THE PEOPLE,
S283169
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
June 26, 2025
Fourth Appellate District, Division Two E080064; Riverside County Superior Court RIF1502535
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Guerrero, Justices Corrigan, Liu, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans concurred.
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.
Before 2020, the Penal Code instructed criminal sentencing courts to “impose a one-year term for each prior separate prison term or county jail term” the defendant had previously served for a felony. (
The question presented is whether a defendant is entitled to resentencing under
I.
A.
Before 2019,
In 2019, in an effort to reduce the societal and fiscal burdens of incarceration, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 136), which amended section 667.5(b) to eliminate prior-prison-term enhancements for all prior crimes except for “sexually violent offense[s] as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.” (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) In 2021, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) made this change retroactive. It enacted Penal Code section 1171.1 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3), later renumbered without substantive change as
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d) sets forth detailed instructions for resentencing once a sentence has been recalled. As relevant here, subdivision (d) specifies: “Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.” (
B.
In 2016, defendant Andrew Christian Rhodius was charged with possession of a firearm (
In 2022, CDCR identified Rhodius as an inmate whose judgment included an enhancement under section 667.5, former subdivision (b), and it so notified the trial court. (See
The Court of Appeal affirmed. (People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, 41 (Rhodius).) Citing People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1127 (Gonzalez), the court explained that the Legislature sometimes uses the term “‘impose‘” in sentencing laws as a “‘shorthand for “impose and then execute.“‘” (Rhodius, at p. 43.) The Court of Appeal concluded that the Legislature used the term in this way in section 1172.75. The court relied primarily on inferences drawn from the requirement in section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), that resentencing
In so holding, the Court of Appeal expressly disagreed with the reasoning of People v. Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1282, which held that section 1172.75‘s resentencing procedures apply to section 667.5, former subdivision (b) enhancements that were imposed and stayed. After the court issued its decision in this case, other courts weighed in on the same issue. The decisions of the Courts of Appeal in People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300 (Christianson), People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, People v. Mayberry (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 665, and People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144 have all disagreed with the Court of Appeal in this case, instead agreeing with Renteria that defendants are entitled to full resentencing based on imposed but stayed section 667.5, former subdivision (b) enhancements.
We granted review to address the disagreement between the decisions of the Courts of Appeal.
II.
A.
The issue in this case turns on a question of statutory interpretation. We employ familiar principles to resolve it. We first “look to the statute‘s words and give them their usual and ordinary meaning,” as “‘[t]he statute‘s plain meaning controls the court‘s interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.‘” (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1126, quoting Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, 260.) We construe statutory text in context and “‘harmonize the various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.‘” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961 (Lewis), quoting People v. Arroyo (2016) 62 Cal.4th 589, 595.) If, after this analysis, “the statute is ambiguous, we may consider a variety of extrinsic aids,” including legislative history. (Gonzalez, at p. 1126.)
Our inquiry thus begins with the text. Subdivision (a) of section 1172.75 declares “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020” for a prior prison or jail sentence under section 667.5, former subdivision (b), other than for a sexually violent offense, to be “legally invalid.” If a court determines that an individual is serving a term based on a judgment that “includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.” (
The critical question before us concerns the meaning of the word “imposed.” Does it mean that the enhancement must simply have been imposed? Or does it mean, as the Attorney General argues and the Court of Appeal held, that the enhancement must have been both imposed and executed, rather than stayed?
The answer might seem obvious at first blush. After all, the statute refers to enhancements that are “imposed,” not “imposed and executed.” The Attorney General does not dispute that, as a matter of ordinary usage, an enhancement is “imposed” when it is made part of a legally effective order, as it was in Rhodius‘s case. (See Webster‘s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 1136, col. 1 [defining “impose” as “to make, frame, or apply as compulsory, obligatory, or enforc[ea]ble“]; see also American Heritage Dict. (5th ed. 2011) p. 883, col. 2 [defining “impose” to mean “establish or apply as compulsory” or “bring about by authority or force“].) Courts, including the trial court in this case, frequently employ the term “impose” in a manner consistent with the understanding that “imposi[ng] [a] sentence” is equivalent to pronouncing a judgment, such that “where the court suspends execution of [a] sentence,” that does not obviate the judgment, but merely makes it “‘provisional or conditional in nature.‘” (People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771, 781, quoting Stephens v. Toomey (1959) 51 Cal.2d 864, 871.) So unless we are to infer additional limitations not appearing on the face of the statute, it might seem clear that Rhodius meets the statutory requirement for section 1172.75 resentencing.
