THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. EARL E. RATLIFF, Appellant.
Docket No. 129356
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
November 14, 2024
2024 IL 129356
Justices Holder White and Rochford concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Cunningham specially concurred, with opinion.
Justice O‘Brien specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Justice Cunningham.
Justice Overstreet concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion.
Justice Neville dissented, with opinion.
¶ 1 Defendant Earl Ratliff entered an open plea to one count of robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to comply with
¶ 2 BACKGROUND
¶ 3 The defendant was indicted for robbery after he purportedly took by force a woman‘s purse containing a necklace, a watch, a cellular telephone, two wallets, and some currency. On April 24, 2019, he was arraigned. The trial court admonished him of the charge, the sentencing range, and his right to counsel. The defendant indicated that he wanted an attorney, and the trial court appointed a public defender. The trial court set a trial date and scheduled a hearing on any pretrial motions.
¶ 4 At that hearing on July 11, 2019, the defendant attempted to speak for himself, but the trial court instructed him to communicate through his attorney. Appointed counsel informed the court that the defendant wished to proceed pro se, and the defendant confirmed that intent. The court then advised him of the difficulties of representing himself:
“Okay. Now, you have to understand something. Representing you on the particular matter in this [case] is not simply a matter of stand up, tell your side of the story. There‘s procedures and protocol that have to be followed. That gentleman right there is here to convict you. He‘s not here to help you. I‘m not here to help you either. I just make sure you get a fair trial. I don‘t do research for you. He doesn‘t do research for you. We give you no special consideration in the jail or outside the jail. You‘re going to [be] held responsible for any type of discovery cutoffs, rulings, filings of motions. They are going to be you[r] responsibility.
*** Also, when you have an attorney representing you, they have freedom of access and movement and research availability to, you know, any type of matters that may need to be involved in. Also, you have the absolute right to represent yourself. I don‘t care one way or the other. If you discharge your lawyer, any claim about my lawyer didn‘t do something claim [sic] in the future is gone because you cannot claim ineffective [assistance] because you were representing yourself. So any mistakes or boo-boos that might happen in the future, they‘re all yours, no one else‘s. You can‘t blame anybody else.”
¶ 5 When the trial court asked whether the defendant voluntarily chose to represent himself, the defendant said that his attorney had “threatened” him with a 22-year sentence and was unwilling to hear his side of the story or to defend him. Appointed counsel replied that he had a duty to convey offers from the State. The court granted the defendant‘s request to proceed pro se without admonishing him regarding the charge, the sentencing range, and his right to counsel, as required by
¶ 6 The defendant subsequently filed several motions, which the trial court denied. On the day of trial, the defendant told the court that he wished to enter an open guilty plea. Before accepting the plea, the trial court admonished the defendant of the charge, the sentencing range, the term of mandatory supervised release, and collateral consequences, as required by
¶ 8 That day, the defendant filed a notice of appeal. Paragraph eight of the notice stated, “If appeal is not from a conviction, nature of order appealed from: MOTION TO RECONSIDER SENTENCE.” More than six months later, on November 12, 2021, the defendant filed an amended notice of appeal in the trial court. The amended notice again specified that the defendant wanted to appeal the May 7 order. The defendant also filed in the appellate court a corresponding “unopposed” motion for leave to file an amended notice of appeal. In that motion the appellate defender stated, “In reviewing the record, counsel noted that the notice of appeal filed by the Clerk erroneously includes paragraph eight. Defendant is appealing his conviction and all rulings related thereto, which became final on May 7, 2021.” The appellate court allowed that motion.
¶ 9 A divided panel of the appellate court affirmed the defendant‘s conviction and sentence. 2022 IL App (3d) 210194-U. The defendant‘s central contention was that his conviction should be reversed because the trial court failed to comply with the admonishment requirements of
¶ 10 The appellate court majority then shifted its attention to the plain error doctrine, stating that the first step in plain error review is to determine whether a plain error
¶ 11 The appellate court majority reviewed the facts. Here, immediately before accepting the defendant‘s waiver, the trial court questioned the defendant about his education and prior involvement in the legal system. Id. ¶ 14. The trial court also extensively admonished the defendant about the disadvantages of self-representation. Id. However, the court failed to advise the defendant of the nature of the charge, the possible sentencing range, and that he had a right to appointed counsel. Id. Despite these omissions, the record showed that the court stated the potential minimum and maximum sentencing range for the offense less than three months before the plea. Id. The majority noted that the defendant‘s motions demonstrated that he knew the charge against him. Id. Thus, any deficiency in the court‘s admonition regarding the nature of the offense and sentencing was therefore harmless. Id. The majority concluded that, “[i]n light of the record, we cannot say that the defendant‘s waiver was rendered unknowing or unintelligent because the court provided an inadequate
¶ 12 Justice McDade dissented. She stated that, while the trial court made admirable efforts to dissuade the defendant from the unwise decision to represent himself, those efforts did not include the required admonishments of
“There is no factual basis for the majority‘s assumption that defendant could or did remember something that had been told to him three months earlier and, therefore, no support for any assumption that giving the required admonishments prior to defendant‘s waiver of his right to counsel was excusable because it was unnecessary.” Id.
¶ 13 This court allowed the defendant‘s petition for leave to appeal. See
¶ 14 ANALYSIS
¶ 15 Before we reach the merits in this appeal, we must address a jurisdictional issue. Though neither the defendant nor the State mentions jurisdiction in their briefs, a reviewing court has an independent duty to consider sua sponte issues of jurisdiction. See People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2008).
¶ 16
¶ 17
¶ 18 The defendant‘s original notice of appeal specified that he was appealing the trial court‘s May 7, 2021, order denying his motion to reconsider his sentence. The appellate court had jurisdiction to review that order, but it did not do so. Instead, the appellate court reviewed the trial court‘s November 19, 2019, order entering judgment on the defendant‘s guilty plea—the order to which the appellate defender alluded in the untimely motion for leave to file an amended notice of appeal. The appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review that order.
