People v. Rish InvestmentsPeople v. Rish Investments
BACKGROUND
Rish owns a property located on South Figueroa Street in Los Angeles (the property). Rish began operating the property as a motel in 2006. In October 2022, Rish leased the property to Gazi Islam and Ismat Islam, who then took over motel operations.
In August 2023, the People filed suit against Rish for violations of the Red Light Abatement Law. The complaint alleged that the property was a public nuisance within the meaning of the Red Light Abatement Law based on ongoing prostitution activity at the property. The complaint sought to enjoin Rish from allowing the property to be used as a public nuisance and to abate the nuisance by closing the property for one year.1
In February 2024, the People moved for summary judgment. In support of the motion, the People submitted evidence that Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers had arrested numerous people for prostitution and violent crimes at or near the property. For example, according to LAPD detective Dana Harris, who had 35 years of law enforcement experience,
In April 2024, Rish removed the case to federal district court, and the state court took the summary judgment motion off calendar. The district court remanded the case back to state court in June 2024.
Meanwhile, Rish and the Islams agreed to terminate their lease as to the property on September 1, 2023. In May 2024, Rish leased the property to Soul Housing, a non-profit homeless housing organization.
In July 2024, Rish filed its opposition to summary judgment. As relevant to this appeal, Rish argued that the City Attorney lacked authority to prosecute it because the Los Angeles City Council (City Council) had not directed the City Attorney to bring the action. Rish cited
Rish also asserted that the case was stayed as a matter of law because Rish had appealed the federal district court‘s remand order. Next, Rish contended that its due process rights had been violated because the People‘s summary judgment motion relied on some redacted materials. Rish also argued that the Red Light Abatement Law is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Finally, Rish asserted that any injunction or closure was unnecessary, because Rish had had abated the nuisance by terminating the Islams’ lease and by entering a new lease with Soul Housing.
The trial court granted the People‘s summary judgment motion in August 2024. It rejected each of Rish‘s arguments. As for
The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the People on September 13, 2024. The judgment found that the property constituted a public nuisance and ordered Rish to abate the nuisance. It also ordered the property to be closed for one year pursuant to
The final judgment awarded costs to the People, but included a blank space for the amount, to be ordered in accordance with the People‘s memorandum of costs. The People filed a memorandum of costs on September 30, 2024. In November 2024, the trial court entered an “AMENDED (ONLY ADDING COSTS) FINAL JUDGMENT.” Rish timely appealed from the amended judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal framework and standard of review
The trial court may grant summary judgment if there are no triable issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (
Rish also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the property closed for one year. We review that
II. Rish has not established any legal error
A. Section 731 authorizes a city attorney to bring an action to abate a nuisance without a mandate from the local legislative authority
Rish first argues that the City Attorney lacked authority to bring a public nuisance suit against it under
“In construing a statute, a court‘s objective is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. [Citation.] To determine legislative intent, a court begins with the words of the statute, because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.” (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871.) “If the statute‘s text evinces an unmistakable plain meaning, we need go no further.” (Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP (2007) 42 Cal.4th 503, 508.)
The statute separately specifies that the “city attorney of any county or city in which the nuisance exists shall bring an
Rish also appears to argue that we should interpret the statute to require a legislative mandate for any nuisance abatement action brought by a city attorney, because this approach would protect property interests and ensure due process of law. But even if we agreed that this interpretation “is preferrable as a matter of public policy, it would be inappropriate for us to override the clear words of the statute . . . .” (Bitner v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1064.)
Next, Rish argues that the underlying lawsuit was stayed as a matter of law while Rish appealed from the federal district court‘s order remanding the case to state court. However, “[t]he appeal of a remand order does not deprive the state court of jurisdiction unless a stay is obtained from the federal court.” (People v. Bhakta (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 631, 636 (Bhakta).) Rish does not argue that it obtained such a stay.
Rish cites several federal authorities for the proposition that an appeal from a federal district court ruling stays proceedings in the district court. (Cf. Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski (2023) 599 U.S. 736, 740 (Coinbase) [“a district court must stay its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on arbitrability is ongoing“]; Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (1985) 470 U.S. 373, 379 [“In general, filing of a notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.“].) But these authorities do not address whether related state court proceedings are stayed during an appeal from a remand order.3
Rish also argues that its due process rights were violated because the People‘s summary judgment motion relied on redacted documents. It is difficult to assess this argument because Rish failed to provide record citations to any of the redacted materials. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277 (Hernandez) [appellant‘s burden is to support arguments with record citations]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [same].) Rish‘s briefing also does not describe the redacted evidence, even at a high level; nor does it explain how the redactions impacted the proceedings below. Rish simply recites a litany of legal standards and asserts that those standards were violated, without applying the law to the facts of this case. This “conclusory assertion of legal error . . . results in forfeiture of the claim.” (Siskiyou Hospital, Inc. v. County of Siskiyou (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 14, 39; Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1 [appellate court will not develop appellant‘s arguments].)
