Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Tex. v. SanchezPlanned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Tex. v. Sanchez
R. Ted Cruz (argued), Lara Grant, Austin, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
Paul Benjamin Linton, Northbrook, IL, Kelly J. Shackelford, Liberty Legal Institute, Plano, TX, for Amici Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
The Texas Legislature restricted the distribution of fedеral family planning funds. Finding this state legislation likely preempted by federal spending statutes, the district court granted a preliminary injunction against its enforcement. The district court concluded that the state legislation could not be interpreted to permit various Planned Parenthood organizations to continue receiving federal funds by creating independent affiliates. We disagree. Persuaded that the state legislation does admit of this potentially saving construction, we remand for further proceedings.
The State of Texas voluntarily participates in several federal programs that provide funds for family planning services. Among these programs are Title X of the Public Health Service Act,1 which provides project grants to public and private agencies for family planning services, and Title XX of the Social Security Act,2 which provides block grants to the states for social services, including family planning. The regulations for Title X specify that funds may not be used to finance abortions or abortion-related activity.3 Both parties agree that any Title XX funds used to match Title X funds are subject to the same restrictions. Furthermore, Title XX funds may not be used for the provision of medical care.4 The State also receives Medicaid funding under Title XIX of the Social Security Act,5 which provides medical care to the needy through a cooperative federal-state program.
The Texas Department of Health (TDH)6 distributes federal family program grants under Titles X and XX. On May 8, 2003, TDH sent letters to the family planning contractors that had been approved to receive funding under TDH‘s federal family planning program grants.7 Appellees — six Planned Parenthood entities located in various parts of Texas that had been contractors in Texas‘s family planning program for many years — were among the groups approved for funding. Pursuant to Title X‘s statutory requirements, Appellees strictly segregated their Title X programs from their abortion-related activities to ensure that no federal funds were used for abortions.8 Thus, Appellees provided Title X and XX family planning services using the federal funds disbursed by TDH, and provided abortion services using private funding. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Title X or XX funds were ever improperly commingled with private abortion funds.
Just under one month later, on June 2, 2003, the Texas Legislature passed the Texas General Appropriations Act.9 The Act included Rider 8, a provision restricting distribution of federal family planning money, including Title X and XX funds.10 Rider 8 provides:
8. Prohibition on Abortions
a. It is the intent of the Legislature that no funds shall be used to pay the direct or indirect costs (including overhead, rent, phones and utilities) of abortion procedures provided by contractors of the department.
b. It is also the intent of the legislature that no funds appropriated undеr Strategy D.1.2, Family Planning, shall be distributed to individuals or entities that perform elective abortion procedures or that contract with or provide funds to individuals or entities for the performance of elective abortion procedures.
c. If the department concludes that compliance with b. would result in a significant reduction in family planning services in any public health region of the state, the department may waive b. for the affected region to the extent necessary to avoid a significant reduction in family planning services to the region. This waiver provision shall expire on August 31, 2004, and no waiver shall extend beyond that date.
d. The department shall include in its financial аudit a review of the use of appropriated funds to ensure compliance with this section.
TDH immediately began efforts to implement Rider 8. On June 10, 2003, TDH sent letters to previously approved family planning contractors, including Appellees, requiring them to sign and return an affidavit by June 30, 2003. The affidavit was a pledge by a contractor applying for Title X and XX funds that, as of September 1, 2003, it would perform no elective abortion procedures and that it would not contract with or provide funds to individuals or entities for the performance of abortions. Appellees were informed that unless they made this pledge they would be ineligible for participation in the funding programs.
Appеllees filed suit on June 26, 2003, seeking immediate injunctive relief. Appellees focused on section (b) of Rider 8 and raised three basic arguments: (1) that Rider 8(b) imposes an unconstitutional condition on Appellees’ eligibility for funds; (2) that it imposes an unconstitutional burden on a woman‘s right to obtain an abortion; and (3) that it violates the Supremacy Clause11 by imposing additional eligibility requirements on Appellees’ receipt of federal funds that are inconsistent with the federal funding statutes.
