which time “During this not partner, would ufacturing saw table Institute]’s Tool [Power meaning- market produce able respond collec- voted to manufacturers with its AIMT— of saws quantity ful those Technology, SawStop tively to major manufacturers way, this negoti- yet in license Defendants profit earn current continue to could SawStop refrained from (cid:127) ations with inferior existing margins their license, the Defen- and requesting a royalties paying lines without product negotia- (for already in Plaintiffs, remain dants who were it would ways them as plausible to abort being) at least found time tions ¶ contend, major manufacturers arose.” J.A. opportunities lawsuits, liability product added). defending (emphasis Thus, De- viable. AIMT was not alleg- words, SawStop’s complaint In other calculation was fendant’s business Defendants meeting which specific es a fare collectively, would better they, SawStop and with agreed to refuse deal AIMT, SawStop and marginalizing Around pact a secret. keep by working with than and/or from time, refrained Defendants same J.A. 90 adopting AIMT.” otherwise or, if in li- technology seeking SawStop’s ¶ 81. SawStop, found censing negotiations meeting (cid:127) agreed at the “It was opin- dissenting to abort them. ways con- that all discussions thereafter of these characterization dismissive ion’s response to cerning a collaborative “eonclusory as mere allegations detailed be conftdential misses assertions,” plainly thus post than persons other concealed the mark. who members Institute] Tool [Power *27 On contrary, SawStop’s the allegations SawStop, viewing the facts and reasonable squarely conform to what require we Sher inferences in the light most favorable to § man plaintiffs Act to plead. “To es Defendants. For example, the dissenting § violation, tablish a 1 antitrust plaintiff opines opinion that “[ignoring the many (1) prove, plead, therefore a practical reasons for declining [SawStopJs contract, combination, (2) conspiracy; or offers, the majority hones in on the fear of imposed an unreasonable restraint of product liability key as the motivation be- trade.” Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Es hind defendants’ boycott.” alleged Post at e Inc., 278, tat Companies, 679 F.3d Yet, 453. majority the opinion rightly fo- (4th Cir.2012) J.) (Wilkinson, (quotation cuses on the products liability reasoning— omitted). Further, marks and citation “Iq because SawStop specifically alleges, it. Twombly bal and require do not a plaintiff See, e.g., J.A. 89-91. We are thus not at prove his complaint.” case the Id. at liberty to swap that pled reasoning out for Instead, 291. complaint the “need “practical other might reasons” we make allege facts sufficient to state elements of up out of whole cloth. A further example: (quotation Id. claim.” marks and cita The dissenting opinion asserts that “it was omitted). 12(b)(6) tions And at the Rule consistent with each manufacturer’s best stage, are, which is where we the com interest reject an expensive, unproven, plaint is to be “construed liberally so as to undeveloped, possibly unsafe technolo- justice.” do substantial Pub. Employees’ gy. Each defendant Ret. Ass’n could easily Colo. v. Deloitte have ar- & Touche LLP, (4th Cir.2009) (Wil rived at this business decision on its own.” J.) kinson, (quotation marks and citation Post at 452. But SawStop alleges that omitted). they didn’t arrive at that decision indepen- Instead, dently. the complaint specifically

In its revisionist account of SawStop’s alleges that expressly Defendants allegations, agreed opinion dissenting essen- tially 12(b)(6) to refuse to deal keep turns the Rule and to agree- standard on its “A See, head. motion to dismiss under ment secret. e.g., Rule J.A. Ignor- 89-91. 12(b)(6) tests sufficiency of a com- ing specific such allegations to SawStop’s plaint; importantly, it does resolve detriment nothing shy is of an all-out per- surrounding facts, contests the merits version of generous through lens which claim, of a or the applicability of defenses.” 551 we F.3d at 311. Republican Martin, Party N.C. v. Finally, dissenting opinion (4th focuses Cir.1992). F.2d Instead, “a policy own preferences, thereby well-pleaded complaint may proceed even abandoning this Court’s limited if it role— savvy strikes a judge proof that actual simply of the which is facts assess whether improbable and that a recovery very plausibly unlikely.” alleges remote elements of its Sec- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. tion 1 claim. the majority opinion Because 544, 556, steers, 127 S.Ct. 167 L.Ed.2d 929 role, sticks to its limited clear of (2007) (quotation marks and citation omit- considering things like “ap- different ted). proach[es]” “globalized in a marketplace,” “ whether the ‘conspiracy’ word is bound crystal-clear our Despite mandate in re- 12(b)(6) paranoia,” stoke viewing dismissal, appropriate this Rule dissenting opinion amount of “lag “product nevertheless attacks time” in develop- light least favorable ment.” Post *28 but only existed have not spiracies in no itself sees dissenting opinion