Even if Rish had not forfeited this point, we would still reject it. The trial court acknowledged that Rish might be entitled to unredacted versions of certain evidence, but the court expressly stated that it did not rely on any redacted materials in granting summary judgment for the People. And Rish has not argued, let alone established, that the judgment would have been affected if Rish had obtained the unredacted materials. Rish therefore has not demonstrated any prejudice. (F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1108 [reviewing court may not set aside judgment based on nonprejudicial error];
D. Rish has not established that the Red Light Abatement Law is unconstitutional
Rish next asserts that the Red Light Abatement Law is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We determine the constitutionality of a statute de novo. (People v. Roberts (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 187, 193 (Roberts).) ” ’ ” ‘A defendant challenging the constitutionality of a statute carries a heavy burden: “The courts will presume a statute is constitutional unless its unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears; all presumptions and intendments favor its validity.” ’ ” [Citations.]’ ” (Ibid.) We conclude that Rish has not met this high burden.
In relevant part, the Red Light Abatement Law provides that any building in which acts of “lewdness, assignation, or prostitution, are held or occur, is a nuisance which shall be enjoined, abated, and prevented . . . .” (
A party seeking to establish that a statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face must establish that “the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” (Village of Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. (1982) 455 U.S. 489, 495 (Village of Estates).) Accordingly, “[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.” (Ibid.) “Under this ‘as-applied inquiry first’ rule, the facial challenge failed if the statute clearly applied to some or all
Here, the complaint alleged, and the trial court found, that Rish‘s property violated the Red Light Abatement Law based on prostitution activity. Rish does not dispute the trial court‘s finding that prostitution activity occurred at its property. As noted above, the Red Light Abatement Law specifies that a public nuisance exists, and must be abated, at any building in which acts of “prostitution, are held or occur . . . .” (
Rish primarily argues that the Red Light Abatement Law is facially unconstitutional because the term “assignation” is vague. It relies heavily on Manning v. Municipal Court (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 825, 830 (Manning), in which the court reached that conclusion in assessing a different statute. But as we have discussed, this case does not implicate assignation. And even if the statute were unconstitutionally vague as applied to other owners of property at which assignations occurred, Rish “cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.” (Village of Estates, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 495.)
Rish also observes that “arbitrary enforcement” is a “prominent component of the vagueness doctrine.” However, Rish fails to apply this aspect of the doctrine to the Red Light Abatement Law or the facts of this case. “We may and do
Rish also claims that the Red Light Abatement Law is unconstitutionally overbroad, again citing Manning, supra, 132 Cal.App.3d 825. Although the appellant in Manning raised an overbreadth argument (id. at p. 828), the appellate court did not reach the issue. Rish otherwise fails to support its overbreadth argument with any legal authority or reasoned argument. We therefore reject this point as forfeited. (Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.)
Finally, Rish argues that the Red Light Abatement Law is “void” on its face and as applied to the facts of this case because nobody was ever convicted of prostitution based on arrests made at the property. Rish also argues that it should not be held liable for conduct that occurred in private hotel rooms, because it did not know whether any crimes were being committed therein. Rish failed to cite any evidence in the record to support these assertions. (Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277 [appellant‘s burden is to support arguments with record citations].) And even assuming that the record supports these claims, Rish forfeited the point by again failing to explain why or how these circumstances render the statute void or unconstitutional. (Ibid. [appellate court may disregard conclusory arguments].)
In sum, Rish failed to overcome the presumption that the Red Light Abatement Law is constitutional. (Roberts, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 193.)
In the B344147 appeal, Rish argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter an amended judgment awarding costs while Rish‘s appeal from the original judgment (B341206) was pending. We review this question of law de novo. (Smith, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 190.)
Rish correctly observes that “the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby . . . .” (
Rish also argues that the cost award constitutes a substantial change to the judgment. Even if true, this would not mean the court lacked jurisdiction to award costs—it would only impact the time to appeal and, potentially, appellate jurisdiction. Specifically, a substantially amended judgment becomes the final appealable judgment in the matter. But if the amendment is
Rish contends that the cost award should be reversed, but this contention is entirely contingent on the success of Rish‘s arguments challenging the original judgment. Because we affirm the original judgment, we also affirm the cost award in the amended judgment.
II. Rish has not established that the court abused its discretion in ordering the property closed for one year
Finally, returning to the B341206 appeal, Rish argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the property closed for one year. We find no abuse.
If the trial court finds that a nuisance exists in a Red Light Abatement Law action, “an order of abatement shall be entered as a part of the judgment in the case, directing . . . the effectual closing of the building or place against its use for any purpose, and that it be kept closed for a period of one year, unless sooner released.” (
To be sure, the court had discretion to allow the property to re-open sooner. (
Rish argues that the closure was unnecessary because it abated the nuisance by terminating its lease with the Islams and entering a new five-year lease with Soul Housing. Rish fails to cite any evidence in the record to support this claim. (Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277 [appellant‘s burden is to support arguments with record citations].) We can discern from record that Rish did, in fact, terminate its lease with the Islams in September 2023; and in May 2024, Rish entered a new lease with Soul Housing. But Rish has not identified or described any
Finally, even assuming that Rish abated the nuisance in September 2023 or May 2024, we would still find no abuse of discretion. Red Light Abatement Law actions “should be dismissed when a nuisance has been voluntarily abated in good faith before the complaint was filed.” (People ex rel. Gwinn v. Kothari (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 759, 766, fn. 3.) The People filed suit in August 2023, meaning Rish did not attempt to abate the nuisance until after the complaint was filed.
The final judgment and amended judgment are affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS