PHANG v. BLANCHEPHANG v. BLANCHE
Responding to public demands for information, Congress with near unanimity passed the Epstein Files Transparency Act (the “Epstein Act“),
Katie Phang (“Ms. Phang“) brings this action against Todd Blanche in his official capacity as Acting Attorney General of the United States (the “Attorney General“), claiming that he has improperly withheld information and failed to comply with other requirements in violation of the Epstein Act. Pending before the Court is Ms. Phang‘s Motion for Preliminary Injunction in which she seeks relief for a limited list of violations of the Epstein Act. See Application for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 9; and Mem. of Points and Auths. in Support of Application for a Prelim. Inj. (collectively “Mot.“), ECF No. 9-1. Upon careful consideration of Ms. Phang‘s motion, the Attorney General‘s opposition, the reply, the applicable law; and for the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Ms. Phang‘s motion.
I. Background
A. Statutory and Factual Background
1. The Epstein Act
The Epstein Act was passed with near unanimity by the House of Representatives on November 18, 2025; by unanimous consent in
Section 2(a) of the Act requires the Attorney General, within 30 days after enactment, and subject to the prohibited and permitted grounds for withholding, to “make publicly available in a searchable and downloadable format all unclassified records, documents, communications, and investigative materials in the possession of the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and United States Attorneys’ Offices, that relate to[:]”
- Jeffrey Epstein including all investigations, prosecutions, or custodial matters.
- Ghislaine Maxwell.
Flight logs or travel records, including but not limited to manifests, itineraries, pilot records, and customs or immigration documentation, for any aircraft, vessel, or vehicle owned, operated, or used by Jeffrey Epstein or any related entity. - Individuals, including government officials, named or referenced in connection with Epstein‘s criminal activities, civil settlements, immunity or plea agreements, or investigatory proceedings.
- Entities (corporate, nonprofit, academic, or governmental) with known or alleged ties to Epstein‘s trafficking or financial networks.
- Any immunity deals, non-prosecution agreements, plea bargains, or sealed settlements involving Epstein or his associates.
- Internal DOJ communications, including emails, memos, meeting notes, concerning decisions to charge, not charge, investigate, or decline to investigate Epstein or his associates.
- All communications, memoranda, directives, logs, or metadata concerning the destruction, deletion, alteration, misplacement, or concealment of documents, recordings, or electronic data related to Epstein, his associates, his detention and death, or any investigative files.
- Documentation of Epstein‘s detention or death, including incident reports, witness interviews, medical examiner files, autopsy reports, and written records detailing the circumstances and cause of death.
Section 2(b), entitled “Prohibited Grounds for Withholding” provides that “[n]o record shall be withheld, delayed or redacted on the basis of embarrassment, reputational harm, or political sensitivity, including to any government official, public figure, or foreign dignitary.” Epstein Act § 2(a)(1)-(9).
Section 2(c), entitled “Permitted Withholdings” identifies five categories of records for which the Attorney General “may withhold or redact the segregable portions,” and requires all redactions to “be accompanied by a written justification published in the Federal Register and submitted to Congress.” Epstein Act § 2(c)(1), (2). The five categories of permitted withholdings are records that:
- contain personally identifiable information of victims or victims’ personal and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- depict or contain child sexual abuse materials (CSAM) as defined under
18 U.S.C. 2256 and prohibited under18 U.S.C. 2252 –2252A; - would jeopardize an active federal investigation or ongoing prosecution, provided that such withholding is narrowly tailored and temporary;
- depict or contain images of death, physical abuse, or injury of any person; or
contain information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.
Epstein Act § 2(c)(1)(A)-(E).
Section 2(c) also addresses classified information and requires the Attorney General to declassify such information “to the maximum extent possible.” Epstein Act § 2(c)(3). For information that cannot be declassified, the Attorney General is required to “release an unclassified summary for each of the redacted or withheld classified information.” Epstein Act § 2(c)(3)(A). Decisions to classify information covered by the Epstein Act after July 1, 2025 “shall be published in the Federal Register and submitted to Congress, including the date of classification, the identity of the classifying authority, and an unclassified summary of the justification.” Epstein Act § 2(c)(4).
