TAD STEINBRINK v. GREENON LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.
C.A. CASE NO. 11CA0050
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF CLARK COUNTY, OHIO
March 30, 2012
[Cite as Steinbrink v. Greenon Local School Dist., 2012-Ohio-1438.]
GRADY, P.J.
T.C. CASE NO. 10CV1538; (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court)
Mark J. Bamberger, Atty. Reg. No. 0082053, 8 S. Third Street, Tipp City, OH 45371 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
Brian L. Wildermuth, Atty. Reg. No. 0066303; Lauren K. Epperley, Atty. Reg. No. 0082924, The Greene Town Center, 50 Chestnut Street, Suite 230, Dayton, OH 45440 Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
GRADY, P.J.:
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a final order denying a motion for a judgment on the pleadings.
{¶ 2} On December 21, 2010, Plaintiff Tad Steinbrink commenced an action on claims for relief alleging (1) defamation libel, (2) defamation per se, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (4) tortious interference with contract. The Defendants identified
{¶ 3} The complaint alleged that Plaintiff was employed as a high school teacher and assistant high school football coach by the Greenon Local School district (the “District“) for seven years. In March and later in May of 2009, Plaintiff was made aware by Defendants of complaints made against him arising from his work as a football coach. Following the latter complaint, Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave. Plaintiff was promised an opportunity to respond to the complaints, following full disclosure by the District of its investigation of the complaints that were made.
{¶ 4} In a meeting on June 3, 2009, Superintendent Lytle told Plaintiff he had twenty-four hours to resign from his coaching position with the District, following full disclosure of the results of the District‘s investigation. Lytle further told Plaintiff that, in any event, the District‘s Board would hold a special meeting on June 6, 2009, “to discuss the Plaintiff‘s employment, and that she would have to inform the media (Springfield News Sun) that the meeting was taking place.” (Complaint, ¶ 22.)
{¶ 5} On June 9, 2009, Plaintiff received notice “that the board would be acting on the termination of Plaintiff‘s supplemental contract during the July Board meeting.” Id., ¶ 34. Attached to the complaint are copies of a report prepared by Lytle, dated June 19, 2009, captioned: “Harassment Investigation[,] Tad Steinbrink.” The report concludes that Plaintiff‘s conduct in relation to student athletes who complained “were reprehensible and irresponsible,” causing Lytle to ask Plaintiff to resign from his position as assistant football coach. Because Plaintiff had not resigned, Lytle recommended termination of Plaintiff‘s
{¶ 6} Plaintiff alleges that he was not given timely notice of Lytle‘s report and recommendation, that he was denied the promised full disclosure, and that Lytle and other representatives of the District subsequently caused “new and damaging comments” concerning Plaintiff to be published in the Springfield News-Sun.
{¶ 7} On January 26, 2011, Defendants the District and Lytle filed an answer to Plaintiff‘s complaint, denying many of his allegations and pleading twenty-eight affirmative defenses, including statutory immunity. On that same date, Defendants filed a
{¶ 8} On June 17, 2011, the trial court overruled Defendants’
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 9} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE BOARD IMMUNITY
{¶ 10}
{¶ 11} Motion for judgment on the pleadings
{¶ 12} After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.
{¶ 13} A
{¶ 14} A
{¶ 15} Unlike a
{¶ 16} Ordinarily, an order overruling or denying a
{¶ 17} The third affirmative defense pleaded in the answer Defendants filed states: “Plaintiff‘s claims are barred and/or limited by Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2744.” The substantive sufficiency of that defense may be tested by a
{¶ 18} “Political subdivision” or “subdivision means a . . . body both corporate and politic responsible for governmental activities in a geographic area smaller than that of the state.”
{¶ 19}
For the purposes of this chapter, the functions of political subdivisions are hereby classified as governmental functions and proprietary functions.
Except as provided in division (B) of this section, a political subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary function.
{¶ 20} The School District employed Plaintiff in providing a system of public education, and the provision of a system of public education is a governmental function.
{¶ 21} Plaintiff‘s four claims for relief against the Board and Lytle for defamation libel, defamation per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with contract, all plead and seek relief for injuries that are alleged to have proximately resulted from tortious conduct that was intentional, not merely negligent.
