*1 Nov. No. 24996. 1988.] [S.F. WALKER, Petitioner, v.
LAURIE GROUARD COUNTY, THE COURT OF SACRAMENTO SUPERIOR Respondent; PEOPLE, Party Real in Interest.
THE
Counsel Volk, Volk G. Scofield for Petitioner.
Scofield Thomas A. and Robert & Schwartz, Vanderet, O’Melveny M. Robert C. Robert Warren Christopher, Chen, Schlosser, Paul L. Alan Edward Myers, Crosby, & Margaret Rosenbaum, Yurkonis, Hoffman, Sobel, Mary Ann David Carol A. Mark Mackenroth, Amici on behalf Seley Anwyl E. Mackenroth & as Curiae of Petitioner.
No for appearance Respondent. General, White, Assistant Attorney John K. Van de Steve Chief Kamp, General, General, Attorney David Attorney John H. Assistant Sugiyama, General, Jr., Attorneys D. Salmon and Clifford K. Thompson, Deputy Real Party Interest.
Hassard, Huber, I. David E. Willett and Catherine & Bonnington, Rogers Party in Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Interest. Hanson as Opinion involuntary
MOSK, prosecution We considerthis case whether J. *7 Code, 192, endangerment manslaughter (Pen. (b)) felony subd. and § (id., 273a, of a child who be maintained the mother (1)) against subd. can § in lieu of medical of treatment meningitis receiving died after statute as well We that the prosecution permitted attention. conclude of state and federal Consti as the free exercise and due clauses process tutions. Christ, Walker is a member of the Church of
Defendant Laurie Grouard Shauntay, fell four-year-old daughter, Her (hereafter Church). Scientist 21, 1984, February days four ill flu-like on and later devel- symptoms her religion, a stiff neck. Consistent with the tenets of defendant chose oped rather than care.1 to treat child’s illness with medical Defendant an accredited Science who thereaf- prayer practitioner contacted Christian Shauntay ter for and visited the child on two occasions. Defendant prayed Shauntay February also a Christian Science nurse who attended on engaged 8.2 again Shauntay grew 27 and on March and nevertheless lost weight, illness, during disoriented and irritable the last week of her and died on March 9 of acute after of and purulent meningitis period heavy irregular ill, lay breathing. During days the 17 she the child received no medical treatment.
The People charged involuntary felony defendant with manslaughter and child endangerment allegations based on that her criminal negligence proxi- mately Shauntay’s caused death. Defendant moved to dismiss the prosecu- Code, (Pen. tion on 995) grounds her (1) specifically conduct was § law, protected (2) and she statutes under which had been charged provide failed to fair her notice that conduct criminal. The was court denied her motion.
Defendant the Court of petitioned Appeal for writ and a prohibition Code, stay. (Pen. 999a.) stay The petition summarily and were request § denied, and petitioned defendant for in We review this court. granted petition and transferred the matter to the of Appeal Court with directions to issue an alternative writ of prohibition. After further briefing and oral argument, the Court again denied Appeal defendant’s She there- petition. court, after filed a second petition for review this which we also granted. 1Members of the Church “believe that physical disease is a manifestation of errors of the (Comment, Religious mind.” System: and the Criminal Justice Some Problems Beliefs 396, 397, Loyola Faith Healer 7.) L.A. L.Rev. fn. The use medicine is believed to perpetuate discouraged. such error (Schneider, therefore Christian Science and the Compromise? Nonetheless, Law: Room 87-88.) Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. for up “the Church injuries sets no abstract determining criteria for what diseases or should be but, rather, by prayer treated questions or other methods leaves such to individual decision in they concrete instances. ... If urgent some turn what is an think time need to medical children, they not—contrary treatment themselves their charges— are to some recent stigmatized by (Talbot, their church.” Position the Christian Science Church 1641, 1642, J. original.) N.E. Med. italics in 2The Church describes in amicus curiae brief the practitioners role of Christian Science practitioners nurses: Science individuals “[Christian who devote their full time to are] through healing prayer, spiritual approved listing by treatment. These individuals Journal, having given Church The Christian Science after evidence of moral character healing ability. charges, usually Practitioners determine their own seven to fifteen treatment, day work, per paid by dollars patients. and are their . practitioner’s . . The however, vocation, religious ministry is a spiritual healing [j[] in its broadest sense. Chris upon nurse, tian Scientists *8 also call provides the services of a Christian Science such who practical dressing having care as spiritual of wounds for those treatment.” and constitutional variety a and amici curiae offer
Defendant under defendant prosecution in of their claim that the arguments support 192, 192(b)), section (hereafter subdivision (b) Penal Code section a 273a, is barred as 273a(l)), section (1) (hereafter subdivision section below, reject their contentions set forth we of law. For the reasons matter charged. can be as that defendant prosecuted and conclude Statutory I. Contentions 270 as a complete prosecution A. Section defense Code section that the Penal provisions Defendant first contends any prosecution defense to based 270) complete (hereafter provide rather than medical care. Shauntay’s prayer illness with on her treatment furnish their that must parents 270 enumerates certain necessities Section so. As liability for the failure do misdemeanor imposes children “Every any child who that provided parent in the statute enacted excuse, omits, any duty perform imposed upon lawful willfully without food, shelter, law, or medical atten- necessary clothing, to furnish him child, (1st 1872) Code ed. (Pen. of a misdemeanor.” guilty dance for such by inserting in 270.) provision The amended Legislature § (Stats. “medical attendance.” “or other remedial care” after phrase 325, 1, in amended 544.) again specify statute was p. ch. § alone” constitutes “other through prayer means spiritual “treatment 1661.)3 ch. (Stats. p. remedial care.” §
1. consideration we must ascertain whether As threshold under the for medical care treatment constitutes substitute acceptable not, it a fortiori contends. If does then of section as defendant terms manslaugh under separate statute no defense to provides prosecutions use lieu and child endangerment provisions ter care,” on whether “other remedial medicine. This determination hinges to “medi an alternative prayer, represents defined in section 270 to include necessity and additional or rather identifies a distinct cal attendance” must their children. provide omits, willfully part: parent pertinent “If a of a minor The statute thus reads attendance, food, excuse, necessary clothing, shelter or medical without lawful to furnish child, . . . If guilty . or her he or she is of a misdemeanor other remedial care his [ffl through prayer by spiritual alone accor parent provides a minor with treatment means denomination, by practices recognized religious of a church or dance with the tenets and care’, thereof, duly remedial as practitioner shall constitute ‘other accredited such treatment used in this section.”
In 426 P.2d Cal.Rptr. Arnold Cal.2d People we section 270 allows 515], parents pro- considered the contention that vide to medical ‘other children with “an alternative attendance: accepted care,’ enemas, The case involved namely prayer.” remedial compresses, of a mother convicted after un- appeal misdemeanor-manslaughter successfully reversing her child’s illness on treating prayer. Although summarily unrelated Arnold court de- rejected dictum the grounds, fendant’s “The interpretation that ‘other reasoning phrase . . remedial care’ . does not sanction unorthodox substitutes for ‘medical
attendance’; it indicates one of the which the multiple necessities parent {Ibid.) must provide.”
While the Arnold predates decision the 1976 amendment specifying that remains “other remedial includes prayer, care” court’s fatal reasoning content, to defense based on treatment its spiritual regardless means: “other remedial care” constitutes “one the multiple necessities” under Arnold, thus operating addition to rather than in lieu of responsibility furnish medical attendance. Because the 1976 amendment “did not ad- dress the contention that other remedial care not could act as a [in Arnold] treatment,” substitute to standard medical Court of Appeal the case at bar concluded that defendant’s provision supplant did her separate responsibility to furnish medical care under section 270. Well-settled guide our principles statutory review the analysis set forth “ ‘ in Arnold and embraced the decision below. “The fundamental rule statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of ’ Legislature as so to effectuate the of the law. In purpose [Citations.]” intent, such determining the court turns first to the words of the statute. clear, . .. language there can be no room for interpreta ‘[W]here ” (Regents tion.’ University v. Public Employment Relations of California Bd. Cal.3d 590], 715 P.2d citations omitted.)
Section 270 food, “furnish requires necessary clothing, attendance, shelter medical view, . . other remedial care . .” In our this language sufficiently clear reject the dictum in Arnold and con clude that the Legislature intended “other remedial care” constitute a substitute for “medical attendance.” We begin by noting repetition of “or” to introduce both “medical attendance” and “other remedial care.” word, attendance,” first use of the preceding “medical denotes food, shelter, clothing, and medical represent attendance distinct necessities each of which child; must provided it would be if superfluous care,” succeeding “or phrase, other remedial yet introduced another neces sity into the scheme. We have often that courts observed *10 act, word, and sentence of an every give phrase,
should significance be avoid certain words should any rendering surplusage construction School v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Faculty Verdes Assn. (Palos ed. Unified 1155].) 580 P.2d Cal.Rptr. Dist. 21 Cal.3d “or,” use of the its second To to the initial use word significance give remedial care” as alternative operates be taken to mean that “other must necessity an additional immediately rather than as preceding phrase afterthought. of an entire sentence in the manner appended inter- in the statute bolsters this pivotal of certain words definition for a remedy: defined as intended “affording “Remedial” is pretation. of an evil.” (Web- or for the removal or abatement a disease or remedy turn, “Remedy,” in is (3d 1961) p. 1920.) Diet. ed. ster’s New Internat. relieves or cures a disease: a medicine or “something applica- defined as restore health.” {Ibid.) tion that serves or to terminate disease and helps p. 1598.) the same: different.” Finally, “other” defined as “not {Id. statute, of the are substituted the words When these definitions food, or shelter provide “clothing, who fail provision penalizes parents attendance, dis- care to relieve or cure a medical [intended [different] remedial that the intended “other Legislature It thus apparent ease].” attendance under the terms care” to an alternative to medical represent section 270. survive examination of
Any doubt this cannot regarding interpretation “other remedial history defining of the amendment legislative considered the Assembly care” to include When the members of the prayer. amendment, Bill Ses Assembly Regular contained in No. 1975-1976 sion, analysis legislation of the they reading had before them third “Under Assembly analysis Office of Research. The stated: prepared bill, for the health of failing this not be liable for parents provide than common they treatment rather child because choose Research, analysis . . 3d (Assem. reading medical . .” Office of treatment Similarly, the members of Sess.).) of Assem. Bill No. 3843 (1975-1976 Reg. by either the analysis legislation the Senate received an prepared analyses Both caucus stated that Republican Democratic Caucus. liability parents provide prayer amendment would shield those who Caucus, (Sen. lieu 3d reading of medical care for their children. Democratic analysis (1975-1976 Sess.); Republican Bill No. 3843 Sen. Reg. Assem. Caucus, analysis (1975-1976 Reg. 3d of Assem. Bill No. 3843 reading legislative While evidence of Sess.).) these materials are not dispositive Cal.App.3d intent Motor Vehicles (Shippen Department of 1119, 1126 insofar as their contents Cal.Rptr. 13]), they significant Home do not of the statute. language contradict plain {Commodore Systems, Inc. v. Court Cal.3d Superior 270, 649 We that section 270 accordingly exempts conclude who utilize treatment from the requirement Arnold, care, furnish medical 452, and overrule People Cal.2d contrary. to the extent it concludes to the *11 2.