Section 3, entitled “Report to Congress,” provides that within fifteen days of the public release of the materials required by the Act, “the Attorney General shall submit to the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary a report listing:”
- All categories of records released and withheld.
- A summary of redactions made, including legal basis.
A list of all government officials and politically exposed persons named or referenced in the released materials, with no redactions permitted under subsection (b)(1).
Epstein Act § 3.
2. The Attorney General‘s Efforts to Comply with the Epstein Act
The Epstein Act required the government to comply with its requirements by December 19, 2025. See Epstein Act § 2(a). On that date, the Attorney General issued a letter to Congress stating that the Department was “producing hundreds of thousands of pages of responsive materials in compliance with the [Epstein Act].” Letter from Todd Blanche, Deputy U.S. Att‘y Gen., to Members of Congress at 1 (Dec. 19, 2025), Exhibit D to Ward-Packard Decl., ECF No. 9-3.1 The letter stated that “the Department is continuing to review additional documents and other items for potential responsiveness,” noting that responsive documents are being provided to the Department by the Department‘s components on an ongoing basis. Id. The letter
The Attorney General made further productions on December 20, 22, and 23, 2025, and on January 30, 2026. Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 14. No production was accompanied by a privilege log. Id.
On January 30, 2026, the Attorney General issued a second letter, stating that that day‘s production “mark[ed] the Department‘s compliance with its production obligations under the [Epstein] Act.” Letter from Todd Blanche, Deputy U.S. Att‘y Gen., Re: Epstein Files Transparency Act - Production of Department Materials at 1 (Jan. 30, 2026), Exhibit E to Ward-
On February 2, 2026, the Attorney General acknowledged that “several thousands of documents and media that may [sic] have inadvertently included victim-identifying information” were disclosed in the January 30, 2026 production and were therefore subsequently removed. See Letter from Todd Blanche, Deputy U.S. Att‘y Gen. to the Hon. Richard M. Berman & the Hon. Paul A.
On February 14, 2026, the Attorney General issued the report required in section 3 of the Epstein Act in the form of a letter to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee and House Judiciary Committee. See Letter from Todd Blanche, Deputy U.S. Att‘y Gen. to Chairman Chuck Grassley, Ranking Member Dick Durbin, Chairman Jim Jordan, Ranking Member Jamie Raskin (Feb. 14, 2026), Exhibit F to Ward-
The letter included a four-paragraph “Summary of Redactions Made and Legal Basis.” Id. at 2-3. The first category in the summary was the withholdings permitted under section 2(c) of the Epstein Act. Id. at 2. For the second category, the letter stated that “[a]lthough permitted by [section 2(c)(1)(E) of] the [Epstein] Act, no materials were redacted or withheld on th[e] basis that a record ‘contain[ed] information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.‘” Id. at 3. The third category were redactions based on “various privileges, including deliberative-process
The letter concluded with a “List of All Government Officials and Politically Exposed Persons” named or referenced in the released materials. Id. at 3-6.
3. Plaintiff Katie Phang
Plaintiff Katie Phang is an “attorney and independent journalist based in Miami, Florida.” Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 15; see also Phang Decl., ECF No. 9-2 ¶ 2. She has worked as a legal analyst for a variety of media outlets, including hosting “The Katie Phang Show” on MSNOW (then MSNBC). Phang Decl., ECF No. 9-2 ¶¶ 5, 6. Since April 2025, she has reported on “major domestic and international events, with a focus on legal and political news” on her YouTube channel and other platforms. Id. ¶ 7. She has “extensively covered the crimes of Jeffrey Epstein, Ghislaine Maxwell, and others in the ‘Epstein elite,‘” including publishing seventy-two videos about the subject in the last year. Id. ¶¶ 8, 9. Her reporting on the Epstein files has “realized more than 9.7 million views on [her] YouTube channel.” Id. ¶ 10.
