THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JONATHAN HAYNES, Appellant.
No. 77569
THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS
Opinion filed October 24, 1996
Rehearing denied December 2, 1996
174 Ill. 2d 204
Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Richard E. Gade, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.
James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Jack O‘Malley, State‘s Attorney, of Chicago (Arleen C. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb and Peter D. Fischer, Assistant State‘s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
CHIEF JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, Jonathan Haynes, was indicted on three counts of murder (
Prior to the defendant‘s trial, a hearing was held to determine the defendant‘s fitness to stand trial. The defendant waived a jury for this hearing, and the hearing proceeded before the trial judge. Expert witnesses testified on behalf of both the State and the defendant. The testimony given by these witnesses is discussed in detail later in this opinion. After hearing the evidence, the trial court ruled that the defendant was fit to stand trial.
Immediately after the trial court ruled on the defendant‘s fitness, the defendant informed the court that he wished to proceed without counsel. The trial court accepted the defendant‘s waiver of counsel and appointed two assistant public defenders to act as standby counsel. The defendant proceeded to represent himself at his trial and death sentencing hearing. The defendant waived a jury for trial.
At trial, the defendant admitted murdering Dr. Martin Sullivan. The defendant delivered an opening statement in which he condemned “fake Aryan cosmetics,” in particular, bleached blond hair, blue tinted contact lenses and plastic surgery. The defendant further stated that, in committing his “murders,” he had issued a challenge to society to act “in accordance with your stated ideals of human equality.”
The State‘s evidence established that, at approximately 2:15 p.m. on August 6, 1993, a man who identified himself as “John Rothmann” entered the office of plastic surgeon Dr. Martin Sullivan in Wilmette, Illinois. This “John Rothmann” had earlier contacted the office and scheduled an appointment for this time with Dr. Sullivan to discuss undergoing a rhinoplasty. Witnesses in the office later identified the defendant as the man who had identified himself as “John Rothmann.” After sitting in the waiting area, the defendant was shown into examination room 1, a room with only one door. Dr. Sullivan entered examination room 1 shortly
On the evening of August 6, 1993, Mitchell Lifson, an administrative aide for State Representative Jeff Schoenberg, saw a television news report of the Sullivan murder. The report identified the perpetrator as “John Rothmann” and included a description of the man. Lifson recalled that, at approximately 10:45 a.m. that day, the defendant, using the name “John Rothmann,” had come into Representative Schoenberg‘s office and spoken to Lifson. The Representative‘s office is located about three or four blocks from Dr. Sullivan‘s office. Lifson told the defendant that the Representative was not available and asked for the defendant‘s name. The defendant was hesitant to divulge his name, though he eventually did identify himself as “John Rothmann,” and refused to leave his telephone number. When Lifson spoke to Representative Schoenberg about the defendant a short time later, the Representative told Lifson to obtain the defendant‘s license plate number if possible.
Lifson left the office at about 12:15 p.m. As he was leaving, he noticed the defendant standing next to a light-blue Volkswagen Beetle with Maryland license
The name “John Rothmann,” a description of his vehicle with the license plate number and a police sketch were distributed to local police agencies. In the early morning hours of August 8, 1993, a Skokie police officer observed a vehicle that matched the distributed description and license plate number driven by a white male. The officer stopped the vehicle and the driver identified himself as Jonathan Haynes. The officer identified the defendant as the man driving the car.