We next consider whether section 270 bars of de prosecution fendant under the and child manslaughter endangerment statutes. (§§ 192(b), 273a(l).) Again we turn to its guidance. for initial plain language statutory Citing provision that “treatment means spiritual through care’, . . prayer alone . shall constitute ‘other remedial as used in this ” (italics section added), Court Appeal concluded that section 270 expressly any extension precludes religious of its exemption other stat analysis utes. This statutory confuses limitation on the definition of “other remedial care” with a limitation possible on defenses implied by that definition. antecedent,
Following the rule of the last the phrase “as used in this section” modify must “other remedial care.” (See v. Baker People (1968) 69 44, 595, Cal.2d Cal.Rptr. 675].) therefore language either qualifies the five earlier references to “other remedial care” in the statute, none of which mentions “treatment spiritual means through alone,” or (2) distinguishes the definition of the phrase section 270 statutes, from its use numerous other most which make no reference to Proc., treatment spiritual means. (See, e.g., Code Civ. 1209.5; Welf. & § Code, 305, 369, Inst. 625, subd. (c), 739, subds. (a)-(g), subd. (c), §§ subds. 11452, (a)-(g), 14059; subd. (6), see also Stats. chs. 1485.) Neither of these qualifications on the statutory language bears on whether care,” by the implied definition of “other remedial as used in defense should apply charges against defendant under sections 192(b) an 273a(l).
Defendant conversely asserts that plain language of section 270 re- quires the extension of its religious exemption to her She prosecution. fo- cuses on the reference in the statute to the provision “necessary clothing, food, attendance, shelter or medical or other remedial care . . .” (Italics . added.) defined, alia, Observing “necessary” inter as “absolutely essential, required: indispensable” (Webster’s New Internat. Diet. (3d ed. 1961) p. 1511), she contends that there can be no circumstance involving the illness of a child in which the use lieu of medicine is unlawful.
It is true that the statute recognizes “other remedial care” as an accept- able substitute for “medical attendance” when “necessary”; care is
however, compliance whether question does not address this conclusion all other liability defendant of under of section absolves terms words must “When used in a statute Penal Code. provisions context, obvious purpose in mind the nature and construed in keeping 1, . . . .” v. Black Cal.3d they appear (People statute where v. Ald Cal.3d ay (1973) 648 P.2d People Cal.Rptr. in one legal 515 P.2d Conduct that statutes created separate thus be actionable under context It follows that the defend legality legislative purposes. different cannot be read to create a under the terms of section 270 ant’s conduct 192(b) 273a(l) sections under parallel exemption prosecution City objective.4(Milligan some shared legislative unless the statutes reflect *12 829, 38, 670 P.2d 34 835 Laguna (1983) Cal.Rptr. Beach Cal.3d [196 of 562, 21 585 (1978) Cal.Rptr. v. Caudillo Cal.3d 1121]; see also People [146 Code, 859, of 4.) Pen. We turn to the section 270. purpose 580 P.2d § statuto than the neglectful parents, principal “Rather punishment of the child to ry section are to secure objectives support [of 270] child has a supporting parent from the burden of who protect public the 280, (1968) him.” v. Sorensen 68 Cal.2d 287 (People able to support [66 495, 7, 1093].) 437 P.2d 25 A.L.R.3d is provision “designed Cal.Rptr. civil statutes for effective enforcement obli supplement support Felo Proposal Criminal and a gations.” (Note, Nonsupport for Effective 1075, ny-Misdemeanor 1079; County 37 L.J. Hastings Distinction George 245].) 149 1015 Cal.Rptr. Ventura v. Cal.App.3d [197 the the requirements simply A thus with statute parent comply custody another individual physical financial assistance to providing 829, 843 v. Court 75 (Lyons Municipal Cal.App.3d child. financially incapable furnishing support, A who is Cal.Rptr. parent Sorensen, fault, is v. compliance. (People without likewise excused from Indeed, 68 section of the 287.) dispositional Cal.2d at supra, p. “If of the fisc protection stipulating
scheme explicitly contemplates assistance, fines, or penalties all forfeitures receiving public children 4 only if analysis together This reflects the rule that different statutes should be construed they they pari in pari in considered be materia when relate stand materia. “Statutes are things, purpose or person thing, person or class of or have the same the same the same object. object important purpose is than characterization of Characterization of the or more closely subject enough justify determining matter in whether different statutes are related subject is interpreting light in of the other. It has been held that where same treated one objects pari in adventitious having in different the statutes are not materia. ‘The several acts matter, wholly subject . . ends will nor occurrence of. similar laws enacted different ” Sutherland, Statutory (Sands, mally justify applying (2A Construction 4th ed. not the rule.’ materia, 51.03, 467, omitted.) pari 1984) p. Even if “each citations and fns. statutes stand § (Id. necessarily independence a violation of the other.” retains its and a violation of one is p. 468.) Similarly, necessarily at to one not a defense to the other. a defense from the violations of and all funds collected defendant section imposed [for county Money section so paid department. paid shall be 270a] . . any remaining shall be first to . and balance shall be applied support needs, to future applied treated as reimbursement past support Code, 270d; public (Pen. furnished from assistance funds.” see People § Sorensen, p.287.) 68 Cal.2d at this
Disputing understanding settled of section 270 as fiscal support provision, objective defendant asserts that the of the statute is to protect injury children serious rather than to secure certain routine necessities She parental expense.5 argues that her interpretation supported *13 of parental As support. criminality to the of a willful omission perform duty.—See this vs. Chandler 6 Reg. [(1855) Cox Crim. 519], Cas. vs. Reg. S_ Gray [(1857) 7 Cox Crim. Cas. vs. 326], Reg. [(1851) 5 Cox Crim. Cas. 279], vs. Reg. [(1853) 6 Philpot[t] Cox Crim. Cas. (Code comrs. 140].” note, Pen. (1st Code ed. 1872) 117.) says Because the note p. nothing re statute, garding the purpose the any of legislative construction intent resting on its contents requires implausible the that the assumption legisla tors sought out and read the common four English law cases cited therein and then conformed their understanding of the statute to the reasoning those opinions. assume, if
Yet even we were to so the cases fail to substantiate defend- ant’s interpretation. She emphasizes that each involved of a child allegations suffering physical injury as a result aof failure to parent’s provide basic necessities, and asserts that child endangerment was thus the harm to be acknowledges Defendant dispositional provisions that the of section 270d substantiate the contrary conclusion reached this court in Sorensen. She maintains that section 270d ignored should be original because it was added passage Penal Code after of section 270. Her principle contention contradicts construing the established that in a statute to dis cern purpose, provisions its together its should be read “so that all be harmonized and (Moore have effect.” v. Panish 32].) Cal.3d 652 P.2d sequence The particular enactment of only sections in a statute bears on its construction provisions event, conflict; when two stand in pre irreconcilable terms of the later (City vail. Petaluma v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. 43].) 44 Cal.2d P.2d liability. contrary, To the the first case of criminal imposition
averted a mother could not be found note held that in the code commission cited had the financial her child when she lacked feed neglecting guilty so, had been available to other- do even assistance though public means to there was child. is admitted in the case that starving for the “It provide wise admitted, means; it no answer to being her having no evidence of relieving applying have the means say might procured that she Chandler, This 520.) disposi- Cox Crim. Cas. (Reg. supra, p. officer.” per rather than support, injury financial provide tion that failure to suggests Indeed, se, the continued of the common law crime. was the gravamen who lack parents section 270 of a defense complete existence under the misde- significantly distinguishes fault the means of support without no 273a(l), recognize from which 192(b) meanor sections provision from severe stemming neglect. insolvency felony charges exception Sorensen, 68 Cal.2d We reaffirm our determination thus necessi able to furnish certain routine requires that section 270 unnecessarily assume that for their children so that need public ties (See also Davis Stroud obligation. Cal.App.2d concern welfare of certainly general While for the reflecting children, manifestly are so objectives support provision fiscal of this involuntary manslaughter distinguishable from the specific purposes citizens from felony child-endangerment statutes—designed protect bodily 270 cannot be read to immediate and harm—that section grievous under those separate provisions create express exemptions prosecution has determined that Legislature as a matter of construction. parallel liability avert for ne is sufficient to misdemeanor provision This support. one’s financial to furnish routine glecting responsibility in so intended to hardly doing the conclusion that compels Legislature *14 endanger felony manslaughter an defense to and unqualified create to alone in the parents ment for those who continue furnish charges ill child lies want of medical dying rare instance when a gravely attention.6
In support plain language purpose the absence from history of certain amendments points legislative defendant disposes separate 6This that both section 270 and sec conclusion defendant’s contention object—child endangerment—and 273a(l) therefore that she must be tion address the same (See charged provision specifically encompassing In re William under the more her conduct. 593].) son Because we have determined that section Cal.2d bodily life-threatening but protect not harm rather focuses on intended to children procurement apply. (People v. Jenkins support, of their the doctrine does routine Indeed, it be a re 28 Cal.3d 620 P.2d would bizarre by failing nearly furnish could be if starve their children to death food sult who prosecuted for a of section 270. no more than misdemeanor violation statute as evidence of an intent to treatment from the reach exempt prayer 273a(l). specifically of sections She contends that the 1925 and 192(b) bar manslaughter prosecu- amendments to section 270 were enacted to amendment, tions Christian Scientists. With to the 1925 against respect statute, added the “or other care” to the phrase which remedial defendant history her legislative rests account of its on certain descriptive passages contained in the 1920 and 1925 annual of the Christian Science reports Committee on Publication for Southern She is not well California. served First, these materials. removed from the legislative documents so of the process any construction statute based on their contents would Second, they unreliable. even if we were to consider the patently reports, provide virtually no for her support contention.7
Defendant next contends that the 1976 amendment identifying prayer treatment as form of “other similarly remedial care” was intended to shield Christian Scientists from manslaughter She observes prosecutions. that the amendment was the Church in sponsored response to our dic- Arnold, in tum involving case a misdemeanor-manslaughter prosecution. While legislative materials demonstrate that the amendment was indeed Arnold, sponsored by the Church in there no response evidence that the Legislature intended the modification to affect manslaughter, as op- misdemeanor, posed liability. (See Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. (1975-1976 Caucus, Reg. Sen. Sess.); Republican 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. supra.) portion of the Arnold in opinion cited the legislative materials as the amendment inspiring fo- cused on exclusively the underlying liability misdemeanor of the parent; none of the documents mentions the relationship between the discussion of section 270 in Arnold manslaughter charge elsewhere involved the case. (Ibid.) While the necessarily amendment ensuing precluded posits 7Defendant relationship misdemeanor-manslaughter causal between a prosecution report detailed in the briefly and the 1925 amendment to section extolled in the lat However, report. passage ter report simply cited of the 1925 language recites the legislation amendment and terms the step any “a forward . .. .” No mention is made re lationship liability between the manslaughter general amendment and specific nor the manslaughter prosecution report. forge missing discussed the earlier In attempt link, disingenuously causal defendant [misdemeanor-manslaughter] observes in “a case materials,” cited in . . judge purportedly those . ruled from the bench that is “a le gal, healing *15 lawful means disease in the by State of California as contemplated Section 270 any or other section of the laws of the . State of California . . .” On ruling, the basis of this legislation defendant concludes parent that the 1925 provides had afforded “a who his/her by prayer with treatment as an alternative to complete medical attendance with a statu tory manslaughter (Italics defense to charges . . . .” original.) in What fails defendant to note is that the ruling discussion of appeared report. the in the 1920 annual The case there predated by fore years, the 1925 amendment obviously at least five nothing lends to its inter pretation, flatly and was light language erroneous in existing of the prior of section 270 recognized which provision (See no substitute for the of medical attendance. Pen. Code (1st 