PRESBYTERIAN CAMP AND CONFERENCE CENTERS, INC., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA BARBARA COUNTY, Respondent; DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY AND FIRE PROTECTION, Real Party in Interest.
S259850
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
December 27, 2021
Second Appellate District, Division Six, B297195; Santa Barbara County Superior Court, 18CV02968
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Jenkins, and Mauro, J.* concurred.
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
In June 2016, a wildfire burned nearly 7,500 acres of land across Santa Barbara County. Federal, state, and local authorities dispatched over 2,000 fire fighters to battle the blaze (designated the Sherpa Fire) and to protect the people and property it jeopardized. The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFire) spent over $12 million suppressing the fire, investigating the fire‘s cause, and pursuing reimbursement for the expenses it incurred in doing so. CalFire ultimately determined the Sherpa Fire had started on the property of Presbyterian Camp and Conference Centers, Inc. (Presbyterian), when Presbyterian‘s employee removed a smoldering log from a malfunctioning fireplace in one of Presbyterian‘s cabins.
Under
that — because the fire was not started by an employee‘s authorized or ratified act or by Presbyterian‘s failure to act — there was no basis to impose direct liability. The trial court overruled the demurrer,
The question before us is whether a corporation like Presbyterian can be held vicariously liable for the cost of suppressing fires that its agents or employees negligently or unlawfully set or allowed to escape. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, although our holding answers a narrower question than the one originally presented; we hold that sections
I.
A.
In 2016, Presbyterian owned property in rural Santa Barbara County, which it operated as Rancho La Sherpa and used to host camps and conferences.3 Presbyterian employed Charles Cook to reside at Rancho La Sherpa and oversee its operations.
On June 15, 2016, a fire in the fireplace of one of the Rancho La Sherpa cabins began to fill the cabin with smoke because of a chimney malfunction. In response to the smoke, Cook transported a smoldering log from the cabin‘s fireplace to an outdoor firepit. Burning embers from the log fell onto the dry vegetation surrounding the cabin and ignited a fire. That fire — the Sherpa Fire — spread rapidly to neighboring properties. Based on its investigation of how the fire began, CalFire concluded that numerous forms of negligence and misdemeanor fire safety violations contributed to the ignition and uncontrolled spread of the fire. These included the kindling of a fire in a malfunctioning fireplace, the failure to adequately maintain that fireplace, the transporting of a smoldering log over dry vegetation, the failure to clear vegetation within 100 feet of the cabins, the failure to provide smoke detectors, and the failure to provide fire extinguishers or adequate water sources.
B.
The dispute in this case centers around the chapter of the Health and Safety Code entitled “Liability in Relation to Fires.” As is relevant here, sections
Section
In relevant part, section
Finally, section
[“Any person who negligently, or in violation of the law, sets a fire, allows a fire to be set, or allows a fire kindled or attended by him to escape onto any forest“].) As described below, this case turns on the meaning of those changes: Presbyterian argues that the deletion of the cross-reference to section
C.
In the aftermath of the Sherpa Fire, CalFire filed a lawsuit against Presbyterian, Cook, and unnamed Doe defendants, seeking recovery of CalFire‘s fires suppression and investigation costs pursuant to
Presbyterian petitioned for a writ of mandate, which the Court of Appeal denied. (Presbyterian, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 152.)
The court expressly disagreed with the Howell majority, adopting instead the position advocated
We granted review to resolve the conflict between Howell and Presbyterian regarding whether or to what extent sections
Presbyterian further maintains that while elimination of the cross-reference to sections
We find Presbyterian‘s theory to be both an arbitrary interpretation of the law and one that is difficult to apply on a practical basis. As explained below, we are unpersuaded by Presbyterian‘s contention that the 1971 amendment‘s elimination of the cross-reference to sections
Presbyterian is ultimately asking us to create an ad hoc doctrine that would effectively limit corporate liability to: (1) negligent acts committed with the direction, authorization, or ratification of some sufficiently high-ranking corporate official; and (2) the corporation‘s negligent failures to act. And this novel approach to corporate liability, Presbyterian claims, was all determined and announced by merely deleting one statute‘s cross-reference to another statutory section. We decline to adopt this approach and instead conclude that sections
II.
A.