The defendant was taken into custody by Wilmette police. After being read Miranda warnings, the defendant requested a pen and some paper so that he could write a statement. The defendant also gave an oral statement to Wilmette police detectives. In that statement, the defendant stated that he telephoned Dr. Sullivan‘s office on August 3 or 4, 1993, and made an appointment for August 6, 1993, at 2:15 p.m. under the name “John Rothmann.” The defendant described that he arrived in Wilmette at around noon on August 6 and first went to Representative Schoenberg‘s office. The defendant wanted to ask the Representative some questions about problems he perceived in society. After leaving the Representative‘s office, the defendant drove to a gas station located next to Dr. Sullivan‘s office and parked his car in that lot. At almost exactly 2:15 p.m., the defendant left his car and walked to Dr. Sullivan‘s office. The defendant related that, upon entering the office, he identified himself as John Rothmann and filled out patient identification forms using that name. He was shown into an examination room at about 2:50 p.m.,
The defendant further related, in this statement, his reason for choosing Dr. Sullivan. The defendant said that he had decided to kill a plastic surgeon and Dr. Sullivan had the largest advertisement in the Yellow Pages. The defendant relayed that he had waited to shoot Dr. Sullivan in his office so that he could be sure that he killed the right person. The defendant also told police that he had arrived in the Chicago area about a month earlier for the express purpose of killing Charles Stroupe, who lived in Lake Forest, Illinois. The defendant desired to kill Stroupe because he was the president of Wesley Jensen Corporation, which, according to the defendant, was the original and largest manufacturer of blue tinted contact lenses. The defendant told police that he had conducted surveillance of Stroupe‘s home, and had attempted to kill Stroupe on August 2, 1993, but had been unable to perpetrate the killing. As a result, the defendant decided to target a plastic surgeon instead. The defendant stated that he remained in the Chicago area after killing Dr. Sullivan so that he could again attempt the murder of Stroupe. Finally, the
The defendant‘s written statement was also read into evidence. In addition to confessing to the murder of Dr. Sullivan and the attempted murder of Charles Stroupe, the written statement included the defendant‘s confession to the 1987 murder of Frank Ringi in San Francisco, California. Ringi, the defendant described, was a hair colorist. In that statement, the defendant again described his motivation for the murders as the condemnation of fake Aryan cosmetics. The defendant also stated that he had “fallen in love” with the “beauty of the Hitler youth” at the age of 12, and that he was “fundamentally in sympathy” with the neo-Nazi movement.
Police searched the defendant‘s car and apartment. Inside the car, police recovered a page torn from the Yellow Pages, which contained Dr. Sullivan‘s advertisement. In the apartment, the police found a loaded pistol, later identified through forensic testing as the murder weapon. Also found in the apartment was a cassette tape marked “taped confession,” which was played at trial. In this tape, the defendant stated that he had killed two persons and that he was “quite happy” with the murders. The tape was meant to be sent to cosmetics industry executives to warn them against perpetuating fake Aryan cosmetics. The police also found the defendant‘s diary, the contents of which were read into evidence. Therein, the defendant detailed his plans to kill Charles Stroupe and described that he had killed Dr. Sullivan.
The defendant presented no evidence at trial, other than his own testimony. In that testimony, the defendant admitted killing Dr. Sullivan and again reiterated that his motivation was to make a statement condemn-
The trial court found the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment of intentional murder (
Dr. Mathew Markos, a psychiatrist, testified for the State. Dr. Markos stated that he had considered whether the defendant had committed the murder of Dr. Sullivan while he was under the influence of an “extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” the standard under the statutory mitigating factor contained in section 9-1(c)(2) of the death penalty statute (
Thomas Trulli also testified for the State in aggravation. Trulli was the life companion and business partner of Frank Ringi. Trulli identified the defendant as the man who, identifying himself as “John Rockman,” had entered their San Francisco hair salon on May 27, 1987, for a consultation with Ringi. After the defendant
The defendant‘s confession to the murder of Frank Ringi, given to San Francisco police detectives after the Sullivan shooting, was also entered into evidence. Therein, the defendant admitted that he went to Ringi‘s salon on May 27, 1987, in order to kill him. He killed Ringi because he advertised himself as a hair colorist. The defendant stated that he was “not repentant” for this crime, although he knew that it was against the law. The defendant also stated in this statement that he believed that “Jews” wanted to control this country and that the population was growing increasingly uglier. The defendant also relayed that he is a “loner” and does not affiliate with any groups.
The State also presented testimony from Detective Brian King of the Wilmette police department. Detective King testified that the defendant said that it was his plan, after he had committed three murders, to send newspaper accounts of those murders to fashion magazines.
The State presented evidence that the defendant had been employed as a chemist with the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in Maryland from November 17, 1991, to March 26, 1993. In addition, a certified copy of the defendant‘s birth certificate, showing his date of birth as October 3, 1958, was admitted into evidence.
Finally, the written statements of Dr. Sullivan‘s wife
With this evidence, the State rested in aggravation. The trial court thereafter gave the defendant time to consult with standby counsel and with his parents. After this consultation, the defendant informed the court that he wished to present no mitigation evidence other than his own statement. The defendant gave a very brief statement in which he again condemned fake Aryan cosmetology.