The being the example insists, caught perfect exam- been and thus way so bound —a of the scandal the ones international vitamin “[h]ere, famous plaintiffs that ple, in engaged 21 firms at 70. It involved Post 1990s—which anti-competitively.” acting over a decade: reviewing a Rule lasted conspiracy job a not our simply is party’s which 12(b)(6) assess to motion man- 21 chemical to From 1988 pro-competitive. more deem we conduct in seven na- headquartered ufacturers role, the to our limited refusing to stick In cartels.... ... joined vitamins tions breathtaking engages opinion dissenting bil- exceeded by $30 these cartels Sales activism. judicial manufac- pharmaceutical .... The lion repeatedly has virtually Court addict- Supreme “As involved became turers policy- Congress is the profits, ... emphasized, monopoly infusion of ed to the re Sunterra In courts.” prompted maker —not the financial results giddy Cir.2004). (4th 257, 269 F.3d their clan- Corp., 361 conspirators to continue Ins. also, Underwriters e.g., years. to 15 up See activities destine Hartford N.A., Bank, Planters v. Union illegal persisted Co. These activities L.Ed.2d 1, 13-14, 120 S.Ct. several things] U.S. [among other face of (2000) policy out- (“Achieving a better conspira- parallel prosecutions of public Congress, not a task for investiga- ... multiple come [and] cies courts.”). sug- inappropriate It is thus simply bur- conspirators .... The tions law, that, as a matter example, gest, for more developed deeper and rowed motivated may not be conspiracy boycott subterfuge. a methods of elaborate pencil Congress can by liability concerns. Connor, Vita- The Great Global M. John into the Sher- limitations categorical such http://ssrn. available mins Cartels Act; man we cannot. com/abstract=885968. yet dissenting opinion embarks con- words, multi-player large, In other policy, into well odyssey another can ruses in- involving spiracies elaborate much reality, assumptions untethered law and a fact. exist as matter deed here, when at issue less the did, here, that one alleges And “[tjhese hard- days secrets are asserts boycott a group it undertook and that something that is keep. A secret is er to technology out of mar- freeze But maybe only Or two. by held one. those alle- refusing accept In ketplace. everywhere Managers twenty-two? stage, this must at gations, as we concurring my be relieved learn oversteps its plainly dissenting opinion peo- twenty-two you can let colleague bounds. nothing leak and have in on a ple secret reviewing at 451. Yet out.” Post II. 12(b)(6) we purposes, complaint for Rule crystal ball decide may peer into sum, disputes, to resolve courts exist believe personally we many people how rules into procedural swords pervert not to out complaints kick keep can secret battles. And fight policy with which court on such basis. whether SawS- today, do not confront we boy- on its ultimately succeed Moreover, dissenting top should extent the to the Instead, confront we claim. cott large,, that a multi-firm suggests opinion whether, viewing SawStop’s com- exist, it when cannot definition eye using unjaundiced plaint with con- Large antitrust simply uninformed. standard, proper say we can that it gation, has I believe the majority has default- made allegations sufficient to ed. I withstand shall throughout show how it has motion to dismiss for failure to state failed such to follow Twombly at every turn. I a claim. It has. with all Accordingly, suggest, due respectfully, most that the respect view, for the dissenting join I in majority has committed basic conceptual *29 judicious and errors majority well-reasoned and that the consequences of those errors, opinion. which the majority prefers not to face and to dismiss policy, regretta- are WILKINSON, Judge, Circuit ble. regrettable, however, Most is the concurring in part dissenting in part: treatment of a Supreme decision, Court even a one, controversial at the majority’s The hands of view of modern com- this court. merce is unfortunate. It takes an iso- approach

lationist in which each business Among Twombly’s insights was that must all but lock itself in semi-solitary or markets, every bit as much as conspira- risk the taint of antitrust claims. Whatev- cies, play a significant role in governing validity er isolationist approach may commercial conduct. 557, See 550 U.S. had, once have profoundly injurious in 127 S.Ct. 1955. Twombly counsels that we an interconnected, increasingly necessarily not leap pejorative explanations when collaborative, globalized marketplace. legitimate business considerations majority rightly The observes agree- more likely at play. Id. at 127 S.Ct. ment is the claim, crux of an antitrust but 1955. The fact that Sherman Act conspir- it has made mere communication the acies in restraint of trade do assuredly touchstone of liability. Ante at 428. continue to exist not does mean we should rush quickly too drape innocent rejects

The majority this aas statement commercial activity in garb. sinister policy, of ante at hardly but it is It that. a rather statement of conse- majority, however, adopts the re- The quences that flow from majority’s re- sequence. verse It fashions a template for fusal to follow Supreme Court’s deci- the frustrated market participant: When- sion in Bell Atlantic Corp. Twombly, ever routine business decisions don’t go 550 U.S. 127 S.Ct. 167 L.Ed.2d your way, reason, for whatever simply (2007), which pleading established re- claim industry conspiracy under the quirements Sherman Act Section Sherman Act and the courts will infer mal- complaint. Supreme The Court lacks the feasance. But such casual presumptions institutional resources to ensure full com- of antitrust can only infractions chill com- pliance with its Among decisions. other among munications companies, which in things, it has room on docket its for a may turn product hinder in- development, cases, limited number of and the Twombly joint ventures, novative and useful trade decisions from the lower may courts association conclaves. WARNING: routinely pitched as pertaining to no more HOLDING OR THIS ATTENDING particulars than the of an individual com- TRADE ASSOCIATION MEETING plaint. WILL INCREASE YOUR EXPOSURE TO ANTITRUST SUITS. be, just may however,

It institu- tional limitations at impart the Court chilling insti- The is most effect acute when obligations tutional on the ap- courts of the majority independent considers mar- peals to respect in fullest measure the ket-driven behavior to be parallel conduct highest approach. Court’s In this warranting obli- antitrust scrutiny. in- Parallel cases majority highlights course, While is, lynchpin of