¶ 19 This appeal, however, presents weighty issues concerning the finality of judgments pursuant to guilty pleas, the applicability of supreme court rules, the right to counsel, and the second prong of our plain error doctrine. In the exercise of our supervisory authority under article VI, section 16, of the Illinois Constitution (
¶ 20 The defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to admonish him pursuant to
¶ 21 This court has long held that “a constitutional right, like any other right of an accused, may be waived, and a voluntary plea of guilty waives all errors or irregularities that are not jurisdictional.” People v. Brown, 41 Ill. 2d 503, 505 (1969)
¶ 22 In People v. Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d 543, 545 (2004), we stated unequivocally that the waiver of constitutional claims consequent to a guilty plea is distinguishable from a forfeiture of such claims that may be excused under our plain error doctrine as memorialized in
“invocation of
Supreme Court Rule 615(a) is entirely out of place in this context.Rule 615(a) is concerned with waivers that result from failing to bring an error to the trial court‘s attention. Under that Rule, ‘[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed [on appeal] although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.’ [Citation.] In relation to a guilty plea, by contrast, ‘waiver’ refers to the ’ “voluntary relinquishment of a known right.” ’ [Citation.] ***Rule 615(a) in no way speaks to waivers ***” Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d at 547-48.
¶ 23
“No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless the defendant, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial court a motion to reconsider the sentence, if only the sentence is being challenged, or, if the plea is being challenged, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment.”
Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
The rule further provides that “[t]he motion shall be in writing and shall state the grounds therefor” and that “[u]pon appeal any issue not raised by the defendant in the motion to reconsider the sentence or withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the
¶ 24 The defendant here pleaded guilty. Before accepting that plea, the trial court gave him the proper admonishments required under
¶ 25 Several months later, the defendant complied with
¶ 26
¶ 27 Moreover, “the rules adopted by this court concerning criminal defendants and guilty pleas are in fact rules of procedure and not suggestions.” People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 103 (1988). As such, “[i]t is incumbent upon counsel and courts alike to follow them.” Id. This court in Wilk explained that our rules concerning guilty pleas, including
”
Rule 604(d) has a purpose. That purpose is to ensure that before a criminal appeal can be taken from a guilty plea, the trial judge who accepted the plea and imposed sentence be given the opportunity to hear the allegations of improprieties that took place outside the official proceedings and dehors the record, but nevertheless were unwittingly given sanction in the courtroom.Rule 604(d) provides for fact finding to take place at a time when witnesses are still available and memories are fresh. [Citation.] A hearing underRule 604(d) allows a trial court to immediately correct any improper conduct or any errors of the trial court that may have produced a guilty plea. The trial court is the place for fact finding to occur and for a record to be made concerning the factual basis upon which a defendant relies for the grounds to withdraw a guilty plea.” Id. at 104.
See People v. Walls, 2022 IL 127965, ¶ 25 (stating that ”
¶ 28 Because the defendant did not raise the trial court‘s
¶ 30 Certainly, the trial court did not substantially comply with
¶ 31 Below, the appellate court majority brushed past the defendant‘s failure to raise the trial court‘s lack of admonitions “because the right to counsel is so fundamental that the failure to properly issue
“The right to counsel is fundamental. [People v. ]Black, 2011 IL App (5th) 080089, ¶ 24. Failure to issue
Rule 401 admonitions amounts to plain error. People v. Vazquez, 2011 IL App (2d) 091155, ¶ 14; Black, 2011 IL App (5th) 080089, ¶ 23; People v. Vernon, 396 Ill. App. 3d 145, 150 (2009); People v. Jiles, 364 Ill. App. 3d 320, 329 (2006); People v. Herring, 327 Ill. App. 3d 259, 261 (2002); People v. Stoops, 313 Ill. App. 3d 269, 273 (2000).” Id.
¶ 32 The problem for the appellate court majority, and ultimately for the defendant in this regard, is twofold. First, Brzowski and the cases that it cites are distinguishable because they involve convictions following trials and not convictions after guilty pleas. Second, neither Brzowski nor the cases that it cites engage in a meaningful analysis of whether a clear
¶ 33 In Brzowski and its supporting cases, the trial court violated
¶ 34 Further, a close examination of the line of authority in Brzowski shows that the appellate court created the proposition that
¶ 35 That is the entire discussion in that case, and it spawned a legion of other “holdings.” Calling a
¶ 36 Robertson and much of its progeny predate significant advances in our plain error jurisprudence, including People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, which largely outlined the proper approach to first-prong plain error, and People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, which did the same for second-prong plain error. Moon controls here.
¶ 37 In Moon, the court faced the question of whether the trial court‘s failure to administer the jury oath, to which the defendant did not object, could be reviewed as second-prong plain error. The court observed that we have generally equated second-prong plain error with “structural error.” Id. ¶ 28 (citing People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 197-98 (2009)). A structural error is one that “necessarily renders a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or is an unreliable means of determining guilt
¶ 38 “The structural errors identified by the Supreme Court include a complete denial of counsel, denial of self-representation at trial, trial before a biased judge, denial of a public trial, racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, and a defective reasonable doubt instruction.” Id. ¶ 29 (citing Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218 n.2 (2006)). Those errors deprive defendants of basic protections, such that their trials are not a reliable vehicle for determining guilt. Id. (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1999)).
¶ 39 The court continued, noting that the six structural errors identified by the Supreme Court are not necessarily a limitation on this court‘s determination of whether an error is cognizable under the second prong. Id. ¶ 30. However, “in analyzing whether an error is structural under the second prong of the plain error rule, we often look to the type of errors that the United States Supreme Court has identified as structural to determine whether the error being considered is comparable.” Id.
¶ 40 The court examined the history of the jury oath and found that it was “firmly rooted in American jurisprudence” (id. ¶ 31), even before the first
¶ 41 In People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, the court faced the question of whether the trial court‘s failure to poll the jury, to which the defendant did not object, could be reviewed as second-prong plain error. The court reinforced the approach in Moon, stating, “In determining whether an error is structural for purposes of applying the second prong of Illinois‘s plain error rule, we often look to the types of errors that the United States Supreme Court has found to be structural error and determine whether the error being considered is similar.” Id. ¶ 30.