1872) 270.) ed. § section 270 on violations of based misdemeanor-manslaughter prosecutions statute, left liability Legislature under that the misdemeanor by eliminating involuntary based manslaughter prosecution of an untouched the possibility in “commission of a lawful the negligence on criminal allegations as here death, (b).)8 . . . (§ in an unlawful manner might produce act which Assembly Bill the enactment documenting The historical materials were well aware Legislature the members of the No. 3843 demonstrate that endanger- and child manslaughter left legislation open possibility amendatory efforts to extend their but declined prosecutions, simply ment Committee Assembly A for the analysis prepared 270. staff beyond section in “The bill unclear two appears respects. Criminal Justice observed that on First, (10 year any it for top) person 273a makes a wobbler Section or custody any to suffer harm physical under his care or minor permit Thus, failing provide not be hable though injury. parents rather than they choose treatment the health the child because treatment, any if child suffered they would be liable common medical Second, under the manslaughter harm. no is made exception physiological If should the child die. treatment liability for parental statutes not be liable for the results in should recognized part, Justice, Com. on Criminal healing.” (Assem. mode of using permitted Sess.).) Despite Bill Analysis (1975-1976 Reg. of Assem. No. analysis, no in of the staff amendments offered the final sentence opinion liability 192(b) 273a(l). under sections potential made to eliminate were the bill on 1976. passed April The committee 6,May on its Assembly legislation When the full considered analysis reading third of the bill prepared members had before them the nearly verba- Assembly analysis incorporated, Office of Research. This tim, lia- and child regarding manslaughter endangerment the observations analysis for the Criminal Justice bility in the earlier prepared contained Research, 3d of Assem. Bill reading analysis Office of (Assem. Committee. response No. no amendments were offered supra.) Again, The and moved to the Senate. passed observations. bill analysis on received Judiciary four-page Senate Committee entirely unlike capitalized, “Comment” and heading Under the legislation. involuntary killing being 192(b) manslaughter a human as the unlawful Section defines act, felony; amounting in the without malice “in commission of an unlawful manner, death, might or without produce which an unlawful commission a lawful act manslaughter charging al circumspection.” The information defendant with due caution daughter of a act leges she malice but the commission lawful killed her “without circumspec produce might in an manner and without due caution and which death unlawful tion.” *16 document, any “Do the following questions: other were portion of this bill conflict with section 273a of the Penal Code which provisions willfully it a any makes a crime for cause or minor under person permit any his care or harm or custody injury? []j] parent to suffer a physical Might liability be immune from for failure to for the health of the child provide they because choose treatment rather than common by prayer medical [s/e] treatment, if liability but incur the child suffers harm?” any (Sen. Com. on 3843, Judiciary, Analysis omitted.) Assem. Bill No. capitalization in Assembly, As the Senate committee members chose to disregard issues analysis raised so in their staff and prominently the measure to passed the full Senate addressing without manslaughter and child endangerment liability. No other reference sections and in 192(b) 273a(l) appears historical materials documenting Assembly enactment Bill No. 3843.
The ineluctable conclusion we must draw from these materials is that the members of the fully were Legislature liability conscious of the potential remaining under 192(b) they sections for conduct 273a(l) had legalized 270, respect to section but simply chose leave the matter unad say, dressed. Needless to considered silence is an insufficient basis to infer that the Legislature, misdemeanor amending support provision, actual ly exempted felony from all liability parents who offer alone dying child. “The failure of the Legislature to in a change law particular when the respect subject is generally before it and changes other respects are made is indicative of intent to leave the law as it stands the aspects (Cole not amended.” v. Rush (1955) Cal.2d 355 [289 1137], A.L.R.2d on disapproved point Vesely another Sager (1971) Cal.3d 486 P.2d plain language, purpose, legislative history section 270 thus fail to estab lish a treatment, discernible legislative intent to exempt prayer as a matter law, from the reach of the felony manslaughter and child-endangerment Note, (Accord, statutes. Prayer Healing Dilemma California's Hastings Const.L.Q. 401-404.) B. legislative Expressions intent in related statutes
Defendant next contends that an intent to prayer treatment exempt from conduct within the reach of sections 192(b) and 273a(l) implied by number of other civil and criminal measures relating to the provision prayer in lieu of medical care to children. She first cites plethora statutes exempting prayer practitioners and their facilities from medical licensure requirements9 or variously individuals who accommodating 9See, e.g., 2063, 2731, 2789; Business and Safety Professions Code sections Health and 430.8, 1270, 1505, 1569.145, 1569.31, Code sections (f), (c), subdivision subdivision observed, long ago and 1738. As we exemption practitioners spiritual licensure *17 their own care.10These accommodative rely such treatment for choose to on however, of for the treat- no sanction legislative prayer evince provisions, circumstances. life-threatening of children ment definition of dealing neglected statutes with the More useful are child welfare services program children for of the state’s purposes abused Code, the Office of Child et the activities of seq.), & Inst. (Welf. § (id. requiring 18950 et and a criminal seq.), provision Prevention Abuse § Code, (Pen. of child abuse suspected instances report certain individuals of these three substantially similar each Utilizing language, 11165 et seq.). § shall not “for receiving treatment prayer statutes that children provides its abused or for neglected purposes. that reason alone” be considered Code, 16509.1) W&I section and (hereafter & Inst. 16509.1 (Welf. §§ Code, Pen. 11165.2 (hereafter section (hereafter 18950.5); 18950.5 W&I § that these as evidence provisions Defendant cites 11165.2).) section to the health not treatment to a threat does consider Legislature children, criminal for the results imposition liability thus that the intent. legislative its use is inconsistent with statutory The General different construction Attorney urges ” (italics “for that reason alone add- phrase He contends that the language. treatment can still fall within the ed) receiving denotes that a child treatment, coupled of such provision reach of the definitions if the condition, a serious threat to the grave with a medical combine pose phrase of the child.11While defendant contends the physical well-being rely simply spiritual care understand that its requirements reflects the fact that those who on licensing independent knowledge statutes seek to effectiveness is and skills which physicians. (People represent public as v. Jordan assure those who themselves to the Comment, Religious P. Justice 172 Cal. see also the Criminal Beliefs Healer, Loyola 12.) System: p. L.A. fn. Faith L.Rev. at Some Problems 7104, 14004, 14059, 10See,e.g, subdivi Welfare and Institutions Code sections 2627.5, 44978; Unemployment (a); Insurance sections sion Education Code section Code (c)(4), and 2709. subdivision Attorney precisely interpretation duplicates an 11The earlier construction General’s surprising quarter: Church. The Church- same words from a the Christian Science offered sponsored legislation containing originally included an the 1976 amendment section Code, 300) (now section the Welfare and Institutions additional amendment dependents of the sets under children can be declared which forth the circumstances which amendment, legislation prior from the to its parents. court and taken their deleted solely by spiritual passage, provided good that “No child who in faith under treatment alone, shall, through prayer person . de means . . reason be considered alone Sess.), Reg. (Assem. (1975-1976 as introduced Mar. scribed Section 600.” Bill No. 17, 1976, added.) Department questioned of Health whether italics When the Director of being depen receiving prayer treatment from declared amendment would bar children endangered, sponsoring the dents even if their health became the Christian Science official general legislation response “The counsel gave following in a letter dated June 1976: . gave . . his on Publication for Southern California us the Christian Science Committee custody taking opinion preclude the court’s considered does amendment] [the *18 merely receiving indicates that a child treatment can come within reasons, of the for other her purview statutes construction renders the and thus rule rejected use the word “alone” must be under the surplusage “ word, ‘[ejvery in a statute is phrase provision employed intended to have and to a useful function. . . meaning (White County perform Sacramento 31 Cal.3d 191], P.2d Clements v. T R. Bechtel Co. quoting (1954) Cal.2d immediately
The code section W&I preceding section 16509.1 in the child welfare strongly services corroborates the chapter interpretation Attorney offered General. That section reads: “Cultural and religious child-rearing practices beliefs which differ from general community standards shall not in themselves create a need for child welfare services unless the present a practices specific to the danger physical emotional Code, safety of the child.” (Welf. (hereafter & Inst. W&I section § 16509).) It is fundamental that “the a language of code particular section must be in light construed of and with reference to the language of other sections accompanying it and related to a it with view to harmonizing several provisions giving effect to all of them.” (Johnson v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. 605].) The provision of prayer treatment in lieu of medical care to a ill gravely child doubtless a constitutes religious child-rearing practice “which from general differ[s] . . community standards . .” Nor is there any question that W&I sections 16509 and 16509.1 are related and intended a unified express statutory objective. To harmonize their provisions of the accordingly, use word “alone” in W&I section 16509.1 must be construed to signify treatment by prayer will not constitute neglect for purposes the child welfare ser treatment, vices in chapter except those instances when such coupled with sufficiently condition, grave health presents “a specific danger physi . cal .. safety the child.”12 minor if [prayer says is only not effective. It to the court that it cannot take a treatment] custody child into the sole being reason that he is furnished accredited Christian Science (Italics original.) analysis treatment.” in The Church official reiterated his in a letter to Sena- Carpenter day: tor on the away parent solely same court can’t take from a be- “[T]he having course,
cause he’s accredited Christian Science treatment in lieu of medical. Of the bill say doesn’t that the be (Italics child can’t taken the treatment should not be effective.” in if original.) Supreme The Colorado has respect nearly Court reached the same conclusion with view, statutory language: identical meaning “In our language, ‘for that alone,’ ‘reasons,’ quite reason finding neglect clear. It . . allows of. for other such as danger, any where the child’s life is in despite imminent spiritual treatment means. In oth words, not, alone, solely by er a child spiritual who is treated . means for that reason . . reason, neglected, but if there is an additional deprived such as where the child is of medical necessary condition, prevent life-endangering care adjudicated the child . . . ne- W&I section 18950.5 lack similar companion
While 11165.2 and section why we should them interpret reasons persuasive there provisions, First, the words “for that reason alone” employs each the same manner. in W&I 16509.1. Identi to the use of the phrase a context identical subject same dealing language appearing separate provisions cal (Ford Dealers Assn. interpretation. be accorded the same matter should *19 453, 347, Cal.Rptr. 32 Cal. 3d 359 (1982) Motor Vehicles Department deals the relationship 650 P.2d Because each statute with 328].) abuse, obliged the of child or we neglect treatment definition (Dieckmann Supe fashion. v. their shared a consistent language construe 345, Second, 356 Cal.Rptr. rior Court Cal.App.3d refer to the lan 11165.2 and W&I 18950.5 explicitly both section section from their excepted 16509.1 to define the conduct of W&I section guage that the suggests Legisla and abuse.13This fact further neglect definitions of meaning. a common the several statutes to share ture intended that the statutes should be construed Finally, telling the most indication Attorney the is their mutual in the manner General together urged of Welfare and Institu interrelation with the child dependency provisions Furnishing W&I section the state (hereafter 300). tions Code section 300 behalf children threatened at its most tool to intercede on powerful W&I 300 delineates the circumstances the hands of their section parents, custody be and declared a parental under which a child can removed court. 11165.2 and W&I sections 16509.1 and of the Section dependent significant acts in some components 18950.5 are each connected separate in W&I 300. proceedings child outlined section dependency fashion sum, of child abuse or suspected In the three acts instances (1) require for agency responsible initiating dependency neglect reported Code, 11166, (a), & (Pen. (b), W&I section 300 subds. under proceedings § children identified neglected through services abused (g)); (2) provide Code, 16506, 16507, Inst. (Welf. (a), & subd. dependency proceedings §§ 16508, prevention projects coopera fund child-abuse (a)); subd. dependency agencies responsible supervising tion with local welfare 271, (Colo. 1982) In 645 P.2d glected (People under the scheme.” Interest D.L.E. 274-275.) purposes of. . . Child Abuse Preven 13W&Isection 18950.5 reads: “For Officeof [the chapter, receiving spiritual provided means a child treatment as 16509.1] tion] [section an abused shall not for that reason alone be considered of Welfare and Institutions Code neglected actually (W&I former 16508 of the Welfare child.” section 18950.5 cites section Code, language previously codified in and Institutions where the of W&I section 16509.1 was nearly prior provisions of the child identical terms to 1982 amendment renumbered 978, 1982, chapter. (Stats. 62.) in W&I ch. The reference section 18950.5 welfare services § amendment.) apparently superseded code section was overlooked at time receiving chapter, a child pertinent part: purposes Section 11165.2 reads in “For the of this provided spiritual as in Section 16509.1 of the Welfare and Institutions treatment means neglected . . . shall not that reason alone be child.” Code considered Code, 18964, & Inst. subd. This (Welf. (f)(3)). in proceedings intimate § statutory objectives, revolving terrelation of around the identification 300, enforcement of W&I section counsels us to provisions interpret language related acts with reference to the provisions depen dency statute to “achieve a uniform legislative and consistent purpose.” (Isobe Unemployment Appeals Insurance Bd. Cal.3d Caudillo, 21 Cal. 3d People 585.) 30, 1987,