To conduct her reporting, Ms. Phang has “personally reviewed many of the documents produced . . . pursuant to the [Epstein Act],” and she has “relied and continue[s] to rely on
Ms. Phang seeks the information that she claims has been illegally withheld “because, as a journalist covering the Epstein story, [she owes her] audience, the public, and the victims of Epstein, Maxwell, and others the most accurate and comprehensive reporting possible.” Id. ¶¶ 32, 33. “[The Attorney General‘s] illegal conduct has injured and continues to injure [her] by preventing [her] from conducting the comprehensive reporting [she] would otherwise conduct” about the specific information she seeks to obtain through her motion. Id. ¶ 34. Additionally, she states that “[the Attorney General‘s] illegal conduct has [] caused and continues to cause [her] to suffer direct financial losses,” by “constraining [her] ability to report” on the Epstein files. Id. ¶¶ 35, 42.
Ms. Phang filed the Complaint on April 27, 2026, alleging four claims: (1) Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act - Contrary to Law and in Excess of Statutory Authority; (2) Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act - Arbitrary, Capricious, and an Abuse of Agency Discretion; (3) Ultra Vires Agency Action;3 and (4) Declaratory Judgment Act. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 12-14. She asks the Court to provide the following relief: (1) declare that the Attorney General has failed to comply with the Act; (2) enjoin the Attorney General‘s ongoing violations of the Epstein Act and require him to: (a) remove all unlawful redactions, (b) explain the bases for any remaining lawful redactions, (c) re-produce all materials that were produced but unlawfully redacted, and (d) produce all materials that have not been produced but should be; (3) appoint a special master to oversee the Attorney General‘s compliance with the law; (4) award attorneys’ fees and costs; and (5) grant any other relief the Court deems just and proper. Id. at 14–15.
On May 28, 2026, Ms. Phang filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking relief for a specific list of violations of
- show cause why the redactions of sender and recipient names in the emails bearing Bates numbers EFTA00749245, EFTA01187999, EFTA01930501, ETFA01928255, EFTA00628112, EFTA02648868, EFTA02504630, and EFTA01022356 should not be removed;
- show cause why the redactions of potential co-conspirator names in the DOJ documents bearing Bates numbers EFTA01703108 and EFTA00038227 should not be removed;
- show cause why the underlying FBI interview notes that formed the basis for the FD-302 interview reports bearing Bates numbers EFTA01245620, EFTA02858481, EFTA02858491, and EFTA02858495 should not be produced (with appropriate redactions to protect victims’ information);
- immediately initiate review and production of foreign-language materials that may be subject to production under the Epstein Files Transparency Act; and
- immediately publish in the Federal Register the redaction log required under Epstein Files Transparency Act § 2(C)(2), and update it concurrently with each future release of redacted materials.
Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 35-36. The Attorney General filed his opposition to the motion on June 5, 2026, see Opp‘n, ECF No. 12; and Ms. Phang filed her reply on June 8, 2026. See Reply, ECF No. 13. The motion is ripe and ready for the Court‘s adjudication.
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right,” and only “upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 24 (2008). The moving party “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. “[T]he first and most important factor” is likelihood of success on the merits. Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Where the federal government is the opposing party, the balance of equities and public interest factors merge. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).
In this Circuit, the four factors have typically been evaluated on a “sliding scale,” such that if “the movant makes an unusually strong showing on one of the factors, then it does not necessarily have to make as strong a showing on another factor.” Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In the wake of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Winter, 555 U.S. at 7; “the D.C. Circuit has suggested that a positive showing on all four preliminary injunction factors may be required.” Holmes v. FEC, 71 F. Supp. 3d 178, 183 n.4 (D.D.C. 2014); see also Sherley v. Sebelius, 644
For the reasons explained below, all factors weigh in Ms. Phang‘s favor.
III. Analysis
A. The Court Likely Has Jurisdiction Over Ms. Phang‘s Claims
The Attorney General argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Ms. Phang‘s claims because: (1) the Epstein Act does not provide for a private right of action; (2) Ms.
1. The APA Provides Ms. Phang With a Right of Action
The Attorney General argues that “[b]y its own terms, nowhere does [the Epstein Act] expressly authorize private individuals to sue for alleged violations, nor does the statutory scheme indicate that Congress intended to create an implied right of action,” and therefore “any claim premised on an alleged violation of the Epstein Act fails as a matter of law.” Opp‘n, ECF No. 12 at 16–17.