¶ 43 The question in this case becomes clear: Is a
¶ 44 The admonitions required under
¶ 46 Similarly, we would not have held repeatedly that substantial compliance with
¶ 47 CONCLUSION
¶ 48 Because the appellate court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant‘s
¶ 49 Appellate court judgment vacated.
¶ 51 JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM, specially concurring:
¶ 52 I agree with and join Justice O‘Brien‘s special concurrence. This court should not invoke its supervisory authority to review the merits of the defendant‘s challenge to his guilty plea or to review the reasoning of the vacated appellate court opinion. However, the majority does improperly undertake this review, and thus, the majority‘s decision on the merits now stands as binding law. Further, Justice O‘Brien‘s special concurrence does not address the majority‘s analysis of the defendant‘s claim. Accordingly, because I disagree with much of the majority‘s analysis, I am compelled to respond with a special concurrence of my own.
¶ 53 Whether a Guilty Plea Waives Any Claim That There Was No Valid Waiver of Counsel Prior to the Entry of the Plea
¶ 54 The defendant, Earl Ratliff, contends that the trial court failed to timely admonish him in accordance with
¶ 55 The majority rejects this contention. The majority holds that, by pleading guilty, Ratliff affirmatively waived his claim and, specifically, that by pleading guilty, Ratliff waived any “constitutional claims that arose before his plea, including any claim related to his right to counsel.” Supra ¶ 24. I disagree.
¶ 56 The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that “a guilty plea to a felony charge entered without counsel and without a waiver of counsel is invalid.” See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 n.6 (1970). It follows, therefore, that a defendant may always argue on appeal that his pro se guilty plea was entered without a valid waiver of counsel because such an argument is a challenge to the validity of the plea itself. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, “when the judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea has become final and the offender
¶ 57 The majority‘s holding in this case that a pro se guilty plea waives any argument regarding the right to counsel that preceded the plea, including any claim that there was no valid waiver of counsel prior to the entry of the plea, is squarely at odds with binding United States Supreme Court authority. Moreover, the majority‘s holding fails as a matter of simple logic: the majority is holding that, because Ratliff pled guilty, he waived his argument that his guilty plea was invalid. This reasoning does not withstand scrutiny.
¶ 58 In this case, Ratliff cannot prevail in his argument that he did not waive his right to counsel before pleading guilty because, as Justice O‘Brien notes in her special concurrence, there was no
¶ 59 Whether the Failure to Include a Claim in а Postplea Motion Constitutes an Affirmative Waiver
¶ 60 The majority also holds that Ratliff affirmatively waived his claim that he did not, in fact, waive his right to counsel before pleading guilty because he failed to raise this contention in a postplea motion. According to the majority, the failure to include an issue in a postplea motion required by
¶ 61
“[n]o appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless the defendant, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial court a motion to reconsider the sentence, if only the sentence is being challenged, or, if the plea is being challenged, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment.”
Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 62 Although
“Over the years, this court has noted that the terms forfeiture and waiver have, at times, been used interchangeably, and often incorrectly, in criminal cases. People v. Hughes, 2015 IL 117242, ¶ 37; People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 443 (2005). Forfeiture is defined ‘as the failure to make the timely assertion of [a] right.’ People v. Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, ¶ 37; see also Buenz v. Frontline Transportation Co., 227 Ill. 2d 302, 320 n.2 (2008) (stating ‘forfeiture is the failure to timely comply with procedural requirements‘). Waiver, on the other hand, ‘is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, ¶ 36.” Id. ¶ 20.
We further stated:
“Although ***
Rule 604(d) has been referred to as the ‘waiver rule’ (People v. Stewart, 123 Ill. 2d 368, 374 (1988)), it is more appropriate to ‘use “forfeited” to mean issues that could have been raised but were not, and are therefore barred’ (People v. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340, 350 n.1 (2006)).” Id. ¶ 22 n.1.
¶ 63 The majority now overrules Sophanavong in a footnоte (supra ¶ 23 n.2). In so doing, the majority does not mention stare decisis or explain why Sophanavong‘s reasoning was incorrect. Moreover, the majority does not explain how an inadvertent failure to include an issue in a postplea motion can be considered a waiver, i.e., an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Sophanavong was not wrongly decided. The terms “waiver” and “forfeiture” are often used interchangeably. Sophanavong should not be overruled, and the majority errs in doing so.
¶ 64 Further, the majority does not acknowledge the scope of its holding. If, as the majority holds, the inadvertent failure to include an issue in a postplea motion results in an affirmative waiver rather than a forfeiture, then plain-error review will
¶ 65 To illustrate this point, consider the following: a defendant pleads guilty, but during the plea colloquy the trial judge gives the defendant incorrect sentencing information. No one in the trial court notices the error, and it is not raised in a postplea motion. According to the majority‘s reasoning, that error could not be argued as plain error on appeal, despite its clear impact on the voluntariness of the plea, because the failure to preserve the issue was an affirmative waiver, not a forfeiture. This result is illogical and unjust. It is also contrary to previous decisions from both this court and the United States Supreme Court that have applied plain-error review in appeals from guilty pleas. See, e.g., People v. Fuller, 205 Ill. 2d 308, 322-23 (2002) (holding that the failure to give a defendant admonishments in compliance with
¶ 66 Plain Error
¶ 67 Despite determining that Ratliff twice waived his challenge to his guilty plea—first by pleading guilty and second by failing to include the issue in a postplea motion—the majority nevertheless proceeds to address whether Ratliff‘s claim may be reviewed as second-prong plain error. Supra ¶ 29. By the majority‘s own reasoning, this analysis is incorrect. As the majority itself acknowledges, plain-error review applies only to errors that have been forfeited, not ones that have been affirmatively waived. Supra ¶ 22 (citing Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d at 545). The majority thus contradicts itself by first finding that Ratliff waived his claim and then addressing it as plain error.
¶ 69 In a footnote, the majority appears to acknowledge that no error occurred in this case and that Ratliff was, in fact, properly admonished in accordance with
¶ 70 For these reasons, I specially concur.
