THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALONZO LEE TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant.
H047540
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Filed 1/22/21
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; Monterey County Super. Ct. Nos. SS981425A, SS001208A
Alonzo Lee Taylor moved in propria persona to dismiss a 1999 felony conviction of violating
On appeal, Taylor argues that under
Taylor asks this court “to remand the matter to permit the trial court to determine [whether] granting the requested relief ‘would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ ”4 and to dismiss both marijuana-related convictions if the trial court determines that granting the petition would not pose such a risk. (See
The California Courts of Appeal have split on the issue of whether after Proposition 64, possession of 28.5 grams or less of marijuana or cannabis in prison or jail is unlawful under
In this case, we determine that cannabis is a controlled substance “the possession of which is prohibited by Division 10 (commencing with [s]ection 11000) of the Health and Safety Code.”6 (
We reject Taylor‘s contentions and conclude that he is not entitled to dismissal of the two convictions under
Procedural History
An abstract of judgment filed March 25, 1999 in People v. Taylor (Super. Ct. Monterey County, 1999, No. SS981425A) (case No. SS981425A) reflected that Taylor was convicted on February 16, 1999 of violating
An abstract of judgment filed on September 19, 2000 in People v. Taylor (Super. Ct. Monterey County, 2000, No. SS001208A) (case No. SS001208A), and an amended abstract of judgment filed on March 27, 2002 in the same case, reflected that on August 3, 2000, Taylor was convicted by plea of conspiracy to commit a crime (
Defense counsel subsequently filed, on behalf of Taylor, a notice of motion, motion, and memorandum of points and authorities to support dismissal of those two convictions (case Nos. SS981425A & SS001208A) pursuant to
The People opposed the motions on the ground that possession of marijuana in prison and conspiracy to possess marijuana in prison continue to be public offenses after Proposition 64. They argued that under the plain statutory language, “if [m]arijuana is prohibited as a controlled substance with some exception[s], it is still a prohibited controlled substance for the purposes of
The trial court denied Taylor‘s motions to dismiss his conviction of violating
Discussion
A. Statutory Construction
This case presents two separate questions of statutory construction or interpretation. “Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. [Citation.]” (Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 724.) We must determine the proper construction of both
” ‘Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature‘s intent so as to effectuate the law‘s purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences [that] the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute‘s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’ [Citation.]” (Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc. (2020) 10 Cal.5th 375, 381.)
“[O]ur interpretation of a ballot initiative is governed by the same rules that apply in construing a statute enacted by the Legislature. [Citations.]” (People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 796.) ” ‘Thus, “we turn first to the language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning.” [Citation.] The statutory language must also be construed in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme [in light of the electorate‘s intent]. [Citation.] When the language is ambiguous, “we refer to other indicia of the voters’ intent, particularly the analyses and arguments contained in the official ballot pamphlet.” [Citation.]’ (People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 685.) In other words, ‘our primary purpose is to ascertain and effectuate the intent
of the voters who passed the initiative measure.’ (In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122, 130.)” (People v. Briceno (2004) 34 Cal.4th 451, 459.)
B. Penal Code Section 4573.6
Under
Cannabis is, and marijuana previously was, defined as a Schedule I controlled substance under Division 10. (See
Taylor contends that as a result of the voters’ approval of Proposition 64 and its enactment of
In Fenton, the defendant was convicted by a jury of violating
On appeal in Fenton, the defendant argued that “by utilizing the term ‘prohibited by’ when referring to [D]ivision 10 of the Health and Safety Code, [Penal Code section 4573] [did] more than simply incorporate a list of controlled substances and, consequently, [did] not prohibit bringing prescribed controlled substances into penal institutions.” (Fenton, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 968.) The Third District Court of Appeal essentially accepted this argument.
The Third District concluded that Penal Code “[s]ection 4573 adopt[ed] the Health and Safety Code prohibition of possessing controlled substances and create[d] another crime of smuggling controlled substances into a penal institution.” (Fenton, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 970 of a physician.’ ” (Fenton, supra, at p. 967.) Thus, ”Health and Safety Code section 11350 does not prohibit possession of a controlled substance with a prescription.” (Id. at p. 969.) It determined that “the reference to [D]ivision 10 [had to] include the prescription exception because [Penal Code] section 4573 imports the prohibition against possession of controlled substances not the list of controlled substances.” (Ibid.) The Third District concluded that the “defendant did not violate [Penal Code] section 4573 because he had a physician‘s prescription for the hydrocodone.” (Id. at p. 971.)
The Third District rejected in Fenton the People‘s contention that
The Third District indicated that its conclusions rested on what it believed to be the “plain meaning” of the phrase “any controlled substance, the possession of which is prohibited by Division 10 (commencing with Section 11000) of the Health and Safety Code” in
Taylor now asserts that the conduct of the defendant in Fenton was “not unlawful because nothing in Division 10 criminalized the possession of hydrocodone with a prescription.” Taylor insists that “no difference” exists between “the statutory scope of the prohibition [at issue] in Fenton” under
In Raybon, the other case relied upon by Taylor, the Third District relied upon its prior analysis in Fenton. (Raybon, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 125-126, review granted.) It rejected the People‘s assertion that, based on “the arrangement of the words (the [D]ivision 10 language only modifying controlled substances),” “as long as [D]ivision 10 continues to ban cannabis in some contexts, the [D]ivision 10 language includes cannabis.” (Id. at p. 120.) The Third District concluded that “[p]ossession of less than one ounce of cannabis is no longer prohibited by [D]ivision 10, and therefore, according to the plain language of
Penal Code “section 4573 and statutes with a similar structure and purpose have long been construed in light of each other. [Citations.]” (Low, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 389.) In attempting to ascertain the “plain meaning” of the critical phrase in
Courts “do not construe statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute ‘with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 899; ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 189 [courts consider statutory “language in its ‘broader statutory context’ “].) “Identical language appearing in separate
Because both
In light of the purposes of
” ‘The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.’ [Citation.] In sum, ’ “[r]ules of statutory construction require courts to construe a statute to promote its purpose, render it reasonable, and avoid absurd consequences.” ’ [Citation.]” (Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1055; see People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 908.) Accordingly, we conclude that the phrase “any controlled substances, the possession of which is prohibited by Division 10 (commencing with [s]ection 11000) of the Health and Safety Code” in
Penal Code section 4573.6 refers to the general category of controlled substances, the possession of which is in any way prohibited by Division 10.