However, Ms. Phang sues under the APA, not under the Epstein Act. “The APA, by its terms, provides a right to judicial review of all final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,
Ms. Phang alleges that the Attorney General‘s violations of the Act are “not in accordance with law” pursuant to
2. Ms. Phang Likely Has Article III Standing
a. Legal Standard
“Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.‘” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157 (2014) (quoting
To establish standing, “a plaintiff must show (1) an ‘injury in fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,’ and (3) a ‘likel[ihood]’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable decision.‘” Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 157-58 (alteration in original) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)). “Since they are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff‘s case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Id.
b. Analysis
Ms. Phang argues that she has two redressable injuries: first, she has suffered cognizable informational injuries, see Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 18–21; and second, she has suffered cognizable economic injuries. Id. at 21. The Attorney General responds that Ms. Phang is not suffering a cognizable informational injury, and that her economic injury is not redressable. See Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 18–19. For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that Ms. Phang likely suffers from informational injuries and her economic injury Likely is redressable.
i. Ms. Phang Likely Has Suffered a Cognizable Informational Injury
It is well-settled that “a denial of access to information qualifies as an injury in fact where a statute (on the claimants’ reading) requires that the information be publicly disclosed and there is no reason to doubt their claim that the
“[T]he fact that a number of people could be similarly injured does not render the claim an impermissible generalized grievance[.]” Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2007). And “[t]he fact that other citizens or groups of citizens” are also deprived of the information a plaintiff seeks “does not lessen [a plaintiff’s] asserted injury, any more than the fact that numerous citizens might request the same information under the [FOIA] entails that those who have been denied access do not possess a sufficient basis to sue.” Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1989). Even if the statute “entitles the public generally to the disclosure of” the information, “that does not mean that the informational injury . . . is not particular to Plaintiff.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity, 266 F. Supp. 3d 297, 311 (D.D.C. 2017).
Ms. Phang argues that she satisfies the first part of the test because she “reads the statute to require a host of disclosures that have not occurred” and because disclosure is owed to the “public at large.” Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 19 (quoting Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 791 F. Supp. 3d 29, 46 (D.D.C. 2025)). The Attorney General disagrees, arguing that: (1) Ms. Phang does not “allege any harm or individualized interests separate from ‘the interests of the public at large,’” Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 17 (quoting Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 600 (2007)); (2) she does not have a “personal ‘statutory right to seek the information’ at issue,” id. at 18 (quoting Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Int’l Dev. Fin. Corp., 77 F.4th 679, 686 (D.C. Cir. 2023)); and (3) because the statute is directed at the government, she has no legally protected interest to assert. Id. (citing Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 77. F.4th at 686).
The Attorney General’s arguments are unpersuasive. As to his first argument, his reliance on Hein is inapposite since it is not an informational injury case.
As to his second and third arguments, Center for Biological Diversity supports Ms. Phang’s argument rather than his. There, plaintiffs sued the U.S. International Development Finance
The Court concludes that Ms. Phang satisfies the first part of the test: on her interpretation of the Epstein Act, it requires the information to be disclosed to her as part of the public at large, and the Attorney General’s alleged failure to comply with the law deprives her of this information. See e.g., Akins, 524 U.S. at 20–25 (emphasizing that an “inability to obtain information” that Congress required to make public constitutes an injury in fact for Article III).
Ms. Phang argues that she satisfies the second part of the test because she is suffering the type of harm that Congress sought to prevent in enacting the Act. Ms. Phang argues first that “Congress enacted the Act to provide ‘complete truth’ for survivors;” Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 19 (quoting 171 Cong. Rec. H4726 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2025) (statement of Rep. Raskin)); and to “achieve ‘maximum possible level of transparency when it comes to the heinous crimes of Jeffrey Epstein.’” Id. (quoting 171 Cong. Rec. H4727 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2025) (statement of Rep. Kiley)); see also id. at 19 n.7 (listing more statements from congressional representatives noting the purpose of the Act is transparency for the American public). Ms. Phang then argues that to realize these goals, journalists “through their
The Attorney General disagrees, arguing that Ms. Phang cannot demonstrate “downstream harm—some concrete consequences of not receiving the information,” but that “[a]t best, [Ms. Phang] asserts generalized grievances of seeking ‘complete truth’ and ‘transparency.’” Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 18–19.
