REDONDO BEACH WATERFRONT, LLC, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF REDONDO BEACH, Defendant; BUILDING A BETTER REDONDO et al., Intervenors and Appellants.
B291111
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Filed 7/9/20
Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BS168564
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
REDONDO BEACH WATERFRONT, LLC, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF REDONDO BEACH, Defendant and Respondent; BUILDING A BETTER REDONDO et al., Intervenors and Appellants.
B294659
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BS168564
APPEALS from a judgment and an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, James C. Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.
Angel Law, Frank P. Angel and Ellis Raskin for Intervenors and Appellants.
Shumener, Odson & Oh, Betty M. Shumener, Henry H. Oh, and John D. Spurling for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky and Popeo, Jonathan Welner, Antony D. Nash and Samantha J. Duplantis for Defendant and Respondent
INTRODUCTION
In this consolidated opinion, we decide two of the multiple appeals currently pending in this court related to a proposed waterfront development project (the Project) in the City of Redondo Beach (the City).
In 2010, a majority of the City‘s residents supported improving the waterfront area and to that end passed an initiative laying the groundwork for the City to establish a public-private partnership with a real estate developer. Respondent Redondo Beach Waterfront, LLC (the Developer) has worked
In the published portion of this opinion, we address the primary legal issue presented in this case: whether the Developer has obtained statutory vested rights regarding the Project as against the City and if so, whether those rights vested before or after the passage of Measure C. The Developer contends it obtained vested rights under
Although the Residents attempt to make this issue a complicated one, it is not. The City deemed the vesting tentative tract map for the Project complete before city residents passed Measure C. We therefore conclude, as the trial court did, that the Developer has obtained vested rights against the City under
In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we address the Residents’ appeal from an order of the court finding they were not a “prevailing party” or a “successful party” in this litigation—a ruling that precludes them from recovering litigation costs under
1. The Waterfront Project
The Redondo Beach King Harbor Pier area (the Waterfront) has been, by all accounts, in need of improvement for some time. In 2010, city residents voted on and approved Measure G, which authorized an additional 400,000 square feet of net new development on the Waterfront. Measure G, and specifically the zoning ordinances contained within it, sought to amend the City‘s local coastal program2 to permit development in the Waterfront area. The Coastal Commission subsequently certified the amendment and the newly-passed zoning ordinances went into effect.
In order to facilitate improvements in the Waterfront, the City acquired leaseholds and other property interests in the area and sought out a private developer to assist with the Project. The City represented that the Project would include renovation of 150,000 square feet of existing building area and up to 400,000
square feet of new development. Ultimately, the City selected CenterCal Properties, LLC, the Developer‘s predecessor-in-interest, as the developer for the Project.3 In 2013, the Developer and the City entered into an exclusive negotiating agreement regarding the Project.
In June 2016, the Developer submitted an application for approval of the Project which included a vesting tentative tract map. The City notified the Developer in writing on June 23, 2016 that its application for approval of Vesting Tentative Tract Map No. 74207 (the Map) was “deemed complete.”
In early August 2016, the Harbor Commission certified the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and approved the coastal development permit, conditional use permit, Harbor Commission design review, and the Map for the Project (collectively, Waterfront Entitlements). The Harbor Commission‘s decision was appealed to the City Council, which approved the Waterfront
In January 2017, the Project continued to move forward as the City and the Developer signed an Agreement for Lease of Property and Infrastructure Financing (the Agreement) that
(among other things) identified specific parcels of land the City would lease to the Developer in connection with the Project. Although the Agreement largely preserved the City‘s right to approve or disapprove the Developer‘s plans for any reason, it acknowledged the City might have preexisting obligations to the Developer regarding vested rights that would be unaffected by the Agreement.
2. Measure C
Although the City and the Developer were moving forward with the Project, residents of the City had concerns about the proposed development. On June 28, 2016, five days after the City deemed the vested tentative tract map application for the Project to be complete, the Residents and others submitted a “Notice of Intent to Circulate Petition” to the City seeking to place a local initiative—the King Harbor Coastal Access, Revitalization, and Enhancement Act, later designated Measure C—on the ballot for the next general municipal election. Opponents of the Project gathered sufficient support and signatures from City residents and Measure C was placed on the ballot for the election held on March 7, 2017.