¶ 71 JUSTICE O‘BRIEN, specially concurring:
¶ 72 I agree with the majority that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant‘s challenge to his guilty plea and, therefore, the judgment of the appellate court must be vacated. I disagree, however, with the majority‘s determination to exercise this court‘s supervisory authority to review the correctness of the appellate court‘s order and the merits of defendant‘s challenge to his plea. Because I would vacate the appellate court‘s judgment without further comment beyond the jurisdictional discussion, I specially concur.
¶ 73 I do not agree with the majority‘s belief that this case warrants the invocation of this court‘s supervisory authority. This court is vested with “[g]eneral administrative and supervisory authority over all courts.”
¶ 74 None of the circumstances that would warrant exercising this court‘s supervisory authority are present in this case. Because the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review defendant‘s challenge to his guilty plea, the appellate court‘s order is void. See Municipal Trust & Savings Bank v. Moriarty, 2021 IL 126290, ¶ 17 (a void order or judgment is one entered by a court without jurisdiction of the subject matter or the parties). This court has no compelling reason to address the appellate court‘s order or reasoning. See Kelch v. Watson, 237 Ill. App. 3d 875, 877 (1992) (when an order is vacated, it is as if the order had never been еntered). The appellate court‘s judgment is without effect. Thus, contrary to the majority‘s assertion, there are no “weighty issues” (supra ¶ 19) presented by that order that demand this court‘s attention or that justify the exercise of supervisory authority. As the majority opinion demonstrates, the appellate process provided adequate relief because, even after reaching the other issues, the result is the same in that the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
¶ 75 Further, by reviewing defendant‘s challenge to his guilty plea by invoking our supervisory authority, we are allowing defendant to proceed in direct contradiction of the requirements set forth in
¶ 76 Although defendant initially filed a pro se postplea motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea, he subsequently abandoned that motion and, instead, filed only a motion to reconsider his sentence, which the trial court then denied. Supra ¶ 8. Defendant‘s deliberate and informed decision to abandon his motion to withdraw his guilty plea meant that the motion to reconsider his sentence was the only postplea motion before the trial court. People v. Willoughby, 362 Ill. App. 3d 480, 483-84 (2005). The trial court did not have a motion to withdraw the guilty plea
¶ 77 Finally, even if the foregoing concerns are set aside, there is no reason to exercise this court‘s supervisory authority to address the merits of defendant‘s challenge to his guilty plea because it is clear that no error occurred in this case. Defendant argues that his pro se guilty plea was invalid and must be set aside because he did not waive his sixth amendment right to counsel before entering the plea. In support of this contention, defendant relies on
¶ 78 At the outset of the guilty plea hearing in this case, in November 2019, and before accepting defendant‘s plea, the trial court informed defendant of the charge against him and the potential punishment he faced. Defendant stated that he understood these admonishments. Defendant was then informed by the trial court that he had the right to counsel, which he then expressly waived:
“THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ratliff, you have been representing yourself in this matter. Do you understand?
MR. RATLIFF: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Now, you also have a right to have an attorney, but you waived that right and want to do this yourself?
MR. RATLIFF: Yeah.”
¶ 80 The resolution of this case should be brief and straightforward. This court should hold that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction, vacate the judgment of the appellate court, and then, at most, simply state there is no need to exercise supervisory authority to address defendant‘s arguments because no error occurred in this case. This case simply does not warrant the invocation of supervisory authority to review the merits of defendant‘s challenge to his guilty plea and the correctness of an appellate court order that has been vacated. Rather than disposing of this appeal on simple jurisdictional grounds, the majority provides an expansive advisory opinion, which offers various procedural grounds to resolve the appeal beyond the jurisdictional question. None of the independent grounds offered by the majority to affirm the judgment of the trial court are properly before this court.
¶ 81 JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM joins in this special concurrence.
¶ 82 JUSTICE OVERSTREET, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
¶ 83 With regard to the jurisdictional issue presented in this case, I agree with the dissent that the May 7, 2021, original notice of appeal was timely filed and conferred jurisdiction on the appellate court to consider the issues raised in the appeal. See Village of Kirkland v. Kirkland Properties Holdings Co., 2023 IL 128612, ¶ 38. Ratliff‘s May 7, 2021, notice of appeal conferred jurisdiction on the appellate court to review the May 7, 2021, order denying the motion to reconsider sentence and all orders that were in the procedural progression leading to the denial of his motion to reconsider sentence. See In re Marriage of Arjmand, 2024 IL 129155, ¶ 27; In re Marriage of O‘Brien, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 23; Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 435-36 (1979); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962); United States v. Rivera Construction Co., 863 F.2d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 1988); Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 1252, 1254 (3d Cir.1977). Accordingly, I disagree with the majority‘s conclusion that the appellate court lackеd jurisdiction to review the circuit court‘s November 19, 2019, order entering judgment on the defendant‘s guilty plea. Thus, I find unnecessary the majority‘s decision to exercise supervisory authority under
¶ 84 Nevertheless, I agree with the majority‘s opinion in all other respects. I join fully in the majority‘s analysis on waiver.
¶ 85 For these reasons, I concur in part and dissent in part.
¶ 86 JUSTICE NEVILLE, dissenting:
¶ 87 The majority, before reaching the merits of the appeal, addressed the preliminary matter of jurisdiction, finding that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to grant Ratliff leave to file his November 12, 2021, amended notice of appeal and finding that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to review the November 19, 2019, order entering judgment on Ratliff‘s blind guilty plea. Supra ¶¶ 15-18. Despite the majority‘s holding that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction, the majority concludes that, because of the “weighty issues concerning the finality of judgments pursuant to guilty pleas, the applicability of supreme court rules, the right to counsel, and the second prong of our plain error doctrine,” it will exercise its supervisory authority to provide guidance on these issues. Supra ¶ 19.