dustry conduct successfully alleged paral- plaintiffs which 1 claim. Section Act many Sherman dispa- conduct, of them features none lel conceptual error cardinal majority’s The If defendants’ as these. actions such rate ap- an ends-based adoption lies in the conduct, then qualifies parallel behavior circumstan- in a parallel conduct proach competi- among divergent actions plainly II.A. Part case. See antitrust tial infra give now rise any field will tors plain- fact that of course is the end The part but This is claims. But adopted. product was tiffs attempt impose majority’s of the parcel the end likely to meet most products defen- guilt on antitrust presumption utility or the least are those of rejection bear burden now must dants who expense. the most that would cause those prop- the burden negative when proving ends-based majority thus uses *30 the claim. bringing party erly lies with the least marketable reward the analysis to Twombly was that itself It is no accident of possibility greatest the products con- For what we an antitrust decision. FAIL- litigation success. WARNING: of perfect storm in antitrust law is front PRODUCT FOR ADOPT THIS TO URE costs, discovery large damages, treble IN- WILL REASON WHATEVER It is the standards. pleading relaxed ANTI- TO YOUR EXPOSURE CREASE pose that combination three factors in SUITS. TRUST marketplace behavior. legitimate threat to means in ends and treatment of This sought to Twombly Supreme The Court the Twom- litigation undermines antitrust latter by addressing the the calm waters rather analysis An of means decision. bly however, adds to the majority, The two. tool most sensitive we is the than ends complaints that by sanctioning turbulence of plausibility to measure the possess even in all failed would likelihood Twombly, 550 U.S. complaint. Here, See standards. pre-Twombly under here, by the means And S.Ct. 1955. acting anti-eompeti- are ones plaintiffs the conspiracy was carried liti- through the They which so-called seek to achieve tively. non-parallel picture product of their paint monopoly a clear gation out the evi- market nor contrac- complaint is best the saw The neither table conduct. result, The yield. would negotiations introduced tual After SD3 of that. dence noted, failures will marketplace entered into defendants product, certain litigation success. increasingly lead to that continued well licensing negotiations of the diffi- beginning And that is boycott agreement. alleged group after culty. to license the tech- them offered Some supposed agree- again nology, to believe that majority appears The after Other ment, SD3. and were rebuffed proper discovery is the full course of offers, with yielded no one negotiations out winnowing meritless mechanism for industry saw leaving table fields, defendant many In observation claims. majority of named The vast altogether.. The bone of contention be correct. not even mentioned litigation frequently are is most civil defendants federal “parallel” trial. supposedly judgment of the versus summary account SD3’s over however, law, flashpoint negotiation posture, Their antitrust behavior. sum- versus to dismiss plaintiffs’ within often over motions would seem well which Court Supreme mary judgment. For forth or de- is nowhere set knowledge, that in the area recognized clearly has tailed. it is the threat steep litigation with, consistent and most plausibly reflect, produces costs that conse- independent deleterious legitimate business deci- itself, quences in and of no matter who the sions. Put simply, majority proceeds victor may antitrust marathon ulti- as if Twombly were at most persuasive mately to be. prove authority, and not very persuasive authori- ty at that. Twombly

As emphasized, discovery dramatically Twombly costs have escalated since the is particularly important here, adoption of the Federal for the Twombly, Supreme Rules. Court in that case ad 558-60, 1955; U.S. 127 S.Ct. dressed the meaning see of plausibility in the Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly context of a Iqbal allegation based Reconsidered, 1621, descriptions 87 Notre of parallel Dame L.Rev. conduct. (2012). Multiplying Court electronic and allegations “when .instructed records, paper parallel combined with increased conduct set out in order claim, § regulatory obligations, make a they have caused discov- must be placed in a ery costs to mount even context further since that raises a suggestion pre of a Twombly ceding agreement, issuance itself. merely Before we parallel con impose these duct that climbing just costs on could companies, as well independent there must exist confidence that action.” Twombly, the claims 550 U.S. at against allege leveled them S.Ct. 1955. “Even actual facts ‘conscious parallelism,’ *31 that make a common and other illicit in- reaction of ‘firms in a concen pláusible. tentions trated SD3 fails to clear that recognize this market their shared bar, but majority just still the economic piles it on. interests and their interdepen dence with respect price to output ” decisions’ is ‘not in itself unlawful.’ Id. at

I. 553-54, (citations omitted). S.Ct. 1955 A. Nor should court infer “that compa agreed nies had among themselves to do majority’s The approach to Twombly what was only natural anyway.” at Id. tells an old intermediate appellate story. 566, Thus, 127 S.Ct. 1955. a plaintiff fails The majority alights on a minor motif of to plead adequately his claim that a defen that Supreme decision, Court leaving while dant unlawfully conspired under Section 1 point wholly main unobserved. The if there exists “obvious ex alternative Court made clear in Twombly, and reiter- planation” for the defendant’s conduct that in Iqbal, ated plaintiff allege renders the prohibited explanation implau enough factual content in complaint to sible. Iqbal, 682, 556 U.S. at 129 S.Ct. render legal his claim for relief “plausible (citation omitted); Twombly, 550 U.S. on its face” to order survive a motion to 567, 127 at S.Ct. 1955. 12(b)(6). dismiss under Rule Ashcroft 662, Iqbal, 678, 556 U.S. 129 S.Ct. This could not more clear. In light of (2009) 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (citing Twombly, Twombly’s directives, allegations SD3’s fall 1955). 550 U.S. at 127 S.Ct. Plausibil- well short of the plausibility requirement. ity requires “more than a sheer possibility complaint The hardly bespeaks a collective that a defendant acted unlawfully.” agreement Id. Instead, not to deal. it most (citation omitted). complaint SD3’s plausibly cannot typical reflects market at forces clear this hurdle. Its conelusory asser- work and rational business choices being tions to, agreed defendants an indus- made—the things kind of that happen ev .try-wide “boycott” of its product fully ery day. Why did the not manufacturers distin- hardly boycott claim real SD3’s Perhaps they sible. product?

