YURY RINSKY, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, INC., Defendant, Appellant.
No. 18-1302
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
March 8, 2019
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
Before Barron and Selya, Circuit Judges, and Katzmann,* Judge.
Sawnie A. McEntire, with whom Benjamin M. McGovern, Holland & Knight LLP, Ralph T. Lepore, III, Paula D. Taylor, and Parsons McEntire McCleary PLLC were on brief, for appellant.
Mark D. Szal, with whom Szal Law Group LLC, John W. Dennehy, and Dennehy Law were on brief, for appellee.
KATZMANN, Judge. In this diversity action, Appellee Yury Rinsky (“Rinsky“), a citizen of Massachusetts, brought suit against his former employer, the New York-based real estate firm Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. (“C&W“), claiming that C&W impermissibly fired him because of his age and disability. C&W removed Rinsky‘s suit from the Massachusetts Superior Court to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts (“district court“) in Boston, which applied the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL“),
I.
A. Evidence at Trial.
Rinsky began working as a senior systems analyst for C&W‘s New York City office in 1988. Between 2009 and 2015, Rinsky worked as a software engineer for the company‘s AS/400 computer system. Beginning in 2012, he worked three to four days a week remotely from his home in New Jersey and spent the remainder of the work week in the New York City office. Rinsky also occasionally worked remotely while visiting his daughter in Boston. Rinsky received performance reviews of “exceeds expectations” and “excellent” throughout his 27-year tenure with C&W.
In December 2014, Rinsky and his wife purchased a home in Winchester, Massachusetts. Rinsky testified at trial that he did not initially intend to move there right away, but rather that he and his wife planned to retire there in a few years to be closer to their daughter and grandchild. In March 2015, Rinsky‘s broker listed his home in New Jersey for sale. Rinsky learned that same month that his boss, Colin Reid, was transferring to the Miami office. Rinsky testified that he then decided to ask Reid about the possibility of transferring to the Boston office, and that when he raised the question, Reid replied that they would “have plenty of time to talk about it later.”
Rinsky then received an offer on his New Jersey home. The offer included the following lease-back provision: “Sellers will have the option to lease the house back at the lease market value until buying another property.” Rinsky called Reid to inform him of the offer and again inquired about the possibility of transferring to the Boston office. During the phone call, Reid approved of Rinsky‘s transfer to Boston but said he needed to check with his boss, Andrew Hamilton. Reid also noted that Rinsky primarily worked remotely anyway. A few days later, Rinsky asked Reid about Hamilton‘s response, but Reid informed Rinsky that he had not yet talked to Hamilton about his transfer request. Rinsky testified that a few days later, however, Reid told him that he had spoken with Hamilton, that Hamilton said that he
Reid disputed Rinsky‘s timeline at trial and testified that the first he had heard of Rinsky‘s relocation was April 30, 2015. He testified that he told Rinsky that the transfer request would need to go through a process, requiring approvals from three other company managers, and warned Rinsky that his own transfer had taken months.
On May 14, Hamilton sent Reid a meeting request to “discuss the situation Yury has put us in with his home purchase in Boston.” On Sunday, May 17, Rinsky emailed Reid:
As discussed I will be moving to Boston on 5/27/2015 for family reasons and need to take 4 personal days after Memorial Day (5/26 - 5/29). I am confident that I can continue to work to the best of my ability remotely. I look forward to sitting down with you and coming up with an arrangement that benefits all involved. Thanks.
Reid replied, “Ok, we will talk on Tuesday.”
Hamilton emailed his boss and senior managing director, Leif Maiorini, on May 27 with six steps to replace Rinsky, including hiring a new employee, retaining Rinsky for about nine weeks for knowledge transfer, and working with the Human Resources manager on Rinsky‘s exit. Later that same week, Rinsky began working remotely from his Winchester, Massachusetts home. On June 2, a C&W employee emailed Rinsky to ask if he would need his desktop in Boston, to which Rinsky replied, “I will need my desktop in a couple of weeks when I get a cubicle in [the] Boston office.” Reid replied, “Pls [sic] wait until I am back in NY tomorrow. Yury might be getting new equipment for Boston, since I have an AS400 consultant sitting there next week.” Rinsky continued to work remotely from his Massachusetts home.