This construction of the Division 10 phrase does not render nugatory any part of the Division 10 phrase. Some types of possession of controlled substances are simply not prohibited by Division 10. For example, the possession of an unusable amount—a trace amount or residue—of a controlled substance is not prohibited. (See People v. Leal (1966) 64 Cal.2d 504, 512 [former section 11500]; id. at p. 507, fn. 5 [disapproving specified cases to the extent that “they suggest[ed] that such traces [could] serve as the
Our construction aligns with the intent underlying the Legislature‘s adoption of this statutory scheme. “[T]he Legislature has long viewed illegal drugs as a problem in penal institutions.” (People v. Gastello (2010) 49 Cal.4th 395, 402.) “Section 4573 and similar laws flow from the assumption that drugs, weapons, and other contraband promote disruptive and violent acts in custody, including gang involvement in the drug trade. Hence, these provisions are viewed as ’ “prophylactic” ’ measures that attack the ’ “very presence” ’ of such items in the penal system. [Citations.]” (Low, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 388; see ibid. [historically, “the Legislature targeted inmates who, upon returning to penal institutions after performing labor outside, hid small amounts of opium and other narcotics in their clothing . . . [b]ecause such contraband often went undetected, and . . . threatened institutional control“].) The “ultimate evil with which the Legislature was concerned was drug use by prisoners,” but the Legislature “chose to take a prophylactic approach to the problem by attacking the very presence of drugs and drug
Unlike the Third District, we find the construction of
The most logical inference is that in enacting statutes governing controlled substances or drugs in prison, jail, and other custodial settings, the Legislature was seeking to keep unauthorized substances out of custodial settings to maintain institutional supervision, discipline, order, and safety, which could be threatened by the surreptitious use, circulation, or sale of those substances by persons in custody. Accordingly, the most natural reading of the phrase “the possession of which is prohibited by Division 10 (commencing with [s]ection 11000) of the Health and Safety Code” as it modifies “any controlled substance” or “any controlled substances” in
Lastly, with respect to
reason that “unauthorized possession of cannabis in prison—just like unauthorized possession of alcohol in prison—is still a felony” under
For a couple of reasons, we do not reach the issue whether possession of 28.5 grams or less of cannabis in prison can be prosecuted under
We turn now to Proposition 64 and the parties’ competing statutory constructions of
” ‘The statutory phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law” has been called a ” ‘term of art’ ” [citation] that declares the legislative intent to override all contrary law.’ [Citation.]” (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 983.) Accordingly, the prefatory phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law” has a broad sweep. But it renders inapplicable “only those provisions of law that conflict with the act‘s provisions” (ibid.) and not “every provision of law.” (Ibid.) Moreover, the “notwithstanding any other provision of law” provision in
section 11362.1 is expressly limited by the stated exceptions. Accordingly,section 11362.45(d) , one of the provisions to whichsection 11362.1(a) is subject, necessarily overrides its “notwithstanding any other provision of law” language.
Taylor argues that the exception set forth in
Taylor points out that
In Raybon, the Third District agreed with the “defendants that consumption can be achieved in ways not strictly involving smoking or ingesting, such as inhaled as a nonburning vapor or applied topically such that it is absorbed through the skin.” (Raybon, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 122, review granted.) The court concluded that “[b]y including the language ‘pertaining to smoking and ingesting,’ the drafters allowed for these various forms of consumption in prison to remain unlawful” (ibid.) and that
Taylor‘s argument and the Third District‘s analysis in Raybon fail to account for differences in the language used in various subdivisions of
We agree with the other cases finding that the phrase “pertaining to” in
In Perry, the First District Court of Appeal found that “Proposition 64, in
Following Proposition 64, smoking or ingesting cannabis remains unlawful in many locations in California. (See, e.g.,
However, nothing in the laws enacted or amended by Proposition 64 makes smoking or ingesting marijuana or cannabis in prison or other custodial settings subject to punishment. Further, nothing in
” ‘Statutes must be interpreted, if possible, to give each word some operative effect.’ [Citation.] ‘We do not presume that the Legislature performs idle acts, nor do we construe statutory provisions so as to render them superfluous.’ [Citation.]” (Imperial Merchant Services, Inc. v. Hunt (2009) 47 Cal.4th 381, 390.) Taylor‘s proposed construction of
section 11362.45(d) would leave the provision without anyoperative effect. Therefore, it should be rejected because there is a contrary reasonable construction that gives that provision effect.
In Whalum, the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that the crime of violating
In Herrera, a direct appeal from a judgment, this court concluded that “[the] defendant was properly convicted under
Nothing in the legislative history undermines our construction of
Taylor was not entitled to relief pursuant to
DISPOSITION
The order denying the motions brought pursuant to
ELIA, ACTING P.J.
I CONCUR:
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.
I agree that the trial court properly denied appellant Alonzo Lee Taylor‘s motion. I would affirm the trial court‘s order based on
Danner, J.