¶ 88 The majority vacates the judgment of the appellate court for lack of jurisdiction over Ratliff‘s Rule 401(a) claim (see
¶ 89 While I agree with the majority that a reviewing court has an independent duty to consider sua sponte issues of jurisdiction, I would reach a different result. Instead, I would find that Ratliff‘s May 7, 2021, notice of appeal conferred jurisdiction on the appellate court to review not only the May 7, 2021, order
¶ 90 Additionally, I would hold that, because the record includes evidence that Ratliff did not knowingly and voluntarily enter a blind guilty plea, the plea may have been void and the circuit court‘s imposition of judgment on the uncounseled plea, without an evidentiary hearing concerning Ratliff‘s evidence he did not understand the plea, violated his right to due process. Consequently, the circuit court‘s imposition of judgment on Ratliff‘s uncounseled, blind guilty plea constituted reversible error. Further, because the court heard no evidence establishing that Ratliff entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily, the plea did not waive his
¶ 91 I. FACTS
¶ 92 Four dates frame the analysis: July 11, 2019, when Ratliff began representing himself in court; November 19, 2019, when the court accepted Ratliff‘s guilty plea; November 22, 2019, when Ratliff sent the court a letter telling the judge he did not understand the guilty plea proceedings; and January 30, 2020, when the court imposed its sentence on Ratliff.
¶ 93 On July 11, 2019, Ratliff‘s appointed counsel appeared before the circuit court and stated that Ratliff wished to proceed pro se. The circuit court then questioned Ratliff regarding his level of education and whether he had any mental disabilities. Ratliff stated that he completed ninth grade and that he has “a part of bipolar.” Although the record reveals that Ratliff had a criminal history, Ratliff stated that he had no prior involvement in the legal system.
¶ 95 On November 19, 2019, the assistant state‘s attorney informed the judge that Ratliff wished to enter a blind plea5 to the charge. Before accepting Ratliff‘s plea, the circuit court reminded Ratliff, who was still without counsel, that he had a right to an attorney but that he had previously “waived his right to counsel.” The circuit court admonished Ratliff that he was charged with a Class 2 felony but, because of his criminal history, he would be sentenced as a Class X offender. The court also admonished him that he faced a term of imprisonment of 6 to 30 years. That same day, Ratliff entered a blind plea of guilty without the benefit of counsel, which the court accepted.
¶ 96 On November 22, 2019, three days after the circuit court accepted his plea and two months before sentencing, Ratliff sent a letter to the judge explaining that he did not understand his blind plea: “I was rushing so fast yesterday (in) court with you‘ll [sic] and I didn‘t understand it to good about the blind plea.”
¶ 97 On January 30, 2020, while Ratliff was yet again without counsel, the circuit court entered an order and sentenced Ratliff to 15 years’ imprisonment with a 3-year term of mandatory supervised release. After sentencing, on February 7, 2020, Ratliff filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which his rеappointed public defender abandoned. On May 6, 2021, Ratliff‘s public defender filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the circuit court denied in its May 7, 2021, order. Finally, on May 7, 2021, the clerk filed Ratliff‘s notice of appeal.
¶ 98 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 99 A. Jurisdiction
¶ 100 Although I agree that Ratliff‘s November 12, 2021, amended notice of appeal was filed outside of the limitations period prescribed in
¶ 101 While notices of appeal are jurisdictional, it is generally accepted that “‘a notice of appeal is to be liberally construed.‘” Village of Kirkland v. Kirkland Properties Holdings Co., LLC I, 2023 IL 128612, ¶ 38 (quoting Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 433 (1979)); People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2008); J. Timothy Eaton, The Timely and Properly Filed Notice of Appeal, 108 Ill. B.J. 26, 28 (2020) (“Courts liberally construe notices of appeal absent prejudice to the litigants involved.“). “‘The purpose of the notice of appeal is to inform the prevailing party that the other party seeks review of the trial court‘s decision.‘” Village of Kirkland, 2023 IL 128612, ¶ 39 (quoting People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 37 (2009)). A notice of appeal should be considered as a whole, and it “will be deemed sufficient to confer jurisdiction on an appellate court when it fairly and adequately sets out the judgment complained of and the relief sought, thus advising the successful litigant of the nature of the appeal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 102 A notice of appeal will also confer jurisdiction on the appellate court even if the order was not expressly mentioned in a notice of appeal, if that order was “a step in the procedural progression” and a necessary prerequisite leading to the judgment which was specified in the notice of appeal. In re Marriage of Arjmand, 2024 IL 129155, ¶ 27 (“[N]otices of appeal are to be liberally construed and *** they confer jurisdiction even if the order was not expressly mentioned in the notice of appeal,
¶ 103 Federal courts have also reviewed notices of appeal to determine whether a particular order was a step in the procedural progression and a necessary prerequisite leading to the judgment specified in the notice of appeal. See United States v. Rivera Construction Co., 863 F.2d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 1988) (where one order or judgment was a step in the procedural progression of a second order or judgment for which a timely notice of appeal has been filed, then an appeal from the latter judgment may be deemed to include the earlier judgment); Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 1252, 1254 (3d Cir. 1977) (“It is true that if from the notice of appeal itself and the subsequent proceedings on appeal it appears that the appeal was intended to have been taken from an unspecified judgment order or part thereof, the notice may be construed as bringing up the unspecified order for review.“); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962) (wherе the notice of appeal failed to specifically state the order from which the party was appealing, but it was apparent that an unnamed order was being appealed from and it did not mislead or prejudice the respondent, the notice of appeal was effective).
¶ 104 Here, Ratliff‘s May 7, 2021, notice of appeal conferred jurisdiction on the appellate court to review the May 7, 2021, order denying the motion to reconsider sentence and all orders that were in the procedural progression leading to the denial of his motion to reconsider sentence. See In re Marriage of Arjmand, 2024 IL 129155, ¶ 27; In re Marriage of O‘Brien, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 23; Rivera Construction Co., 863 F.2d at 298; Burtell, 76 Ill. 2d at 435-36; Elfman Motors, Inc., 567 F.2d at 1254; Foman, 371 U.S. at 181. Those orders would include the January 30, 2020, judgment of sentence; the November 19, 2019, guilty plea judgment order; and the July 11, 2019, order permitting Ratliff to proceed pro se (waiver of counsel order).