Over the next three weeks, senior management exchanged several emails regarding Rinsky‘s position, his move to Boston, and the need to terminate him. On June 15, Maiorini emailed Hamilton and Reid to say, “we need to move forward with Yuri‘s [sic] termination as quickly as possible. The position that Yuri [sic] fills is located in NYC. Given that he left without notifying his manager or HR is unacceptable and we need to take action as [sic] quickly.” The next day, the Human Resources manager emailed Hamilton and Reid sample resignation language to share with Rinsky. On Monday, June 22, Hamilton and Reid called Rinsky and asked him to report to New York City for work five days a week, beginning the next day, or, in the alternative, to resign from his position. Rinsky protested, sending emails to senior management in which he explained that he believed his job transfer to Boston had been approved. After Rinsky opted not to resign, C&W terminated him on July 10.
Rinsky was 63 years old when he was terminated, and C&W replaced him with an approximately 48-year-old employee. Hamilton and Maiorini were in their forties, while Reid was 61 years old. C&W also treated the request for a transfer of another employee differently from the way it treated Rinsky‘s request. In May 2015, another C&W employee, Jay Leiser,1
B. Background and Procedural History.
On January 15, 2016, Rinsky, then living in Winchester, Massachusetts, filed a complaint in Massachusetts Superior Court, asserting claims against his former employer, C&W, for age discrimination and disability discrimination, both in violation of
Noting that Rinsky was a citizen of Massachusetts, C&W was a corporation organized under the law of the state of New York, with a principal place of business in New York, and the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000, C&W removed the case on diversity grounds to the federal district court. As required by
Citing the Massachusetts “functional choice-of-law approach that responds to the interests of the parties, the States involved, and the interstate system as a whole,” C&W argued that New York law should apply because New York “has the most significant relationship” to the case. See Bushkin Assocs. v. Raytheon Co., 473 N.E.2d 662, 668 (Mass. 1985); City of Haverhill v. George Brox, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 138, 144 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999). According to C&W, Massachusetts was only connected to the case because the plaintiff moved there on his own accord. Moreover, the termination took place in New York and was the key event that engendered this suit. C&W represented that the New York counterpart to the Massachusetts discrimination statute (
Rinsky responded that the statute most analogous to the Massachusetts statute was the NYCHRL,
The district court ruled that:
[a]fter reviewing the parties’ supplemental briefing [ECF Nos. 45, 46], the Court concludes that New York law applies to this case, and that New York law does not permit Plaintiff to bring common-law claims for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation or promissory estoppel. The Court further concludes that Plaintiff may bring his discrimination claims pursuant to the New York City Human Rights Law,
Admin. Code of City of New York § 8-101 et seq. , which provides for the recovery of punitive damages and attorneys’ fees. Therefore, the Court will allow Plaintiff to introduce evidence of damages in accordance with this statute. The parties are granted leave to supplement their proposed jury instructions.3
The district court also determined that the NYCHRL, which provides for punitive
The morning of the commencement of the trial and delivery of opening statements by counsel, just as the evidence was about to be introduced, C&W‘s counsel stated to the court:
I don‘t think this particular point has been made clear. C&W objects to the New York City Human Rights Law being applied. I know it‘s in Your Honor‘s order from last Friday. Our position on this is what was pled was state law claims. [Rinsky] availed himself of the MCAD. He availed himself of
M.G.L. 151B . These are state law claims. There is a New York counterpart toM.G.L. 151B , and that is the New York State Human Rights Law. And our position is although Your Honor has already ruled on this, it would be the state law claims that would be the analog to the Massachusetts claims that have been pled.
The court replied: “Okay. That wasn‘t clear. So thank you.”
Following a five-day trial, the jury returned its verdict. Although Rinsky did not prevail on his claim of disability discrimination, the jury found in his favor on his age discrimination claim, awarding $425,000 in compensatory damages and $850,000 in punitive damages. After the verdict was rendered, C&W filed, pursuant to
C. Jurisdiction.
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under
II.
C&W argues that the district court impermissibly applied the NYCHRL because the impact of Rinsky‘s termination was felt in Massachusetts, not New York City, as would be required for the protections of the NYCHRL to apply; that the district court improperly instructed the jury; and that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury‘s verdict. We discuss each issue in turn.
A. Applicability of the NYCHRL.
On appeal, C&W launches two separate challenges to the applicability of the NYCHRL. Neither is meritorious.
