PIAZZA, APPELLEE, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY, APPELLANT, ET AL.
No. 2017-1649
Supreme Court of Ohio
June 26, 2019
Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-2499
Submitted March 5, 2019
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Piazza v. Cuyahoga Cty., Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-2499.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-2499
PIAZZA, APPELLEE, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY, APPELLANT, ET AL.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Piazza v. Cuyahoga Cty., Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-2499.]
Political-subdivision tort liability—
(No. 2017-1649—Submitted March 5, 2019—Decided June 26, 2019.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 104724, 2017-Ohio-8163.
FRENCH, J.
{¶ 1} This
Facts and procedural background
{¶ 3} In 2003, Piazza began working as an office manager for the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision (“BOR“). She continued to work there until August 2010, when the county transferred her from the BOR to the Department of Justice Affairs. In June 2010, about two months before Piazza‘s transfer, the Plain Dealer Publishing Company (“Plain Dealer“) began to publish a series of articles reporting on an ongoing investigation into the BOR and its employees and board members. In December 2010, the Plain Dealer described its investigation as having “unearthed rampant mismanagement, deplorable work habits, questionable tax breaks, favors for the connected and violations of state law.”
{¶ 4} On March 9, 2011, the county terminated Piazza‘s employment as well as the employment of two other county employees who had previously worked at the BOR. In a press release, County Executive FitzGerald stated, “Today three people have been terminated from employment with Cuyahoga County due to the reorganization of the Cuyahoga County Board[] of Revision.” Within 90 minutes of being informed of her termination, Piazza received a telephone call from a Plain Dealer reporter seeking comment on her discharge. Piazza refused to comment.
{¶ 5} About 30 minutes later, the Plain Dealer published an article on www.cleveland.com with the headline, “Cuyahoga County Executive Ed FitzGerald fires three employees tied to board[] of revision scandal.” The article began, “Three more Cuyahoga County employees have lost their jobs because of the extensive dysfunction and mismanagement uncovered last year at the board[] of revision.” Despite noting that Piazza and the other two terminated employees had been reassigned in August 2010 to other county departments “after The Plain Dealer reported about poor work habits of board employees,” the article quoted a FitzGerald spokesperson as stating that the terminations were “due to our reorganization of the board of revision.”
{¶ 6} Later that day, the Plain Dealer published a second article with the headline, “Cuyahoga County Executive Ed FitzGerald says he couldn‘t justify keeping reassigned board[] of revision workers in new positions.” The second article quoted FitzGerald as stating, “Instead of terminating [Piazza and the other two former BOR employees], the previous administration reassigned them. * * * We can‘t afford to reshuffle people for their own job security.” The second article included a photograph of Piazza that the county had supplied.
{¶ 7} Piazza initially filed a complaint for false-light invasion of privacy against the county and the Plain Dealer in October 2013 (”Piazza I“), but she later voluntarily dismissed that complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1). She filed this action against the county and the Plain Dealer in August 2015. Piazza bases her false-light claim against the county on the quoted statement from FitzGerald, and she alleges that the statement created a false inference that she was involved in the BOR corruption scandal. Piazza alleges that the statement was made with a reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. She also alleges
{¶ 8} The county moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from liability pursuant to
{¶ 9} The county filed an interlocutory appeal from the denial of its motion for summary judgment. The Eighth District addressed only the question of immunity, and in a two-to-one decision, it affirmed the trial court‘s rejection of the county‘s assertion of immunity, holding that Piazza‘s claim “arose out of her employment relationship with the county, and the county is not immune from liability pursuant to the express exception in
{¶ 10} This court accepted the county‘s discretionary appeal. 152 Ohio St.3d 1442, 2018-Ohio-1600, 96 N.E.3d 298. The county maintains that
Analysis
{¶ 11}
{¶ 12}
{¶ 13} The county asserted in its motion for summary judgment that it is immune from Piazza‘s claim pursuant to the general grant of immunity in
{¶ 14} Both the trial court and the Eighth District applied
{¶ 15} This appeal presents a legal question—whether
R.C. 2744.09(B) does not require an ongoing employment relationship between the plaintiff and the political-subdivision employer
{¶ 16} A dispute over the meaning of a statute presents a question of law that we consider de novo. Progressive Plastics, Inc. v. Testa, 133 Ohio St.3d 490, 2012-Ohio-4759, 979 N.E.2d 280, ¶ 15. Our primary goal in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislature‘s intent. Christe v. GMS Mgt. Co., Inc., 88 Ohio St.3d 376, 377, 726 N.E.2d 497 (2000). To do so, we look to and give effect to the statutory language without deleting or inserting words. Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 39-40, 741 N.E.2d 121 (2001), citing Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105, 304 N.E.2d 378 (1973), and Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland, 37 Ohio St.3d 50, 524 N.E.2d 441 (1988), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶ 17} The county argues that for
{¶ 18} The Eighth District rejected the county‘s argument that because the alleged tortious conduct—the statement by FitzGerald—occurred after the county terminated Piazza‘s employment, her claim does not arise out of her employment relationship with the county. 2017-Ohio-8163, 98 N.E.3d 1263, at ¶ 17-19. In doing so, it relied on Fleming v. Ashtabula Area City School Bd. of Edn., 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2006-A-0030, 2008-Ohio-1892. Fleming was a substitute teacher employed by a school board of education that chose not to renew his contract. Following a school-board meeting at which the board discussed its decision not to renew Fleming‘s contract, the school-district superintendent made allegedly defamatory statements about Fleming during a radio interview. Fleming thereafter filed an action, including a defamation claim, against the school board.