{¶ 22} Relying on the principle announced in Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc., 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 453 N.E.2d 572 (1982), we have held that
{¶ 23} On February 16, 2012, the Supreme Court filed its decision in Sampson v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-570, rejecting application of the Blankenship rationale to
{¶ 24} The Syllabus of the Court in Sampson states:
- When an employee of a political-subdivision employer brings a civil action against the political subdivision alleging an intentional tort, that civil action may qualify as a “matter that arises out of the employment relationship” within the meaning of
R.C. 2744.09(B) . - An employee‘s action against a political subdivision employer arises out of the employment relationship between the employee and the political subdivision within the meaning of
R.C. 2744.09(B) if there is a causal connection or a causal relationship between the claims raised by the employee and the employment relationship.
{¶ 25} From the face of the pleadings, there was a causal relationship between the claims for relief in Plaintiff‘s complaint and his employment relationship with Defendants the District and Board. On the authority of Sampson, we conclude that
{¶ 26} The first assignment of error is overruled.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 27} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING SUPERINTENDENT LORI LYTLE IMMUNITY UNDER
{¶ 28}
(a) The employee‘s acts or omissions ere manifestly outside the scope of the employee‘s employment or official responsibilities;
(b) The employee‘s acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.”
{¶ 29} Lytle‘s acts or omissions in investigating the complaints against Plaintiff and filing her two reports and a recommendation concerning those complaints were not manifestly outside the scope of her employment as Superintendent of the School District.
{¶ 30} Defendants argue that none of the requirements imposed by
{¶ 31} In Dearth, a police officer released an intoxicated male to the care of his girlfriend, who protested to the officer that the subject “is violent when he is drunk.” The subject subsequently attacked the girlfriend, causing injuries which led to her death. The trial court granted a
{¶ 32} In the present case, there is more. In a “Final Decision,” which is attached to Steinbrink‘s complaint as Exhibit “D,” Lytle stated that a Harassment Report concerning the complaints against Steinbrink “indicates evidence of unlawful harassment has occurred” in violation of Board policies “and Ohio law.” At paragraph 57 of his complaint, Steinbrink alleges that though no criminal investigation was ever conducted, Lytle “handed out copies” of her final decision “to each person who attended a special meeting on October 13, 2009,” and that Lytle subsequently sent out an email to all attendees asking them to throw away the Superintendent‘s final decision they received at the meeting, because it contained wrong information.
{¶ 33} The foregoing allegation was made in support of Plaintiff‘s claim for defamation libel, and was repeated in support of his subsequent claims for defamation per se,
{¶ 34} We do not discount any of the other allegations in Plaintiff‘s complaint in finding that the allegations in paragraph 57 in the complaint are sufficient to satisfy
{¶ 35} The second assignment of error is overruled.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 36} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE BOARD AND SUPERINTENDENT LYTLE IMMUNITY UNDER
{¶ 37} Defendants argue that because Plaintiff‘s intentional tort claims arose from their employment relationship for purposes of the immunity exception in
{¶ 38} Defendants’ argument is undercut by Sampson, which recognizes that the policies supporting statutory immunity and workers’ compensation are separate and distinct. Defendants’ argument is undercut completely by Blankenship, which held that claims for
{¶ 39} At oral argument, counsel for the District contended, for the first time, that
This section does not apply to claims arising during the course of employment involving discrimination, civil rights, retaliation, harassment in violation of Chapter 4112. of the Revised Code, intentional infliction of emotional distress not compensable under Chapters 4121. and 4123. of the Revised Code, contract, promissory estoppel, or defamation.
{¶ 40} By its express terms,
{¶ 41} Intentional torts, because the do not occur within the employment relationship, are beyond the reach of the authority conferred on the General Assembly by Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution to establish a system of worker‘s compensation, and therefore any attempt to create worker‘s compensation coverage for intentional torts through the enactment of
{¶ 42} The third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 43} Conclusion
{¶ 44} The District raised other issues in the
{¶ 45} Appellants limited their arguments in their brief to the particular errors assigned, which did not involve those other issues. We are required by
{¶ 46} Having overruled the three errors assigned, we will affirm the judgment from which the appeal was taken.
DONOVAN, J., And HALL, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Mark J. Bamberger, Esq.
Brian L. Wildermuth, Esq.
Lauren K. Epperley, Esq.
Hon. Douglas M. Rastatter