adopt SD3’s very allegations guishable from' nascent was too technology ized the Twombly. rejected Supreme Court it Perhaps license, unproven. in short case, in that complaint to the According cost effective been not have here, who, like the defendants per it. Or defendants — incorporate manufacturers market— of the share significant owned in actually product incipient SD3’s haps conduct” parallel “engage agreed consumers. injury to risk creased the Twombly, entry.” competitive “prevent may explanations market varied These 550-51, 1, 127 n. S.Ct. at 550 U.S. com different different have been well the de- charged that 1955. decisions of business They reflect panies. “ motivation’ common ‘compelling fendants’ ordinary character. the most common efforts competitive plaintiffs’ thwart explana alternative “obvious They are conspiracy.” to form a naturally led them sufficiently rebut apd not been tions” allega- If 1955. these S.Ct. at Id. preceding aof assertions any valid by ted they familiar, it because sound tions All the behavior to collude. agreement made the claims parrot perfectly almost only compati “was not by SD3 described that the argued complaint. SD3 in its SD3 likely ex more was with, indeed but ble named defen- least the few defendants —at lawful, free- unchoreographed by, plained discuss— actually bothered dants at Iqbal, U.S. behavior.” market collectively among themselves “agreed Twombly, 550 U.S. (quoting 129 S.Ct. 1937 aon licensing offers “based refuse” SD3’s 1955). 567, 127 S.Ct. determination” calculated economic however, eyes, majority’s In the marketplace in the they would fare better effort, mere- is all wasted discussion above If J.A. if were excluded. SD3 supposi- and “factual reasons” ly “practical pass complaint could Twombly’s Ante not be considered. that must tions” not fare should then SD3’s well-pleaded, Instead, plain- take we should 430, 441. any better. *32 and call it a face value at allegations tiffs’ that the majority claims The we assume certainly true that day. It is solely descriptions on Twombly in “rested at the mo- allegations factual truth of conduct, any on inde- and not parallel of U.S. Twombly, 550 stage. tion-to-dismiss agreement.” actual pendent allegation omitted). (citations 1955 127 S.Ct. at (citation quotation internal at 443 Ante claims as plaintiffs’ accepting Even after omitted). incorrect. simply This is marks ana- however, further true, the court must actual lan- overlooks majority The “plausi- allegations are those lyze whether “Defen- complaint: Twombly in guage 556, 127 S.Ct. Twombly. Id. at under ble” motivations compelling had common dants undertake to majority refuses 1955. The horizontal unlawful include in then- to step. My con- second, analytic more this of them that each agreement agreement an away. it simply colleague wishes curring of concerted in a course engage here, for nostalgia warp There is a time effective prevent to conduct calculated ” days. Those ways and pleading the old Amend- [plaintiffs].... competition from us, I ad- were easier earlier standards ¶ 50, Bell Atl. Twombly v. at Complaint ed in flies nostalgia now But our mit. (S.D.N.Y.2003); F.Supp.2d Corp., Court deci- controlling Supreme of a face ¶ (noting that defendants also id. at see sion. one compete with agreed not “have Twombly another”). sure, after To for “plausible” claim is not boycott SD3’s hope in the length sought complaints have plau- was not Twombly’s the same reasons that courts would length mistake such tial skepticism would be to mistakenly ‘col- substance. But the substance here is thin lapse discovery, summary judgment[,] and gruel. complaint’s The allegation of an trial into the pleading stages of a case.’ agreement is weaker than in Tiuombly, ... District courts possess a number of boiling down to a that the de- contention ... tools any combat sort of predatory fendants at a trade met association meet- discovery.” (citation omitted). Ante at 434 ing followed the inconvenient fact for That approach is astonishing, for it pre- the majority non-parallel conduct en- cisely what Twombly against: warned “It sued. is no say answer to that a just claim shy of fact, Twombly complaint was a plausible can, entitlement to relief if much stronger than the one this case groundless, be early weeded out in the and it went much further. That complaint discovery process ... given the common relied on evidence that defendants refused lament judicial that the success supervi- provide plaintiffs with network connec sion in checking discovery abuse has been tions and equal services of quality, that on the modest side.” Twombly, 550 U.S. they billed plaintiffs’ customers a man (citation at omitted). 127 S.Ct. 1955 plaintiffs’ ner to ruin relations, customer they plaintiffs refused access to cer majority’s The assurance that of course tain delayed facilities and provision of district courts can control discovery is the network elements after in plaintiffs had sort appellaté wand-waving that ignores vested tens of billions of dollars. Twom every reality on the ground. Trial judges bly, F.Supp.2d Despite 177-78. this they are busy; priorities. set Many support plaintiffs’ conspiracy allega understandably feel that time is better tions, the Court maintained that each de spent trial or in dealing with dispositive fendant reason to “had want to avoid deal motions to dismiss or for summary judg- ing with plaintiffs,” and each defendant ment in wading than big into the muddy of attempt “would keep out, plaintiffs re discovery disputes. There is tempta- gardless of the actions the other” defen tion, again one, and is an understandable dants. Twombly, U.S. say parties, “Folks, go work this S.Ct. 1955. Defendants’ actions in Twom- among yourselves.” out problem has bly, like ease, defendants’ actions this become even more acute with the advent “just were as much in line with a wide e-discovery. Modern electronic devices swath of rational and competitive business generate and record a great variety and strategy unilaterally prompted by common *33 volume of information. It is now easier perceptions of the market.” Id. at and faster evidence, to store which in turn (citation omitted). 127 S.Ct. 1955 Conse spawned has greater opportunities for dis- quently, plaintiffs’ conspiracy claims in covery requests and Regulatory conflict. both “stop cases short of the line between governments every mandates at level possibility and plausibility.” Id. at add to the store of paper both and elec- (citation omitted). 127 S.Ct. 1955 If tronic All files. of companies this makes plaintiffs the in Twombly could have called more and more vulnerable to open-ended upon this court to refashion their com requests. discovery majority The no pays plaint. more lip than service to what has become a B. serious problem. Its casualness stands in But, insists the majority, “[t]o contrast to the gravity dismiss of Twombly the SawStop’s complaint of because some ini- Court’s concern. hope: much for 1955. So 127 S.Ct. is to resurrect this concern overlook

To it on. majority just loads lay to the sought to Twombly dangers cor doubtless was v. Gibson Conley rest. 41, 78 355 U.S. See decided.