Respondeat superior has long been a bedrock doctrine of the common law. (See Gleason v. Seaboard Ry. (1929) 278 U.S. 349, 356 [“few doctrines of the law are more firmly established or more in harmony with accepted notions of social policy than that of the liability of the principal without fault of his own“].) For nearly 150 years, the long-standing history of respondeat superior — a form of vicarious liability — has been reflected in both California statutory and common law, pursuant to which, by default, “an employer may be held vicariously liable for torts
committed by an employee within the scope of employment.” (See Mary M., supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 208; 1872
In light of the doctrine‘s deep history — particularly in fire liability cases — we conclude that it would not be appropriate to read respondeat superior out of section
see also McMillin Albany LLC v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 241, 249 [“To the extent possible, we construe statutory enactments as consonant with existing common law and reconcile the two bodies of law. [Citations.] Only ‘where there is no rational basis for harmonizing’ a statute with the common law will we conclude that settled common law principles must yield.“].)
Presbyterian contends that no “clear and unequivocal” expression of legislative intent is necessary to deviate from the long-standing incorporation of respondeat superior into section
Presbyterian argues that when section
We are not persuaded. Nothing about a right of action being a creature of statute suggests that it exists on a slate wiped clean of common law principles. (See People v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 593, 603 (Southern Cal. Edison) [holding that § 13009 incorporates well-settled principles of compensatory damages, notwithstanding conclusion that the § 13009 recovery right is purely a creature of statute]; see also Cal. Health, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 295–296 [concluding that statute incorporated common law liability principles without even inquiring whether the conduct prohibited by the statute — health and safety violations by nursing facilities — had been actionable at common law].)7
Even when a statute does not expressly mention relevant common law principles, where the Legislature creates new tort liability, background tort principles will often be incorporated. (See Leslie Salt Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation etc. Com. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 605, 618–619 [“Where, as here, such legislation does not expressly purport to depart from or alter the common law, it will be construed in light of common law principles bearing upon the same subject“]; cf. Meyer v. Holley (2003) 537 U.S. 280, 285 [“when Congress creates a tort action, it legislates against a legal background of ordinary tort-related vicarious liability rules and consequently intends its legislation to incorporate those rules“].)
This court has repeatedly read statutes as incorporating respondeat superior liability even when they do not expressly address the imposition of liability on that basis. (See, e.g., Kinney v. Vaccari (1980) 27 Cal.3d 348, 354 [relying on
respondeat superior supply the proper analytical framework under [the Fair Employment and Housing Act]” despite no explicit language to that effect in the statute]; Ford Dealers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1982) 32 Cal.3d 347, 361 [concluding that
In light of the enduring importance of respondeat superior in our common law and the conciliatory approach courts take in construing statutory enactments against the backdrop of existing common law, we understand section
B.
We now turn to the parties’ key disagreement: whether the 1971 amendment provided such an expression of intent, thereby eliminating respondeat superior liability under section
As explained above, prior to 1971, section
or through another wilfully, negligently, or in violation of law, sets fire to, allows fire to be set to, or allows a fire kindled or attended by him to escape to, the property of another.” In 1971, the Legislature amended section
For the reasons described below, we reject that conclusion. Neither the plain language of the statute nor the legislative history supports Presbyterian‘s position. Moreover, Presbyterian‘s interpretation of the statutory amendment would undermine the policy goals that motivate the law.
1.
Presbyterian contends that the phrase “through another” (or “personally or through another“) is the mechanism that allows for respondeat superior liability under section
section
First, the phrase “personally or through another” does not contain any of the legal terms of art typically associated with the concept of respondeat superior. It does not mention the terms “servant,” “agent,” “employee,” or “master.” (See Rest.2d Agency, §§ 1, 2 [discussing these as key terms in the context of the law of respondeat superior].) Although this fact is not dispositive, using such terms of art would have clearly signaled that the clause referred to the theory of respondeat superior. The absence of such terms would tend to suggest the opposite. (Cf. People v. Weeren (1980) 26 Cal.3d 654, 668 [finding that, where Congress “avoided all reference to . . . long established terms of art,” it did not invoke the laws associated with those terms]; Ramirez v. Nelson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 908, 917–919 [explaining that vicarious liability was expressly imposed in the context of a statute that contained the phrase “either personally or through an employee or agent“].)