The Attorney General’s arguments are unpersuasive. First, Ms. Phang has identified “some concrete consequences of not receiving the information.” Id. at 18. She has identified “half a dozen stories she is currently unable to report” because the Attorney General has not disclosed the information. See Reply, ECF No. 13 at 8-9 (citing Phang Decl., ECF No. 9-2 ¶¶ 14–31). She has identified harms to victims and the public who are being denied the benefit of her reporting. Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 20. She also cited authority that supports her assertion that journalists, and herself in particular, have suffered the type of harm that the Epstein Act was meant to prevent. See Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 20–21 (citing Seife v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 440 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) and Pub. Citizen v. Carlin, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 184 F.3d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). The Attorney General does not address this authority. See generally Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 18. Second, “the fact that a number of people could be similarly
The Court concludes that Ms. Phang satisfies the second part of the test: she is suffering the type of harm—lack of transparency—that Congress sought to prevent by requiring disclosure of the information and the disclosure of the information that Ms. Phang seeks would help her in her work. See e.g., Jewell, 828 F.3d at 992 (“[T]he existence and scope of an injury for informational standing purposes is defined by Congress: a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate that it has informational standing, generally ‘need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress identified.’” (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016))).
For all these reasons, Ms. Phang has established that she likely is suffering from an informational injury.
ii. Ms. Phang’s Economic Injuries Are Likely Redressable
Ms. Phang also argues that she has suffered an economic injury based on the Attorney General’s failure to disclose materials in violation of the Epstein Act, which has caused her “actual economic loss” because she has been unable to publish additional videos about the Epstein files and consequently has
The Attorney General’s argument is without merit. “A ‘plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement’ by showing ‘that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury’ to the plaintiff,” and “[t]he plaintiff ‘need not show that a favorable decision will relieve’ his or her ‘every injury.’” Energy Future Coal. v. E.P.A., 793 F.3d 141, 145–46 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007)) (emphasis in original). Rather, the plaintiff needs to show that her injury would be redressed by removing a “hurdle.” Id. at 144.
Ms. Phang is not seeking monetary damages. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. Rather, she is requesting that the “hurdle“—the violations of the Act—be removed so she can continue to publish her work and so she does not experience further economic loss caused by the hurdle. Accordingly, her economy injury is redressable by the relief she requests.
The Attorney General does not contest causal connection, which is easily met here. See generally Opp’n, ECF No. 12. Ms. Phang’s injuries are directly traceable to her claims that the Attorney General has violated the Epstein Act. The Attorney General also does not dispute that Ms. Phang’s informational injuries are redressable by the relief she is seeking. See generally id. A favorable ruling by the Court would resolve her informational injuries, as she would be able to obtain and report on the information she is seeking.
For all the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that Ms. Phang has established Article III standing.
3. FOIA Does Not Provide an Adequate Remedy
The Attorney General argues that Ms. Phang invoked the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity when she brought this action under the APA, but because FOIA provides Ms. Phang with another adequate remedy, there was no waiver of sovereign immunity and so the Court lacks jurisdiction over her claims. See Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 19–21.