rect when II. (1957), by abrogated 2 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. A. It 1955. 127 S.Ct. U.S. Twombly, 550 pleadings through the skip made sense Twombly, of version its inverted With discovery some would theory that on the to contort majority plaintiffs allows 47-48, 78 See id. at out. it all how sort poten- into marketplace behavior normal Al changed. times But S.Ct. 99. ma-' by the Even violation. antitrust tial “the ex pooh-poohs majority though standard, howev- pleading diluted jority’s ante litigation,” antitrust modern pense of its claim fails as boycott er, group SD3’s for the legitimate altogether 434, it is con- alleges wm-parallel complaint plainly of cognizance to take Court Supreme contrary con- majority bases The duct. of action causes between interplay shifting paral- of expansive definition an on clusion claims) and (here Act Section Sherman perceived solely on a focused conduct lel (here pleading those of Rules the Federal to dis- regard without uniformity ends Thus, in Twom the Court discovery). majority ob- similarity of means. from what sought to shield defendants bly actions uniform “The similar serves: “heavy costs as it later described of the defen- none alleged are obvious: efficiency expen in terms of litigation or other- ultimately took a license dants and resources” time of valuable diture technology.” SawStop’s implemented wise those plausibility burden allocating vastly “dif- defendants’ at 427. The Ante Iqbal, conduct. unlawful allege who part of action” seen courses ferent 1937. 685, 129S.Ct. atU.S. un- conceal the grand scheme of some majority understood what The Court By 427. Ante at derlying conspiracy. that an antitrust does not: parallel majority would find logic, It pass up. provides tempting often too allegedly long as defendants all conduct whose parties for tantalizing weapon adopting end—not the same reached badly. The going endeavors are business dealings how the product regardless — para- bound stoke “conspiracy” is term proceed- and defendants plaintiffs between pin an effort noia, to kindle apart. fell ed or business failures others the blame misses focus an ends-based Such damages awards The treble one’s own. is to deter- Twombly, which point of entire temptation are a further actions anticompetitive allegedly whether mine armed floundering companies decision independent “stems from conduct rather knowledge defendants express.” tacit or agreement, or from dam- of such prospect face the settle than 127 S.Ct. 550 U.S. at Twombly, high attendant with the ages, especially omitted). act in (citation If defendants Twombly, 550 U.S. costs. See litigation the same they arrive at whenever parallel Twombly sought 558-59, 127 S.Ct. *34 outcome, con- parallel then or end general of no language in dangers these to reduce identi- but independent will embrace duct by only “It majority: is to the moment by market decisions borne cal business allegations taking require care Twom- conduct that precisely conspiracy suggesting level reach the forces— liability. antitrust bly excluded from enor- potentially hope to avoid we can conspiracies 559, distinguishing horizontal Id. at discovery....” expense of mous coincidences, innocuous the means matter. They to weigh had options. majori- The competitors That travelled divergent paths ty’s ready acceptance of unsupport- SD3’s absence, to the same end reflects the superiority ed assumption is part presence, of illicit coordination or fallacy of its ends-based perspective, agreement. namely that any ultimate to adopt refusal nothing more than one more instance of Certainly, direct evidence aof collusive parallel behavior. end would amount to a plausible Section 1 claim. See Chiropractic American Ass’n A analysis, means-based one that focus- Healthcare, Inc., Trigon 212, es the means which the so-called (4th Cir.2004) (“Direct evidence an- out, was carried most titrust cases is explicit and requires no gauge sensitive parallel conduct and inferences to establish proposition or complaint plausibility. The majority con- asserted.”). conclusion contrast, being By tends the dissent would parallel find con- plaintiffs rely when on circumstantial evi- “only duct when defendants move'in rela- of conspiracy, dence inas Twombly and lockstep” tive “by substantially identical hand, case at approach ends-based means.” Ante at 429. Not so. A focus on an unacceptably carries high risk of find- analysis means-based comes nowhere close ing parallel conduct wildly disparate to requiring identical means. As circum- behaviors by independent motivated eco- stantial evidence of a conspiracy, the simi- nomic concerns. With its larity over-inclusive of conduct along lies a spectrum. sweep, majority erodes the long-recog- Beyond a certain point, starkly dissimilar nized right of party one not to deal with means render agreement a secret among another. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite competitors plausible. less majority The Corp., Service 465 U.S. 104 S.Ct. dismisses this analysis, means-based ap- (1984). 79 L.Ed.2d 775 long As as parently because dissimilar “might means competitors in the respond way same to an also read to suggest deception” rather unappealing product, offer or a business’s independent than activity. business Ante refusal to deal now part paral- becomes at 428. The majority thus sets a nifty lel conduct potentially triggering trap: if defendants engage similar liability. means, collusion; it’s if they engage in means, dissimilar it’s deceit. Given those assumption running throughout the options, businesses should either keep to complaint is that SawStop only was the up themselves or close shop. product anyone could thought adopting. No other then, business decision For good reason courts have shied could have Therefore, been reasonable. away majority’s from the ends-driven con rejection defendants’ of SawStop ception parallel conduct and instead re part have been of a group boycott. Case quired specific See, more e.g., similarities. closed. We are not told exactly why SD3’s Gallery, Cosmetic Inc. v. Schoeneman product was demonstrably superior to (3d. oth- Corp., Cir.2007) F.3d competing er products terms of cost (deeming uniform refusal to sell insuffi safety, effectiveness and such one cient to show parallelism conscious be decision, business respect to it was cause one distributor decided not to deal conceivable. assumption The naked of its to the prior alleged agreement); LaF appeal irresistible adoption inevitable France, lamme v. S ociete Air operates in a comparative (E.D.N.Y.2010) (cast vacuum. But F.Supp.2d defendants comparative faced ing decisions. parallel doubt on conduct claim where *35 unreasonably stingy it considered at what strategies disparate in engaged