The trial court denied standby counsel‘s request that the court consider a memorandum of mitigation evidence and a letter from Dr. Karen Smith offered in mitigation. Those documents are contained in the record. The mitigation memorandum, prepared by the public defender‘s office, urged that the statutory mitigating factor of “extreme mental or emotional disturbance” (
After hearing the evidence, the trial court ruled that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude a sentence of death. The trial court accordingly sentenced the defendant to death.
Fitness Hearing
Waiver of Jury for Fitness Hearing
The defendant charges that the trial court committed reversible error in accepting his waiver of a jury for the fitness hearing. We find no error in this regard.
The defendant‘s fitness hearing was set to begin on March 2, 1994. At the start of proceedings on that date, defense counsel appeared for the defendant and stated that a jury had been requested for the hearing. One of the prosecutors then informed the trial judge that the defendant had indicated, during one of his fitness examinations, that he wished to proceed without a jury. The trial judge questioned the defendant on this issue:
“THE COURT: *** I am going to ask him. You have a right, not a constitutional right, Mr. Haynes, to have this issue concerning whether you are legally competent mentally to stand trial in this criminal case to be decided by a jury of six persons, this is a civil proceeding, or whether you want to present whether that issue can be presented to the Court sitting without a jury.
The decision is yours to make, and I am asking you to make that decision. Do you want six people seated in this jury box to hear evidence from your doctors and other persons concerning your mental status and your legal competence to stand trial, or do you want to have the Court make that decision without the jury?
Tell me.
THE DEFENDANT: I wish the Court to make that decision.”
The defendant thereafter executed a written waiver of a jury for the fitness hearing. The defendant now contends that the trial court incorrectly accepted his jury waiver when defense counsel had already demanded a jury for the proceeding.
There is no constitutional right to a jury at a hearing to determine fitness to stand trial. People v. Manning, 76 Ill. 2d 235, 239 (1979). Our legislature, however,
“Right to Jury. The issue of the defendant‘s fitness may be determined in the first instance by the court or by a jury. The defense or the State may demand a jury or the court on its own motion may order a jury. However, when the issue is raised after trial has begun or after conviction but before sentencing, or when the issue is to be redetermined under Section 104-20 or 104-27, the issue shall be determined by the court.” (Emphasis added.)
725 ILCS 5/104-12 (West 1992).
The defendant‘s argument rests upon the wording of this statutory provision. The defendant asserts that
This court has held “[i]t is clear that an accused may waive a jury in a proceeding to determine his competency.” People v. Lyons, 42 Ill. 2d 437, 440 (1969); see also People v. Brown, 43 Ill. 2d 79, 82 (1969). The defendant acknowledges this holding and concedes that, at the time of that holding and up until the legislature enacted the current version of the fitness jury statute in 1979, a defendant had the statutory right to waive a jury for his fitness hearing. He argues, however, that
The defendant emphasizes that, prior to the 1979 change, the fitness jury provision provided that “the defendant” (in addition to the State or the court) could demand a jury. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005-2-1(d). In 1979, the section was changed to provide, as noted above, that “the defense” may demand a jury. The defendant contends that, in substituting “the defense” for “the defendant,” the legislature intended to take away from the defendant the right to demand or waive a jury and to give that right to defense counsel instead. The defendant‘s interpretation of the statute is erroneous.
In construing a statute, a court‘s duty is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Parker, 123 Ill. 2d 204, 209 (1988). In determining that intent, a court must look first to the language of the statute and interpret that language in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Ross, 168 Ill. 2d 347, 350 (1995). We find that the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “the defense,” as used in
The legislative history surrounding the 1979 change in the fitness jury provision confirms our conclusion. This change was effected as part of a major overhaul of the statutory provisions governing fitness for trial and sentencing. Public Act 81-1217, effective December 28, 1979, repealed previous provisions regarding fitness (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, pars. 1005-2-1, 1005-2-2), and replaced them with sections 102-21 and 104-10 through 104-29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The new sections provided detailed procedures to be employed in determining fitness and dealing with unfit defendants. Thus, changing “the defendant” to “the defense” was not the only, and was certainly not the most significant, change wrought by Public Act 81-1217.