Proponents of the initiative represented that if passed, Measure C would “stop[ ] construction of a waterfront mall adding 13,136 daily car trips and doubling development. If built, 80% of ocean views from Harbor Drive will be blocked by 45’ tall structures nearly 2 football fields long. It paves 1/3 of Seaside Lagoon, eliminates our popular saltwater pool used by 81,000 people each season, and plops a massive 5-level parking structure in the harbor entrance.” Measure C proponents urged City residents: “Don‘t sell out our waterfront and 6 acres of public parks for a pittance in annual lease income. Don‘t settle for a
boat ramp deemed inherently unsafe by every public safety official patrolling the harbor including Lifeguards and Baywatch Captains.”
Opponents of Measure C argued that Waterfront repairs were urgently needed and the financially responsible course was to continue working with
In substance, Measure C proposed amendments to two City ordinances5 which had last been amended in 2010 by Measure G. Specifically, Measure C contained detailed provisions requiring the expansion and/or preservation of Seaside Lagoon Regional Park, preservation of harbor and ocean water views, construction of a public boat launch ramp, limitation of new off-street parking, and analysis of traffic patterns. Measure C also modified the cumulative development cap definition to include space devoted to parking facilities.
A majority of the voters casting ballots in the March 7, 2017 election voted in favor of Measure C. The City later certified the vote. As required under
Commission, which approved the amendments to the City‘s local coastal program.6
One month after voters passed Measure C, the City notified the Developer that, in the City‘s view, the passage of Measure C triggered the Agreement‘s force majeure clause, and that the Project would be delayed.7
3. The Developer‘s Lawsuit
The Developer initiated the present case in early 2017 by filing a verified petition for writ of mandate (
orders from the court on multiple issues including, as pertinent here, that Measure C could not be applied retroactively to the Project because the Developer‘s statutory rights under
The parties and the court agreed that certain dispositive issues could be addressed as a matter of law based solely on the pleadings and matters subject to judicial notice. The Developer filed a motion, essentially styled as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, contending that its rights had vested against the City as a matter of law and therefore Measure C could not be applied to the Project. The Developer relied on the text of Measure C, which expressly exempted any project as to which development rights had vested, and
With respect to the statutory rights claim, the City responded that even if it could not apply Measure C to the Project because the Developer‘s rights had vested against it, the Coastal Commission had the authority to apply Measure C to the Project in the future.
The Residents also opposed the Developer‘s motion, arguing the Developer could not have vested rights in the Project because, even as of the time the motion was filed, the Developer had not yet obtained all the necessary permits and approvals necessary to complete the Project. Further, the Residents claimed,
In addition, the parties disagreed as to whether the controversy was ripe for decision at that time. Both the City and the Residents argued the matter was
4. The Court‘s Rulings and the Appeals
After hearing oral argument on the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court issued its final decision on March 22, 2018, finding that the Developer had obtained statutory vested rights against the City to proceed with the Project in accordance
with the Map. The court rejected the Developer‘s contentions that Measure C conflicted with the City Charter and was arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory under Arnel.
As an initial matter, the court found the matter ripe for declaratory relief. The court rejected the City‘s contention that the matter was not ripe because it had not yet attempted to apply Measure C to the Project. Rather, the court found, the City had taken at least two actions adverse to the Project and the Developer with reference to Measure C: notifying the Developer that the passage of Measure C triggered the force majeure clause of the Agreement, which the City claimed would delay performance of the Agreement, and later terminating the Agreement.
On the issue of vested rights, the court noted
The parties agreed that the Map application was “deemed complete” by the City on June 23, 2016, and that the City, through the City Council, subsequently approved the Map by resolution on October 18, 2016. Moreover, the resolution explicitly affirmed the Developer‘s vested right to proceed with
the Project in substantial compliance with the ordinances, policies, and standards in effect at the time. And, the court stated, even the text of Measure C recognized that it would not affect any project for which development rights had vested.
As we explain in detail in section 3, post, the Residents subsequently submitted a request for costs under
We have consolidated the two appeals for purposes of decision.
DISCUSSION
1. The court did not err in finding that the Developer has statutory vested rights in the Waterfront Project.
1.1. Standard of Review
The question presented turns on the interpretation of several statutory provisions. We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432; Nist v. Hall (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 40, 45.)
” ’ “As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature‘s intent so as to effectuate the law‘s purpose.” (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.) We begin by examining the statutory language because the words of a statute are generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. (People v. Watson (2007) 42 Cal.4th 822, 828; Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871.) We give the words of the statute their ordinary and usual meaning and view them in their statutory context. (People v. Watson, supra, at p. 828.) ... “If the
1.2. Statutory Vested Rights
The basis of the Developer‘s claim to vested rights is found in
project ‘in substantial compliance with the ordinances, policies, and standards’ ... in effect when the map application was deemed complete.” (Kaufman & Broad Central Valley, Inc. v. City of Modesto (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1577, 1586.)