On the Governor law September signed into Senate Bill No. Session, 1987-1988 Regular which revised W&I 300 in its Service, entirety. ch. (Stats. Adv. Deering’s Legis. § [No. pp. 5779-5780].) Although the legislation January will take effect until 1, 1989, its provisions dealing with the treatment to relationship *20 dependency proceedings critically are significant to our task interpretive they insofar as the represent Legislature’s most recent and detailed articula- protection tion of the to be assured ill seriously receiving children such care. Newly amended W&I section 300 provides “Any in pertinent part: minor who comes any within of the following is descriptions within the jurisdic- juvenile tion of the court which adjudge that to be a person dependent suffered, child of the . court. . . (b) The minor has or there is substan- [fl] suffer, tial risk that the minor illness, will serious harm or ... physical the willful negligent failure the parent... the minor provide with food, shelter, adequate clothing, or medical . . treatment. . it Whenever is alleged that a minor comes jurisdiction within the of the court on the basis . parent’s . . willful failure to provide adequate medical treatment specific decision to provide spiritual treatment through the prayer, court give treatment, shall nontreatment, deference to . . . parent’s medical or spiritual treatment through prayer alone accordance with the tenets a practices of recognized church or religious denomination by an ac- credited practitioner thereof and jurisdiction shall not assume unless neces- sary to protect minor suffering serious physical harm or illness.'” (Italics added.)
Thus any circumstance involving the threat of “serious physical illness,” harm or has Legislature empowered the juvenile court to inter cede and assume custody for the express purpose assuring medical care for a child whose is parent furnishing spiritual treatment alone. prayer The expression legislative intent is clear: awhen child’s health seriously a jeopardized, right of parent rely on exclusively yield. must This intent is in the implicit enumeration of necessities a must parent furnish avert dependency proceeding 300; under W&I section conspicu ously absent from the any list is substitute for adequate medical treatment.
134 related only provisions construction of the It tenable follows or abuse is the treatment to child neglect defining relationship General. Attorney offered analysis criminal, their rele- are civil rather than
While dependency proceedings in the interest profound Parents inquiry plain. possess vance our 482, 489 re Carmaleta B. 21 Cal.3d (In (1978) custody of their children. 623, 186 v. Court (1960) 579 P.2d Holt Superior Cal.Rptr. [146 524, “Custody the sum of 353].) 526-527 embraces Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.2d [9 child, It its care. including respect rearing parental rights regarding . activities and make decisions . . the direct his right includes control, education, health, City & religion.” (Burge his care and 608, 41 Cal.2d 617 Francisco County (1953) San [262 constellation of parental Court has termed this United States Supreme 390, 262 U.S. 399 (Meyers (1923) “essential” Nebraska interests [67 625, civil A.L.R. the “basic 1446]), among L.Ed. S.Ct. 316 U.S. L.Ed. (Skinner v. Oklahoma rights man” . 1655, 1660, . . than far more 1110]), “[r]ights precious S.Ct. L.Ed. (May v. Anderson U.S. property rights” stake, 73 S.Ct. Consistent with 840]). gravity prerogative W&I are assured notice and proceedings involved in 310, 318 re Robert P. (In process hearing Cal.App.3d due re indigent (In receive counsel 5]) appointed while those who *21 41]; Rules of Cal. Cal.App.3d Christina H. Court, on a intrude 1334(c), 1363(c)). Legislature’s willingness rules receiving prayer of to assure that children magnitude interest such parental contrary certainly harm evinces no spared physical treatment are serious laws, of in penal significant with which respect application intent less the state’s advancing constitute a intrusive method para- respects mount interest in the of its children. protection to civil argument by analogy neglect dependency provi-
Defendant’s than determination previous sions therefore corroborates rather refutes our 192(b) has no under sections exemption that the created Legislature with killed or 273a(l) charged having endangered who are parents seriously alone in lieu of lives of their ill children providing treatment medical care. The consistent: legislative design appears of a attending will be as an means of the needs acceptable accommodated is at a only harm or illness risk. When physical insofar as serious life in discern no intent to shield danger, child’s is we placed liability. the chastening felony prospect
C. criminal culpability conduct the standard for Defendant’s tack, she cannot different defendant next contends that
Taking wholly felony manslaughter child-endangerment be either the or convicted under regardless availability religious exemption. statutes of the She rests this be prove degree contention on a claim that the will unable to People her necessary to convict under either both which culpability provision, an offending criminal the commission of act. require negligence (People Penny Peabody 44 Cal.2d People We have defined Cal.Rptr. 780].) crimi Cal.App.3d “ reckless, is, nal as or negligence ‘aggravated, gross, culpable, conduct of the accused must be such from what would be the departure an ordinarily conduct of or careful man under the same circum prudent or, life, stances as with a for human incompatible proper regard words, disregard other of human indifference to life conse . . . quences. ordinarily to be determined negligence] pursuant [Such general principles negligence, the fundamental of which is knowledge, slayer actual that the imputed, act tended to life.’” endanger v. Penny, 44 Cal.2d (People 879-880.) at Defendant two pp. makes law, cannot, for the arguments claim that her conduct as a matter consti such tute negligence.
She first contends that the defenses recognized English common law 22.2, are available her under Civil Code section which reads: “The common law of England, so far as it not to or repugnant inconsistent States, the Constitution of the United or the Constitution or of this laws State, is the rule of decision all the courts of this State.” She cites two English cases from the 19th century in support proposition that common law recognized treatment by prayer in lieu of medicine as legally insufficient to constitute criminal negligence.14 While note we defenses, common law with limited exceptions, unavailable in California Court, (Keeler v. Superior supra, Cal.3d at pp. 631-632), we need look no further than the cases themselves to of defendant’s dispose contention.
The in opinion Regina of the court Wagstaffe (Cen.Crim.Ct. 1868) Cox. Crim. Cas. a consists of vaguely jury worded The charge. court instructed the jury that criminal negligence very “was a wide . . . question. At different times people had come to different to conclusions as what be might done with . a sick . . person. might man be convicted [A] manslaughter he a because lived in place where all the of a community was contrary in opinion, and another he might acquitted they because were (Id. all of his . .” . opinion. at p. 532.) rhetorically The court asked wheth- old, Although century more than a represent English cases the last word of courts on question the common negligence law of criminal in such circumstances. Parliament there passed after the Poor imposing statutory duty Law Amendment Act of 1868 a on provide O’Neill, (Trescher their children with medical Dependent care. & Medical Care for Manslaughter Liability Children: the Christian Scientist U. 206- Pa. L.Rev. 207.) content them- persons that should by Almighty er “intended God it was themselves, assistance, without or resort- by helping for His selves praying (ibid.), for that and as their reach purpose?” to such means were within ing sincere and appeared that the defendants concluded with observation the fact subsequently were Although acquitted, the defendants affectionate. negligence negates of criminal question itself resolved the jury that recognized legal charge. defense Wagstqffe that the court claim Furthermore, crimi- restated the jury merely principle its instructions light contempo- to be determined in nal is a of fact negligence question standards, particular question the time made the community which at rary a close one. clearly. In quite makes this point
The second case cited defendant 80 Cent. Crim. Ct. the court dismissed an Regina v. Hines exclusively had parent prayed who manslaughter against indictment crimi- court ruled that the conduct was not Although for an ill child.15 law, holding is to refute its as a matter of state nally negligent rejected later: the court considered years proposi- application calling a child care “instead spiritual tion that a who treated parent blisters, leeches, calomel,” guilty of criminal was apply doctor blisters, leeches and calomel medical (Id. 312.) Were negligence. p. Hines today, likely defendant’s reliance on would alternative to quite advanced this court. Medical science has dramati- fully more resonate with however, may fairly community we that the standard cally, presume Nineteenth-century criminal English negligence changed accordingly. has defense, law, common charges thus as a matter law fails establish a child treated today for criminal in the death of arising negligence alone.16 her insufficient to legally Defendant next contends that actions criminal estab under the definition that conduct negligence constitute her sincere concern and in the decisions of this court. Emphasizing lished Shauntay she claims that her conduct good treating prayer, faith Defendant does not incompatible required degree culpability. with the however, criminal objectively. must be evaluated negligence dispute, v. Watson Cal.3d 296-297 (People Penny, 880.) question 44 Cal.2d whether People *23 postdates passage of Amendment Act of While this decision the Poor Law (Trescher apparently disregarded applied principles. & court the statute and common law O’Neill, 206.) op. supra, p. 109 U. Pa. L.Rev. at cit. law, English common apparently 16We that case decided under the note in the one other unlawfully neglecting provide praying for an ail
parent to medical aid after was convicted O’Neill, 63; op. supra, Hurry ing (Reg. v. Cent. Ct. see Trescher & cit. child. Crim. 16.) p. U. Pa. L.Rev. fn. at have “a in defendant’s would been aware person position reasonable Watson, so, If 296.) . . . .” 30 Cal.3d at (People p. risk involved (Ibid.) to “defendant have had such awareness.” presumed of this was well illustrated in Bur- significance principle People roughs (1984) 894], Cal.3d 678 P.2d case Cal.Rptr. “ ” “self-styled involving ‘deep’ ‘healer’ who abdominal mas- provided to a sages” leukemic who thereafter died a massive abdominal hemor- made, rhage. (Id. 828.) at We observed that “There no pp. allegation trial, any any nor was there evidence at that at adduced [the defendant] any time harbored intent even to harm in the slightest fashion.” [the victim] “Indeed, 834.) at (Id. p. nowhere is it claimed that defendant attempted any action with perform other than to heal him respect [the victim] Nonetheless, . . . (Id. .” at p. 833.) determined that the we defendant could charged criminally negligent involuntary manslaughter. at (Id. p. then, 836.) The relevant inquiry, subjective turns not on defendant’s intent heal her on the daughter objective but reasonableness of her course of conduct.17 standard,
In view of this we reject must defendant’s assertion that no jury reasonable could characterize criminally her conduct as negligent for purposes sections 192(b) 273a(l). As the court v. Atkins People Cal.App.3d 855], observed in affirming the involuntary manslaughter felony child-endangerment conviction of care, whose parent child died for want medical criminal negligence have “could been found have consisted of the failure seek [mother’s] medical prompt son], attention for rather than waiting days. several [her knew, known, There is evidence she or should have was [her son] . seriously injured. . . Viewing the light most favorable to [the evidence] the prosecution, there is substantial evidence here of involuntary man- slaughter based on the lack of due caution and circumspection in omitting to take the child ato doctor.” (Id. 360.) When p. subjec- divorced her intent, tive the alleged conduct defendant here is essentially indistin- guishable.