Moreover, the debates in the legislature leave little doubt as to the motivating factor behind the legislative overhaul. The legislators’ comments reveal that the primary purpose of the act was to address situations such as that in the much-publicized case of Donald Lang. This court issued an opinion in Lang‘s case in May 1979. People v. Lang, 76 Ill. 2d 311 (1979). As noted in that opinion, Lang was an illiterate deaf-mute with virtually no communicative abilities who, over the course of 14 years, had been twice charged with murder, but had been found unfit for trial and not civilly committable. According to the House debates, Public Act 81-1217 was the result of the Lang case and was intended to bridge a “glaring gap” in the statutory framework for dealing with unfit defendants. 81st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 19, 1979, at 75 (statements of Representative Daniels). Under the then-existing
Accordingly, the relevant legislative history provides no support for the defendant‘s interpretation of
The defendant nonetheless argues that logic compels the rule he proposes. The defendant asserts that, where a bona fide doubt of a defendant‘s fitness has been raised (as there must be for a fitness hearing to take place), it is not logical to allow that potentially unfit defendant to personally make the decision whether to have a jury decide his fitness. This court rejected this precise argument in People v. Brown, 43 Ill. 2d 79, 82 (1969), stating:
“Defendant asserts, however, that it is inconsistent to try a person‘s competency to stand trial and at the same time accept his tendered jury waiver as being understandingly made. This argument has some surface appeal, but we do not think it makes a tendered jury waiver a nullity
as defendant contends. The other side of the coin is that it would be reversible error for the trial court to deny a competent defendant‘s jury waiver.” Brown, 43 Ill. 2d at 82.
The defendant acknowledges the holding in Brown, but urges a different result here. We see no reason not to adhere to the Brown court‘s resolution of this issue. The defendant concedes that, up until 1979, the legislature expressly granted defendants in this situation the right to demand or waive a jury, apparently finding no lack of logic in that procedure. We have held that the 1979 change in the fitness jury statute did not take away that right. We therefore continue to adhere to the Brown court‘s rejection of this argument. We find no inherent inconsistency in upholding the legislature‘s grant to defendants of the right to decide whether a jury will determine their fitness for trial.
In a related argument, the defendant contends that the acceptance of his jury waiver was improper because it was based upon the trial judge‘s “unsubstantiated personal belief” that the defendant‘s judgment was not impaired even if he was mentally ill. Having found that the defendant possessed the statutory right to decide whether to have a jury determine fitness, we agree with the State that there is no need to consider the trial court‘s “reason” for accepting the defendant‘s waiver. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly held the defendant‘s fitness hearing without a jury.
Fitness Finding
The defendant next contends that the trial court‘s ruling that he was fit to stand trial must be reversed. The defendant makes several arguments in this regard.
A. Manifest Weight of the Evidence
The defendant asserts that the trial court‘s ruling on fitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We find the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of fitness.
At the fitness hearing in this case, defense counsel agreed that there was no dispute that the defendant understood the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him. Rather, the dispute centered on the second part of the fitness inquiry, whether the defendant had the capacity to assist in his defense.
Dr. Mathew Markos, a licensed forensic psychiatrist and acting clinical director of the Psychiatric Institute of the Circuit Court of Cook County (Psychiatric Institute), testified for the State. Dr. Markos testified that he had previously conducted examinations to determine fitness for trial or sanity thousands of times. Dr. Markos met with the defendant, pursuant to court
Dr. Markos diagnosed the defendant as suffering from a personality disorder with schizoid, narcissistic and paranoid traits, which does not constitute a mental illness or mental disorder. Using the criteria set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Third Edition-Revised) (DSMIII-R), Dr. Markos concluded that the defendant was not suffering from schizophrenia. The DSMIII-R requires that, for a diagnosis of schizophrenia, there must be the presence of at least two symptoms, and one of those must be a prominent delusion. The defendant exhibited no delusions or delusional thinking. Neither did the defendant exhibit other symptoms of schizophrenia, such as hallucinations, catatonia or incoherence.
Dr. Markos further testified that, according to his medical records, the defendant had been treated with various antipsychotic drugs while in custody. There was, however, no change in the defendant‘s beliefs as a result of the medications. According to Dr. Markos, a true psychiatric delusion would be amenable to treatment with medications. Dr. Markos conceded that drugs will not always cure a delusional disorder.
