F.P. v. MonierF.P. v. Monier
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Chin
In February 2006, plaintiff F.P. sued defendant Joseph Monier for acts of sexual battery that defendant allegedly committed in 1990 and 1991, when plaintiff was 10 years old and defendant was 17 years old. Plaintiff also sued defendant‘s parents for negligence, alleging that they had failed reasonably to care for, supervise, direct, oversee, and protect her from defendant. Defendant filed an answer denying the allegations and asserting in part that others were at fault and that any liability should be apportioned among them.
Before trial, plaintiff settled her claim against defendant‘s parents. The rest of the action went to trial before the court. The evidence presented during that trial showed, among other things, that plaintiff‘s father also sexually abused plaintiff during the time period in question. Dr. Laurie Wiggen, a licensed clinical psychologist who treated plaintiff from September 2005 until December 2007, diagnosed plaintiff as having posttraumatic stress disorder and attributed it to the traumas resulting from the molestations by her father and defendant. Dr. Wiggen could not separate the harm done by defendant from that done by plaintiff‘s father, testifying that their conduct was “cumulatively impactful.” Dr. Eugene Roeder, a licensed psychologist who evaluated plaintiff in July 2005, diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from major depression, an anxiety disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. Like Dr. Wiggen, Dr. Roeder could not distinguish the symptoms defendant had caused from those plaintiff‘s father had caused, but he testified that the molestation by plaintiff‘s father “was dramatically more traumatic than” the molestation by defendant because plaintiff‘s relationship with her father “was a much more central, basic relationship in her life” and “[h]er relationship with the [defendant] was more tangential.”
The court issued a tentative decision on April 29, 2009, finding that defendant had committed the alleged acts and that his conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff‘s injuries. The court indicated its intent to award damages in the amount of $305,096, consisting of $44,800 for lost income, $10,296 for past and future medical expenses, and $250,000 for general noneconomic damages. The court instructed plaintiff‘s counsel to prepare a judgment. Later that day, defendant timely filed a request for a statement of decision requesting, as relevant here, that the court set forth “the basis upon which” it was awarding special damages, emotional distress damages, past and future medical expenses, and lost wages.
On May 1, 2009, plaintiff‘s counsel submitted a proposed judgment to the court. In an accompanying declaration, counsel explained: (1) he faxed a copy of the proposed judgment to defendant‘s counsel after trial on April 29, 2009, and was informed that defendant‘s counsel was no longer at that
On May 1, 2009, the court signed the judgment without issuing a separate statement of decision. The judgment stated in relevant part: “After considering all of the evidence and testimony presented at trial it is hereby adjudged, determined and decreed that [defendant] molested his biological cousin, plaintiff [F.P.] numerous times when she was ten years old, including acts of unlawful penetration, sodomy, oral copulation of him and other lewd and lascivious acts. The conduct of Defendant . . . is further found to be outrageous and a substantial factor in causing injuries to the Plaintiff. Defendant took advantage of the vulnerability of the Plaintiff due to her age. Plaintiff . . . was injured as a proximate result of [defendant‘s] sexual assaults of her causing her to incur past and future medical/psychological treatment expenses of $10,296.00. Plaintiff lost income as a proximate result of [defendant‘s] sexual assaults of her in the amount of $48,800.00.” The judgment ordered defendant to pay total damages of $305,096.00, which included general damages of $250,000 and special damages of $55,096.00.
Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had erred in failing to issue a statement of decision and that the error was reversible per se. According to defendant, without a statement of decision, it was unknown whether the trial court had apportioned general damages as the law required. The Court of Appeal found error, but disagreed that it was reversible per se.