¶ 105 Moreover, a notice of appeal confers jurisdiction to consider an unnamed ruling if the intent to address the unnamed ruling is apparent and there will be no prejudice
¶ 106 Ratliff has not forfeited review of any issues on appeal. Ratliff argues, both in his opening appellate court brief and in his opening brief before this court (to which the State responded), that the circuit court‘s failure to admonish him pursuant to
¶ 107 Because the May 7, 2021, original notice of appeal conferred jurisdiction on the appellate court to consider orders that were not specifically named in the notice of appeal but were prerequisites and procedural steps in the progression leading to the judgment named, the appellate court had jurisdiction to consider Ratliff‘s contentions of error with respect to the November 19, 2019, guilty plea order as well as the July 11, 2019, waiver of counsel order. See In re Marriage of Arjmand, 2024 IL 129155, ¶ 27; In re Marriage of O‘Brien, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 23; Rivera Construction Co., 863 F.2d at 298; Burtell, 76 Ill. 2d at 435-36; Elfman Motors, Inc., 567 F.2d at 1254; Foman, 371 U.S. at 181. Further, the record reveals no prejudice to the State by liberally construing his notice of appeal as an appeal of the guilty plea order, of the waiver of counsel order, and of all other orders in the procedural progression leading to the order denying his motion to reconsider sentence. It should be noted that the State addressed all of Ratliff‘s arguments and
¶ 108 Lastly, the majority relies on Bingham, 2018 IL 122008, ¶ 16, and Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d at 37, for the proposition that a notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on an appellate court in criminal cases “‘to consider only the judgments or parts of judgments specified in the notice.‘” Supra ¶ 17 (quoting Bingham, 2018 IL 122008, ¶ 16, quoting Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d at 37). However, Bingham is distinguishable from the case on review. First, in Bingham, the defendant argued that the registration requirement of the Sex Offender Registration Act was unconstitutional as applied to him on substantive due process grounds and violated ex post facto principles. This court dismissed the appeal, finding that this was “not the proper forum for defendant to raise his claims and because an as-applied constitutional challenge may not be raised where it is litigated for the first time on review.” Bingham, 2018 IL 122008, ¶ 25. We then vacated the portion of the appellate court‘s judgment that addressed the defendant‘s constitutional claims on the merits. Id. In reaching this conclusion, we reasoned that the defendant‘s claims of error were beyond the scope of review. In other words, the trial court‘s judgment did not include the claims of error asserted by the defendant. Specifically, the trial court‘s order did not require the defendant to register as a sex offender, and this requirement was not encompassed within any order of the trial court. Id. ¶ 17. Therefore, no judgment could be properly reviewed by the notice of appeal because the error defendant sought to appeal was beyond the scope of any judgment entered by the trial court.
¶ 109 By contrast, the May 7, 2021, notice of appeal in this case conferred jurisdiction on the appellate court because it was timely filed and sought review of the trial court‘s order denying Ratliff‘s motion to reconsider sentence, which necessarily calls into question all orders leading up to the denial of the motion to reconsider sentence. The majority‘s conclusions that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to cоnsider the guilty plea order because it was not specifically named in the original notice of appeal has no merit. The amended notice of appeal was void, and it did not preempt the May 7, 2021, order because it was filed outside the limitations period in
¶ 110 Additionally, Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d at 37, does not support the conclusion reached by the majority, but instead it supports the conclusion that a notice of appeal should be liberally construed and is sufficient to confer jurisdiction where it fairly and adequately identifies the judgment complained of, such that the appellee is not prejudiced. In Lewis, we held that, although the defendant‘s notice of appeal listed the date of the denial of the defendant‘s motion to suppress, this error did not cause uncertainty as to the nature of his appeal because the notice expressly stated that he was appeаling from no orders “‘other than conviction.‘” Id. at 38. Therefore, we held that the “defendant‘s notice of appeal, considered as a whole and liberally construed, adequately identifies the complained-of judgment and informs the State of the nature of the appeal. Accordingly, the notice was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the appellate court to consider this appeal.” Id. at 39.
¶ 111 Like the notice of appeal in Lewis, the notice of appeal in this case, when construed liberally, adequately identifies the judgment complained of, informs the State of the nature of the appeal such that there is no prejudice, and permits the reviewing court to consider the legal issues in all unnamed orders that were a step in the procedural progression leading to the judgment named in the notice of appeal. In re Marriage of Arjmand, 2024 IL 129155, ¶ 27; In re Marriage of O‘Brien, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 23; Rivera Construction Co., 863 F.2d at 298; Burtell, 76 Ill. 2d at 435-36; Elfman Motors, Inc., 567 F.2d at 1254; Foman, 371 U.S. at 181. Because the appellate court had jurisdiction over the issues Ratliff raised in this appeal, we need not exercise our supervisory authority to provide guidance in future cases. Instead, we may simply reach the issues Ratliff raised in this appeal, which were argued in the petition for leave to appeal that this court granted a year and a half ago and which were thoroughly briefed by the parties before this court.
¶ 113 B. Waiver
¶ 114 Next, the majority holds that Ratliff waived any argument that the circuit court committed reversible error when it failed to admonish him of his right to counsel pursuant to
¶ 115 The United States Supreme Court held that, after a guilty plea, a defendant may not “‘raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.‘” Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 29-30 (1974) (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)). However, a defendant may attack “the voluntary and intelligent nature of the guilty plea, through proof that the advice received from counsel was not ‘within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.‘” Id. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). A guilty plea may be involuntary if the defendant does not understand that he is waiving constitutional rights or if the defendant has such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976); see United States v. Rossillo, 853 F.2d 1062, 1067 (2d Cir. 1988) (where the court found, inter alia, that a failure to make an on-the-record determination that the defendant‘s plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered constituted reversible error). In addition to the guilty plea being voluntary, it must also be a knowing and intelligent act done with “sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
¶ 116 Similarly,
¶ 117 The record establishes that Ratliff was pro se on November 19, 2019, and entered an uncounseled blind guilty plea that same day. Therefore, Ratliff did not have the advice of counsel—competent or otherwise—to ensure that his guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered.