Dr. Markos acknowledged that Drs. Fauteck and Rabin, also of the Psychiatric Institute, had diagnosed
Based upon all of this information, Dr. Markos found the defendant fit to stand trial. In Dr. Markos’ opinion, the defendant understood the charges against him and had the capacity to cooperate with counsel if he so chose. The defendant had simply chosen not to cooperate with counsel and had very clearly articulated that he wished to represent himself.
The defendant‘s first witness at the fitness hearing was Assistant Public Defender Thomas Verdun. Verdun was assigned to represent the defendant at his August 9, 1993, bond hearing. Verdun interviewed the defendant for 20 to 30 minutes, during which time the defendant never looked directly at him. While in court at that hearing, the defendant interrupted the judge in order to make a statement condemning “fake Aryan beauty.” The defendant also stated to the court that he was disgusted by the ugliness of people and that he was honored to give his life for his cause. The judge conducting the bond hearing ordered that the defendant undergo a behavioral clinical examination at the Psychiatric Institute.
Dr. Satinder Brar, a clinical psychologist and coordinator of the residential treatment unit of Cook County jail, also testified for the defendant. Dr. Brar had diagnosed the defendant with delusional disorder, grandiose type, which is a mental illness. Dr. Brar
The defense also called Dr. Paul Fauteck, a forensic psychologist at the Psychiatric Institute. Pursuant to court orders, Dr. Fauteck examined the defendant four times between August 19, 1993, and February 15, 1994, administering psychological tests on two occasions. At the first examination, the defendant seemed very intense, maintaining unbroken eye contact, but was overall appropriately behaved. The defendant described to Dr. Fauteck his philosophy, stating that he was alarmed at the increasing ugliness of the American population and believed that it was due to “false Aryan cosmetics,” specifically plastic surgery, hair coloring and tinted contact lenses. The defendant reported that he believed that the Anti-Defamation League was tracking him and had labelled him a “very dangerous man.” After the first examination, Dr. Fauteck diagnosed the defendant as suffering from delusional disorder, persecutory type.
During the second examination, Dr. Fauteck administered several psychological tests, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (Second) (MMPI-2), the Rorschach Ink Blot Test and the Thematic Apperception Test, to the defendant. After analyzing the test results, Dr. Fauteck diagnosed the defendant as schizophrenic, paranoid type, which is a mental illness. In reaching this diagnosis, Dr. Fauteck also relied on a social history provided by the defendant‘s parents, showing a history of apparent schizophrenia in the family, the defendant‘s statements and behavior, and the defendant‘s medical records while incarcerated. Dr. Fauteck also noted that the defendant exhibited marked looseness of association, in that he did not have an internal consistency in his delusions, and that he had
In Dr. Fauteck‘s opinion, the defendant was not fit to stand trial. Dr. Fauteck found that the defendant understood the charges against him, but that his mental illness rendered him incapable of assisting in his defense. Dr. Fauteck explained that, for the defendant, the virtual survival of civilization depends on him and on his sacrificing his life to make a statement. In Dr. Fauteck‘s opinion, because of his delusion, the defendant could not view the trial process as a defendant should view it and could not make rational decisions about his defense.
On cross-examination, Dr. Fauteck testified that the defendant was very bright and articulate. Dr. Fauteck admitted that, after his first examination of the defendant, his provisional opinion was that the defendant was fit. Dr. Fauteck acknowledged that the criteria in the DSMIII-R for diagnosing schizophrenia are used almost universally in his profession. Dr. Fauteck also acknowledged that, under the DSMIII-R, more than just a delusion is necessary for a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Dr. Fauteck further conceded that a diagnosis of schizophrenia does not by itself render a person unfit for trial.
Dr. Michael Rabin, a forensic psychologist at the Psychiatric Institute, also testified for the defense. Dr. Rabin had particularized training in the scoring of the MMPI and Dr. Fauteck asked him to analyze the defendant‘s test. Dr. Rabin also sat in on Dr. Fauteck‘s interviews with the defendant on two occasions. The defendant stated during these interviews that he expects to use the trial as a forum to warn America about the danger posed by fake Aryan cosmetics and that he did not want a lawyer to represent him because his ideas
In addition, psychiatrists Drs. Rafael Carreira and Usha Kartan testified for the defense. While both had diagnosed the defendant as suffering from delusional disorder, neither offered an opinion on the defendant‘s fitness.