1. Pleading.
C&W argues on appeal that Rinsky waived his NYCHRL claim “by failing to plead a city-based cause of action (or amend his pleadings in order to do so) at any point during the proceedings below.” We conclude that this claim has not been preserved for appellate review and that in any event it fails on the merits.
At the outset, we note that the NYCHRL claim is in the case only because after C&W removed the action from Massachusetts state court to federal court, C&W requested that the district court
C&W‘s pleading claim also fails on the merits. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern an action once it is removed from the state court.
We also note that
Here, contrary to C&W‘s assertions, the NYCHRL claim was not an unlitigated claim “tease[d] [] out of adduced facts.” Id. On these facts, C&W has shown no prejudice arising out of the failure to replead, nor can it assert successfully that it was denied notice of what claim was being litigated. Although it would have been advisable as a matter of “clean” litigation practice for the district court to have ordered repleading, repleading was not required here.6
2. Justiciability.
C&W alleges that the district court improperly concluded that the NYCHRL applied to Rinsky‘s claims because he lived and worked in Massachusetts at the time C&W terminated him, and thus the impact of the adverse employment decision was not felt in New York City. Therefore, according to C&W, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We are unpersuaded by C&W‘s contentions.
a. Basic Concepts.
At the outset, we note that C&W confuses the very different concepts of subject matter jurisdiction and justiciability. “[T]he question whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute, as a general matter, is substantively different from the question whether a district court has, or has acquired, the power to adjudicate a particular dispute.” AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holding Co. v. Bank of America, 626 F.3d 699, 720 (2d Cir. 2010). “It is well-settled that subject matter jurisdiction ‘concerns a court‘s competence to adjudicate a particular category of cases.‘” Id. (quoting Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (2006)); see also Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 643 (2002) (noting that subject matter jurisdiction refers to “the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case” (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env‘t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (emphasis omitted))). Subject matter jurisdiction “poses a ‘whether[]’ question: Has the Legislature empowered the court to hear cases of a certain genre?” Schmidt, 546 U.S. at 316. Cf. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) (condemning the use of “‘drive-by jurisdictional rulings‘” that conflate a federal court‘s subject matter jurisdiction with “the question whether the federal court had authority to adjudicate the claim in suit” (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 91)).
Here, there can be no doubt the federal district court has original subject matter jurisdiction under
We have recognized a formulation of justiciability that relates to whether there is “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [the case].” Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). Thus, whether the elements of the legal claims in dispute have been satisfied -- that is, whether the claims are cognizable and thus justiciable -- is another matter to which we now turn.
Throughout trial, C&W contended that it terminated Rinsky because he moved to Massachusetts without first receiving proper approval to transfer his employment to the C&W of Massachusetts (“C&W of MA“) office in Boston. C&W argues that the NYCHRL did not apply to Rinsky‘s claims because he lived and worked in Massachusetts at the time C&W terminated him, and thus the impact of the decision was felt only outside New York City and not within the reach of the statute. We disagree.
The highest court in New York, the Court of Appeals, has held that when determining whether plaintiffs can bring a claim pursuant to the NYCHRL, the question is whether the impact of an alleged discriminatory decision was felt within New York City. Hoffman v. Parade Publ‘n, 933 N.E.2d 744, 746 (N.Y. 2010); see also Vangas v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 823 F.3d 174, 182-83 (2d Cir. 2016); Robles v. Cox & Co., 841 F. Supp. 2d 615, 624 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). “[T]he impact requirement does not exclude all nonresidents from its protection; rather, it expands those protections to nonresidents who work in the city, while concomitantly narrowing the class of nonresident plaintiffs who may invoke its protection.” Hoffman, 933 N.E.2d at 747. In other words, the impact requirement “confines the protections of the NYCHRL to those who are meant to be protected -- those who work in the city.” Id. In contrast, the fact that the alleged discriminatory action occurs in New York City is not enough to support a claim under the NYCHRL; “although the locus of the decision to terminate may be a factor to consider, the success or failure of an NYCHRL claim should not be solely dependent on something as arbitrary as where the termination decision was made.” Id.
b. Impact Under the NYCHRL.