Gonzalez illustrates the point. In that case we confronted a question about the meaning of the term “impose” as it appeared in a provision of
In the context of these instructions for the “impos[ition]” of overlapping enhancements, we concluded that the Legislature had used the term “‘impose[d]‘” as a shorthand for “imposed and then executed.” (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1127.) This understanding, we concluded, was the only sensible way to understand the use of a term in the context of a provision expressly aimed at “ensur[ing] execution of the maximum enhancement” where multiple enhancements were otherwise applicable. (Ibid.) It would, we explained, “be unreasonable for the Legislature to direct the court to impose the longest enhancement in the sense of ‘impose and stay.‘” (Ibid.) Moreover, to understand the prohibition on “impos[ing]” cumulative enhancements as referring, in context, to imposing and executing them would mean that trial courts could impose and stay such enhancements, and so ensure that an otherwise applicable enhancement could be later executed should the enhancement with the longest term of imprisonment be invalidated on appeal. (Ibid.) This, too, would further the purpose behind the enactment of the firearm enhancement statute.
Although Gonzalez explains that the meaning of the word “imposed” may vary depending on context, its interpretation of the word as it appears in the statute there at issue holds no real lessons for understanding the meaning of “imposed” as it appears in section 1172.75(a) — a provision with markedly different wording, structure, and purpose. The issue that divides the parties is whether consideration of these indicia of statutory meaning should lead us to conclude that here, too, the Legislature used the term “imposed” in section
The Attorney General‘s central argument is that reading section 1172.75(a)‘s reference to “imposed” enhancements to mean enhancements that were imposed and executed is the only way to harmonize that provision with the statute‘s instructions for resentencing in subdivision (d). The Attorney General points in particular to subdivision (d)(1), which provides: “Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.” (
Reading section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1) in context, we are not persuaded that the reference to a “lesser sentence” necessarily imports any assumptions about whether the section 667.5(b) enhancement was imposed and executed or simply imposed. The premise of the argument is that a “lesser” sentence must mean a sentence that inevitably results in less time served than the original sentence — in other words, a shorter operative sentence, setting aside any component of the sentence that had been stayed. It is of course true, as the Attorney General emphasizes, that in the typical case involving an executed enhancement, to order a “lesser” sentence will mean ordering a shorter one. But we see no obvious reason why a trial court cannot also comply with the instruction to order a “lesser” sentence in a case in which a section 667.5(b) enhancement was stayed rather than executed.
The reference to a “lesser” sentence is reasonably understood to mean, as a general matter, that courts must lessen the burdens of the sentence relative to “the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement” (
In sum, we do not see in section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1) any convincing textual proof that the Legislature was concerned exclusively with the elimination of enhancements that had already been executed. On the contrary, other features of the statute point against that conclusion.
First, we return to the wording of section 1172.75(a): ”Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.” (Italics added.) “‘[R]ead naturally, the word “any” has an expansive meaning, that is, “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.“‘” (Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons (2008) 552 U.S. 214, 219, quoting United States v. Gonzales (1997) 520 U.S. 1, 5.) Although not independently dispositive, “[u]se of the term ‘any’ to modify the words [sentence enhancement] demonstrates the Legislature intended the law to have a broad sweep . . . .” (Ennabe v. Manosa (2014) 58 Cal.4th 697, 714; accord, e.g., Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 533.)
Second, and more fundamentally, there is the matter of the statute‘s structure and practical operation. The Attorney General‘s arguments focus on inferences drawn from section 1172.75‘s instructions about the conduct of resentencing in section 1172.75, subdivision (d). But the operative provision we are called on to interpret, section 1172.75(a), is not about resentencing. Rather, it specifies which enhancements are now “legally invalid” following
The Attorney General‘s theory is not implausible. But if it was the Legislature‘s intent to defer the invalidation and reexamination of stayed section 667.5(b) enhancements, we expect that it would have put the matter more plainly. Again, the operative statutory language says in pertinent part that “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, . . . is legally invalid.” (
B.
In sum, we conclude that section 1172.75(a) is most naturally read to mean that a covered enhancement is invalid if it was “imposed” before January 1, 2020, not just if it was “imposed and executed.” But “[e]ven if we considered the language and structure of section [1172.75] to be susceptible to the Court of Appeal‘s . . . reading,” and thus employed “‘other aids, such as the statute‘s purpose, legislative history, and public policy‘” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 967), we would find nothing in that inquiry that persuades us to adopt a different conclusion.