We granted review, limiting the issue to whether “a trial court‘s error in failing to issue a statement of decision upon a timely request” is “reversible per se.”2
The duty of a trial court in question here — to issue, upon the request of a party appearing at a court trial of a question of fact, “a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial” (
In 1872, when the Legislature enacted the Code of Civil Procedure, it replaced these provisions with section 632 and former section 633. Section 632 provided: “Upon the trial of a question of fact by the Court, its decision must be given in writing and filed with the Clerk within twenty days after the cause is submitted for decision, and unless the decision is filed within that time the action must again be tried.” Former section 633 provided: “In giving the decision, the facts found and conclusions of law must be separately stated. Judgment upon the decision must be entered accordingly.” (Repealed by Stats. 1933, ch. 744, § 198, p. 1904.) Two years later, the Legislature amended section 632 by (1) extending the time for filing the decision from 20 to 30 days, and (2) deleting the clause stating that “the action must again be tried” if the decision was not filed within the specified time. (Code Amendments 1873-1874, § 79, p. 312.)
In 1933, the Legislature combined these separate provisions into a single section 632, which provided in relevant part: “In superior courts and municipal courts, upon the trial of a question of fact by the court, its decision must
The Legislature next substantively revised the section in 1968. As here relevant, the amended section provided: “In superior courts, upon [the] trial [of a question of fact by the court,] the court shall announce its intended decision. Within the time after such announcement permitted by rules of the Judicial Council, any party appearing at the trial may request findings. Unless findings are requested, the court shall not be required to make written findings and conclusions. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Where findings are required, they shall fairly disclose the court‘s determination of all issues of fact in the case.” (Stats. 1968, ch. 716, § 1, pp. 1417-1418.)
The current version of section 632 began to take shape in 1981, when the Legislature amended the statute to provide: “In superior . . . courts, . . . upon the trial of a question of fact by the court, written findings of fact and conclusions of law shall not be required. Upon the request of any party appearing at the trial, made within 10 days after the court announces a tentative decision, . . . the court shall issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial. The request for a statement of decision shall specify those controverted issues as to which the party is requesting a statement of decision. . . . [¶] The statement of decision shall be in writing, unless the parties appearing at trial agree otherwise.” (Stats. 1981, ch. 900, § 1, p. 3425.)
In 1998, the Legislature slightly reordered this language so that the statute provided in relevant part, as it does today, as follows: “In superior . . . courts, upon the trial of a question of fact by the court, written findings of fact and conclusions of law shall not be required. The court shall issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial upon the request of any party appearing at the trial. The request must be made within 10 days after the court announces a tentative decision . . . . The request for a statement of decision shall specify those controverted issues as to which the party is requesting a statement of decision. . . . [¶] The statement of decision shall be in writing, unless the parties appearing at trial agree otherwise.” (Stats. 1998, ch. 931, § 84, p. 6442.)
As this discussion demonstrates, except between 1872 and 1874, when section 632 stated that “the action must again be tried” upon a trial court‘s
Moreover, at least since 1851, our generally applicable statutes have precluded reversal for errors in civil cases absent prejudice. Section 71 of the 1851 Practice Act provided that “[t]he Court shall, in every stage of an action, disregard any error or defect in the pleadings, or proceedings, which shall not affect the substantial rights of the parties; and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect.” (Stats. 1851, ch. 5, § 71, p. 61.) In 1872, the Practice Act provision became section 475, which initially provided: “The Court must, in every stage of an action, disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties, and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect.” Since 1897, when the Legislature last amended it,
More importantly, for over 100 years, the California Constitution has also expressly precluded reversal absent prejudice. In 1911, California voters added
As we have explained,
Based on these provisions, we agree with the Court of Appeal that a trial court‘s error in failing to issue a requested statement of decision is not reversible per se, but is subject to harmless error review. Nothing in the language of
Defendant argues that, notwithstanding the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, a rule of automatic reversal is dictated by our precedents. “This court,” he asserts, “has stated almost since statehood that a judgment must be reversed for failure to provide required findings, and has restated the rule time and again since” the adoption of
Defendant is correct that many of our decisions suggest a rule of automatic reversal. For example, in possibly our first decision on the subject, after quoting section 180 of the Practice Act, we reversed a judgment and remanded for a new trial, stating: “We are of opinion that this law is not merely directory, and we have no right to destroy or impair its efficacy. It is intended by it, that the decision of the Court shall be the basis of the judgment in the same manner as the verdict of a jury; and it follows, that without such decision the judgment cannot stand.” (Russel v. Armador (1852) 2 Cal. 305 (Russel).) Eighty-five years later, in 1937, we stated that if “findings are necessary” under