Defendant’s arguments contrary are not She persuasive. first as- serts that the various exemptions enacted for Christian Scientists demonstrate a legislative acceptance of the reasonableness of their spiritual care that is with a incompatible finding of “gross, culpable, reckless” 17Compare LaFave and Scott’s comment that “an honest belief that is a better cure medicine, doctors, than can might negative Providence heal better than serve to required manslaughter awareness risk which is subjective in those states which use a Scott, negligence.” (LaFave test ed.) criminal & p. Criminal Law fn. italics add *24 above, however, California’s length As discussed at negligence. of efficacy not an endorsement of the or reasonableness
scheme reflects a for children diseases but rather prayer battling life-threatening treatment when children do face practice to accommodate willingness religious Indeed, treat- suggest harm. the relevant statute physical serious the sufficiently justify ill is state gravely ment for children unreasonable rights custody. in the of their taking step depriving draconian at {Ante, pp. 132-134.) clearly cited in of her claim are
The two cases defendant support Rodriguez In Cal.App.2d distinguishable. People involuntary manslaughter the court conviction 863], reversed of a had her alone at home where one died in a mother who left children fire. The ruled that the conduct did not reflect a course of court mother’s of criminal sufficiently justify finding negligence. (Id. conduct reckless unreasonableness, however, In 440-441.) at terms of failure de pp. to seek medical attention for a child who sickened and died over a fendant 17-day Rodriguez than the of Mrs. period plainly egregious more decision children her at home for an afternoon. In Somers v. Superior leave alone the court Cal.Rptr. 630], granted Court Cal.App.3d officer prohibition barring manslaughter prosecution police writ youth had shot a whom the mistook for a felon. The fleeing who officer menacing” court observed that situation was “tense and because of earlier of robberies that the victim matched the reports vicinity, of a to be and that description suspect appeared carrying shotgun, victim after the “Stop, police.” continued flee officer had shouted {Id. 965, 968-970.) Again, unreasonableness of defendant’s pp. objective Somers, conduct, course of with the officer’s actions of an compared evidently greater magnitude. sum, reject
In we that the alone to a proposition provision ill as a seriously negligence child cannot constitute criminal matter law. sufficiently Whether was particular culpable this defendant’s conduct justify involuntary felony conviction of child endanger- manslaughter the jury. ment remains a the exclusive question province II. Constitutional Defenses A. Free under the exercise First Amendment a statutory
In the absence of basis to bar defendant’s we prosecution, necessarily her reach constitutional claims. Defendant absolutely Church first contend that her conduct is from criminal protected
139 the United States Constitution and by the First Amendment liability 4, I, agree. We do not article of the California Constitution. the free The First Amendment bars government “prohibiting absolutely religious of the clause be Although protects exercise” religion. lief, for subject regulation “remains the motivated conduct religiously 296, (Cantwell 310 303- society.” of v. Connecticut U.S. protection (1940) 1213, 900, 1218, 304 60 A.L.R. determine 1352].) L.Ed. S.Ct. 128 To [84 conduct is violative of the governmental regulation religious whether of Amendment, must First the of the state’s interest be balanced gravity v. against severity (Wisconsin the of the Yoder religious imposition.
406
If
U.S.
1526].)
regulation
L.Ed.2d
S.Ct.
[32
stake,
justified in view the
at
the free exercise clause
of
balanced interests
requires
additionally
the least restrictive alterna
policy
represent
tive available
adequately
objectives. (Thomas
advance
state’s
v. Re
Bd,
view
Ind.
Sec. Div.
450 U.S.
L.Ed.2d
Empl.
634,
Defendant does of dispute gravity not inter governmental case, est felony involved this as she well should not. liabili Imposition ty for an ill endangering by failing medical care killing provide furthers an interest of unparalleled significance: the protection very children, lives of California’s upon “healthy, whose well-rounded growth . . rests, . full maturity into society as citizens” our “democratic for its continuance . . . (Prince .” Massachusetts 321 U.S. 645, 653,
L.Ed. 64 S.Ct. Balanced this interest is a against religious infringement of significant dimensions. Defendant relied unquestionably on faith, prayer treatment as article of genuine the restriction which seriously note, however, would impinge on We practice religion. her that resort to medicine does constitute “sin” a Christian Scientist (Schneider, Christian Science and the Law: Room Compromise?,supra, Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. pp. 87-88), at does not subject church member Church, to stigmatization (Talbot, The Position the Christian Science supra, 26 N.E. Med. J. at does p. 1642), not result in divine retribution (Schneider, and, op. cit. supra, pp. 87-88), to the Church’s according brief, amicus curiae is not matter church compulsion.
Regardless severity religious imposition, governmental interest is plainly adequate justify its restrictive effect. As the United Massachusetts, States Supreme Court stated Prince U.S. at page 654], L.Ed. at p. martyrs “Parents be free to become free, circumstances, they themselves. But it does not follow identical martyrs to make their children before they have reached the of full age legal they discretion when can make that choice for themselves.” The court *26 reli by whose parents in Prince considered a free-exercise claim asserted tracts in violation of religious that their children sell required beliefs gious liberty “martyr” taking If are not at to children parents child labor laws. labor, martyr they liberty it fortiori that are not at to chil their follows a to As “The very explained, right dren their lives. the court taking or freely expose community to the religion liberty does not include practice at (Id. or the latter ill health or death.” child to communicable disease Yoder, accord, v. supra, 166-167 L.Ed. at Wisconsin p. pp. [88 at U.S. at 233-234 L.Ed.2d pp. p. [32 conclusion, at argues
In an to avoid this inexorable the Church attempt the governmental over the distinction between length purportedly pivotal and the religiously prohibi- of a act compulsion objectionable governmental act. the force of the religiously Accepting arguendo tion of a motivated distinction, has in case an interest of involving we find that it no relevance a no recognized, parents right this As the court in Prince have magnitude. life, regardless a of the religion free exercise of at the of child’s price Fur- of the compulsive governmental infringement. nature prohibitive thermore, the specifically the United States Court has sustained Supreme no compel- for interests more compulsion religiously prohibited conduct here In 197 U.S. than Jacobson Massachusetts ling implicated. the 358], L.Ed. 25 S.Ct. the court a law upheld compelling communicable in the of parental vaccination children diseases face Lee 455 U.S. religious objections. In United States v. 127, 135, 102 that the 1051], requiring
L.Ed.2d S.Ct. the court law upheld Security Amish violate the of their faith in the Social participating tenets L. system. And in Gillette United States U.S. 168, Ed.2d S. the 828], upheld right 91 Ct. court government’s war compel objectors despite religious certain conscientious make objections. for the precedents character their We see no basis these constitutionally conclusion that insulate themselves state parents so as their conduct takes the form compulsion long life-threatening religious act. omission rather than an felony liability failure to seek medical care for imposition ill To survive a seriously justified by child is thus state interest. compelling however, First also challenge, policy represent Amendment must the Church least restrictive alternative available to the state. Defendant and that civil advance the interest argue dependency proceedings governmental First, already in a This have far less intrusive manner. is not evident. we it is not clear profoundly proceedings; observed intrusive nature of such children to a prefer custody would lose their pursuant and invasive than to face disruptive judicial inquiry privately prospect Second, liability. advance the proceedings criminal dependency time only interest when state learns of child’s illness governmental measures, likely rather will be the protective quite exception to take which circumstances,. . . case believ- rule: of a true ordinary than the “Under authorities, er in will not come to the attention healing faith even (Comment, Religious until and the Crimi- unless and someone dies.” Beliefs Healer, L.A. System: Loyola nal Problems the Faith Justice Some liability of criminal is re- pp. 403-404.) Finally, L.Rev. imposition for the loss of a child’s life thus is endangerment served actual *27 narrowly tailored to those instances when is abso- governmental intrusion lutely compelled.
We conclude that an and adequately effective less restrictive alternative is not available to further state’s interest in compelling assuring provi- sion of medical care to gravely ill children refuse such treat- whose ment on religious grounds. Accordingly, First Amendment and its California do equivalent not bar defendant’s criminal prosecution. (Accord, 684, v. State 220 Craig (1959) 690]; Md. 590 A.2d v. Pierson People [155 243, 176 N.Y. (1903) 201 N.E. v. State 6 (1911) Owens Okla.Crim. [68 345, P. 110 347-348]; Commonwealth v. Barnhart 345 (1985) Pa.Super. [116 616, Note, Dilemma, 10 A.2d 623-624]; Prayer Healing [497 California’s 14 Hastings Const.L.Q. pp. 412.) B. Due process right illegal notice conduct fair I, 7,
Article
section
of the California Constitution
Four
and the
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution both assure that no
“life,
shall
person
deprived
liberty, or
without due
property
process
law.” Among the
implications
this constitutional command is that the
state must give
citizenry
its
fair notice of potentially criminal conduct. This
requirement has two
“due
components:
statute to be
process requires
definite enough to
provide (1)
standard of conduct
those
whose activi
proscribed
ties are
(2)
standard for
enforcement and
ascer
police
of guilt.”
257,
tainment
v.
(Burg
35
Municipal
(1983)
Court
Cal.3d
269 [198
145,
812,
Cal.Rptr.
732],
673 P.2d
cert. den.