It is undisputed that the Developer submitted an application for a vesting tentative tract map to the City and that the City notified the Developer in writing on June 23, 2016 that the application was “deemed complete.” Applying the plain meaning of the statute compels the conclusion that the Developer‘s right to proceed with the Project vested as to the City on June 23, 2016, well before City residents passed Measure C in March 2017.
“(a) To establish a procedure for the approval of tentative maps that will provide certain statutorily vested rights to a subdivider.
“(b) To ensure that local requirements governing the development of a proposed subdivision are established in accordance with Section 66498.1 when a local agency approves or conditionally approves a vesting tentative map. The private sector should be able to rely upon an approved vesting tentative map prior to expending resources and incurring liabilities without the risk of having the project frustrated by subsequent action by the approving local agency, provided the time periods established by this article have not elapsed.
“(c) To ensure that local agencies have maximum discretion, consistent with Section 66498.1, in the imposition of conditions on any approvals occurring subsequent to the approval or conditional approval of the vesting tentative map, so long as that discretion is not exercised in a manner which precludes a subdivider from proceeding with the proposed subdivision.”
Here, as noted, the City started to explore development in the Waterfront area by at least 2010, selected the Developer as its development partner in 2012, and entered into an exclusive negotiating agreement and then a memorandum of understanding with the Developer in 2013. The Developer represents that during this period it expended more than $14 million in Project-related costs. Finding that the Developer‘s rights against the City vested in mid-2016 after the City deemed the application for a vesting tentative tract map to be complete—and well after the Developer committed significant resources to the Project—fulfills the Legislature‘s stated desire to provide stability for the private sector. In other words, at this point in the Project, it was reasonable for the Developer to “be able to rely upon an approved vesting tentative map prior to expending [further] resources and incurring [additional] liabilities without the risk of having the project frustrated by subsequent action by the approving local agency[.]” (
1.3. The Residents’ arguments are without merit.
The Residents do not contend that section 66498.1(b) is ambiguous, or that the undisputed facts of this case compel a finding against the Developer. Instead, the Residents suggest that
A brief discussion of the Coastal Act and the role of the Coastal Commission is of assistance. “The Coastal Act ‘was enacted by the Legislature as a comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California. The Legislature found that “the California coastal zone is a distinct and valuable natural resource of vital and enduring interest to all the people“; that “the permanent protection of the state‘s natural and scenic resources is a paramount concern“; that “it is necessary to protect the ecological balance of the coastal zone” and that “existing developed uses, and future developments that are carefully planned and developed consistent with the policies of this division, are essential to the economic and social well-being of the people of this state... .” ([
As the Residents correctly explain, local agencies like the City, which include within their boundaries areas lying in whole or in part in the coastal zone, must develop a local coastal program that implements the requirements of the Coastal Act at the local level. The local coastal program includes a land use plan and zoning ordinances implementing that plan, all of which must
be consistent with the Coastal Act. (Pacific Palisades, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 794;
At the state level, the Coastal Commission ensures that local agencies comply with the Coastal Act in a variety of ways. As pertinent here, the Coastal Commission must certify that a local agency‘s local coastal program complies with the Coastal Act before it can take effect. (
The Residents contend the Coastal Act precludes all statutory vested rights claims by a developer under section 66498.1(b), to the extent those claims relate to development in a coastal zone. They offer two alternative theories about why this is
so. First, the Residents contend that the Coastal Act—and specifically the provision for independent review of a local agency‘s land use decisions by the Coastal Commission—displaces section 66498.1(b). In other words, they argue section 66498.1(b) does not apply to any development project including areas of coastal zone because the local agency‘s decision-making is subject to review by the Coastal Commission. The Residents’ second argument (which is essentially a variant of their first argument) relies on
The foundation of both the Residents’ arguments rests on an untenable interpretation of section 66498.1(b). The Residents apparently assume that vested rights acquired under section 66498.1(b) would exempt a developer from compliance with any and all conceivably applicable land use laws and regulations, regardless of the source. They then argue that such a broad exemption from land use regulation predicated merely on a local agency‘s approval of a vesting tentative map could not possibly be the correct outcome.