TDH appeals the court‘s holding as to the unconstitutional condition and Supremacy Clause claims, and asserts that Rider 8 can be interpreted to allow affiliates. Appellees, in turn, contend that the district court erred in concluding that Rider 8 imposes no undue burden on women‘s right tо obtain an abortion.
II
We review the ultimate decision to grant a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion.13 A decision grounded in erroneous legal principles is reviewed de novo.14
To obtain a preliminary injunction plaintiffs must show (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any damage that the injunction might cause the defendant, and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the public interest.15 A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy” and should only be granted if the plaintiffs have “‘clearly carried the burden of persuasion’ on all four requirements.”16
III
We turn to the Supremacy Clause clаim. Appellees assert that Rider 8 is invalid under the Supremacy Clause because it adds eligibility requirements to the receipt of federal funds that are inconsistent with federal law. The district court found a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. In our review, we first explain why this is a preemption claim. Then we examine whether the district court had jurisdiction and whether the Appellees stated a claim, as well as the role of
A
Where, as here, a state law purportedly conflicts with federal statutes enacted under the Spending Clause,17 courts often proceed without invoking “preemption.”18 Some courts have explicitly found that preemption was not an issue in such cases,19 while others have expressed ambivalence.20 The growing consensus, however, is to analyze such claims under traditional preemption doctrine.21 The First Circuit gave the following explanation:
The vast majority of preemption cases involve situations in which Congress has exercised its power under the Commerce Clause. Here, however, we are dealing with a congressional exercise of the spending power, not the commerce power, and the dynamics between preemption and Congress‘s reliance on the spending power differ appreciably from those applicable in the Commerce Clause context. The principal difference is that whereas preemptive legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause trumps state law throughout the United States ex proprio vigore, preemptive legislation enacted under the spending power presents states with a choice: they may either accept federal funds (and subject themselves to requirements imposed by federal law) or decline such funds (and avoid the necessity of abiding by those requirements).22
B
We next ask whether the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over Appellees’ preemption claim and whether Appellees’ efforts state a claim. We answer in the affirmative.
1
It is well-established that the federal courts have jurisdiсtion under
A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a federal question which the federal courts have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.26
We recently affirmed this principle, holding that when a plaintiff seeks “injunctive relief based on a federal statute, federal question jurisdiction clearly exists based on Shaw.”27 Several of our sister circuits have explicitly agreed.28
2
TDH argues that, even with federal jurisdiction over the claim, it was improper for the district court to resolve it because Appellees were not sеeking to vindicate any right or to enforce any duty running to them — a necessary host, in the view of TDH, to Appellees’ assertion that Rider 8 was preempted by federal Spending Clause legislation. We disagree.
Cognizant of the distinction between the inquiry into federal court jurisdiction and whether a claim has been stated, we remind that “[i]t is firmly established [by Supreme Court precedent] that the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”29 Recently, however, a majority of the Supreme Court in Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh implicitly rejected the contention that asserting the preemptive force of federal Spending Clause legislation is itself no claim.30 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that a state regulation was preempted by Medicaid, a federal Spending Clause statute. The lower court, in discussing the plaintiff‘s standing, observed that the plaintiff had “not asserted an action to enforce rights under the Medicaid statute ... but rather a preemption-based challenge under the Supremacy Clause. In this type of action, it is the interests protected by the Supremacy Clause, not by the preempting statute, that are at issue.”31 A plurality of four Justices, apparently accepting these conclusions, reached the merits of the plaintiff‘s claim,32 as did the three dissenting Justices.33 In sum, seven Justices assumеd both that the federal courts have jurisdiction and that a claim was stated for Spending Clause preemption, tacitly rejecting the suggestion advanced by two concurring Justices — and today espoused by TDH — that no claim was stated.34
Walsh, 538 U.S. at 661-69, 123 S.Ct. 1855 (plurality) (finding state law not preempted).32
Id. at 684-90, 123 S.Ct. 1855 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that state regulation was preempted).33