We initially
observe
these statutes do not invite standardless law
enforcement. Unlike typical
process
due
challenges involving an ambigu
ously worded statute
applied
arbitrary
(see,
unforeseeable manner
Lanzetta
e.g„
Jersey (1939)
New
respective proscriptions. (People of 273a fair notice validity on [upholding § [48 677] 108, 114 v. Wilson grounds]; Cal.App.2d People 567] P. Cal.App.Supp. v. Yates [same, 192(b)];People § if defendant’s contention that 270].) accept arguendo Even we [same, § 961] uncertainty on the en part creates law the intersection of the statutes treatment when child’s legality officials regarding forcement lost, only to make required are nevertheless endangered life officials otherwise conduct discretionary judgment: prosecute one whether of section statutes in view of the felony provisions within the reach of the certainly sweep is not “of such a standardless 270. This discretion [that it] juries pursue personal predilections.” their prosecutors, allows policemen, (Sm 605, 613, Goguen L.Ed.2d U.S. ith S.Ct. analysis, of the due process respect remaining component With *28 to why statutory provide two the scheme fails arguments defendant makes no 192(b) fair first that sections and 273a(1) provide notice. She contends unlawful, the at treatment becomes thus point notice of which lawful life, as the liberty her “at to to requiring peril property speculate Jersey, 306 v. New U.S. penal (Lanzetta supra, statutes.” meaning in form of a 890].) argument 453 L.Ed. at She frames her the p. p. [83 rely solely on treatment rhetorical “Is it lawful for a question: parent the during for the care of ill child through prayer means spiritual his/her fifth days day?” first but for the fourth or Justice Holmes few of sickness not a man’s fate correctly depends answers: law is full of instances where “[T]he it, is, estimates some rightly, jury subsequently on his that as the estimating murder, . may matter . . ‘An death be degree. causing manslaughter, act misadventure, common it’ according degree danger attending in v. United States the circumstances known to actor.” experience (Nash 373, 1232, 1235, 377 L.Ed. 33 S.Ct. see also (1913) 229 U.S. [57 217, 611, 214, 614 City (1971) Coates v. Cincinnati 402 U.S. L.Ed.2d [29 on relying 91 “matter of 1686].) degree” persons S.Ct. is the at which their course of con rightly point treatment must estimate notice, criminally process requires duct In terms of due negligent. becomes Court, 270.) v. 35 Cal.3d at {Burg no more. Municipal p. violates her statutory Defendant in conclusion that scheme contends fair under sections and right by allowing punishment 192(b) notice sec assertedly for the same conduct that is accommodated under 273a(l) that the statutes issue argues She essence tion 270. contradictory v. 360 U.S. (Raley (1959) commands” Ohio “inexplicably 423, 1344, 1356, 1257]) S.Ct. and thus violate due 438 L.Ed.2d 79 [3 ordinary intelligently choosflng], “an process precluding person [from]
143 advance, (Connally lawful him to v. pursue.” what course it is 322, 385, 329, Co. L.Ed. General Construction 269 U.S. (1926) [70 S.Ct. 126].)18 sufficiently whether a clear considering legislative proscription
In
notice,
satisfy
language
of fair
“we look first
requirements
statute,
history,
finally,
then to
to California decisions
legislative
its
statutory
v.
Court
(Pryor Municipal
(1979)
construing
language.”
238,
330,
636]; People
Cal.3d
599 P.2d
Mirmirani
Cal.Rptr.
[158
30 Cal.3d
636 P.2d
We thus
(1981)
Cal.Rptr.
only
citizens to
themselves
but
require
language
apprise
construction,
history,
of legislative
judicial
also
subsequent
underlying
legislative
v. Grubb
63 Cal.2d
purposes (People
Amsterdam,
(See
408 P.2d
100]).
generally
The Void-For-
Vagueness Doctrine
U.
Court
Pa. L.Rev.
Supreme
67.)
These
principles
strong
legislative
enactments
express
presumption
“must be
unless
upheld
unconstitutionality clearly,
their
positively,
unmistakably
A statute should
certain
appears.
sufficiently
be
so
[Citations.]
may
that person
prohibited thereby
know what is
and what
be done
violating
without
its
it
void
uncertainty
but
cannot
held
if
provisions,
any reasonable and
construction can be
practical
given
language.”
its
(Lockheed
Corp.
Court
28 Cal.2d
Superior
Aircraft
As we have discussed at length
of the statutes
purposes
*29
here at issue are evidently distinguishable:
192(b)
sections
and 273a(l)
18 Attorney
analyze
The
General
we
question
contends that
should
this
under
“reason
notice,
able reliance” doctrine rather than as a traditional fair-notice issue. Unlike fair
which
validity
statute,
enforceability
addresses the
of a
exception
and
“reasonable reliance” is an
ignorance
the rule
(Kratz
(E.D.Pa. 1979)
no
law is
excuse.
v. Kratz
477
F.Supp.
480.) It focuses on those circumstances in which an individual acts “in reason
law,
upon
able reliance
neous,”
an officialstatement of the
afterward determined
be invalid
erro
Code, 2.04,
prosecuted
then
(Model
and is
for a violation of the law.
Pen.
subd.
§
defense,
(3)(b).)
Unlike
requires proof
fair-notice
the reasonable reliance doctrine
of actual
(Cf. McBoyle
reliance on a mistaken
construction of the statute.
v. United States
283
816, 818,
U.S.
L.Ed.
51 S.Ct.
clearly
The issue before us is
of a different sort.
270 not an
Section
erroneous statement
interpretation
273a(1)
192(b);
separate
legal
sections
and
it is
statute with full
force
significance
and effect.
analyzed
The
of this distinction is borne out
the cases
under the
Ohio,
Raley
reasonable
(Compare
reliance doctrine.
360 U.S.
Cox Louisiana
(1965) 379
476],
(5th
U.S.
L.Ed.2d
85 S.Ct.
and United States v.
Cir.
Lichenstein
1980) 610
public
misrepresenting applicable
analyzed
F.2d
officials
law
[statements
under
reasonable reliance
with United States v.
protect against at expense. (Ante, at parental the routine of child provision support assures it cannot be said distinguishable objectives, In 124-126.) light these pp. under section 270 constitutes that the of defendant’s conduct legality to the separate require- command” with contradictory respect “inexplicably Indeed, history 192(b) 273a(l). legislative and ments sections to ex- Legislature’s unwillingness demonstrates section specifically felony (Ante, pp. exemption provisions. the statute’s religious tend constitutionally 127-129.) 192(b), 273a(l) provided and thus Sections her alone to defendant that provision sufficient notice to not threat- only insofar as the child was would accommodated daughter harm or illness.19 ened with serious physical
III. Disposition involuntary man- We conclude that the defendant prosecution nor statutory neither law felony violates slaughter endangerment of the Court of judgment Appeal the California or federal Constitution. The affirmed. Kaufman, J., Lucas, J., Panelli, J., J., J., Arguelles, Eagleson, C. concurred. holds as a
MOSK, J., My opinion for the court Concurring prepared 270 (hereafter construction that Penal Code section matter no under the religious charges arising defense 270) provides this felony statutes. Because of hold manslaughter child-endangerment Attorney reach the conten majority separate chose not to General’s ing, felony this religious tion that an extension of section 270’s exemption into the a defense that offends import proceeding would prosecution issue, of the state and federal Constitutions. establishment clauses *30 briefed, however, timely thoroughly importance has been raised and and its it in this for the guidance is manifest. I believe we should address case any further efforts to accommodate Legislature, legislative religious so that 19 allegedly argues Union in an amicus curiae brief that these The American Civil Liberties they scrutiny impinge pro conflicting particularly warrant because on conduct statutes close authority proposition by supporting the First Amendment. Amicus curiae cites tected (See, e.g., vague protected expression for serious concern. that which chill are cause laws 228, 222, Groyned City (1972) v. 408 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. U.S. 109 92 [33 of Rockford 205, 209-210, 215].) (1959) S.Ct. v. 361 U.S. 150-151 L.Ed.2d 80 Smith [4 California authority only inapposite. possibly The be “chilled” the interre The is conduct could 192(b) these reliance alone in circumstances reached sections lation of statutes is on is, 273a(l)—that endangers life of circum and when the or takes the a child. In such conduct stances, (Ante, 138-141.) implicated. pp. free exercise is not at
145 in this As will comply appear, will constitutional command. practice statutory exemption plainly view the as it now reads violates estab- my lishment clauses. “to Legislature
The California and federal Constitutions admonish the Const., 1st religion.” (U.S. make no establishment of respecting law I, Const., Amend.; fall 4.) legislation Cal. art. Two broad classes under § and religions” this laws a uniform benefit to all proscription: “affording v. 456 among “that Valente religions.” (Larson laws discriminate 33, 52-53, 102 1673], U.S. 252 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. italics original.) [72 constitutionality mea- traditionally of the first class enactments is against sured three criteria the United Supreme delineated States Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman U.S. L.Ed.2d 91 S.Ct. [29 2105]. Lemon, second, Under first secular law must have a its legislative purpose; or must principal primary effect neither advance nor inhibit and religion; third, it not governmental must foster an excessive reli- entanglement with (Id. at gion. 612-613 L.Ed.2d at pp. pp. 755-756].) [29 Laws in the second class strike closer to the heart of the establishment clause and prohibition scrutiny. thus more v. require demanding (Larson Valente, supra, p. U.S. at As p. 52].) L.Ed.2d the Larson [72 observed, court “The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that religious one officially denomination cannot be preferred (Id. over another.” at p. 47].) L.Ed.2d at The essential p. attribute of this constitutional is governmental dictate neutrality with respect to matters of faith: “Govern- national, ment our democracy, state and must neutral matters doctrine, religious theory, and It practice. may any be hostile to not religion aid, foster, or to the advocacy it no-religion; and one promote or religious theory religion against another even against the militant The First opposite. governmental neutrality Amendment mandates between religion religion, and between religion and nonreligion.” (Epperson 228, 234, Arkansas U.S. 103-104 266].)1 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. If a law a preference effects among religions, governmental policy Valente, presumptively strict suspect subject scrutiny. (Larson U.S. at p.246 L.Ed.2d at p. The court in Larson considered a from the provision exempting reporting registration requirements of a charitable act only solicitations those I, 1Under the California explicit. Constitution this value Article assures enjoyment religion “free exercise and preference guaran without discrimination or *31 provision, In teed.” view of this “Preference thus is even forbidden when is no there discrimi (Fox City Angeles (1978) nation.” Los Cal.Rptr. 22 Cal.3d 796 587 P.2d [150 of 663].) The conjunction establishment clause the California in Constitution must be read unqualified this prohibition against preference with religious appreciate constitutional the scope independent protections. full of its 146 over 50 of their contributions organizations receiving percent
religious (Id. By 231 at p. p. 39].) or at L.Ed.2d organizations. members affiliated [72 statutory in the allocation the religions plainly discriminating among a granted preference requiring the denominational provision exemption, “a While that the state had acknowledging at scrutiny. (Id. p. 246.) strict abusive in practices in its citizens from significant interest protecting charity, importance that this interest retains solicitation of funds for at 248 by religious organization” (id. p. the solicitation is conducted a when that 50]), percent the court nonetheless determined L.Ed.2d at p. [72 statutory to withstand sufficiently objective rule not tailored was L.Ed.2d at scrutiny. (Id. p. p. 52].) constitutional at a its benefit on selective basis. similarly religious Section 270 allocates liability a any parent provides The from criminal who statute excludes in alone accor- by spiritual through minor with “treatment means prayer religious de- recognized tenets and a church practices dance nomination, duly-accredited (Italics added.) a practitioner thereof’’'' their no who otherwise treat protection parents thus affords provision denied the “by through means alone.” spiritual Specifically children a church or “recognized” not affiliated with exemption treatment on the religious provide prayer denomination who nonetheless sect, of an teachings unrecognized basis of beliefs personal religious in who treatment accordance with tenets (2) parents provide prayer denomination a not “accredit” recognized prayer “practition- does ers.” not of a read- product
These excluded believers are
the fanciful
strained
statutory
People
In
Arnold
Cal.2d
ing
language.
of the
115, 426
515],
religious exemption
this court considered
Cal.Rptr.