For a remedy to constitute an adequate remedy precluding APA review, the remedy must not be “doubtful.” El Rio Santa Cruz Neighborhood Health Ctr., Inc. v. DHS, 396 F.3d 1265, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The disclosure mandate in the Epstein Act is
First, Ms. Phang likely would not be able to obtain the unredacted names of senders and recipients in email exchanges with Mr. Epstein because such information would likely be redacted under FOIA Exemption 6—information that, if disclosed, would invade another individual’s personal privacy; and FOIA Exemption 7—information compiled for law enforcement purposes. See Clemente v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. 1:20-cv-1527, 2022 WL 17092585, at *3–9 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2022) (holding that the FBI properly asserted Exemptions 1, 3, 5, 6, 7(A), 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E) for records withheld in response to a broad FOIA request for records related to Mr. Epstein and his alleged criminal activities). Second, she would not be able to obtain unredacted DOJ internal charging documents or the notes of the interview with the person who accused Mr. Trump of assault because they would likely be subject to the same exemptions, as well as potentially being exempted as grand jury records under
The Department’s own post-Epstein Act responses to FOIA requests for the Mr. Epstein and Ms. Maxwell files refute the Attorney General’s argument that FOIA provides an adequate remedy. In responses to two FOIA requests for the files, the Department stated that “the [Epstein Act] directed a much broader and less redacted release of the files than would have been made under the FOIA. Certain exemptions which may have been made under FOIA were not made in the [Epstein Act] release.” Letter from Andrew D. Fiorillo, Chief, Initial Request Staff, U.S. Dep’t of Just. Off. of Info. Pol’y, to Joseph Elfelt at 2 (Apr. 23, 2026), Exhibit H to Ballou Decl., ECF No. 14-1; Letter from Andrew D. Fiorillo, Chief, Initial Request Staff, U.S.
The Attorney General relies on a string cite to assert that FOIA provides an adequate remedy here. Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 20-21. But the Attorney General does not even attempt to explain why the cases cited are analogous to this case, where the Epstein Act mandates broad disclosures that would be exempted under FOIA and requires the publication of a redaction log that the Attorney General has not yet published.
The Attorney General argues that the Epstein Act and FOIA “must be construed as a whole and, indeed, they operate in harmony.” Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 22. But he provides no authority for these propositions. He contends that the Epstein Act “supplements FOIA by imposing additional disclosure obligations with respect to a specific set of records; it does not supplant FOIA or create a parallel enforcement framework.” Id. He provides no authority for these propositions either. The Epstein Act is a standalone piece of legislation. It does not reference
The Attorney General asserts that since Ms. Phang “alleges that the Department’s public disclosures violated the law by failing to produce required records, improperly withholding information, and neglecting to provide adequate justification for any redactions applied,” which is similar to what a plaintiff would contest under FOIA, “FOIA’s remedial scheme is not merely adequate, but is substantively identical to the relief Plaintiff seeks.” Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 22. The Attorney General cites Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (“CREW“) v. Dep’t of Just. to support this argument. 846 F.3d 1235, 1245–46 (D.C. Cir. 2017). CREW sued under section 704 of the APA to compel the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel to disclose its opinions under the “reading-room” provision of the FOIA. Id. at 1238. That provision “requires agencies to ‘make [certain records] available for public inspection in an electronic format[,]’ including ‘statements of
The Attorney General also points to the Department’s “Cross Walk” that correlates the exemptions under the Epstein Act to FOIA exemptions. Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 22 (citing Department of Justice, Off. Of Info. Pol’y, EFTA-FOIA Crosswalk (2026), https://www.justice.gov/oip/media/1438931/dl?inline.7 The Attorney General argues that “the redactions and withholding decisions [Ms. Phang] challenges align with FOIA’s exemption framework.” Id. at 22. What the Cross Walk in fact shows is that
For all these reasons, it is highly “doubtful” that FOIA would provide an adequate remedy. Therefore, Ms. Phang’s suit under the APA is proper and is not barred by sovereign immunity.
B. Ms. Phang Is Likely to Prevail on Her Administrative Procedure Act Claims Relevant to the Pending Motion
Ms. Phang argues that she is likely to succeed on the merits of her APA claims relevant to the instant motion. Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 23-26. Ms. Phang identifies five categories of violations of the Epstein Act. First, the Attorney General has violated the Epstein Act by redacting the names of senders and recipients in at least eight email exchanges with Mr. Epstein regarding a “torture video” and sexual activity with young women, including minors. Id. at 23-26. Second, the Attorney General has violated the Epstein Act by redacting the names of co-defendants in a draft indictment, the names of individuals identified as “co-conspirators,” and the sender and recipients in a Department briefing email. Id. at 26. Third, the Attorney General has violated the Epstein Act by withholding certain
The Attorney General does not respond substantively to any of these arguments. Rather, he states that based on his jurisdictional arguments, “[Ms. Phang’s] APA claims fail as a matter of law.” Id. at 14. By not responding substantively, the Attorney General has conceded Ms. Phang’s merits arguments in the pending motion. Texas v. United States, 798 F.3d 1108, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (stating that D.D.C. Local Rule 7(b) is “understood to mean that if a party files an opposition to a motion and therein addresses only some of the movant‘s arguments, the court may treat the unaddressed arguments as conceded“). Accordingly, Ms. Phang is likely to succeed on the merits of her APA claims relevant to the pending motion.