See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 675, 123 S.Ct. 1855 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would reject petitioner‘s statutory claim on the ground that the remedy for the States‘s failure to comply with the obligations it has agreed to undertake under the Medicaid Act is set forth in the act itself: termination of funding by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. Petitioner must seek enforcement of the Medicaid conditions by that authority....” (citаtions omitted)); id. at 683, 123 S.Ct. 1855 (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing doubt as to “whether third parties may sue to enforce Spending Clause legislation — through pre-emption or otherwise“). These arguments have great purchase, and they might also apply in the
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 362 F.3d 817, 819 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.2004).35
See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 121 S.Ct. 2404, 150 L.Ed.2d 532 (2001); Crosby v. Nat‘l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. 2890; see also David Sloss, Constitutional Remedies for Statutory Violations, 89 IOWA L.REV. 355, 380 & n.141 (2004) (collecting cases).37
Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. 2890 (emphasis added).38
535 U.S. at 642, 122 S.Ct. 175339
TDH‘s suggestion that Verizon is distinguishable because “the plaintiffs identified contractual rights that were violated and therefore gave them a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause based on their existing rights” is unpersuasive. Verizon did not sue to enforce its contractual rights, and none of its claims was based on its alleged contractual rights. As the Court explained:
Verizon alleged in its complaint that the Commission violated the Act and the FCC ruling when it ordered payment of reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound calls. Verizon sought a declaratory judgment that the Commission‘s order was unlawful, and an injunction prohibiting its enforcement. We have no doubt that federal courts have jurisdiction under
§ 1331 to entertain such a suit.
308 F.3d 762, 759-60 (7th Cir. 2002) (suit removed to federal court from state court)42
993 F.2d 479, 484 (5th Cir.1993)44
See Local Union No. 12004, 377 F.3d at 74-75 (“A plaintiff may assert federal preemption as an affirmative cause of action to enjoin state officials from interfering with federal rights.... Verizon and Shaw make clear that in suits against state officials for declaratory and injunctive relief, a plaintiff may invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts by asserting a claim of рreemption, even absent an explicit statutory cause of action.“); Thompson, 362 F.3d at 819 n. 3 (rejecting the argument that plaintiffs asserting preemption based on Spending Clause legislation have “no private right of action for injunctive relief against the state“); Village of Westfield v. Welch‘s, 170 F.3d 116, 124 n. 4 (2d Cir.1999) (“Without deciding whether Welch has a private right of action under the [federal statute], we note that Welch has asserted several federal causes of action — including claims based on the Supremacy Clause ... — that do not depend on the existence of a private right of action under the [federal statute].“); Bud Antle, Inc. v. Barbosa, 45 F.3d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir.1994) (“Even in the absence of an explicit statutory provision establishing a cause of action, a privаte party may ordinarily seek declaratory and injunctive relief against state action on the basis of federal preemption.“); First Nat‘l Bank of E. Ark. v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 775, 776 n. 3 (8th Cir.1990) (“[T]he Supreme Court has ... made clear that a party may apply directly to federal court for relief based on an affirmative claim of preemption.” (citing Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 259 n. 6, 105 S.Ct. 695; Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. 2890)).46
RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER‘S THE FEDERAL COURTS & THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 903 (5th ed.2003)
While the Supreme Court has not explained the source of this right of action, one school of thought holds that the Supremacy Clause itself creates an implied cause of action. Professors Wright, Miller and Cooper argue that “[t]he best explanation of Ex Parte Young and its progeny is that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for injunctive reliеf against state officers who are threatening to violate the federal Constitution or laws.” 13B CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3566, at 102 (1984). Some courts share this view. See, e.g., Burgio & Campofelice v. N.Y. State Dep‘t of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000, 1006 (2d Cir.1997) (“[T]he Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for injunctive relief against state officers who are threatening to violate [federal law].“); see also BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. MCImetro Access Transmission Servs., Inc., 317 F.3d 1270, 1289 (11th Cir.2003) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (disputing majority‘s finding of jurisdiction but characterizing Shaw as “holding that plaintiffs may assert a private right of action directly under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution“); League of Women Voters v. Blackwell, 340 F.Supp.2d 823, 828 (N.D.Ohio 2004) (“[T]he Supremacy Clause provides the cause of action and federal jurisdiction.“); but see Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. Pegues, 904 F.2d 640, 643 (11th Cir.1990) (rejeсting the proposition that a “constitutional cause of action should be implied directly from the Supremacy Clause“); Mashpee Tribe v. Watt, 542 F.Supp. 797, 806 (D.Mass.1982) (“The Supremacy Clause does not support direct causes of action.... It only gives priority to federal rights created by a federal statute when they conflict with state law.“), aff‘d, 707 F.2d 23 (1st Cir.1983).