Born,”
First
under
a member of “the Church of the
claimed
442, fn.
(Id.
as
in faith
religious
believing
healing.”
p.
described
“a
group
Whether,
basis,
Church of
and on what
a court would determine that the
1.)
Born
is a serious
“recognized” religion
question
First
constitutes
Furthermore,
in
that mem-
easily answered.2
while the
Arnold states
opinion
cure,
no
bers of the
with the defendant for
there is
indica-
group prayed
tion
they
“duly
were
accredited
treatment.
practitioner[s]”
Grady,
example
case Arthur
in
Consider
Charles
who was described
another
” (In Grady
self-styled ‘peyote
‘way
(1964) preacher’
case
“a
shower.’
re
Cal.2d
as
Grady
spiritual
group
394 P.2d
“acted as the
leader of
together
consisting
group
This
individuals
codefendants and himself.
lived
[the
[five]
Although
living expenses
group,
[Grady]
share in the
home of a
did not
codefendant].
food,
exercises,
general
how
taught
deepbreathing
pray,
he
their
them
how to
‘and
selected
” (Ibid.)
group
“recognized”
to love the Christian life.’
Would this
warrant
status under
Grady
provide prayer
if
exemption
terms of the
its members were instructed
lieu
ill
of medical care to their
children?
*32
not,
statutory
If
Mrs. Arnold would have been denied the current
{Ibid.)
“recognized.”
even if the Church of the First Born had been
exemption
Indeed,
a “heal-
anyone
certain
denominations decline to term
well-known
actively
members who
seek
er”: “The so-called Pentecostal sects have some
intervention,’
ordinarily
but
acts
encourage
they
perform
‘divine
do
sense,
‘healers’;
sick
In
are
thought
that are
‘heal’ a
this
there
no
person.
thought
directly
Religious
the cure is
to come
from God.” (Comment,
and the Criminal
the Faith Healer
System:
Justice
Some Problems of
Beliefs
L.A.
Loyola
413-414.)
L.Rev. at
pp.
denied the
of prayer
Also
whose use
exemption
parents
treatment stems from
beliefs rather
the tenets of a
personal religious
than
In
recognized
jurisdictions
church or denomination.
other
such parents
repeatedly
have
on establishment
prevailed
equal
grounds
protection
against similarly formulated
In Davis v.
provisions.
State
Md.
107],
A.2d
the court considered a
to a
challenge
compulsory
[451
immunization statute
children
exempting
objected
whose
because
“‘conflicts with
procedure
the tenets and
of a
practice
recognized
church or religious denomination of which he is an adherent or member
108-109,
....’”
at
deleted.)
objec
italics
“rested his
pp.
plaintiff
{Id.
tion
on his
than
personal religious views rather
[to
immunization]
any recognized
tenets of
church
religious
of which he
denomination
was
a member or adherent.”
109.)
at
In Dalli v. Board
(Id.
p.
Education
(1971) 358
219],
Mass.
N.E.2d
fell outside
similar
plaintiff
to a
exception
compulsory immunization statute because she
on
objected
”
Bible,
the basis of
personal
“her
‘belief in the
(Id.
and its
at
teachings.’
p.
Finally,
v.
220.)
the court in Brown
(Miss. 1979)
Stone
378 So.2d
certiorari denied
The one group parents squarely protected the terms of the statute Scientists, are Christian whose denomination sponsored 1976 amend- ment to section 270 enacting its religious exemption. It thus more than fortuity that the word “practitioner,” used Christian formal- Scientists to *33 148 healers, to the in section 270 describe their also
ly designate appears As of analysis treatment. the the amend- exempted the required providers observed, Judiciary frankly Senate Committee on ment prepared no Christian who uses legislation parent was “Ensure purpose for not providing to heal his or her child shall be liable Science methods Judiciary, Com. on (Sen. medical attention for the children.” recognized added; 3843 italics Analysis (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.), of Assem. Bill No. Caucus, accord, Assem. Bill No. analysis 3d reading Sen. Democratic Sess.).) 3843 (1975-1976 Reg. liability condemning criminal while others
By
the favored from
sparing
a
in the mantle of
sanctioned denomi-
for failure
cloak identical conduct
270
with-
exemption
operates
nation
section
procedure,
religious
doctrine,
neutrality
religious theory,
practice,”
“in matters of
out
of a
state interest in its
compelling
thus cannot survive in the absence
Larson, however,
which ad-
effect. Unlike the
discriminatory
exemption
interest
objective,
only
vanced an
secular
discernible state
independent
se. While
per
in this
accommodation
accommodation
exemption
religious
nothing
it “reflects
more
legitimate objective
has been sustained as a
when
neutrality in the face of
governmental obligation
religious
than the
374
L.Ed.2d
(1963)
differences”
v. Verner
U.S.
409
(Sherbert
[10
83
here the
reflects
less than
deno-
1790]),
nothing
S.Ct.
accommodation
face
conduct.
indistinguishable religious
in the
preference
minational
sense.
Manifestly
objective
this is not a
in the constitutional
compelling
liability
If
from criminal
those
Legislature
parents
wishes to exempt
care,
on
in lieu of medical
the establishment
rely
who
treatment
prayer
granted
clause
at minimum that the
requires
exemption
irrespective
401
(Gillette
(1971)
denominational affiliation or
v. United States
practice.
168, 183,
S.
Lewis Califano,
U.S.
454
L.Ed.2d
91 Ct.
v.
828];
supra,
government
Ohio Misc.2d
N.E.2d
414;
Kolbeck Kramer
A.2d
N.J.Super.
N.Y.S.2d at p.
*34
Note,
14
Prayer Healing
(1987)
Hastings
Dilemma
California's
Comment,
412-414;
and the Criminal
Const.L.Q.
Religious Beliefs
8 Loyola
Healer
L.A.
System:
(1975)
Justice
Some Problems
Faith
of
396, 429.)4
L.Rev.
The
270
also invalid under the
set forth in
section
is
criteria
exemption
Kurtzman,
v.
Lemon
I already have observed accommodative of this purpose reflects a nonsecular exemption preference among adherents treat- ment rather than governmental a neutral to response religious genuine While charitably differences. one might exemption has the argue conduct, effect indicia of identifying sincere religious thus facilitating statute, administration of the to subject discrimination the strictest scrutiny 4Defendant and the Church cite exemptions three cases which reserved for adherents of “recognized” upheld. (Jaggard church or denomination were v. Comr. Internal Revenue (8th 1978) 1189; Varga (D.Md. Cir. 1979) 582 F.2d v. United F.Supp. States affd. (4th 1980) 106; (W.D.Ky. Cir. v. 1976) 902.) F.2d F.Supp. Kleid Board Education readily distinguishable. Varga Each Jaggard challenges Both involved to a statute ex empting belong from the self-employment recognized federal tax those individuals who to a religious opposes acceptance any sect which private public of the benefits insurance and provides dependent (Jaggard, which supra, p. 1190; otherwise its members. 582 F.2d at test, Varga, supra, 1116.) F.Supp. p. Employing compelling at interest in Var court “ ga governmental justified: found that the Congress distinction was ‘The limitation exemption religious to opposed members of sects with established tenets insurance and provisions which made dependent reasonable for their keeping members was in with the Security purpose overall provision provided welfare of the Social Act. This assurance that qualifying exemption those provided would be otherwise for in the event their de ” Revenue, 1118;accord, pendency.’ (Id. Jaggard p.at supra, v. Comr. Internal 582 F.2d at p. 1190.) court exemption The in Kleid compulsory considered from a immunization statute re nationally recognized served for “members of (Kl religious and established church or denomination.” Education, 3.) Board 406 F.Supp. p. plaintiff at fn. The chal eid lenged the exemption statute as violative of the establishment clause because it denied its “ ” objected those ‘non-religious grounds.’ p. 904.) who on immunization The court {Id. among religions; thus did not presented religious consider discrimination the issue involved a exemption provided objectors. not opinion otherwise for secular nowhere mentions the possibility statutory language under the among religious, of discrimination such and as inapposite. alone. (Cf. on of administrative convenience justified cannot be the basis 583, 594, 411 U.S. L.Ed.2d Frontiero Richardson Furthermore, likely and more S.Ct. indicia are underinclusive by requiring theological rather than facilitate administration complicate and courts are and social that law enforcement officials judgments closely linked to complications administrative to make. These equipped invites provision of church and state that the troubling entanglement and Lemon forbids. required
To law enforcement officials and courts are apply *35 a religions, searching “the various for practices” evaluate tenets and of alone”; by they are called prayer doctrinal sanction of treatment “spiritual “duly by have been accredited” to consider whether individual healers upon denomination; they required a and most ascer- disturbing, particular a is This last religious “recognized.” inquiry tain whether particular group judge law enforcement officials to their discre- requires and prosecutors of tion has reached the critical mass religious group whether particular necessary statutory and leaves courts protection, size and acceptance and the nothing subjective guide required but belief to experience determination. secretary clearly
The assistant
affairs
to the Governor
legal
anticipated
the
analysis
scenario in her
of
1976
foregoing troubling
preenactment
amendment to section 270: “The bill
that the
or denomina-
requires
religion
‘recognized.’
tion be
further definition
While this would
provided.
No
situation,
constitute a severe
in the medical
it would
problem
emergency
opportunity
argue
problem
where there is sufficient
present problem
It
of
officials
religion.”
public
arguing
of
precisely
entangling prospect
as
problem religion”
aspect
ongoing
“the
of their
enforcement
270,
their
implications
judg-
section
with the
divisive
coupled
politically
Valente,
ments,
avert.
(Larson
that the establishment clause seeks to
52-55].)
456
252-255
pp.
pp.
U.S.
L.Ed.2d at
[72
if
violates the
exemption
Defendant maintains that even
clause,
it in an edited
establishment
courts should nevertheless construe
facially
fashion to avert the
difficulties raised
its
preferen
constitutional
“If
tial
This cannot be done. It is of course fundamental
language.
feasible within bounds
their words and
statutes should be
purposes,
set
to preserve
constitutionality.” (Conservatorship
construed
their
of Hofferber
161,
854, 616 P.2d
This is a
836].)
28 Cal.3d
Cal.Rptr.
[167
however,
function,
in way
limited
and
no
to courts the
interpretive
delegates
As Justice Tobriner ob
authority
Legislature.
rewrite the work of
of section
constitutionality
served with
of another
respect
provision
of a
a wholesale
objectionable parts
requires
“If elimination
statute
legislative
a court’s
do so
both the
intent
rewriting,
attempt
transgresses
judicial
(In
King
function.”
re
Cal.3d
983],
cert.