Notably, the Developer does not advance this expansive interpretation of section 66498.1(b). Instead, the Developer argues only that a local agency cannot change its own ordinances and policies after it approves a vesting tentative map and then apply the new ordinances and policies to the previously approved development project. Indeed, the Developer concedes it is subject to the Coastal Act and the jurisdiction of the Coastal
Commission. As we will explain, this is precisely what
The essential defect in the Residents’ arguments is that it conflates a local agency‘s enforcement of local ordinances and policies, which is subject to the
As noted,
Here, as noted,
That is not to say, of course, that either the applicability of the Coastal Act or the oversight provided by the Coastal Commission is curtailed by the Developer‘s vested rights. California courts have consistently recognized the supremacy of the Coastal Act over matters of local concern and the cases cited by the Residents hold as much. Pacific Palisades, supra, 55 Cal.4th 783, upon which the Residents rely heavily, is the best example. There, our Supreme Court emphasized that ” ‘[u]nder the Coastal Act‘s legislative scheme, ... the [local coastal program] and the development permits issued by local agencies pursuant to the Coastal Act are not solely a matter of local law, but embody state policy.’ (Charles A. Pratt Construction Co., Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1075 [(Pratt)].) ‘In fact, a fundamental purpose of the Coastal Act is to ensure that
But contrary to the Residents’ contention, the existence of the Coastal Act and its provision for oversight of local land use decisions in coastal zones do not invalidate
There, as here, the developer claimed to have acquired vested rights under
The Court of Appeal affirmed, noting that state laws and policies are unaffected by
Importantly, Pratt does not stand for the proposition advanced by the Residents here, namely that the Coastal Act preempts
2. The court properly concluded the vested rights issue was ripe for adjudication.
The Residents also argue the court erred in concluding the Developer‘s statutory vested rights claim was ripe for adjudication. We disagree.
“The ripeness requirement, a branch of the doctrine of justiciability, prevents courts from issuing purely advisory opinions.” (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170.) Generally speaking, a controversy is ripe ” ‘when it has reached, but has not passed, the point that the facts have sufficiently congealed to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made.’ ” (Id. at p. 171.) “In contrast, unripe cases are those ’ “in which parties seek a judicial declaration on a question of law, though no actual dispute or controversy ever existed between them requiring the declaration for its determination.” ’ [Citation.]” (Communities for a Better Environment, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 733.)
Ripeness is often an issue when a litigant seeks declaratory relief pursuant to
Here, it is plain that an actual controversy over the Developer‘s statutory vested rights exists. As the court found, following the passage of Measure C, the City took the position that the Agreement‘s force majeure clause had been triggered and that some of the City‘s obligations under the Agreement might be impacted by Measure C. In doing so, the City suggested it believed the Project would be impacted by the amendments to the local coastal program
That circumstance virtually guaranteed a future controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties. And indeed, substantial Project-related litigation has ensued.
The Residents offer two explanations why, in their view, this case does not present a ripe controversy. First, they argue that the Coastal Commission had not yet certified the amendments to the local coastal program embodied in Measure C and, therefore, the Developer had not yet exhausted its administrative remedies. In addition, the Residents claim this matter was not ripe because the Coastal Commission had not yet determined whether it would apply Measure C when it reviewed the City‘s decision to issue a coastal development permit for the Project. Both of these contentions miss the point.
The issue in the present case is not whether Measure C is valid. And although our decision in this appeal may inform the City and the Coastal Commission concerning the application of Measure C to the Project in future proceedings, we do not decide any specific issue regarding Measure C‘s applicability or viability. Instead, the narrow issue before us is whether, and when, the Developer‘s rights to proceed with the Project vested as against the City. And as to that question, an actual controversy plainly exits.
3. The court properly found that the Residents were not entitled to recover litigation costs or attorney‘s fees.
The Residents contend they are entitled to recover their litigation costs and attorney‘s fees because, in their view, they prevailed on a majority of the issues presented in the motion for judgment on the pleadings. We disagree.
3.1. Additional Facts
As discussed ante, the court resolved the ripeness issue and the declaratory relief claim regarding statutory vested rights in favor of the Developer. The court rejected the Developer‘s alternative arguments that Measure C was arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory under Arnel and that Measure C violated the City Charter. After the court ruled in favor of the Developer on its request for declaratory relief, the Developer dismissed its remaining claims without prejudice. The court entered judgment accordingly.