Another possible source is the
536 U.S. 273, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002)49
See Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107-08, 110 S.Ct. 444, 107 L.Ed.2d 420 (1989).50
Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 280, 122 S.Ct. 2268.51
See supra Part III.B.2; see also Ill. Ass‘n of Mortgage Brokers, 308 F.3d at 765 (finding it unnecessary in adjudicating preemption claim to determine whether the federal statute at issue creates rights enforceable under
Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372, 120 S.Ct. 2288.53
Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‘n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982).54
Id. at 152-53, 102 S.Ct. 3014.55
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 541, 121 S.Ct. 2404 (citations omitted); accord English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990) (listing three categories of preemption); AT&T Corp. v. Public Util. Comm‘n of Tex., 373 F.3d 641, 645 (5th Cir.2004) (same). As the Supreme Court has hastened to point out, however, “the categories of preemption are not `rigidly distinct.‘” Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372 n. 6, 120 S.Ct. 2288 (quoting English, 496 U.S. at 79 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. 2270).56
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm‘n, 461 U.S. 190, 204, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)); see also Wells Fargo Bank of Tex. NA v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 491 n. 3 (5th Cir.2003) (explaining that implied conflict preemption occurs “where the state law mandatеs or places irresistible pressure on the subject of the regulation to violate federal law, where compliance with both regulations is physically impossible, where the state regulation frustrates or hectors the overall purpose of the federal scheme, or where the federal scheme expressly authorizes an activity which the state scheme disallows“)(citations omitted).57
King, 392 U.S. at 333 n. 34, 88 S.Ct. 2128. Congress has wide latitude to attach conditions to funds, as long as they are not “unduly coercive” or “impermissibly sweeping.” Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 1947, 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004); see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987).58
Walsh, 538 U.S. at 661-62, 123 S.Ct. 1855 (citation omitted) (citing Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 153, 64 S.Ct. 474, 88 L.Ed. 635 (1944)).59
Id. at 667, 123 S.Ct. 1855 (rejecting
See Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 145-46, 102 S.Ct. 2355, 72 L.Ed.2d 728 (1982) (holding provisions of New York welfare program that conflicted with federal
The Court summarized this line of cases as follows:
In [Carleson, Townsend, and King,] it was clear that state law excluded people from AFDC benefits who the
Social Security Act expressly provided would be eligible. The Court found no room either in the Act‘s language or legislative history to warrant the States’ additional eligibility requirements. Here, by contrast, the Act allows for complementary state work incentive programs and procedures incident thereto — even if they become conditions for continued assistance. Such programs and procedures are not necessarily invalid, any more than other supplementary regulations promulgated within the legitimate sphere of state administration.
Dublino, 413 U.S. at 421-22, 93 S.Ct. 2507 (emphasis added).61
See Hope Med. Group for Women, 63 F.3d at 421 (“Although a state‘s participation in the
Sanchez, 280 F.Supp.2d at 611.63
167 F.3d 458 (8th Cir.1999). The state statute at issue there restricted the Missouri Deрartment of Health‘s expenditure of state funds:
[N]one of these funds may be expended for the purpose of performing, assisting or encouraging for abortion, and further provided that none of these funds may be expended to directly or indirectly subsidize abortion services or administrative expenses, as verified by independent audit. None of these funds may be paid or granted to organizations or affiliates of organizations which provide or promote abortions. None of the funds may be expended for directly referring for abortion....