In light of these tenets, the present claim appears fully justiciable. It is clear that Rinsky‘s residence in Massachusetts does not either preclude him from bringing a claim under the NYCHRL or support the conclusion that the impact of his termination was not felt in New York City. See id. Nor does the fact that he teleworked from Massachusetts. C&W asserts, unpersuasively, that “the only rational interpretation of the jury‘s verdict is that it rejected C&W‘s theory of job abandonment
The
We find instructive the analysis presented in Wexelberg v. Project Brokers LLC, No. 13 Civ. 7904, 2014 WL 2624761 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In that case, the plaintiff had worked in the defendant‘s New York City office for six weeks, followed by five weeks of working remotely for the New York City office from his New Jersey home. Id. at *10. The court determined that the plaintiff could bring claims under the
C&W contends that the district court committed reversible error in its causation and punitive damages instructions. We do not discern merit in these claims.
1. Causation.
C&W argues that the district court failed to instruct the jury properly regarding the substantive differences between the
The relevant portion of the jury instruction is as follows:
It is unlawful for an employer or its agents to terminate an employee based on his age or because of a disability. In this case, in order for the plaintiff to recover, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his age, a disability, or both was a determining or substantial factor in Defendant Cushman & Wakefield‘s decision to terminate him. . . .
Age and/or disability are determining factors if Plaintiff would not have been terminated but for his age and/or disability. . . .
Evidence of pretext standing alone may but not need support an inference of unlawful bias. Therefore, if the plaintiff has persuaded you that the defendant‘s explanation for terminating the plaintiff is false, you may but are not required to infer that defendant is covering up a discriminatory intent, motive, or state of mind, although plaintiff must still show that age or disability was a substantial factor.
Additionally, C&W complains of the question posed in the special verdict form asking whether Rinsky “prove[d] by a preponderance of the evidence that his age was a substantial factor in [C&W‘s] decision to terminate him?”
Claims of preserved instructional error are reviewed under a split standard. Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 55 (1st Cir. 2018). “Questions as to whether jury instructions capture the essence of the applicable law are reviewed de novo, while questions as to whether the court‘s choice of phraseology in crafting its jury instructions is unfairly prejudicial are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Id. (citing DeCaro v. Hasbro, Inc., 580 F.3d 55, 61 (1st Cir. 2009)). The abuse of discretion analysis “focuses on whether the instruction ‘adequately illuminate[d] the law applicable to the controverted issues in the case without unduly complicating matters or misleading the jury.‘” Shervin v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc., 804 F.3d 23, 47 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Testa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 173, 175 (1st Cir. 1998)).
As we have discussed, the
If anything, the district court‘s instructions provided a higher burden of proof than was necessary in stating that “[a]ge and or disability are determining factors if [Rinsky] would not have been terminated but for his age and/or disability.” Such error was not prejudicial. Because the more lenient “substantial factor” standard is appropriate under the
“Jury instructions are intended to furnish a set of directions composing, in the aggregate, the proper legal standards to be applied by lay jurors in determining the issues that they must resolve in a particular case.” Teixeira v. Town of Coventry, 882 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. DeStefano, 59 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1995)). Here, the instructions, in aggregate, describe the appropriate substantial factor standard. Thus, “[g]iven the satisfactory nature of the district court‘s jury instructions as a whole, we discern no merit in the appellant‘s claims of error.” Id. at 15.
Finally, we address C&W‘s contention that the court should have delivered C&W‘s requested jury instruction:
Plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his age . . . was the “but-for” cause of defendant‘s decision to terminate his employment. The issue in an action for age . . . discrimination is not whether defendant acted with good cause, but whether its business decision would have been made but for a discriminatory motive.
“When . . . a party assigns error to the failure to give a requested instruction, the threshold inquiry is whether the requested instruction was correct as a matter of law.” Shervin, 804 F.3d at 47 (citing Elliott v. S.D. Warren Co., 134 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1998)). “If that threshold is met, the challenger must make two subsequent showings: first that the proposed instruction is ‘not substantially incorporated into the charge as rendered’ and second that it is ‘integral to an important point in the case.‘” Franchina, 881 F.3d at 55-56 (quoting White v. N.H. Dept. of Corr., 221 F.3d 254, 263 (1st Cir. 2000)). Here, as discussed above, the applicable standard for the
2. Punitive Damages.
C&W contends that the district court‘s punitive damages instructions to the jury constituted error for two reasons. First, according to C&W, the
Second, C&W argues that, even assuming arguendo that consideration of punitive damages under the
Although uncertainty in the amount of damages does not bar recovery and mathematical precision is not required, you must not speculate, conjecture, or guess in awarding damages. A damages award must be based on just and reasonable inferences from the evidence.