Second, Presbyterian predicates its argument on an assumption that “through another” must refer to the principle of respondeat superior. However, the phrase does not commonly refer to that principle. Presbyterian
generally, nor can we find any. Moreover, in other contexts, the phrase is regularly used to refer more generally to situations in which a person (natural or corporate) accomplishes something indirectly or through the use of an intermediary, as opposed to acting alone. (See, e.g., Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1291, fn. 2 [“Section 388 [of the Restatement Second of Torts] states: ‘One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability‘“]; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 623, quoting Consolidated Irrigation Dist. v. Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 697, 710 [“[A]n agency has constructive possession of records if it has the right to control the records, either directly or through another person‘“].) Thus, Presbyterian is wrong to assume that “through another” necessarily refers to respondeat superior. Instead, the phrase “through another” is regularly used to refer to situations in which a person will be held liable because they directed another person to act; the phrase is not employed to impose liability on otherwise blameless parties because of the actions of another person.9
Third, Presbyterian argues that the omission of the phrase “through another” abrogated only respondeat superior liability and not other forms of liability (like direct liability). But Presbyterian cannot escape that its interpretation of the phrase “through another” would actually abrogate both respondeat superior and direct corporate liability — the very form of liability that Presbyterian claims has not been abrogated. While Presbyterian believes that the phrase “through another” only refers to respondeat superior, the more natural reading of the phrase is one that encompasses a variety of agency situations, including those in which a principal directs an agent to act in a manner determined to be negligent or negligently supervises the agent. To that end, if — as Presbyterian argues — the 1971 Legislature deliberately omitted “through another” from section
“through another” does not invoke the concept of respondeat superior, pursuant to which an otherwise blameless person is held liable for the actions of another. Instead, the phrase simply refers to situations in which a person facing criminal charges is culpable because they directed or instructed another person to act.
Finally, it is also clear that when the Legislature does intend to exclude or abolish respondeat superior liability, it knows quite well how to do so explicitly. For example, it can expressly state that a person will not be liable for the actions of others. (See, e.g.,
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the phrase “through another” was used by the Legislature to refer to respondeat superior in section
13009 when it was amended in 1971, let alone that it did so with the scalpel-like precision that Presbyterian asserts. As noted above, in order to depart from or abrogate common law rules, statutory language must “” ““clearly and unequivocally disclose[] an intention to“‘“’ do so. (Cal. Health, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 297, italics added.) The mere deletion of a cross-reference to section 13007, which in turn contains the phrase “through another,” does not in any way manifest a “” ““clear[] and unequivocal[]” intent to abrogate more than a century of common law tort principles. (Cal. Health, at p. 297.)
Presbyterian contends that this conclusion relegates the meaning of the phrase “through another” to mere surplusage. How, it asks, can the phrase be anything other than surplusage if its omission does not eliminate respondeat superior liability? In other words, Presbyterian contends that our conclusion about the language used in section 13009 drains any meaning from the
But this principle is simply a starting point for our analysis, and we avoid mechanistically applying it where it defeats the manifest statutory purpose. (People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 782; People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 687, quoting Cruz, at p. 782 [the rule against surplusage is “only a ‘guide[] and will not be used to defeat legislative intent’ “]; People v. Raybon (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1056, 1070, fn. 10, quoting People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 381 (conc. opn. of Kruger, J.) [“Moreover, like all . . . interpretive canons, the canon against surplusage is a guide to statutory interpretation and is not invariably controlling“].) For one thing, the Legislature can use different language to refer to the same ideas. (See United Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Coast Iron & Steel Co. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1082, 1093 [“Different bills, drafted by different authors, passed at different times, might well use different language to convey the same basic rule“].) Thus, sections 13007 and 13009 could use different language to refer to the same bases of liability. In addition, even assuming for the sake of argument that our interpretation did render language in section 13007 surplusage, rigid application of the rule against surplusage would defeat the statutory purpose of section 13009, as we explain below. Ultimately, whatever “personally or through another” may mean in section 13007, we cannot conclude that the mere deletion of section 13009‘s cross-reference to section 13007 evinces a “clear[] and unequivocal[]” legislative intent to eliminate respondeat superior liability. (Cal. Health, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 297.)
2.
The legislative history supports this conclusion. (See, e.g., Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1163, quoting Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737 [confirming interpretation of the statutory text by examining the legislative history].) In 1963, the Court of Appeal decided People v. Williams (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 152, which interpreted section 13009 as precluding recovery of fire suppression costs when a fire burns only on the land of the person who started the fire. (Williams, at p. 155.) At the urging of the California Department of Conservation, the Legislature amended section 13009 in 1971 to hold liable property owners whose fires do not escape their own property lines.