89th Leg., 2d Sess., Mo. H.B. 1010, § 10.715(1), quoted in Dempsey, 167 F.3d at 463.65
Dempsey 167 F.3d at 461-64.66
Although Appellees also support their Supremacy Clause claim by reference to
See Townsend, 404 U.S. at 286, 92 S.Ct. 502.69
Such a provision might, of course, be unconstitutional on other grounds71
See 65 Fed.Reg. 41,270.73
500 U.S. 173, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991)76
65 Fed.Reg. at 41,270-77 (quoting
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (“[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron [U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)] deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.“); In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 109 F.3d 248, 254 (5th Cir.1997) (finding preemption by first examining “whether the Secretary meant to pre-empt [the state agency‘s] rate order, and, if so, whether that action is within the scope of the Secretary‘s delegated authority“); see also Thompson, 362 F.3d at 821; Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Mich. v. Engler, 73 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir.1996).80
Rust, 500 U.S. at 187-90, 111 S.Ct. 1759.81
Id. at 196, 111 S.Ct. 1759 (citations omitted) (last emphasis added).82
See Rust, 500 U.S. at 178-81, 111 S.Ct. 1759; see also Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983) (Congress, exercising spеnding power, can refuse to fund lobbying activities where organizations are free to establish a separate affiliate to engage in lobbying without the use of federal funds); Planned Parenthood Fed‘n of Am. v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650, 663 (D.C.Cir.1983) (“Although Congress is free to permit the states to establish eligibility requirements for recipients of Title X funds, Congress has not delegated that power to the states. Title X does not provide, or suggest, that states are permitted to determine eligibility criteria for participants in Title X programs.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).84
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884-85, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).85
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 944, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 147 L.Ed.2d 743 (2000).86
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988).87
Cf. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (“Deference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency‘s convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate.“).88
The Dempsey opinion is a stretch. The Missouri statute explicitly stated that “[n]one of these funds may be paid or granted to organizations or affiliates of organizations which provide or promote abortions.” 89th Leg., 2d Sess., Mo. H.B. 1010, § 10.715(1) (emphasis added), quoted in Dempsey, 167 F.3d at 463. The court stated that “nothing [in this statute] expressly prohibits grantees from maintaining an affiliation with an abortion service provider, so long as the affiliated abortion service provider does not directly or indirectly receive State family-planning funds.” Dempsey, 167 F.3d at 463. Perhaps the court concluded that the statute barred affiliates but not “independent” affiliates, but even this is less than persuasive.90
Cf. Dempsey, 167 F.3d at 464 (“The Constitution does not guarantee that recipients of State funds will not be required to `expend effort’ to comply with funding restrictions.” (citation omitted)); Legal Aid Soc‘y of Haw. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 145 F.3d 1017, 1027 (9th Cir.1998) (White, J. (Retired), sitting by designation) (“The [Rust] Court did not find it constitutionally significant that the restrictions required the recipient
Notes
Another court expressed the following:
It would not seem to be of any consequence whether this is described as “preemption” in the sense used in the traditional doctrine, or as an application of the Supremacy Clause to the administration of state-federal programs derived from the voluntary nature of state participation in the programs. The latter is a more realistic treatment....
....
... If the [state chooses] to participate, there is thereby accepted a limitation or restriction on state statutes or regulations which conflict with the federal statutes. This has consequences similar to the traditional preemption doctrine but as mentioned they come about by a choice made by the state.
Planned Parenthood Ass‘n of Utah v. Dandoy, 810 F.2d 984, 988 (10th Cir.1987) (citation omitted).The district court did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Walsh because it was decided after the district court‘s final order was entered.
Appellants rely on the Walsh plurality; Appellees rely on the Walsh dissent.
While the plurality in Walsh found no preemption, its logic would suggest that if a state regulation did conflict with the federal program‘s objectives, it would be preempted.
In addition to Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O‘Connor, and Justice Kennedy also expressed concerns about the use of the Supremacy Clause to enforce Spending Clause conditions.
The D.C. Circuit noted that the Supremacy Clause provides a cause of action for injunctive relief against state officials.
The court rejected the argument that Gonzaga University v. Doe changed this established rule.
The Sloss article discusses the historical development of the Supremacy Clause cause of action.
The Court in Shaw stated that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief from state regulation on the ground that such regulation is prеempted by a federal statute presents a federal question which the federal courts can resolve.
In Verizon Maryland, the Court reaffirmed the availability of federal jurisdiction for preemption claims against state officials.