. . . .
In addition to awarding damages to compensate the plaintiff, you may but are not required to award plaintiff punitive damages if you find the acts of the defendant were wanton and reckless or malicious. The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the plaintiff but to punish the defendant and thereby discourage the defendant and others from acting in a similar way in the future. An act is malicious when it is done deliberately with knowledge of the plaintiff‘s rights and with intent to interfere fear [sic] with those rights. An act is wanton and reckless when it demonstrates conscious indifference and utter disregard of its effect upon the health, safety, and rights of others. If you find that the defendant‘s acts were not wanton or reckless or malicious, you may not award punitive damages. On the other
hand, if you find the defendant‘s acts were wanton or reckless or malicious, you may award punitive damages.
After the trial concluded and briefing on the post-trial motions was completed, “consistent with the New York City Council‘s directive to construe the New York City Human Rights Law liberally,” Chauca v. Abraham, 89 N.E.3d 475, 477 (N.Y. 2017), the New York Court of Appeals rejected the heightened level of culpability set forth under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, that had been imposed by Second Circuit precedent. Id.9 Rather, it ruled that the appropriate, common-law-derived standard, as articulated in Home Ins. Co. v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 550 N.E.2d 930, 934-35 (N.Y. 1990), was “whether the wrongdoer has engaged in discrimination with willful or wanton negligence, or recklessness, or a ‘conscious disregard of the rights of others or conduct so reckless so as to amount to such disregard.‘” Chauca, 89 N.E.3d at 481 (quoting Home Ins. Co., 550 N.E.2d at 932). Thus, as it turned out, the jury instruction challenged in the instant appeal largely tracked the language set forth by the New York Court of Appeals, and on appeal C&W does not contend that the standard to be used for determining liability for punitive damages as charged by the judge here was in error. Rather, C&W argues that the punitive damages instruction was in error because it did not reflect the plaintiff‘s burden of offering “clear and convincing evidence” in order to obtain punitive damages, which, according to C&W, was required under New York law.
We are unpersuaded by this argument. First, to provide context, we note that the appropriate burden of proof for punitive damages generally is a matter of debate within New York‘s courts. See N.Y. Prac., Com. Litig. In New York State Courts § 49:7 (4th ed. 2018). Indeed, the New York Pattern Jury Instructions “does not include a statement of the standard of proof that must be satisfied for an award of punitive damages because the Appellate Divisions are split on the issue” of whether “clear and convincing evidence” or “preponderance of the evidence” is the appropriate standard. N.Y. Pattern Jury Inst. - Civil 2:278 (Comment, Dec. 2018 Update).10 New York‘s highest court has not addressed the split. Writing in 1997, then Judge Sotomayor observed that “[t]he federal and state court cases on the question are mired in a morass of ambiguity.” Greenbaum v. Svenska Handelsbanken, N.Y., 979 F. Supp. 973, 981-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Surveying the landscape, including New York Court of Appeals and Second Circuit jurisprudence, the court in Greenbaum determined that the appropriate standard is “preponderance of the evidence.”
The issue before us, however, is a narrower one: is clear and convincing evidence required to award punitive damages under the
We turn for resolution of the burden of proof question before us to the New York Court of Appeals decision that is now the touchstone of our understanding for punitive damages under the
[I]n 2005, subsequent to Farias, the City Council passed the Restoration Act, amending the Administrative Code of the City of New York to ensure that “[t]he provisions of [the
NYCHRL ] shall be construed liberally . . . regardless of whether federal or New York state civil and human rights laws . . . have been SO construed” (Administrative Code § 8-130 [a] ). Expressing concern that theNYCHRL was being too strictly construed, the amendment established thatsimilarly worded state or federal statutes may be used as interpretive aids only to the extent that the counterpart provisions are viewed “as a floor below which the City‘s Human Rights law cannot fall, rather than a ceiling above which the local law cannot rise,” and only to the extent that those state or federal law decisions may provide guidance as to the “uniquely broad and remedial purposes” of the local law (Local Law No. 85 [2005] of City of NY §§ 1, 7). In a report on the amendments (see Rep of Comm on Gen Welfare, Aug. 17, 2005, 2005 NY City Legis Ann at 537), the Committee on General Welfare rejected prior reasoning by this Court that the City Council “would need to amend the City HRL to specifically depart from a federal doctrine if it wanted to do so” (Bennett v. Health Mgt. Sys., Inc., 936 N.Y.S.2d 112 [2011]; McGrath v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 821 N.E.2d 519 [2004]). As a result, this Court has acknowledged that all provisions of the NYCHRL must be construed “broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible” (Albunio v. City of New York, 947 N.E.2d 135 [2011]).