However, our decisions are not as uniform as defendant argues. In McQuillan v. Donahue (1874) 49 Cal. 157, the trial court, in a bench trial, decided the case “orally in favor of the plaintiff,” and “[n]o decision in writing was ever given or filed.” The defendant moved for a new trial pursuant to
In several decisions that predated the 1914 addition to our Constitution of a “miscarriage of justice” provision for civil cases (
Ten years after McCourtney, in Winslow v. Gohransen (1891) 88 Cal. 450, 451-452 (Winslow), we explained that a trial court‘s failure to make a finding on all issues is not reversible error if there was no evidence to support a finding on the omitted issues in favor of the complaining party, or if the evidence on those issues was insufficient to support such a finding. Again citing
We began grounding the prejudice inquiry in the state Constitution soon after the 1914 amendment to
The significance of this analytical omission is clear from our decision in Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 509, which relied on the constitution‘s “miscarriage of justice” provision to overrule our decisions holding that the erroneous admission of a coerced confession is reversible per se under California law. Cases predating adoption of the constitutional provision, we explained, did not consider or decide whether the erroneous admission of a coerced confession constitutes a “miscarriage of justice” within the meaning of that provision such that reversal is required “without regard to the other evidence received at trial.” (Cahill, at p. 494, fn. 10.) Cases postdating that event, we continued, had “lost sight of” the new provision‘s “principal purpose and significance” insofar as they focused on the persuasive impact that coerced confessions, ” ‘as a class,’ ‘[a]lmost invariably’ ” have. (Id. at p. 503.) Recognition of this impact “simply means that the improper admission of a confession is much more likely to affect the outcome of a trial than are other categories of evidence, and thus is much more likely to be prejudicial under the traditional harmless-error standard.” (Ibid.) But this increased likelihood of prejudice “does not . . . justify the judicial adoption of a state-law rule that automatically and monolithically treats all improperly admitted confessions as requiring reversal of the defendant‘s conviction; the California constitutional reversible-error provision was adopted for the specific purpose of eliminating just such a prophylactic approach to reversible error.” (Ibid.) As to considerations of stare decisis, we reasoned in part that (1) the precedents supporting the defendant did not even
In Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at page 574, we relied on
In People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 172-179, we again relied on
In light of these decisions, the precedents on which defendant relies, which fail to mention, let alone discuss, the constitutional harmless error provision, do not offer a sound basis for a rule of automatic reversal. Because
In addition to relying on precedent, defendant argues that, because a trial court‘s error in failing to issue a statement of decision “impairs” the “fundamental right[]” to a trial, “which necessarily includes the right to a decision on the matters in dispute,” “[i]t is a ‘structural defect’ in the trial proceedings” that is reversible per se. According to defendant, in a nonjury trial, a court‘s “findings are, in substance, a special verdict,” and “the statement of decision is the court‘s final decision.” It follows, defendant argues, that a failure to issue a statement of decision constitutes “a failure to decide the case,” and that “[e]ntering judgment without issuing a required statement of decision is tantamount to” entering judgment in a jury trial
In light of our precedent and the terms of the relevant statutes, we reject defendant‘s arguments. Regarding our precedent, as noted above, in Winslow, supra, 88 Cal. 450, we explained that where a trial court fails to make a finding on an issue that could only be decided in a way that “would not ‘invalidate’ the judgment rendered in accordance with the other findings” (id. at p. 452), “the failure to make such finding would not affect the substantial rights of” (ibid.) the complaining party and “is not error sufficient to authorize the reversal of the judgment” (id. at p. 453). In a separate decision decided the same year as Winslow, we explained that the rule defendant here invokes — where a trial court fails to make findings upon all the material issues presented by the pleadings, “there has been a mistrial, and the [court‘s] decision, having been rendered before the case has been fully tried, is considered to have been a decision ‘against law’ ” — applies only where a finding on the omitted issue “would have the effect to countervail or destroy the effect of the [court‘s] other findings.” (Brison v. Brison (1891) 90 Cal. 323, 328.) Thus, “[i]f the findings which are made are of such a character as to dispose of issues which are sufficient to uphold the judgment, it is not a mistrial or against law to fail or omit to make findings upon other issues which, if made, would not invalidate the judgment.” (Ibid.) The next year, in Diefendorff v. Hopkins (1892) 95 Cal. 343, in the course of restating the rule that a trial court‘s failure to make a finding on an issue that “could make no possible difference in the result” (id. at p. 347) — i.e., had “become immaterial” (id. at pp. 347-348) — “is not error, or at least, . . . not a prejudicial error” (id. at p. 348), we rejected the argument that a failure to find upon all issues “is prejudicial error, because it deprives [the complaining party] of the advantages which it was the purpose of the statute (Code Civ. Proc. secs. 632, 633) to secure, viz., a final adjudication upon each separate issue, to serve as a basis for a final judgment by this court on the appeal.” (Ibid.) Consistent with these precedents, we have more generally explained that “the absence of findings [does] not make [a] judgment void, but at most [is] only . . . error reviewable on appeal.” (May v. Hatcher (1900) 130 Cal. 627, 629.)