After hearing all of the evidence, the trial court ruled that the defendant had the ability to assist in his defense and was therefore fit to stand trial. This ruling was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Dr. Markos’ testimony provided adequate support for the trial court‘s finding that the defendant was fit. The only dispute was whether the defendant was capable of assisting in his defense. Dr. Markos, whose qualifications as an expert in this regard were unchallenged, testified that the defendant was capable of assisting in his defense and was therefore fit to stand trial. Dr. Markos’ opinion was based on repeated examinations of the defendant and took into consideration all relevant information, including the contrary opinions of his colleagues. While the defendant presented other expert witnesses who testified to a contrary opinion, the trial court was not required to accept the defense experts’ view. The credibility and weight to be given to psychiatric testimony are for the trier of fact to determine. Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d at 18; People v. Bilyew, 73 Ill. 2d 294, 302 (1978). As this court has previously stated, “[t]he ultimate issue was for the trial court, not the experts, to decide.” Bilyew, 73 Ill. 2d at 302.
Moreover, the opinions of the defense experts who
B. Trial Court‘s Reference to Delusions
In a further attempt to obtain reversal of the fitness finding, the defendant charges that the trial court‘s ruling cannot be upheld because the trial court made a factual finding which compelled the opposite conclusion. The defendant refers to the following statement by the trial court, made while delivering its ruling on fitness:
“The fact that an individual has deep-seated, delusional beliefs which are fixed and which do not change in the light of more reasoned beliefs does not lift such feelings to the level of being unable, and I underscore unable, to assist counsel who may not hold or agree with such delusional thought.”
The defendant asserts this statement reveals that the trial court found the defendant‘s beliefs were delusional. The defendant contends all of the expert witnesses testified that, if the defendant‘s beliefs were delusional, he was not fit to stand trial. Accordingly, the defendant concludes, this factual finding by the trial court required the court to rule that the defendant was unfit.
The defendant‘s argument fails. When the trial judge‘s comment is considered in context, it is clear that he had accepted Dr. Markos’ testimony that the defendant‘s belief system did not preclude him from cooperating with counsel. The trial court stated that he found
C. Prejudgment of Fitness
The defendant next contends that a comment by the trial judge revealed that he had prejudged the fitness issue. The record does not support this contention.
As discussed earlier in this opinion, prior to the start of the fitness hearing, an issue was raised concerning the defendant‘s desire to waive a jury for the proceeding. In connection with this issue, the trial court asked the parties for a synopsis of the evidence which would be presented at the fitness hearing. Defense counsel stated that doctors were expected to testify that the defendant was schizophrenic, and argued that this would render the defendant incompetent to waive a jury for fitness. The trial court responded with the following comment:
“Well I do because I do not think that a paranoid schizophrenic—By nature of that disease, I do not think you are going to find anything that says that they are impaired because of the disease, if they are actively suffering from that disease, in making decisions. Their decisions may be bad, but it does not say anything—.”
The defendant contends that these remarks reveal that the trial court had prejudged the issue of the defendant‘s fitness. We disagree. It is clear from the
D. Reliance on Presumption of Fitness
The defendant finally asserts that the trial court improperly relied on the statutory presumption of fitness in finding the defendant fit. For this contention, the defendant relies on the following comment by the trial court in delivering its ruling:
“It is, therefore, the finding of this Court that the State has borne its burden by a preponderance of the evidence as to fitness and that the legal presumption of fitness has not been overborne and that the defendant is adjudged to be legally fit to stand trial.”
The defendant correctly asserts that, once the trial court finds that a bona fide doubt of fitness exists, the presumption of fitness no longer adheres and the burden shifts to the State to prove the defendant‘s fitness.
Trial
Waiver of Counsel
The defendant asserts that reversal of his convictions is warranted because his waiver of counsel was accepted without compliance with
It is well established that the
“(a) Waiver of Counsel. Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The court shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands the following:
- the nature of the charge;
- the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences; and
- that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel appointed for him by the court.” 134 Ill. 2d R. 401(a).