The Legislative Counsel‘s Digest makes clear that responding to the Williams holding was the primary purpose of the 1971 amendment. The final legislative digest summary for Assembly Bill No. 1247 (Reg. Sess.) stated that it: “Provides that the expenses of fighting a fire are a debt of the person who negligently, or unlawfully sets the fire, allows it to be set, kindled, or to escape onto any forest, range or nonresidential grass-covered land, rather than providing such liability only where the fire damages the property of another.” (Legis. Counsel‘s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1247, 3 Stats. 1971 (1971 Reg. Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 173; accord People v. Southern Pacific Co. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 627, 637 (Southern Pacific) [concluding that the 1971 amendment was a reaction to the holding in Williams]; see also Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1247 (1971 Reg. Sess.) May 3, 1971, p. 1 [analysis & proposed amendment; “Health & Safety C §§ 13007–13009 provide that any person is liable for damages caused to another‘s property on account of his negligently attended or started fires. The costs of fire suppression on such victim‘s property is also chargable [sic] against the fire starter. [¶] AB 1247 makes a person who willfully, negligently or unlawfully burns his property liable for fire suppression expenses.”11]; Dept. of Conservation, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1247 (1971 Reg. Sess.) prepared for Governor Reagan (Oct. 20, 1971) p. 1 [“Public agencies are presently prevented from recovering fire suppression costs incurred on forest fires which do not escape from the property of origin. This creates an inequality in favor of the very large property owner. Recovery of major suppression costs is, in some cases, based on ownership pattern rather than irresponsible acts“].12) The fact that the Legislature was focused on expanding liability in response to the Williams decision undermines Presbyterian‘s argument that the 1971 amendment also sought to abolish respondeat superior — a change that would have been a significant curtailment of liability.
Presbyterian counters by arguing that responding to Williams was not the only purpose of the 1971 amendment. The amendment also restricted recovery in two specific ways. First, it narrowed section 13009 so that it applied
Presbyterian points to the inclusion of these two restrictions as support for the contention that the 1971 amendment abolished respondeat superior liability as well, suggesting that the Legislature intended to curtail corporate liability at the same time (by eliminating a significant means of imposing negligence liability on corporations). This argument is unavailing. The available legislative history for the 1971 amendment reveals no discussion whatsoever of the elimination of respondeat superior liability specifically or vicarious liability generally. Not a single document mentions or refers to what would have been a very significant change to the law. Moreover, the legislative history does address the two other changes in the 1971 amendment that restricted the existing bases for recovery. (See, e.g., Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1247 (1971 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 19, 1971, pp. 2–3.) Analysis provided by the Senate Committee on Judiciary explicitly noted that the 1971 amendment would “[r]equire[] that a fire which is kindled or attended by a person escape onto any forest, range, or nonresidential grass-covered land, rather than any land, before any liability for such expense may be imposed” and that it would “[e]liminate[] any liability for such expense in any case in which a person allows a fire burning on his property to escape to the property of another without exercising due diligence to control the fire.” (Ibid.) By contrast, the analysis did not mention changes to the availability of respondeat superior liability. (Ibid.)
Presbyterian argues that “[t]he fact legislative history materials do not reflect discussion on a particular topic does not necessarily mean the Legislature did not intend to change the law.” (Hayes v. Temecula Valley Unified School Dist. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 735, 753; see also ibid. [“The objective manifestation of the legislative intent (the words of the amended statute) controls over silence in the legislative history record“].) True. But we do not think an amendment principally aimed at expanding liability simultaneously effectuated a significant curtailment of corporate liability without a single comment or any explanation. (See Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 146 [“what is clear from the legislative history is that the . . . amendment
3.
Statutes should be interpreted to be “consistent with legislative purpose and not evasive thereof.” (Cal Pacific Collections, Inc. v. Powers (1969) 70 Cal.2d 135, 140, citing Kusior v. Silver (1960) 54 Cal.2d 603, 620; see also City of Poway v. City of San Diego (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 847, 858 [“We seek to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the apparent purpose of the law“].) The fact that the elimination of respondeat superior liability would hinder the policy goals of section 13009 reinforces why Presbyterian‘s argument must fail. A central goal of the statute was clearly to reimburse governmental agencies for the cost of firefighting. In light of that legislative objective, it would make little sense to remove one of the primary forms of corporate liability for negligence: respondeat superior.
Certainly, the Legislature has committed to providing taxpayer-funded fire suppression services where necessary — it made that policy decision long ago. (Howell, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 176, citing Shpegel-Dimsey, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 1020.) However, taxpayer funds are collected to pay for the suppression of “those inevitable fires which are bound to occur.” (Wylie & Schick, A Study of Fire Liability Law (1957) pp. 11–12, italics added.) Thus, the Legislature has also determined that taxpayers should not be required to “subsidize individual negligence, carelessness, or breach of duty” by footing the bill for fires negligently started. (Ibid.) Accordingly, it is hard to see how the position advanced by Presbyterian could be understood as consistent with the Legislature‘s policy goal of
operator and others]; Shpegel-Dimsey, at p. 1015 [plastics company]; County of Ventura v. So. Cal. Edison Co. (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 529, 539 (County of Ventura) [electric company]; Southern Pacific, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 631 [railroad company].) Under Presbyterian‘s preferred interpretation, taxpayers would be made to subsidize negligent behavior — contrary to the Legislature‘s intention — whenever an individual employee who negligently started a fire (while acting within the scope of their employment) is unable to pay the cost of fire suppression.