Following the entry of judgment, the Residents filed a memorandum seeking costs of $2,022.52. The Developer filed a motion to strike or tax costs arguing mainly that it, not the Residents, was the prevailing party in the litigation under
The court denied the Residents’ ex parte application but bifurcated the issue of which party or parties would qualify as the “prevailing party” for purposes of a cost award or a “successful party” for purposes of an attorney‘s fee award. The court asked all parties to brief that issue and set the matter for a hearing on August 16, 2018, at the same time the Developer‘s motion to strike or tax costs was to be heard.
The Residents argued they were entitled to recover costs and attorney‘s fees because they “prevailed on a majority of the principal disputed issues (two of three) the Court adjudicated on the merits” and “vindicated the Redondo Beach electorate‘s constitutional right to vote on initiatives, and all Californians’ rights of access to water-oriented recreation under the [Coastal Act], strengthened by Measure C.” The Residents noted that they defeated two of the Developer‘s claims, i.e., that Measure C was invalid as a matter of law under Arnel and that Measure C violated the City Charter. And although the Residents acknowledged that the Developer prevailed on its statutory vested rights claim, they asserted their “briefing of relevant Coastal Act provisions and case law was instrumental in securing express statements from this Court narrowing the judicial declaration [the Developer] moved for under § 66498.1.”
The Developer argued it was the successful and prevailing party in the litigation because it filed the petition after the passage of Measure C in order to ensure that Measure C would not be applied to the Project. The Developer succeeded by obtaining a declaration from the court stating that its rights against the City vested on June 23, 2016, prior to the passage of Measure C, and that it could proceed with the Project under the ordinances, policies, and standards in effect as of the vesting date.
The court agreed with the Developer. As the court put it, the Developer “sought to invalidate a law interfering with its development rights. The legal ground by which this interference was halted did not concern [the Developer], so long as its development rights were protected. [The Developer] achieved a declaration of this right.” As to the Residents, the court noted “[t]heir primary goal in intervening was to defend Measure C and stop [the] Project.” The Residents failed to achieve their desired result. Accordingly, the court concluded the Residents were not entitled to either costs or attorney‘s fees.
3.2. The Residents are not entitled to recover attorney‘s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
A party11 seeking an award of attorney‘s fees under
As noted, the court determined that the Developer unquestionably achieved its litigation aims. The Developer‘s goal, as reflected in the petition, was to obtain a ruling which would permit it to proceed with the Project without being forced to comply with Measure C. To that end, the Developer asserted several causes of action based on the theory that Measure C was invalid per se. For example, the Developer claimed that Measure C exceeds the power of the electorate, conflicts with the City Charter, is unconstitutionally vague under the California Constitution, and conflicts with the City‘s general plan. Alternatively, the Developer claimed the application of Measure C to the Project, specifically, was unlawful. It urged, for example, that Measure C violated its substantive due process rights by interfering with its statutory vested rights. In addition to attempting to invalidate Measure C generally, the Developer sought to avoid its application. Specifically, the request for declaratory relief sought to establish, among other things, that Measure C could not be applied retroactively to the Project and that the Developer‘s rights had vested against the City on June 23, 2016. Success on any one of the claims contained in the petition would have achieved the Developer‘s litigation goal. And it did.
The resulting judgment also substantially changed the landscape on a practical level. Prior to the litigation, there was substantial disagreement as between the Developer, the City, and the Residents about the potential applicability of Measure C to the Project. And at the time the Developer initiated the present suit, the City had advised the Developer that the Project would be delayed due to Measure C‘s passage. Now, as a result of the Developer‘s suit, there is no uncertainty on the issue: Measure C cannot be applied to the Project. In short, a comparison of the situation immediately prior to the suit and the situation today compels the conclusion that the Developer is a successful party within the meaning of the private attorney general statute.
The Developer‘s success notwithstanding, the Residents argue that they qualify as a successful party under
Further, and as the court observed, the “before and after the litigation” analysis also undermines the Residents’ claim of success. Prior to the litigation, the Residents sought to apply Measure C to the Project. Now, the Developer has secured a judgment precluding the application of Measure C to the Project—a result directly contrary to the express goal of the Residents. The litigation substantially changed the legal relationships among the parties by resolving the conflict over Measure C.