Chauca, 89 N.E.3d at 90. Because the New York Court of Appeals has determined that the standard for recovering punitive damages under the
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
C&W contends that the district court erred “by rejecting C&W‘s post-verdict challenges to awards of compensatory and punitive damages that were unsupported and against the weight of the evidence.” C&W argues that Rinsky fell far short of meeting his burden to show that age discrimination was the “but-for” cause of termination. As discussed supra pp. 18-23, however, the
We review de novo the district court‘s post-verdict denial of the
C&W has failed to meet its burden of showing either that there was no legally sufficient basis for the verdict or that the district court abused its discretion. We thus affirm the district court‘s denial of JMOL and the motion for a new trial.
As we have noted, C&W contends that Rinsky was fired because he moved to Boston without its approval, and then refused to return to New York when C&W asked him to do so. C&W argues that “although Rinsky premised his entire case on the notion that C&W created a ‘pretext’ to terminate him, there is not one iota of evidence in the record to explain why C&W would have been motivated to do so.” C&W further contends that “[t]here also was no direct evidence in the record” to show age discrimination and provides a litany of reasons as to why it would not have made sense for Rinsky‘s age to motivate his termination, from his “excellent performance reviews” to his experience with the AS/400 system and the age of his replacement. C&W, in sum, asserts that the lack of direct evidence on the record plainly showing age discrimination creates an evidentiary insufficiency, entitling C&W either to JMOL or a new trial.
C&W, however, uses the wrong standard. As the district court noted in its order and memorandum denying C&W‘s motion, the
In amending the
NYCHRL , the City Council expressed the view that theNYCHRL had been “construed too narrowly” and therefore “underscore[d] that the provisions of New York City‘s Human Rights Law are to be construed independently from similar or identicalprovisions of New York state or federal statutes.” Restoration Act § 1. To bring about this change in the law, the Act established two new rules of construction. First, it created a “one-way ratchet,” by which interpretations of state and federal civil rights statutes can serve only “‘as a floor below which the City‘s Human Rights law cannot fall.‘” Loeffler, 582 F.3d 268, 278 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Restoration Act § 1). Second, it amended the NYCHRL to require that its provisions “be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal or New York State civil and human rights laws, including those laws with provisions comparably-worded to provisions of this title[,] have been so construed.” Restoration Act § 7 (amendingN.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-130 ).
While noting that the Restoration Act, amending the
Discriminatory intent can be difficult to prove. In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), the Supreme Court held that the McDonnell Douglas framework is applicable to federal age discrimination claims (“Reeves/McDonnell Douglas“), setting forth when it is appropriate for a jury to infer discrimination if it declines to credit the employer‘s explanation for an adverse employment action. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143-44. “Proof that the defendant‘s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it can be quite persuasive.” Id. at 147. A jury may infer unlawful discrimination where there is (1) a prima facie case of discrimination and (2) “sufficient evidence to find that the employer‘s asserted justification is false.” Id. at 148. This does not mean “that such a
Whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in any particular case will depend on a number of factors . . . includ[ing] the strength of the plaintiff‘s prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer‘s explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer‘s case . . . .
Id. at 148-49. In such cases, a court should not order JMOL for the defendant absent sufficient evidence “to conclusively demonstrate that [the employer‘s] actions were not discriminatorily motivated.” Id. at 153 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978)).
As discussed above, one way for a plaintiff to establish discrimination under the
(i) at the relevant time the plaintiff was a member of the protected class; (ii) the plaintiff was qualified for the job; (iii) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and (iv) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, such as the fact that the plaintiff was replaced by someone “substantially younger.”