Another legislative goal behind section 13009 was “to stimulate precautionary measures aimed at preventing the starting and spreading of fire, and thereby eliminate needless conflagrations destructive of property and dangerous to the safety and welfare of the public.” (County of Ventura, supra, 85 Cal.App.2d at p. 539.) This objective would also be well served by the application of respondeat superior, as one of the central rationales behind the doctrine is to prevent recurrence of the tortious conduct. (See Mary M., supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 208–209; Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 962, 967–968 (Perez); Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 956, 960 (Hinman).) With the application of respondeat superior, employers will have greater incentives to take measures to prevent employee negligence that may start wildfires, such as through better employee training or safer
It is also notable that the Legislature defined the term “person” — as that term refers to the entities that may be held liable for fire suppression costs — to include corporations. (
In addition, Presbyterian‘s “interpretation of the statute would [also] give rise to incongruous results” when it comes to imposing liability on corporations. (Cal. Health, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 300.) For example, if Presbyterian were a small “mom and pop” shop whose owners (and officers) were
Presbyterian‘s argument also ignores the practical realities and challenges of holding corporations liable for their actions. Because a corporation is a legal fiction, it cannot act but through the agency of natural persons. (Cal. Health, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 296 [“regardless of the precise form of ownership, corporate [entities] can only act through their agents and employees“]; Snukal v. Flightways Manufacturing, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 754, 782 [“‘corporations necessarily act through agents’ “].) While Presbyterian‘s proposed interpretation of section 13009 contemplates the imposition of at least some forms of direct corporate liability, it ignores the fact that it can be difficult to prove that a corporation is directly liable for the actions of its employees or agents. (See Rest.3d Agency § 2.01, com. e, p. 85; id., § 1.03, com. c, pp. 58–62.) To prove such liability, a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate authorization by the corporation, usually in the form of direct instructions or a written job description, which may not be possible (and would undoubtedly entail a burdensome inquiry). (See Rest.3d Agency § 2.01, com. e, p. 85; id., § 1.03, com. c, pp. 58–62.) As a result, respondeat superior can serve an important function: it can allow a plaintiff to proceed against a corporation that could have been liable under a burdensome direct liability theory, but to do so under an alternate theory that presents fewer obstacles to the plaintiff‘s ability to prove entitlement to relief. Through section 13009, the Legislature intended to compensate taxpayers for the cost of suppressing fires that were negligently started, so the eradication of a long-standing method of establishing corporate liability would have been inconsistent with that legislative purpose.
The cases cited by Presbyterian do not assuage these concerns. It points to Southern Pacific, County of Ventura, and Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 355 as examples of cases in which corporations were found directly liable for their actions or failures to act. However, these cases do not discuss the basis upon which the corporations were found liable; they did not have to: respondeat superior would have provided a basis for corporate liability, even if actual authorization or ratification did not. The courts in those cases did not have to engage in the difficult task of determining the precise basis upon which liability would be imposed upon the defendant corporations; if the corporations had authorized the conduct, they would be directly liable for the damages caused, and if they had not authorized the conduct, they would be liable under a theory of respondeat superior. Under Presbyterian‘s preferred interpretation of section 13009, however, courts would be forced to engage in precisely this type of arduous inquiry, and its adoption would undoubtedly result in a curtailment of corporate liability. Such an outcome would undermine the goals the Legislature sought to pursue through section 13009.
To the extent that Presbyterian believes the wildfire context requires a different balancing of policy goals, it may address its concerns to the Legislature, which has made deliberate decisions about how to allocate risks and balance competing interests in this arena. (See Lonicki v. Sutter Health Central (2008) 43 Cal.4th 201, 215 [“Those concerns raise issues of policy that should be addressed to the Legislature rather than this court, whose task is limited to construing the laws enacted by the Legislature“].)
III.
Health and Safety Code sections 13009 and 13009.1 allow CalFire to recover the taxpayer dollars it spends on fighting and investigating wildfires that were caused by human negligence. For the reasons set forth above, we hold that sections 13009 and 13009.1 incorporate the common law theory of respondeat superior.17 To decide otherwise would misread the plain language of the statutes enacted by the Legislature, undermine the legislative history, and cast aside the goals and purposes that underpin the statutes at issue. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
GROBAN, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
JENKINS, J.
MAURO, J.*
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.