Also relevant are decisions involving the adequacy of factual findings and legal conclusions contained in the judgment itself. As detailed earlier, before the 1960‘s, the relevant statutes required that a court‘s findings of facts and conclusions of law “be separately stated” in writing, and that “[j]udgment upon the decision . . . be entered accordingly.” (See Stats. 1959, ch. 637, § 1,
Here, as previously explained, the judgment set forth the following: (1) defendant molested plaintiff numerous times when she was 10 years old, including acts of unlawful penetration, sodomy, oral copulation of him and other lewd and lascivious acts; (2) his conduct was outrageous and a substantial factor in causing plaintiff‘s injuries; (3) he took advantage of plaintiff‘s vulnerability due to her age; (4) plaintiff was injured as a proximate result of defendant‘s conduct, causing her to incur past and future medical/psychological treatment expenses of $10,296.00; and (5) plaintiff lost income as a proximate result of defendant‘s conduct in the amount of $48,800.00. Given these findings, defendant is incorrect that the trial court‘s failure to issue a separate statement of decision constituted a failure to decide the case.
Finally, defendant‘s argument, which depends largely on cases applying the language of earlier provisions, is inconsistent with aspects of the relevant statutes as they stand today. Under
Of course, the more issues specified in a request for a statement of decision and left unaddressed by a court‘s failure to issue a statement, the “more difficult, as a practical matter, [it may be] to establish harmlessness.” (People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 412 [adopting prejudice test and rejecting per se reversal for instructions that omit multiple elements of a criminal offense].) A trial court‘s failure to issue a properly requested statement of decision may effectively shield the trial court‘s judgment from adequate appellate review. (E.g., Gordon v. Wolfe (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 162, 167-168 [without a statement of decision allocating general and special damages, “we are unable to review the sufficiency of the [lump sum] award properly by examining its various components in light of the evidentiary support for each of them“].) As plaintiff herself acknowledges, “a trial court‘s failure to issue a statement of decision may at times require reversal in order for the appellate court to effectively perform a review of the material issues.” But the possibility of causing prejudice even “in many cases . . . does not . . . justify the judicial adoption of a state-law rule that automatically and monolithically treats all [failures to issue a requested statement of decision] as requiring reversal.” (Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 503.) As we have explained, our “constitutional reversible-error provision was adopted for the specific purpose of eliminating just such a prophylactic approach to reversible error.” (Ibid.)
It is true that, in this case, the correct procedure was not followed before the court signed and entered the judgment. Defendant did not have the requisite time to file objections to the proposed judgment before the court signed and entered the judgment.3 However, citing our Constitution‘s “miscarriage of justice” provision, we have long held that similar procedural errors are subject to harmless error review. (Miller v. Murphy (1921) 186 Cal. 344, 350 [failure to serve proposed findings before court signed them was not prejudicial]; Baker v. Eilers Music Co. (1917) 175 Cal. 652, 656-657 [premature signing of findings and judgment was not prejudicial].)
For reasons stated above, we affirm the Court of Appeal‘s judgment.
CHIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
HUMES, J.*
*Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.