Roge v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting O‘Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996)) (applying the standard for a prima facie case of racial discrimination by an employer, set forth in McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 793, to an age discrimination case); see also Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2005). At 63 years old, Rinsky was indisputably a member of the protected class. Both parties, moreover, agree that Rinsky was qualified for his job, receiving “excellent” performance reviews, and that C&W terminated him. The fourth requirement of a prima facie showing is met by substantially the same record evidence as that of the finding that C&W‘s non-discriminatory justification was false, including C&W‘s replacement of Rinsky with a “substantially younger” employee, fifteen years his junior, see O‘Connor, 517 U.S. at 313, and buttressed by substantially the same record evidence discussed below supporting the finding that C&W‘s non-discriminatory justification was false. We conclude that Rinsky established a prima facie case of age discrimination.
The second element of the Reeves/McDonnell Douglas inquiry is also satisfied, as there is sufficient evidence on the record for the jury to find that C&W‘s justification was false. Making inferences most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find from the evidence of record that Rinsky had long worked remotely for C&W, C&W knew of Rinky‘s intent to move to Boston, C&W treated other employees requesting transfers differently, and C&W never warned Rinsky that his move to Boston could result in termination. Rinsky was the
With the first two elements met, we then must examine, as the district court rightly stated, “whether the record ‘conclusively revealed’ an alternative, non-discriminatory reason for the employer‘s decision.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49. On C&W‘s side of the ledger, the record does indicate that Reid was close to Rinsky in age, Rinsky was skilled at his position, and senior management had concerns about the number of employees working remotely. However, nothing on the record conclusively shows that C&W‘s motivation for firing Rinsky was non-discriminatory. The district court noted “the lack of any indication in the record of an obvious, alternative, non-discriminatory explanation for Plaintiff‘s firing” and found “the jury permissibly inferred that Defendant‘s continued insistence that it fired Plaintiff for moving without permission was covering up an impermissible motive, even where there was little direct evidence of age discrimination.” Considering both C&W‘s burden to show conclusively the non-discriminatory reason for Rinsky‘s termination and our obligation to weight our review of the record “toward preservation of the jury verdict,” we conclude that the record provides an insufficient basis for us to overturn the district court‘s denial of JMOL. Crowe, 334 F.3d at 134. The district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion, as the evidence substantially supports its finding that Rinsky satisfied the age discrimination analysis under Reeves/McDonnell Douglas.
As we have noted, apart from the more stringent federal McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff may also establish a claim of age discrimination in violation of the
The McDonnell Douglas framework and the mixed motive framework diverge only after the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination . . . and the defense has responded to that prima facie case by presenting admissible
evidence of “legitimate, independent, and nondiscriminatory reasons to support its employment decision” (Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 N.Y.3d 295, 305 [2004] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
At that point, under McDonnell Douglas, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce evidence tending to “prove that the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant were merely a pretext for discrimination.” (id.). By contrast, under the mixed motive analysis, the plaintiff may defeat the defendant‘s evidence of legitimate reasons for the challenged action by coming forward with evidence from which it could be found that “unlawful discrimination was one of the motivating factors, even if it was not the sole motivating factor, for [the] adverse employment decision” (Melman v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 98 A.D.3d 107, 127 [1st Dept.2012]).
Hamburg v. NYU Sch. of Med., 62 N.Y.S.3d 26, 32 (App. Div. 2017).
We have already concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that Rinsky established at trial a prima facie case of discrimination. We have further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the trial evidence “strongly suggested that [C&W]‘s asserted reason for firing [Rinsky] was false.” Thus, under a mixed motive theory of liability, the jury‘s verdict could also be sustained. In short, whether analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework or the mixed motive framework, we affirm the district court‘s denials of C&W‘s motions for JMOL and a new trial.
Finally, we are mindful of the “maximally protective” reach of the
III.
We uphold the district court‘s ruling denying C&W‘s motion for JMOL or a new trial, and we reject C&W‘s other assignments of error. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Notes
Alternatively, a plaintiff may also prevail in a
NYCHRL action “if he or she proves that unlawful discrimination was one of the motivating factors, even it was not the sole motivating factor for an adverse employment decision.” Melman v. Montefiore Med Ctr., 989 A.D.3d 107, 127 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). “If a plaintiff can prevail on a ‘mixed motive’ theory, it follows that he or she need not prove that the reasons proffered by the employer for the challenged action was actually false or entirely irrelevant.” Id. Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged action was “more likely than not based in whole or in part on discrimination.” Id. (quoting Aulicino v. N.Y.C. Dep‘t of Homeless Servs., 580 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 2009)).