defendants undeveloped and its untested Moundridge v. terms for times); City at different of con- parallel this is If all F.Supp.2d technology. Id. Corp., Exxon Mobil deal, well skepti to (D.D.C.2006) of a refusal (expressing and evidence duct 131-32 con parallel of allegation qualify. will anything cism towards then did defendants that on evidence based duct this, agreement all the yet, despite And information). Al exchange no more than to as a refusal characterized repeatedly these cases insists majority though the this How can at 427-28. E.g., deal. ante “non-parallel of findings foundered offer to and did did deal Defendants be? in fact failing was ends,” common their How were technology. SD3’s purchase Ante at 428-29 means. disparate patently in not discussed eighteen defendants the added) (internal quotation (emphasis when, inso- to supposed deal complaint the omitted). marks concerned, they far as the here, there is means to the Turning approached? never were even li- separate parallel about nothing simply along sepa- short, defendants four proceeding discussed censing all discussions results and their different with deal with SD3 but willing timetables to rate were alleges that SD3 times at various motivations. broke down negotiations different li- not to collectively agreed reasons, SD3 not least because defendants for various 2001. J.A. technology October were will- cense than defendants more demanded supposedly then Defendants 89-90. refusal no The record shows to offer. ing negotiations the to abort” ways “found that deal, parallel less means much by “giving sepa- agreement conceal their the plausible think It is not end. As stated 94. J.A. rate excuses.” some- were disparate actions defendants’ however, three defendants complaint, the to ex- choreographed plan carefully a how Oc- with SD3 negotiate continued to after By supposing market. the clude SD3 from Bosch, fourth, ended 2001 while tober severely underes- majority possible, month and restarted a negotiations before group a of difficulty getting timates Ryo- later. J.A. years discussions of action agree on course competitors to licensing signed non-exclusive bi sent may or negotiations separate contract January 2002—three agreement SD3 in their best to be not have shown may collective refusal the so-called months after quite It interest. commercial contract offered The J.A. 91-92. to deal. moreover, to management, stage feat initially would increase royalty a 3% actually competitors those have some of suc- technology proved if the to 5%-8% licensing of- but different generous extend 91-92. SD3 the market. J.A. cessful on very party times fers at different gener- appear to be accept what refused to supposed group subject of the that was the wording issue. on minor ous terms based claim on type boycott. This is royal- the same offered J.A. 92. Emerson Twombly conceivability that margins far negoti- participated Ryobi ty rate as condemned. months October for several ations after com- nature SD3’s Mary Hail 2001, eventually ending leaving talks by the fact plaint is underscored fol- industry altogether the table saw named defendants twenty-two four of 56-57, 97. Six months year. J.A. lowing allega- much as discussed in so deal, even Black refusal & after (the comes “twenty-two” figure tions licensing agreement SD3 a Decker offered one defendant complaint as original SD3 balked royalty. J.A. 92. 1% *36 appear somehow failed to in the amended B.

version). Compare J.A. (original com- The majority believes that all the non- (amended plaint) with J.A. 70 complaint). parallel behavior disparate means of Indeed, even the majority plaintiffs chides proceeding were hatched in secret. The for “assembling] some collection of defen- concurrence makes much of the fact that dants and then mak[ing] vague, non-specif- the meeting among table saw manufactur- ic allegations against all of them as a ers was “secret.” Ante at fact, 438-40. In group.” Ante at 422. no fewer than four times does the concur- ring opinion refer to agree- Even plaintiffs appear to realize how ment not to deal as a “secret agreement” tenuous their claim of parallel conduct is. or a “pact [kept] secret.” Id. This is mani- original contrast complaint, SD3’s festly a cover for the fact my concur- amended complaint collapses its descrip- ring colleague is point unable to to the tion of the negotiations various and time- traces of agreement, an I hoping, suppose, lines to create an illusion of uniformity. that a fishing expedition will unearth them. Compare J.A. (original 55-58 complaint) But there is larger problem here. (amended with J.A. 88-93 complaint). These days secrets harder to keep. A original While the version details each of secret is something that is held the discussed negotiation defendant’s his- one. maybe Or two. But twenty-two? tory in a separate section, plaintiffs’ sec- Managers everywhere must be relieved to ond effort weaves those divergent strands learn my concurring colleague that narrative, into one vague obscuring dates you can let twenty-two people in on a and distinctions along way. Id. secret and nothing leak out. This attempt at hardly obfuscation in- We also run into a significant collective spires confidence in promise SD3’s action difficulty here. larger al- discovery will bolster its claims. Even leged conspiracy, larger the number of with its artful redrafting, however, SD3 alleged participants that need to be falls short of the bare minimum required brought into line both as to object for alleging a group boycott. To hold oth- execution of the conspiracy as well as the erwise is to use antitrust law badly skew need to keep secret. The vast number the market forces normally at play con- of antitrust cases involve a much smaller tract negotiations. on, From now defen- number conspirators, and it is telling dants decline to deal with entity propos- my concurring friend must venture ing any new design product feature of back to the 1990s even to find an inappo- development at peril. their They also can- site situation. The again concurrence la- purchase refuse a product in the bels the dissent’s discussion collective course of licensing negotiations because problems action foray policy. into It is too, under majority’s rubric, is not. It is an inquiry into plausibility, grounds possible liability if which Tivombly absolutely requires that others arrive independently aat similar we undertake. The failure do this is judgment. business Again, SD3’s attempt but one more example of the majority’s through litigation achieve more than failure to follow that decision. what markets or contracts would ever in- C.