Nevertheless, the Residents maintain that they are a “successful party” entitled to seek attorney‘s fees. It is true, as the Residents note, that “[a] favorable final judgment is not necessary; the critical fact is the impact of the action. (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 565.) [Parties] may be considered successful if they succeed on any significant issue in the litigation that achieves some of the benefit they sought in bringing suit. (Maria P. v. Riles[, supra,] 43 Cal.3d [at p.] 1292.)” (Ebbetts Pass, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at pp. 381–382.) The Residents contend the court failed to apply these legal principles when it noted that the Residents did not achieve their primary litigation goal—stopping the Project from going forward. Citing Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Julian Union Elementary School Dist. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 970 (Sweetwater), the Residents emphasize that in order to qualify as a “successful party,” ” ‘a party need not prevail on every claim presented in an action’ ” and may instead be a party that “succeeds on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Although this principle is well established, it is inapplicable here and, in any event, Sweetwater is distinguishable.
In Sweetwater, the dispute concerned the unlawful operation of charter school facilities by one school district (Julian) within the geographical boundaries of a neighboring school district (Sweetwater). Sweetwater filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to prohibit Julian and its business partner, Diego Plus Education Corporation (Diego Valley), from operating its facilities within Sweetwater‘s boundaries. Sweetwater sought a peremptory writ of mandate directing Julian to set aside Diego Valley‘s charter, to exercise oversight of Diego Valley as required by law, to refrain from approving additional charter schools in Sweetwater‘s district, and to revoke Diego Valley‘s charter and prohibit it from operating charter schools in an unlawful manner. (Sweetwater, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 982.) Sweetwater also requested declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the unlawful charter school operations. (Id. at pp. 982–983.) Ultimately, the court did not order Julian to revoke the charter. And although the court commented that Diego Valley‘s operation of two facilities within Sweetwater‘s boundaries ” ‘would be in violation of the Education Code’ ” and a recent court decision, the court denied Sweetwater‘s petition as to Diego Valley because “ordering compliance with the law [would] be ‘superfluous.’ ” (Id. at p. 983, italics omitted.) The court granted Sweetwater‘s request for injunctive relief, however, and prohibited Diego Valley from operating the charter school facilities within Sweetwater‘s boundaries. (Id. at p. 984.)
The court awarded Sweetwater attorney‘s fees under
Relying on Sweetwater, the Residents urge that even though the court found in favor of the Developer on its statutory vested rights claim, they succeeded in the litigation by defeating two of the Developer‘s claims (the Arnel claim and the City Charter claim), securing a dismissal of the Developer‘s remaining claims, and obtaining a ruling clarifying that the City must abide by future Coastal Commission decisions.
We reject the Residents’ argument for several reasons. Although the court had discretion to find that the Residents were partially successful for purposes of a fee award under
We see no abuse of discretion in the court‘s conclusion that, as a practical matter, the Residents failed to achieve any significant benefit through their participation in the lawsuit. The Residents’ success on two of the three legal challenges to Measure C has no practical impact in the context of this litigation: Measure C cannot be applied to the Project, notwithstanding the court‘s findings that Measure C is not arbitrary and discriminatory under Arnel and does not violate the City Charter. And unlike the situation in Sweetwater, where Sweetwater‘s partial success in the litigation effected a significant change in the legal relationship of the parties, here the Residents’ success on two of the Developer‘s claims makes no difference in this regard.
Moreover, that the Developer voluntarily dismissed its remaining claims without prejudice—after it obtained the relief it sought—cannot reasonably be considered a “success” for the Residents within the meaning of the statute. Finally, the Residents’ assertion that the judgment includes declaratory relief in their favor because it acknowledges that the City must comply with future Coastal Commission decisions is misplaced. The Developer never claimed it would be exempt from future Coastal Commission decisions and the primacy of the Coastal Act is well settled, as we have said. And the fact that the court may have accepted part of the Residents’ legal argument does not convert their loss into success under
3.3. The Residents are not prevailing parties entitled to recover litigation costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032.
Under
As noted, the Residents filed a memorandum seeking to recover litigation costs. They argue the court erred in striking their cost memorandum and again assert that because they defeated two of the Developer‘s legal claims, the court should have apportioned costs among the parties by assessing their relative degrees of success. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, the Residents failed to request this relief in their opposition to the Developer‘s motion to strike or tax costs. Accordingly, they have forfeited the issue. (See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [noting “a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court“].) Second, and in any event, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Residents did not prevail in the litigation. As we have said, the Developer sought and obtained a ruling prohibiting the application of Measure C to the Project. It prevailed. That the Residents successfully opposed the Developer‘s alternative theories for relief does not undermine that finding.12
DISPOSITION
The judgment and the August 16, 2018 order are affirmed. Redondo Beach Waterfront, LLC shall recover its costs on appeal. The City shall bear its own costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION
LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.