C. Ms. Phang Likely Has Established That She Faces Irreparable Harm
“[T]he basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm;” thus “[a] movant‘s failure to
The D.C. Circuit “has set a high standard for irreparable injury.” Id. “First, the injury must be both certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical.” Wis. Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam). The movant must show that “[t]he injury complained of is of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Id. (internal citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). “Second, the injury must be beyond remediation.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297.
Ms. Phang argues that she “is suffering two kinds of irreparable harm: an informational harm (because Blanche refuses to produce time-sensitive information she is entitled to) and an economic harm (because she cannot publish time-sensitive reporting based on that information).” Reply, ECF No. 13 at 14-15; Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 18–21, 32–34. The Attorney General argues that her purported information injury is speculative and conjectural, Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 26-27; and that her economic injury alone does not constitute irreparable harm. Id. at 27-28.
1. Ms. Phang’s Informational Injury Is Neither Speculative Nor Conjectural
Ms. Phang argues that the information she seeks is time-sensitive because Congress has said so by requiring compliance with the Epstein Act within thirty days of its enactment. Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 31. Ms. Phang argues that the information is time-sensitive “in fact” because if she is able to report on the names of the co-conspirators whose names have been redacted, judicial redress for victims may be possible. Id. at 32. Ms. Phang argues that the foreign language materials “are likely to be a fruitful source of information about the identities of those complicit in Epstein’s crimes.” Id. Ms. Phang argues that materials related to President Trump are particularly time-sensitive “because of the ongoing midterm elections” and the fact that “[m]any candidates have highlighted the Epstein Files as part of their campaigns.” Id. Finally, Ms. Phang argues that the “redaction log is time-sensitive as a structural matter” because without it, there is “no systematic way to evaluate the productions that have occurred to date.” Id. at 34.
The Attorney General argues that Ms. Phang has not provided adequate evidence “that any records are presently at risk of destruction, that any relevant evidence is likely to be lost
Finally, the Attorney General argues that Ms. Phang’s argument regarding public interest fading after the upcoming mid-term elections is speculative. Id. However, “the non-disclosure of information to which a plaintiff is entitled, under certain circumstances itself constitutes an irreparable
2. Ms. Phang’s Economic Injury Likely Is Irreparable
Ms. Phang argues that the information she seeks is time-sensitive to her business interests because she “derives income from each video and story she publishes,” and to maximize her
As an initial matter, the Attorney General’s contention that “economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm” misunderstands the applicable law. Opp’n, ECF No. 13 at 16 (quoting Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674). Rather, where, as here, Ms. Phang cannot receive damages under the APA, economic harm can be considered irreparable. See, e.g., Chef Time 1520 LLC v. Small Bus. Admin., 646 F. Supp. 3d 101, 115–16 (D.D.C. 2022) (“[B]ecause [plaintiff] will not be able to seek damages under the APA for any possibly unlawful agency action once the fund has fully expired the Court concludes that [plaintiff] is likely to suffer irreparable economic harm absent a temporary restraining order.” (internal citations omitted)); Nat’l Mining Ass‘n v. Jackson, 768 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[I]f a movant seeking a preliminary injunction will be unable to sue to recover any monetary damages against a government agency in the future because of, among other things, sovereign immunity, financial loss can constitute irreparable injury.” (internal quotations omitted)); E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden, 993 F.3d 640, 677 (9th Cir. 2021) (although “economic harm is not generally considered irreparable . . .