As an initial matter, we note that the Attorney General‘s argument that stayed section 667.5(b) enhancements remain valid for the time being is “inconsistent with the repeated — and unqualified — statements throughout the legislative history that Senate Bill 483 ‘applies retroactively . . . the repeal of sentence enhancements for prior prison or county jail felony terms.‘” (People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, 200, review granted Oct. 23, 2024, S286987 (Espino), quoting Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 1, 2021, p. 1; see also, e.g., Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 15, 2021, p. 1 [“This bill retroactively applies the repeal of sentence enhancements for prior prison or county jail felony terms“]; Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483, supra, as amended July 7, 2021, p. 1 [“Applies the repeal of sentence enhancements for prior prison or county jail felony terms“]; Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 3, 2021, p. 1 [“The purpose of this bill is to apply retroactively the repeal of sentence enhancements for prior prison or county jail felony terms. . . .” (boldface & italics omitted)].) Such statements strongly suggest that the Legislature did not intend to render Senate Bill No. 136‘s invalidation of section 667.5(b) enhancements only partially retroactive. (See Espino, at p. 200.)
The Attorney General points to the uncodified preamble of Senate Bill No. 483, which states that “in order to ensure equal justice and address
While the preamble is “‘entitled to consideration‘” in discerning the legislative purpose (Doe v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 40, 69), we find it unrevealing on the issue before us. To read this statement of intent as limiting application of the statute‘s resentencing procedures to defendants currently serving a term for a prior-prison-term enhancement would be plainly incompatible with section 1172.75, subdivisions (b) and (c), which make clear that resentencing is not exclusively available to “individuals who . . . are currently serving a sentence based on the enhancement.” (
As we have previously noted, subdivisions (b)(1) and (c)(1) of section 1172.75 provide separate deadlines by which CDCR must identify and the trial court must resentence defendants “who have served their base term and any other enhancement and are currently serving a sentence based on the enhancement” as opposed to “all other individuals.” These subdivisions were intended to prioritize resentencing for defendants for whom review would result in immediate release. But they also make clear that those defendants who are not currently serving time for a repealed enhancement are still entitled to resentencing under section 1172.75, subdivision (c), so long as they are serving a sentence for a judgment that includes a qualifying section 667.5(b) enhancement imposed before January 1, 2020. (See
We note that various pieces of the legislative history describe the purpose of the legislation in somewhat broader terms. The history indicates that
The history makes amply clear that the Legislature was motivated in large part by a purpose of reducing incarceration and thereby reducing public prison expenditures and overcrowding. But this purpose does not, as the Attorney General would have it, necessarily presuppose that defendants must be currently facing the certain prospect of “additional incarceration as a result of a section 667.5(b) prior.” (Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 47.) It is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature also intended for section 1172.75 to accomplish this purpose through its full resentencing procedures for defendants whose judgments contain now-invalidated section 667.5(b) enhancements, regardless of whether the enhancements were stayed or executed. By requiring the trial court to consider a broad range of factors in resentencing, including “changes in law that reduce sentences” (
What is more, the legislative history suggests that the Legislature‘s goal was not only to reduce incarceration; the Legislature was also concerned, more generally, with “advanc[ing] fairness in our criminal legal system.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483, supra, as amended Mar. 3, 2021, p. 3.) The history indicates that legislators’ fairness concerns went to the very rationale underlying prior-prison-term enhancements. (See Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136,
The Attorney General argues that Rhodius‘s interpretation undermines the Legislature‘s goals of “ensur[ing] equal justice” and “promot[ing] uniformity of sentencing” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3; see
In sum, considering what the history reveals about the Legislature‘s purpose for enacting section 1172.75, we see no persuasive reason to think that the Legislature intended implicitly to distinguish between defendants whose enhancements were imposed and executed and those for whom an enhancement was imposed, but punishment was stayed.
The Attorney General argues that it is not necessary to read section 1172.75 as reaching defendants with stayed enhancements because such individuals have alternative paths to relief. The Attorney General points to
IV.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
KRUGER, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
EVANS, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Rhodius
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 97 Cal.App.5th 38
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S283169
Date Filed: June 26, 2025
Court: Superior
County: Riverside
Judge: John D. Molloy
Counsel:
Matthew Aaron Lopas, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen, Robin Urbanski, Paige Hazard, Minh U. Le, Christine Y. Friedman and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Matthew Aaron Lopas
Attorney at Law
333 South Juniper Street, Suite 110
Escondido, CA 92025
(760) 317-1640
Joseph C. Anagnos
Deputy Attorney General
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 738-9010