¶ 118 The majority maintains that Ratliff “never argued that his plea was less than knowing and voluntary.” Supra ¶ 24. However, the record establishes that, on November 22, 2019, three days after the circuit court accepted his guilty plea and two months before sentencing, Ratliff sent a letter to the judge explaining that the blind plea proceedings were moving too quickly and that he did not understand the blind plea: “I was rushing so fast yesterday (in) court with you‘ll [sic] and I didn‘t understand it to good about the blind plea.” Additionally, Ratliff stated on record that he has only a ninth-grade education, has a history of drug abuse, and has mental health disorders (namely bipolar disorder, anxiety-depression with suicidal tendencies, hearing voices, and “incompetency“). The record includes a list of medications prescribed for Ratliff, and the list includes psychotropic medications. The court made no inquiry at all into the possible effect of the medications on Ratliff‘s ability to knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty. Because the record includes unrebutted evidence that Ratliff did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty, the court should have held an evidentiary hearing on the validity of the plea before sentencing on January 30, 2020. The circuit court‘s acceptance of an uncounseled plea coupled with its failure to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine if Ratliff understood the plea constitutes reversible error. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 748; Rossillo, 853 F.2d at 1067; see also People v. Brown, 924 N.E.2d 782, 783-84 (N.Y. 2010) (reasoning that “[w]here, however, the record raises a legitimate question as to the voluntariness of the plea, an еvidentiary hearing is required.“).
¶ 120 Courts have the burden of protecting the fundamental rights of criminal defendants. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 (1959) (acknowledging the “burden which [law enforcement officers] share, along with our courts, in protecting fundamental rights of our citizenry, including that portion of our citizenry suspected of crime“). The majority‘s attempt to shift to Ratliff the burden of protecting his fundamental rights to due process and counsel is flawed and amounts to a breach of the court‘s duty and a violation of Ratliff‘s constitutional rights. The majority asserts the rule that “[a]ny constitutional claims that arose before his plea, including any claim related to his right to counsel, were waived. See Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶ 20[.]” Supra ¶ 24. This rule applies only to valid guilty pleas, pleas entered into knowingly and voluntarily. Because the record includes unrebutted evidence that Ratliff did not understand the guilty plea proceedings, he did not knowingly and intelligently plead guilty, and this failure of the circuit court to ensure Ratliff‘s understanding, alone, was reversible error. See Rossillo, 853 F.2d at 1067 (where the court found, inter alia, that a failure to make an on-the-record determination that the defendant‘s plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered constituted reversible error); Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 (waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with “sufficient awareness of thе relevant circumstances and likely consequences“). Therefore, because the circuit court committed reversible error when it accepted Ratliff‘s uncounseled, unknowing plea, Ratliff did not waive any claims, including his claim that the circuit court committed reversible error when it failed, on July 11, 2019, to admonish him about his right to counsel as required by
¶ 122 I would find that Ratliff‘s unknowing, unintelligent, and uncounseled blind guilty plea is akin to an unсounseled felony conviction after a trial and is unconstitutionally invalid. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that all uncounseled felony convictions are constitutionally invalid). In Gideon, the United States Supreme Court reasoned:
“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.” Id. at 344-45 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
The perils of an uncounseled blind plea of guilty, entered into unknowingly and unintelligently, are no less daunting than the perils of an uncounseled conviction after a trial—both defendants are stripped of their constitutional right to counsel, causing them to face the “danger of conviction because [they do] not know how to establish [their] innocence.” Id. at 345 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 69).
¶ 123 While I recognize that adherence to
¶ 124 I maintain that Ratliff‘s November 22, 2019, letter in which he stated that he did not understand the guilty plea proceedings, coupled with the evidence of his limited education (ninth grade), his history of drug abuse, his mental health disorders (namely bipolar disorder, anxiety-depression with suicidal tendencies, hearing voices, and “incompetency“), and his use of prescription psychotropic medications to treat the disorders, supports the conclusion that Ratliff did not enter into the uncounseled blind guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. On November 22, 2019, when the court became aware that Ratliff claimed he did not understand the plea—months before sentencing—the court had an obligation to
¶ 125 Additionally, I note that the majority of the cases relied upon by the majority assert that a voluntary plea of guilty waives all claims of error that are not jurisdictional, but these cases are factually distinguishable from this case. See supra ¶¶ 21-22. Most notably, the defendants in those cases, unlike Ratliff who was uncounseled, were represented by counsel at the time they entered a guilty plea. See People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶ 6 (where, after the defendant entered a guilty plea, he filed a pro se postconviction petition arguing, inter alia, that his defense counsel was ineffective); People v. Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 6 (where, at the plea hearing, defense counsel asked that the record reflect that the agreed-upon terms were against counsel‘s advice, but the defendant insisted on the accepted terms of the plea); People v. Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d 543 (2004) (where defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that his attorney coerced him into pleading guilty); see People v. Brown, 41 Ill. 2d 503, 505 (1969) (where defendant alleged that he pleaded guilty upon the advice of his attorneys); People v. Dennis, 34 Ill. 2d 219, 221 (1966) (where transcript of the proceedings at the time of the guilty plea reveal that the defendant stated that he had consulted with his attorney about entering a plea of guilty); see also People v. Smith, 23 Ill. 2d 512, 514 (1961) (where the transcript of the trial proceedings attached to the defendant‘s postconviction petition established that defendant‘s constitutional rights were not denied, as defendant was shown in open court, while represented by counsel, changing his plea from not guilty to guilty and that the trial judge explained the effects of his plea to defendant).
¶ 126 In People v. Del Vecchio, 105 Ill. 2d 414, 433 (1985), another case relied on by the majority, this court found that the defendant waived the issue of whether the circuit court erred in admitting evidence, at his sentencing hearing, of a guilty plea in a prior murder trial. Ratliff‘s case does not involve a guilty plea that Ratliff entered into during a previous trial.