dependently confer precisely the kind of abuse of Sherman Act claims that Assuming, Twom- though only for the sake of bly sought prohibit. argument, that plaintiffs properly had al- inflat for such support little There is com- conduct, amended *37 leged parallel conceded Plaintiffs self-confidence. “something ed the to show fails still plaint not could agreements licensing any that parallelism conscious turn to needed more” its that and until effect taken have Twombly, 550 conspiracy. plausible a

into fully im been not have technology would majority The 1955. 560, 127 S.Ct. U.S. it de years after until plemented necessary to 2008— “more” the that contends J.A. acceptance. industry-wide manded across claim boycott group SD3’s nudge that concerned were also 92. Defendants identifica- complaint’s is the line the goal actually increase could technology new the time, and place, particular “the tion of of blade the use injuries, discourage hand initially boycott the in which manner in “kickback” to address and fail guards, meeting separate describing a formed, luke the Despite 101. J.A. juries. for held manufacturers] [among table saw royalty rate its reception, SD3 set warm Insti- Tool the Power during purpose a prices, 8% of wholesale approximately meeting.” 2001 annual October tute’s operating for manufacturers costly gamble (cid:127) omitted). This, we (citation Ante at profit always uncertain and often thin on com- SawStop’s of told, heart “the is 1; For J.A. 86. Br. Response margins. Ante at plaint.” reasons, consistent with it was all these trade association lawful perfectly But reject interest best manufacturer’s each a particu- on place take in fact meetings do and undeveloped, expensive, unproven, a particular for time particular at a day lar Each defen technology. unsafe possibly majority’s assertion the And purpose. busi at this easily have arrived could dant inoff broke manufacturers saw that table on its own. decision ness of a the course meeting” “separate a the end Fairs at recalls World’s One nothing more is trade convention larger of beginning and the nineteenth of ordinary conduct. of description a than al- held They were century. twentieth for a bar Indeed, be unusual it would serving as annually, most often most care conven- meeting, health association among competition a for brisk epicenter gathering industry-wide tion, any other produce countries participating specialized into more out to break not ad- technologically creative most of common matters to discuss subgroups now, then, It was exhibitions. vanced term not coin need We interest. fairs The unusual inventiveness. of time liability” to note discussion “breakout booths, tables, exhib- humming with were staple long been have sessions these off to show its, designed all and displays life, ma- and the professional business about buzz technologies -create new form of this made even now has jority products those Some products. new perilous. more communication larger a far spectacularly; succeeded simply con point behavior recognized cratered. have number Courts to take be able interests manufacturers should economic trary to defendants’ takes, time it after showing concerted action. account into plus factor become for an invention hype, initial See, v. HomeServices e.g., Hyland utility (6th and marketable practical Cir. America, Inc., F.3d one injury expose consumers not any defendant that would 2014). see how It is hard majori- liability. The manufacturers against its economic or case in this acted lag cognizance however, takes no that, ty, boldly but asserts SD3 interest. exists, always as it time, which manufacturers table saw all boycott, in the but development has, product technology. J.A. licensed highly most touted medical discoveries. liability and antitrust law each serve dif- Yet lag consciousness of time is something ferent and valid interests. Nothing is to be no prudent business without. gained by scrambling them in way has the two bodies of law working at cross Ignoring many practical reasons for purposes such that manufacturers are for- offers, declining SD3’s majority hones bidden, pain of antitrust liability, from product on the fear of liability as the discussing and weighing product liability key motivation behind defendants’ concerns. *38 boycott. This, Ante at 481-32. we are told, “why.”1 is the Ante 431. Defen- D. dants counter that no manufacturer rushed adopt SawStop technology even after By casting product liability concerns as began SD3 producing its own saws in 2004. the driver of anticompetitive conduct, the Response Br. 32. The majority answers majority risks curtailing communication plaintiffs’ behalf: SD3 remained too critical to technological development. We small a player in the table saw market to would seemingly want manufacturers to be pose a significant products threat in liabili- concerned about products liability. Prod- ty suits. Ante at 431. Yet the earlier ucts liability law exists to make businesses products liability cases involving SawStop cognizant of the products risks their create technology focused on the “mechanical fea- and to encourage them to take steps to sibility,” share, not the market of a “safer avoid liability. such Open and honest dia- design.” alternative Osorio v. One World logue among competitors can help locate Inc., Technologies (1st product vulnerabilities and formulate solu- Cir.2011) (citation omitted). Different de- tions, hopefully leading to improved con- sign anywhere in features use are routine- sumer safety. But the majority forces the ly used comparatively products liability yet defendants into another a double bind: litigation. entry SD3’s into the market They product face liability suits either for should put have defendants at a serious refusing to use what alleges SD3 is a safer disadvantage in products liability suits. product or for adopting an prod- untested J.A. yet 90. And still defendants refused uct that could well fail to work as adver- to bite at product. SD3’s they Either tised. The industry have fool- been were never by motivated product liability ish not to discuss the risks way. either It concerns in place the first or those con- makes little sense to dampen such discus- cerns were outweighed by other draw- sions prematurely the specter of anti- (too costly, backs ineffective, unsafe) or liability. trust licensing SawStop technology. Working together, whether cooperating course,

Of if manufacturers miscalculate joint venture or simply exchanging failing adopt safer technologies, prod- information at a trade meeting, association ucts liability lies in But products wait. can not only save industry participants— point, In making this majority planned credits defendants "to use whatever technol- scraps testimony from cherry- David Peot ogy prevent we felt would be best to table saw picked by ignores SD3 while it the district accidents. There were no limitations that I diligent court's review of the full trial tran- can way remember one or the other.” J.A. script, full, Ante at 431. When read in Peot’s discrepancy 140. This plain- emblematic testimony joint focused on defendants’ ven- attempt tiffs’ conjure and of ture, years formed group after the majority's willingness to overlook the boycott. J.A. 134-40. revealing Far holes narrative. deal, collective refusal to Peot clarified that Industry, Manufacturing money Semiconductor consumers—time and therefore (2014). 555, 559 1990-2010, Pol’y that no 43 Res. innovations spawn also can