{¶ 19} The Eleventh District applied
The language of the statute expressly connects the terms “employee” and “arises out of the employment relationship.” Obviously, therefore, the statute only applies to former employees if the alleged tortious conduct arises out of the employment relationship. Appellants [the school board and superintendent] are requesting an interpretation that affords an exception to the immunity only if the conduct occurred while the employee was technically employed. If the legislature intended the statute to be as narrow as appellants suggest, it would have been quite simple to limit the application of the statute by stating just that. However, it seems clear that “relative to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship” is intended to encompass much more than appellants propose.
(Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 34.
{¶ 20} When the General Assembly intends to require that conduct or injuries have occurred during ongoing employment, it does so expressly. For example, with respect to employer intentional torts,
{¶ 21} In the context of workers’ compensation, a compensable injury must have occurred “in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee‘s employment.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 22} The General Assembly did not use “in the course of” or “during the course of” language in
{¶ 23} The county relies on the General Assembly‘s use of the present-tense “arises” in
{¶ 24} The county argues that its contrary reading of
{¶ 25} Before turning to the question whether Piazza‘s claims, in fact, arose out of the employment relationship between Piazza and the county, we briefly address—and reject—the county‘s argument that the plaintiff must have been an employee at the time she filed a lawsuit against a political-subdivision employer in order for
{¶ 26} The county argues that because
{¶ 27} We reject the county‘s argument that we must interpret any ambiguity in
{¶ 28} Neither this court nor, as far as we can discern, any Ohio appellate court has ever adopted the county‘s position that
{¶ 29} The General Assembly has instructed courts to presume that in enacting
{¶ 30} We reject the dissenting opinion‘s assertion that we are interfering with the General Assembly‘s constitutional authority to make policy for the state. Indeed, it is undisputed that it is not this court‘s role to second-guess the General Assembly‘s policy choices. Ohio Neighborhood Fin., Inc. v. Scott, 139 Ohio St.3d 536, 2014-Ohio-2440, 13 N.E.3d 1115, ¶ 38, citing Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066, ¶ 61. But it is our constitutional role “to interpret the law that the General Assembly enacts,” with the “primary goal * * * to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” State v. Taylor, 138 Ohio St.3d 194, 2014-Ohio-460, 5 N.E.3d 612, ¶ 14. And in light of the General Assembly‘s stated intention to achieve a “just and reasonable” result when enacting a statute,
{¶ 31} In accord with the prior decisions cited above and to avoid the unreasonable results that would arise from a contrary
Piazza‘s false-light claim is “relative to [a] matter that arises out of the employment relationship”
{¶ 32} We now turn from the legal question regarding the meaning of
{¶ 33} As part of its de novo review of the trial court‘s rejection of the county‘s assertion of immunity, the court of appeals held that Piazza‘s claim arose out her employment relationship with the county. 2017-Ohio-8163, 98 N.E.3d 1263, at ¶ 11, 23. We likewise apply a de novo standard of review. Sampson at ¶ 19. And in doing so, we agree with the Eighth District‘s conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that Piazza‘s claim is relative to a matter that arose out of her employment relationship with the county.
{¶ 34} As we consider whether there is a causal connection between Piazza‘s claim and her employment relationship with the county, we are not judging the merits of Piazza‘s claim; that question is not before us. We therefore do not consider the county‘s arguments that Piazza‘s claim does not satisfy the required elements of a false-light claim or that the defense of truth will bar the county‘s liability. Instead, we consider only whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding a causal connection between Piazza‘s claim and her employment relationship with the county. Whether Piazza can succeed on the merits of her claim is a question for the trial court.
{¶ 35} The statement forming the basis of Piazza‘s claim against the county concerns, and was made at about the same time as, the county‘s termination of her employment. According to Piazza, the quoted statement falsely connected her and her termination with the BOR corruption scandal. Termination of employment is a matter that arises out of the employment relationship. Gessner, 159 Ohio App.3d 43, 2004-Ohio-5770, 823 N.E.2d 1, at ¶ 31. In Schmitt v. Cuyahoga Cty. Educational Serv. Ctr., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97623, 2012-Ohio-2210, the Eighth District held that because the plaintiff‘s claims, including claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, “stem from the termination of her employment, it is apparent there is a causal connection between her claims and her employment relationship” with her former employers. Id. at ¶ 14.
{¶ 36} Unlike the plaintiff in Schmitt, Piazza has not alleged that the termination of her employment was itself tortious. But the statement allegedly made by FitzGerald is “relative to” her termination, which is a “matter that arises out of the employment relationship.”
