Rinsky v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc.
918 F.3d 8
1st Cir.2019Background
- Rinsky, a 27-year C&W senior systems analyst, moved from New Jersey to Winchester, Massachusetts in 2015 and began working remotely for C&W’s New York office; he was 63 at termination.
- After notifying supervisors of his move and intending to transfer to the Boston office, management exchanged emails planning his replacement and terminated him after demanding he return to NYC or resign. C&W replaced him with a substantially younger employee.
- Rinsky sued in Massachusetts state court asserting age and disability discrimination (and common-law claims); C&W removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds. The district court applied New York law and held NYCHRL was the proper analog, dismissing the common-law claims.
- At trial the jury found for Rinsky on age discrimination under the NYCHRL, awarding $425,000 compensatory and $850,000 punitive damages; defendant moved for JMOL and a new trial, which the district court denied.
- On appeal C&W challenged (1) applicability of the NYCHRL, (2) jury instructions (causation and punitive damages burden), and (3) sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict. The First Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of NYCHRL (pleading/choice‑of‑law) | NYCHRL is the proper New York analog to Mass. law; removal and prior briefing gave fair notice so repleading unnecessary | Claim waived because Rinsky never pleaded a city‑based cause of action | Waiver not preserved on appeal; on merits NYCHRL applies and repleading was not required after removal |
| Applicability of NYCHRL (justiciability/impact) | NYCHRL protects nonresidents whose employment is tied to NYC; impact of decision was felt in NYC because employment centered there | NYCHRL inapplicable because Rinsky lived/worked in Massachusetts when terminated so impact not in NYC | NYCHRL covers this situation; employer cannot evade city law by lulling employees to work remotely outside NYC |
| Jury instruction — causation standard | Favor the NYCHRL motivating/substantial‑factor standard (age need only be a motivating factor) | District court should have instructed only the stricter NYSHRL "but‑for" causation standard | Court correctly instructed under NYCHRL; any inclusion of stricter language was harmless and not prejudicial |
| Punitive damages burden of proof | Punitive damages permitted under NYCHRL; no clear‑and‑convincing standard required | Punitive damages require clear and convincing proof under New York law | NYCHRL should be construed liberally; clear and convincing standard is not required for NYCHRL punitive awards; district court’s instruction was proper |
| Sufficiency of evidence (JMOL/new trial) | Circumstantial evidence, pretext, replacement by younger employee support mixed‑ motive or McDonnell Douglas inference of age discrimination | No direct evidence; employer reason (job abandonment) was non‑discriminatory and dispositive | Evidence sufficed under both mixed‑motive and Reeves/McDonnell Douglas frameworks; denial of JMOL and new trial affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2013) (NYCHRL must be construed liberally and independently from state/federal law)
- Chauca v. Abraham, 89 N.E.3d 475 (N.Y. 2017) (NY Court of Appeals defines punitive‑damages culpability standard under NYCHRL as willful/wanton negligence or recklessness)
- Hoffman v. Parade Publ’n, 933 N.E.2d 744 (N.Y. 2010) (NYCHRL applies when impact of discriminatory decision is felt in NYC; protects some nonresidents tied to NYC employment)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (McDonnell Douglas framework permits inference of discrimination where employer’s explanation is not credible)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (prima facie framework for disparate treatment claims)
- Butler v. Balolia, 736 F.3d 609 (1st Cir. 2013) (federal courts sitting in diversity must predict how state high court would decide unsettled state‑law questions)