but alone. achieved could participant ad- Standard-setting bodies offer similar develop- product which speed Given the Tube & Conduit Allied vantages. See special- increased and the moves ment now Head, Inc., U.S. Indian Corp. v. industries, “much innova- many ization of 500-01, 100 L.Ed.2d 108 S.Ct. lateral and require likely to today is tion make (1988). Compatibility standards well as vertical linkages as horizontal making parts more efficient markets J. & David M. Jorde Thomas ones.” benefitting produc- both interchangeable, Hori- Analysis Teece, Reason Rule change want who ers and consumers De- Agreements Arrangements: zontal Farrell Joseph shop around. products Com- Innovation signed Advance Standardization, Saloner, Com- & Garth L.J. Antitrust Technology, 61 mercialize Innovation, Rand J. Econ. & patibility, (1993). Particularly for smaller 579, 590 (1985). devised properly And 70, 70-71 patent- inor limited resources firms with *39 provide consumers both safety standards of- industries, conclaves professional heavy safety and minimum guarantee some infor- acquiring means of fer an efficient adopt albeit to safer encourage producers world, complex In an ever more mation. features, buoyed by the expensive more to the vital sharing information becomes these may realize consumers hope that highly so crucial perspectives holistic they expensive more because are products To keep pace. companies specialized help thus use. The standards safer assists end, information sharing shoddy prod- or unsafe cheaper, prevent increasingly com- in industry American try- undercutting manufacturers ucts from marketplace.. global petitive These welfare. consumer ing protect industry-wide example, one but To take and to consumers many other benefits and driving force has been coordination stan- can accrue from alike competition in American semi- technological progress dardization. In semi- manufacturing. conductor a consor- producers established conductor recognizing majority for I commend gathered pooled resources tium standard-setting of the virtues some then a what was from across information so, doing 435. organizations.2 Ante & M. Jorde industry. Thomas stagnant however, caught in a contradiction: gets Innovation, Teece, Cooperation David J. monopolis- acknowledges the majority 1, 35 Antitrust, Berkeley Tech. L.J. standard-setting con- plaintiffs’ tic aims then, manu- (1989). Since semiconductor eye to a blind claim but turns spiracy them the size of only reduced facturers driving impulse anticompetitive same (nm) to 45 500 nanometers circuits—from Compare allegation. boycott group, SD3’s quadrupled than they also more nm—but opin- 431. Its ante at at 436-38 with ante transistors, amplifiers, the number totality of what comprehend ion fails Pa- Kapoor & Rahul chips. semiconductor here. to achieve aims SD3 Interplay McGrath, Unmaski-ng the tia J. use entirety, plaintiffs’ taken its When R & D Technology Evolution Between of even the heart law strikes of antitrust the Global Evidence Collaboration: from claims rejecting SD3’s in Part III majority concur Part Vi of I concur in thus simply of defendants against a number challenge the ac- dismissing opinion SD3’s nothing conspiracy through lumped into Un- standard-setting organization, tions of allegations. conclusory Laboratories, (UL). than I also more Inc. derwriters the most constructive coopera horizontal complaint in which a supposed group boy- tion. I recognize that collaboration may- cott fell apart for so many reasons and in collusion, shade into very evil that the so many directions. Even applying the Sherman Act was designed to prevent. generous most assumptions, one is hard See, e.g., Soc’y Am. Eng’rs, Inc. v. pressed to a plausible find group boycott of Mech. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 102 S.Ct. claim in defendants’ divergent and market- (1982) 72 L.Ed.2d 330 (finding liabili explicable all, conduct. After SD3 has not ty competitors where incorrectly declared been excluded the marketplace. Its product unsafe to market); exclude it from SawStop technology is currently available Burners, Radiant Inc. v. Peoples Gas through its own production. Though it Light Co., & Coke 364 U.S. 81 S.Ct. would have liked to corner the market (1961) 5 L.Ed.2d 358 (finding valid through industry’s leading manufactur- cause of action when competitors excluded ers and standard-setting organization, it product innovative from market through had right no to establish what was effect non-objective standards). safety a monopoly all its own. SD3 aims to force all manufacturers, through group boy- yet And many may minds be better than claim, cott to adopt its technology at its ventures, one. Joint standard-setting or- prices and to have the industry’s standard- ganizations, and trade association meetings setting organization do the same. may allow individuals special- different ties to benefit from each expertise. other’s It is disappointing that such a skimpy These fora may prove invaluable for effi- complaint pressing such anticompetitive *40 cient and effective product development. ends should be allowed to traduce the Those efficiencies in turn generate reduced Twombly standard and coopt antitrust law costs of doing that can business then be precise for the monopolistic purposes that passed along to the consumer the form the Sherman Act was designed prevent. prices reduced and better products. The fallout will disable American compa- Some endeavors, forms of collaborative in nies from all of cooperative sorts communi- words, other are not so conspi- inherently cation, from the most innocuous to the ratorial their benefits can over- productive. most If the complaint had looked. majority ignores all this spun even a remotely plausible narrative rush to flatten pleading standards, make impermissible collusion, I should have perilous, communications and consign anti- been the first to wave it through the trust law to isolationist ends. It is an odd Twombly See, gates. e.g., Robertson v. time for the majority to assume a more Estate, (4th Pines Sea Real 679 F.3d 278 isolationist stance. It raises the risk that Cir.2012). IBut cannot conspire with my law will render American compa- colleagues in the demise of the Twombly nies comparatively incommunicative and decision. For the above, stated reasons I thus at competitive disadvantage respectfully dissent. very global time commercial interactions are becoming more commonplace.

III.

I have seldom read a complaint where so

many defendants were named com-

plaint (twenty-two) and so few were actual- (four).

ly discussed I have seldom seen a

Case Details

Case Name: SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date Published: Sep 15, 2015
Citation: 801 F.3d 412
Docket Number: 14-1746
Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.
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