Kaufman, J., concurred. BROUSSARD, J., Concurring Dissenting I agree majority with the a that be prosecution may maintained against involuntary petitioner Code, 192, However, manslaughter. (Pen. subd. I (b).)1 agree cannot that § the child endangerment provisions of are section 273a to applicable cases where the parent necessary has omitted to provide medical attendance. Rather the failure to provide necessary medical attendance is punish made by able section and section 273a is not to applicable omissions All further references to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. Moreover, even if the child. endangering but to active conduct care provide punishable attendance were under necessary medical provide the failure to 273a, into section section must read exemption the prayer section overwhelmingly It is clear is exemption pointless. 273a or the liability com- persons child sought endangerment Legislature preclude where prayer section religious exemption particularly within the ing successful, defeat the section 273a such would persons is apply religious meaningless. rendering exemption intent legislative omits, willfully a “If a of minor child part: parent Section 270 provides excuse, . . ... he necessary furnish . medical attendance lawful without person . .”2 273a that a of a misdemeanor . Section guilty provides or she is abuse or of the “willfully endangerment causes or child permits” who felony or a misdemeanor. The section or guilty child’s health person to describe the language into subdivisions which use identical is divided two “under applies that subdivision proscribed except conduct omits, excuse, willfully provides: parent of a without lawful Section 270 “If a minor attendance, food, necessary remedial care for clothing, shelter or medical or other to furnish child, by exceeding guilty punishable a fine not two or he she is of a misdemeanor his her or year, jail ($2,000), by imprisonment county exceeding or in the not one thousand dollars or jurisdiction a final ad by imprisonment. competent If a court of has made both such fine and judication child and person parent action is the of minor in either a civil or a criminal omits, willfully adjudication lawful person and he or she then without has notice of such shelter, excuse, food, necessary clothing, medical attendance or other remedial to furnish child, county jail ex punishable imprisonment in the not care for his or her this conduct day, year year ceeding one prison one or in a state for a determinate term of one ($2,000), imprisonment. exceeding fine and fine thousand dollars both such two *37 liability parent the criminal This shall be construed so as to relieve such statute not merely parent legally enti the of such child is defined herein for such omission because other any per custody parent other because the other of such child or tled to the of such child nor food, necessary voluntarily involuntarily clothing, shel organization or or furnishes such son or so. or other remedial care for such child undertakes to do ter or medical attendance by par- parent, such desertion of a child such or the omission “Proof of abandonment or food, necessary clothing, or care to shelter or medical attendance other remedial ent furnish prima his her facie evidence that such abandonment or desertion or omission or child is food, necessary clothing, or remedial care is will- shelter or medical attendance other furnish lawful excuse. ful without child, court, ability con- determining parent support the of his or her shall “The in the income, including gifts. social insurance benefits and sider all are were provisions applicable whether the of such child or “The of this section are divorced, regardless any any decree made in divorce action relative to ever married or of yet alimony A conceived but not born is to be deemed support or to the of the child. existing person as is insofar this section concerned. as a artificial insemination shall be “The husband of woman who bears a child result of a section, writing if he in purpose child for the of this consented considered the father that the artificial insemination. spiritual through alone in parent provides “If a a minor treatment means with denomination, practices recognized religious the of a church or accordance with tenets and thereof, duly practitioner ‘other remedial accredited such treatment shall constitute care’, used in this section.” as
153 likely great bodily or harm or death” produce circumstances conditions the “under circumstances or condi- (2) applies and subdivision section likely bodily harm or death.” Subdi- produce great tions other than those in its is the (1) provides punished by imprisonment vision that violation two, jail year the four or six county exceeding prison one state years. (2) Violation of is a misdemeanor.3 subdivision
We must “in rules of interpret statutes accordance with applicable construction, statutory fundamental are those which counsel among which aim that the of such construction should be the ascertainment of legislative so [citation]; intent law be effectuated that a purpose statutory statute should be system construed with reference to entire which it part way harmony may forms such be achieved among the parts [citations]; and that courts should effect to give ‘according statutes usual, ordinary them.’ import language employed framing (Merrill v. 71 Department Motor Vehicles Cal.2d [Citations.]” Cal.Rptr. P.2d People Woodhead Cal.3d 1007-1008 Younger P.2d rel. Cal.Rptr. 154]; People ex Court Superior Cal.3d
When we follow the fundamental rules of construction it is clear that sections 270 and 273a are both protection concerned children, person health and that section 270 applicable to a willful failure to provide necessary care and that section applicable 273a not to a to provide failure medical care but to active willful conduct harm or causing endangering the child’s health person.
There can be no rational doubt that the Legislature intended that section 270 should be applicable where a parent provide fails to medical care endan- gering health or person of child. The language of speaks the omission to “furnish . . . necessary medical attendance.” Medical at- only tendance is necessary when the health or person of child is *38 who, “(1) provides: Any Section 273a person likely under circumstances or conditions to death, produce great bodily suffer, willfully or any harm permits causes or child to or inflicts unjustifiable physical pain thereon suffering, mental having custody any or or the care or child, willfully permits person causes or injured, willfully the or health of such child to be or permits causes such placed person or child to be in such that situation its or health endan is gered, punishable by county imprisonment jail exceeding is year, the not one or in the state 2, 4, prison years. 6 or who, “(2) Any person under or likely pro- circumstances than conditions other those death, great bodily suffer, willfully duce any harm or permits causes or child to or inflicts unjustifiable physical pain thereon suffering, any having custody or mental the or care or child, willfully permits or person injured, willfully causes the or health of such to be or child permits causes placed person or such child to be in such situation or that its health endangered, guilty is of a misdemeanor.”
154 the section shows of the first sentence of plain language endangered. If the in the conduct. endangering parent to child applies that the section it is clear that she the prayer exemption, case had not come within instant (1967) 66 (See v. Arnold People under section 270. could be prosecuted 115, 438, 451, 426 misde- [upholding 452 P.2d Cal.Rptr. Cal.2d [58 515] 270 adoption on the basis of section prior manslaughter charge meanor exemption].) the religious reimburse- merely regulation requiring 270 is not economic
Section While the third sentence medical attendance. providing ment those liability not relieved of criminal because parent that a section provides care, may not be read as prohi- the medical that sentence another furnishes necessary the liability People criminal when no one biting provides support. 495, 7, 437 P.2d 25 68 Cal.2d Cal.Rptr. Sorenson [66 the in conclud- majority case relied 1093], upon A.L.R.3d principal (maj. 124), 270 is reimbursement opn., p. that the section ing purpose “ are to secure statutory objectives sup- states that ‘the principal expressly ” any fisc. If there was doubt as of the child’ and port protect public the child statute should be when applied intent that the legislative as state medical attendance as well when the necessary does not receive reimbursement, reli- adoption such doubt is dispelled seeks As majority recog- in the last sentence of the section. gious exemption nize, to “shield history Legislature shows that the legislative sought of medical care” liability those who lieu provide prayer it that 122-123), by adopt- and would be absurd to conclude (maj. opn., pp. from a only intended Legislature exempt parent ing provision for medical care which was not furnished. duty pay 273a, is to child endan- Accordingly applicable section like section injured and both sections are whether not child germent, applicable 780]; (see Peabody (1975) Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. People Both Cal.Rptr. 677]). v. Harris People Cal.App.2d The statutes are sections are found in the same the Penal Code. chapter materia. v. Caudillo 21 Cal.3d (People pari Sutherland, Statutory 2A Construction see 51.03, duty it is our to con- (Sands, 1984) Accordingly, 4th ed. p.467.) § strue them and harmonize them. together
We cannot materia rule on the reject grounds application pari but also with reim- only endangerment deals not only endangerment 273a with child but bursement that section deals If materia rule were limited to identical also with child abuse. statutes, the pari *39 The applied. it at all and could never be would serve no purpose is the same pari purpose basis of the materia rule that both statutes share object. although may The materia rule the statutes have (Ibid.) pari applies objectives they additional dissimilar so as share the same common long also objective. statutes,
When we harmonize the the result is clear. Section 270 imposes a duty to . . upon parents “necessary the identified . medical atten- provide dance,” liability criminal imposes “willfully when the omits” to parent so, thereby do endangering liability the child. Section 273a criminal imposes for willfully causing endangerment. child To avoid conflict permitting sections, between the section 273a should be not construed to when apply the asserted criminal conduct is the omission to the duties perform imposed only but when the basis the child endangerment is active child, endangering conduct willfully causing or permitting endan- germent. only active conduct shown the evidence is that petitioner prayed. Prayer is not by section prohibited 273a.
Moreover, even if it is concluded that the failure to provide necessary medical attendance is under punishable section 273a cases where the section 270 prayer is exemption may we inapplicable, section 273a apply to cases where exemption applies. The conclusion is unavoidable that the Legislature to intended exempt parents who utilize prayer treatment requirement provide to . . “necessary . medical atten- above, dance.” As pointed out medical attendance necessary is when its absence endangers health or To person. hold that section 273a applies parents who utilize prayer treatment in accordance with the exemption section 270 means that those may exempt always be under prosecuted that, section 273a for child endangerment and since injury is unnecessary for child endangerment, it would be irrelevant whether God answered the prayers.
The legislative intent provide some from criminal exemption liability is clear, overwhelmingly although extent of the exemption not be clear. The exemption is obviously duty directed at the to protect the child by securing medical attendance imposed section 270. It would be unreal- istic contrary all of the legislative history we have been furnished to conclude that the exemption directed at the economic of section aspect 270.4There nothing legislative history to indicate that Legisla- agree majority 4 I weight may given with the Assembly conclusion that no staff re port urging that incorporate section 273a should religious exemption be amended or to report raising Senate staff questions possible as exemption conflict between the provisions (See the child harm maj. opn., of section 273a. pp. 128-129.) We cannot tell undesirable, whether the Legislature members of the decided the amendment was was unnec essary or should be deferred so as interruption process. to avoid of the enactment I point would also report out that neither endangerment; focused on child both were con- necessity cerned with the for amendment respect por- of section 273a with to the child abuse *40 for medical services duty a nonexistent to pay to eliminate sought ture reimbursement primarily was concerned with which were never rendered or services others. paid for medical endangerment pro- applied must be religious exemption It must be totally intent is defeated. legislative of section 273a or the
visions medical attendance necessary where the failure to provide to cases applied in harm. the child’s health but does not result endangers directions to Appeal I of the Court of judgment would reverse it of the insofar as seeks dismissal grant prohibition writ petition deny it insofar as it seeks dismissal charge section 273a and to charge. manslaughter January 1989. for a was denied rehearing
Petitioner’s application
statute,
merely endanger-
manslaughter
tion of the section and the
cases where there is not
but
ment
harm.
notes
the Code Commission of 1870-1872.
We will consider the
code commissioners’ notes when
do not
they
conflict with other persuasive
“
evidence of legislative intent and
‘where the
particularly
commission’s
brief,
comment is
because
such a situation
is ordinarily
there
strong
reason to believe that
legislators’
votes were based in large measure
”
upon the
explanation
the commission
proposing
(Keeler
bill.’
Superior
Court
(1970) Cal.3d
Cal.Rptr.
420],
A.L.R.3d
quoting Van Arsdale v. Hollinger (1968) 68 Cal.2d
249-