The Attorney General argues that Ms. Phang has acknowledged that she “has continued to publish on her YouTube channel and has not been prevented from covering the Epstein matter generally.” Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 28. He also argues that the fact that “Plaintiff released an episode just two months ago that recorded over 315,000 views to date, and another three months ago that recorded over 841,000 views to date” has shown that the absence of these records “has not silenced her.” Id. However, that Ms. Phang has continued to work does not mean that the economic harm is irreparable for the reasons explained above and because she would do additional reporting based on the information she seeks.
3. Ms. Phang Did Not Delay Seeking Preliminary Injunctive Relief
“[A] party requesting a preliminary injunction must generally show reasonable diligence.” Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. 155, 159 (2018). While “a late filing, on its own, is [not] a permissible basis for denying a preliminary injunction,” “untimely filings may support a conclusion that the plaintiff cannot satisfy the irreparable harm prong.” Gordon v. Holder, 632 F.3d 722, 724-25 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
On January 30, 2026, the Department announced that as of that date, it had published approximately 3.5 million pages in response to the Epstein Act. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Department of Justice Publishes 3.5 Million Responsive Pages in Compliance with the Epstein Files Transparency Act (Jan. 30, 2026), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-publishes-35-million-responsive-pages-compliance-epstein-files.9 Ms. Phang states that she “promptly filed this lawsuit after discovering and confirming the scope of [the Attorney General’s] noncompliance, but she delayed motion practice in the hope that
D. The Balance of the Equities and the Public Interest Favor an Injunction
“A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show that ‘the balance of equities favors preliminary relief’ and that ‘an injunction is in the public interest.’” Hanson v. District of Columbia, 120 F.4th 240, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting Singh v. Berger, 56 F.4th 88, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2022)). The Court “must carefully balance the equities by weighing the harm to the moving party and the public if there is no injunction against the harm to the government and the public if there is.” Id. The balance of the equities and the public interest “merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).
Ms. Phang argues that because “[t]here is generally no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action,”
However, “there is no competing harm to the government with the issuance of preliminary relief that orders compliance with . . . statutes and the Constitution, while ‘[t]here is a substantial public interest in having governmental agencies abide by the federal laws that govern their existence and operations.’” Widakuswara v. Lake, 779 F. Supp. 3d 10, 40 (D.D.C. 2025) (citing Newby, 838 F.3d at 12 (internal citation omitted)). The Epstein Act requires the Attorney General to publicly disclose the documents that are covered by it; complying with the law does not harm the Attorney General. Moreover, Ms. Phang is not seeking “expedited treatment.” Opp’n,
E. The Court Imposes a Nominal Bond on Ms. Phang
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “the court may issue a preliminary injunction . . . only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit“) recently clarified that injunction bonds are “generally required” under Rule 65(c). Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Trump, No. 25-5157, 2025 WL 1441563, at *3 n.4 (D.C. Cir. May 16, 2025) (per curiam). To ensure that the imposition of a bond does not “unduly burden [p]laintiffs, impair [the] ability to seek judicial relief, and chill access to justice,” courts in this district “routinely require only nominal bonds from parties obtaining preliminary relief against the Government when the awarded relief will not impose an undue monetary burden on the enjoined parties.” Se. Fisheries Ass’n v. Lutnick, Civil Action No. 26-1533, 2026 WL 1430499, at *13 (D.D.C. May 21, 2026).
The Court agrees that anything more than a nominal bond would prejudice Ms. Phang and potentially create a chilling effect on other public-law plaintiffs. See Reply, ECF No. 13 at 20. Furthermore, the Attorney General has not shown that if the Court grants preliminary relief the Department will incur any significant costs or damages. Therefore, the Court joins other judges in this district and imposes a nominal $1.00 bond. See,
F. The Court Will Not Issue a Stay
The Attorney General requests a stay of seven days to determine whether to seek emergency appellate review. Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 30. The Attorney General also requests a stay of sixty days to determine whether further appellate review is warranted. Id. The Court will not issue a stay for the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion. The Attorney General has conceded that he is in violation of the Act. Ms. Phang is not requesting the immediate production of documents, but rather that the Attorney General show cause if he declines to do so. As to the requests to review of foreign language documents and publish the redaction log, the Act required the Attorney General to produce the documents and publish the log by December 19, 2025—more than six months ago.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Ms. Phang’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 9-1. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
June 25, 2026