Conclusion
{¶ 37} We hold that there is no temporal limitation in
Judgment affirmed.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and DONNELLY and FROELICH, JJ., concur.
FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY and DEWINE, JJ.
JEFFREY E. FROELICH, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for STEWART, J.
FISCHER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 38} The majority determines that
A former employee of a political subdivision is not an “employee” for purposes of R.C. 2744.09(B)
{¶ 39} The propositions of law we accepted for review in this case address the meaning of
This chapter does not apply to, and shall not be construed to apply to, the following:
* * *
(B) Civil actions by an employee * * * against his political subdivision relative to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship between the employee and the political subdivision.
(Emphasis added.) The issue that we must resolve first is whether appellee, Marcella King Piazza, a former employee of Cuyahoga County at the time she filed the lawsuit in this case, is an “employee” for purposes of
{¶ 40} We determine the General Assembly‘s intent first by examining the language of the statute. Stewart v. Vivian, 151 Ohio St.3d 574, 2017-Ohio-7526, 91 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 24. “When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need for this court to apply the rules of statutory interpretation.” Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000).
{¶ 41} In reviewing the language of the statute, “we may not restrict, constrict, qualify, narrow, enlarge, or abridge the General Assembly‘s wording.” State ex rel. Carna v. Teays Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 131 Ohio St.3d 478, 2012-Ohio-1484, 967 N.E.2d 193, ¶ 18. “Instead, we must accord significance and effect to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute, and abstain from inserting words where words were not placed by the General Assembly.” (Citation omitted and emphasis added.) Id. When the General Assembly has defined the terms used within
{¶ 42} The majority determines that
{¶ 43} The General Assembly has specifically defined the term “employee” in
{¶ 44} The majority, in holding that
{¶ 45} I would hold that
This court‘s decision in Vacha and other appellate courts’ decisions do not preclude us from applying the plain language of R.C. 2744.09(B)
{¶ 46} The majority supports its holding by noting that neither this court nor any
{¶ 47} It is true that no appellate court in Ohio has adopted the position that
{¶ 48} In Vacha v. N. Ridgeville, 136 Ohio St.3d 199, 2013-Ohio-3020, 992 N.E.2d 1126, this court may have implicitly assumed, for purposes of deciding other issues relating to the statute, that
{¶ 49} The only appellate court that has ever remotely addressed this particular issue is the Eleventh District Court of Appeals in Fleming v. Ashtabula Area City School Bd. of Edn., 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2006-A-0030, 2008-Ohio-1892. That court did not conduct a statutory analysis of
A plain-language application of R.C. 2744.09(B) would not lead to unreasonable consequences
{¶ 50} The majority explains, as further justification of its holding and its rejection of the clear and unambiguous language of
{¶ 51} Generally, when there is no ambiguity in a statute, this court does not apply any of the rules of statutory construction. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d at 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057; United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95-96, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820). Because the language of
{¶ 52} But even assuming arguendo that it is appropriate to consider the rules of statutory construction, including
{¶ 53} Despite the lack of a definition of “unreasonable,” this court has determined that an interpretation of a statute would produce unreasonable consequences when there would be some type of unintended and serious legal consequence. See, e.g., Dispatch Printing Co. at 634 (rejecting an interpretation of the Public Records Act that would allow a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement to take precedence over the act‘s requirements because that interpretation would have empowered private citizens to alter legal relationships between a government and the public at large through collective-bargaining agreements); State v. Wells, 91 Ohio St.3d 32, 34, 740 N.E.2d 1097 (2001) (the statutory term “anal cavity” does not include the victim‘s buttocks because that interpretation would subject an offender committing only one criminal act to prosecution under two different criminal provisions).
{¶ 54} Although there is no established test for determining whether an interpretation of a statute would produce unreasonable consequences, what is clear from the above definition of “unreasonable” and from our case law is that an unreasonable consequence is something more than an undesirable consequence. An unreasonable consequence is one that goes beyond the limits of fairness or that is contrary to reason. And here, the consequence of applying the plain language of
{¶ 55} I understand the majority‘s policy concern that if we applied the plain language of the statute, employers could be encouraged to terminate employees when an incident has occurred in order to avoid potential liability, see majority opinion at ¶ 29, citing Fleming, 2008-Ohio-1892, at ¶ 31. I do not presume to know the policy considerations of the General Assembly, but I am aware that while there
{¶ 56} Here, the General Assembly chose to define the term “employee” in
Conclusion
{¶ 57}
{¶ 58} For the reasons set forth above, I must respectfully dissent.
KENNEDY and DEWINE, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.
Schuster & Simmons Co., L.P.A., and Nancy C. Schuster, for appellee.
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brian R. Gutkoski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney; Robert J. Triozzi, Cuyahoga County Law Director, and Awatef Assad and Jonathan M. Scandling, Assistant Law Directors, for appellant.
Gwen E. Callender; and Bolek, Besser, Glesius, L.L.C., and Matthew D. Besser, urging affirmance for amici curiae Fraternal Order of Police of Ohio, Inc., and Ohio Employment Lawyers Association.