¶ 128 Therefore, because the record establishes that Ratliff‘s uncounseled guilty plea was entered into unknowingly and unintelligently, the circuit court‘s acceptance of the uncounseled plea violated his constitutional rights and was void. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466. Finally, the court‘s acceptance of the plea was reversible error, and I would vacate Ratliff‘s guilty plea and remand the cause to the circuit court for a new trial. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 748; Rossillo, 853 F.2d at 1067.
¶ 129 C. Structural Error
¶ 130 The majority concedes that the circuit court did not substantially comply with
¶ 131 I would find that the circuit court deprived Ratliff of counsel by failing to admonish Ratliff about his right to counsel pursuant to
¶ 132 I find our decision in People v. Campbell, 224 Ill. 2d 80, 84 (2006), instructive and the Montana Supreme Court‘s decision in Halley v. State, 2008 MT 193, ¶ 23, persuasive on this matter. In Campbell, this court held that there was no compliance with
¶ 133 In this case, on April 24, 2019, at his arraignment, Ratliff was admonished of the minimum and maximum sentence he could face if convicted of robbery, that he had a right to an attorney, and that one would be appointed for him, months before he expressed a desire to waive his right to counsel. On July 11, 2019, months after his arraignment when he first expressed his desire to waive counsel, he was advised on the perils of proceeding without an attorney but was not informed, as required by
¶ 134 Although attempts were made to admonish Ratliff, the first attempt was made during his April 24, 2019, arraignment—several months before he expressed his desire to proceed pro se. The second attempt was made on July 11, 2019, after he expressed a desire to proceed pro se, but the court‘s admonishments failed to satisfy the requirements of
¶ 135 Requiring Ratliff to remember admonishments he was given on April 24, 2019, several months before he first expressed a desire on July 11, 2019, to waive his right to counsel, can hardly be considered substantial compliance with
¶ 136 In Halley, the Montana Supreme Court found that the circuit court erred by allowing the defendant to proceed pro se without making an inquiry into whether the defendant was waiving his right to counsel knowingly and voluntarily. Halley, 2008 MT 193, ¶ 21. The Halley court further held that, because the defendant entered guilty pleas without a valid waiver of counsel, the guilty pleas were invalid because he was “deprived of his constitutional right to counsel during critical stages of the criminal proceeding.” Id. ¶¶ 22-23.
¶ 137 This is precisely what occurred in this case. The circuit court accepted Ratliff‘s invalid waiver of counsel when it accepted his waiver without first admonishing him—at the time he first expressed a desire to waive counsel—pursuant to
¶ 138 Finally, the majority asserts that the test we employed in People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 30, for analyzing structural error under the second-prong plain error doctrine is to “‘look to the type of errors that the United States Supreme Court has identified as structural to determine whether the error being considered is comparable.‘” Supra ¶ 39 (quoting Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 30). Among the structural errors identified by the United States Supreme Court is the denial of counsel. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 (“Such [structural] errors include denial of counsel ***.” (citing Gideon, 372 U.S. 335). I can think of no more egregious structural error than depriving Ratliff of counsel and accepting his uncounseled blind guilty plea. See Allen, 895 F.2d at 1580 (“Acceptance of an invalid waiver in violation of a defendant‘s Sixth Amendment rights necessarily leaves him entirely without the assistance of counsel at triаl.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149. It would be a miscarriage of justice to hold that Ratliff waived his constitutional right to counsel when he was not properly informed that he had the right, while excusing the circuit court‘s failure to meet its burden of ensuring Ratliff‘s fundamental right to counsel was preserved at every critical stage, including at the guilty-plea stage. Brown, 2017 IL 121681, ¶ 25; Spano, 360 U.S. at 321.
¶ 139 D. Supreme Court Rule Amendments
¶ 140 This case presents an opportunity for this court to review the rules and the procedures our circuit courts follow when providing admonishments and when accepting guilty pleas. Such a review is important because “[p]leas account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010); see Note, Stephanie Stern, Regulating the New Gold Standard of Criminal Justice: Confronting the Lack of Record-Keeping in the American Criminal Justice System, 52 Harv. J. on Legis. 245, 245 (2015) (97% of federal convictions and 94%
¶ 141 I would resolve the due process problem by having circuit courts take the following action: (1) all admonishments would be in writing, including those given pursuant to Rules 401, 402, and 604, and (2) the defendants would be given a copy of the admonishments and one or two hours to review the admonishments before they are given by the circuit court. I would resolve the state defendants’ right-to-counsel problem by amending the rules to provide that defendants shall be represented by counsel during all admonishment and guilty plea proceedings. The defendants would review the written admonishments with their attorneys, and those defendants who are proceeding pro se would be provided with standby counsel to answer any questions before the court gives admonishments or accepts a plea. Finally, by providing each defendant with a copy of the admonishments and by giving the defendants an opportunity to review the admonishments with counsel, the defendants would be in a much better position to ask the judge questions at each admonishment and plea hearing.
¶ 142 This case also teaches this court that we need a statewide public defender program so a judge has a larger pool of attorneys to choose from when the defendant and public defender have a conflict or when the defendant accuses his local public defender of threatening him. Finally, while the above recommendations do not cure all the due process and right-to-counsel problems, these recommendations will assist defendants with limited education and resources to receive all the process they are due.
¶ 144 In sum, I would hold that the appellate court had jurisdiction to review the guilty plea and waiver of counsel orders, as both orders were steps in the procedural progression leading to the order denying Ratliff‘s motion to reconsider sentence. Bingham, 2018 IL 122008, ¶ 16; In re Marriage of Arjmand, 2024 IL 129155, ¶ 27; In re Marriage of O‘Brien, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 23; Rivera Construction Co., 863 F.2d at 298; Burtell, 76 Ill. 2d at 435-36; Elfman Motors, Inc., 567 F.2d at 1254; Foman, 371 U.S. at 181. I would also hold that, because the record establishes that Ratliff‘s uncounseled guilty plea was entered into unknowingly and unintelligently, the plea violated his constitutional rights and was void, obviating the need to file a