The Court noted that the statutory basis for jurisdiction was 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The Court‘s focus was on the federal nature of the preemption claim, not any underlying contractual right.
The Seventh Circuit allowed a preemption challenge to state mortgage regulations to proceed.
In Edwards, we adjudicated a preemption claim regarding state abortion funding restrictions without requiring a separate statutory cause of action.
We held that the plaintiff had standing to bring a preemption claim under the Supremacy Clause.
The court emphasized that the right to be free from state regulation that is preempted by federal law is itself a sufficient basis for a suit for injunctive relief.
This widespread consensus among the circuits reinforces the availability of the preemption cause of action.
The source of the right of action is often less critical than its existence, which the Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed in the context of preemption claims.
Section 1983 is often used in civil rights litigation but has specific requirements for demonstrating a “right” that differ from the preemption analysis.
Gonzaga clarified the standard for determining whether a federal statute creates an individual right enforceable under § 1983.
In Golden State, the Court distinguished between preemption as a basis for a § 1983 claim and preemption as a direct cause of action.
The Court emphasized that only individual rights, not mere violations of federal law, are actionable under § 1983.
The distinction between standing/cause of action and the existence of a § 1983 right is fundamental in preemption jurisprudence.
Conflict preemption exists when state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
The Court noted that federal regulations have no less preemptive effect than federal statutes.
Preemption may result even if the regulation is not explicitly stated as preemptive, provided there is a conflict.
The labels “express,” “field,” and “conflict” often overlap in practice.
The “obstacle” prong of conflict preemption is particularly relevant in the context of federal funding programs.
The Spending Clause authority allows Congress to influence state policy in areas it might otherwise not be able to regulate directly.
The Court noted that there is a presumption against preemption, especially in fields traditionally occupied by the States.
In Dublino, the Court found that the federal program was intendеd to complement, not displace, state efforts.
The distinction between conflicting eligibility requirements and complementary administrative procedures is key to the preemption analysis.
Once a state chooses to participate, it is bound by the federal rules.
The district court found that the state restriction did not conflict with federal law because it only applied to state funds.
The district court relied heavily on the Dempsey decision from the Eighth Circuit.
The Missouri statute was remarkably similar to the Texas provision at issue here.
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the state had the right to decide how its own money was spent.
The court in Dempsey found that the restriction did not interfere with the federal program‘s operation.
The analysis for Titles XIX and XX might involve different statutory and regulatory considerations.
Townsend stands for the proposition that states cannot narrow federal eligibility standards.
Section 1008 of the Public Health Service Act prohibits the use of Title X funds in programs where abortion is a method of family planning.
For example, it could potentially violate the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause.
This regulation defines the entities eligible to receive Title X grants.
The 2000 regulations revised the standards for Title X projects.
The Secretary emphasized the broad goal of providing family planning services to all who want them.
The regulations were designed to ensure that Title X projects remain separate from abortion-related activities.
Rust upheld a previous version of the Title X regulations that prohibited abortion counseling and referral.
The Secretary‘s interpretation of Section 1008 is entitled to deference.
The regulations specify that Title X projects must be physically and financially separate from prohibited activities.
This “separation” requirement is meant to prevent the use of Title X funds for abortions while allowing grantees to engage in such activities with other funds.
The delegation of rulemaking authority is central to the agency‘s power to preempt state law.
The Court found that the Secretary‘s construction was a permissible interpretation of the statute.
The Court notеd that the government may validly choose to fund one activity to the exclusion of another.
The Court held that the regulations did not violate the First or Fifth Amendments.
These cases establish that while the government can restrict its own funds, it cannot use those restrictions to prevent organizations from using private funds for other purposes.
The Court in Reno struck down provisions of the
Stenberg invalidated a state law banning “partial birth abortion” because it lacked a health exception.
The doctrine of constitutional avoidance requires courts to interpret statutes to avoid constitutional difficulties.
The Court cautioned against deferring to agency positions taken only for the purpose of litigation.
The Eighth Circuit in Dempsey did not find a conflict between the Missouri statute and Title X.
The Dempsey court‘s reading of the statute seems to contradict its plain language regarding “affiliates.”