This court has held that compliance with
In this case, the record reveals that the defendant‘s waiver of counsel was preceded by substantial compliance with
On December 14, 1993, the defendant again appeared before Judge Locallo. At that time, Judge Locallo raised the issue of defendant‘s self-representation. The following colloquy ensued:
“THE COURT: Mr. Haynes, you have appeared before me a number of times. Initially if I recall correctly from one of the first times that you came before me you had indicated that you wished to represent yourself, but then at the same time also have standby counsel.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I am sorry. I didn‘t realize you were going to address this at this point. If it‘s your intention, if it‘s your Honor‘s intention to address the matter of Mr. Haynes’ representation, we‘re going to interpose an objection at this point.
THE COURT: Before you propose your objection. Obviously you are working hard on this case with co-counsel, and the State is working hard on this case, too, to get ready for trial. The Court is getting mixed signals from Mr. Haynes as to whether he is going to represent himself or whether he is going to have you as counsel. The Court is not going to require Mr. Haynes to make that decision today. But I feel that it is incumbent since this case is in
the system that he should be admonished regarding the consequences of representing himself. *** So I am not going to make Mr. Haynes make his decision, but I feel it is incumbent that he understands the consequences. And he will be given some additional time to make a decision as to what he wishes to do. But I am not going to allow this case to go too much longer because at some point the State has to know who they are going to be dealing with.”
Defense counsel objected, asserting that it was inappropriate to address the issue of the defendant‘s representation before the fitness issue had been resolved. Judge Locallo, however, stated that he believed it was appropriate to admonish the defendant pursuant to
“THE COURT: All right. Mr. Haynes you had previously stated to me before that you wanted to represent yourself. But then wanted standby counsel. And then on another court date you said you wanted to retain the attorneys that are representing you today. Then on December 6th you had again indicated you wished to represent yourself. Is that a fair assessment of what you had stated before?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. It‘s a fair assessment.”
Thereafter, Judge Locallo described to the defendant each of the three counts of first degree murder and the one count of burglary with which he was charged. The judge further informed the defendant of the minimum and maximum penalties for first degree murder, including the possibility of an extended term sentence and the death penalty. Judge Locallo informed the defendant that he had the right to be represented by counsel and that, if he could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed for him. The judge also described the functions a lawyer would undertake on the defendant‘s behalf. The defendant stated that he understood the judge‘s admonishments. Judge Locallo also inquired into the defendant‘s personal history, determining that
Following this court appearance, subsequent fitness examinations were conducted, leading up to a fitness hearing which took place between March 2 and 4, 1994. On March 4, 1994, immediately following the trial court‘s ruling that the defendant was fit to stand trial, the defendant orally informed the court he would “like to make a move to be my own counsel and be my own representative.” The trial judge, Judge Strayhorn, responded as follows:
“THE COURT: You have that right. Mr. Haynes, I will grant that right, but I will order Mr. Sarley and Miss Marchigiani [assistant public defenders] to stand by and offer you such assistance as you ask them to offer in the trial process.
Therefore, defendant‘s request to represent himself is allowed. Public defender is appointed as standby counsel. I will set the trial date then.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We would ask for a hearing on whether Mr. Haynes can represent himself.
THE COURT: No. If he wants to represent himself, I have advised him, other judges have advised him against the wisdom of representing oneself in a criminal case. The supreme court says that right cannot be taken away from an individual who wants to do so. Therefore, I am going to let him do so. You will stand by as standby counsel.”
Later in this same court appearance, one of the prosecutors sought to obtain from the trial judge clarification of the judge‘s position on the required admonitions, and the following colloquy ensued:
“[PROSECUTOR]: With respect to Supreme Court Rule 401 regarding the admonishments required, Judge Locallo in our presence did advise the defendant of that.
THE COURT: I know that.
[PROSECUTOR]: I want to make sure that is of record and that is what you are relying on at this point. At that time Judge Locallo— THE COURT: It was done in open court in the presence of a court reporter. I have no reason to doubt that it wasn‘t done. I do not feel it necessary to repeat it. It has already been repeated many times to this man. Therefore, if he persists in his determination to represent himself, fine, so be it.”
On the first day of trial, April 25, 1994, Judge Strayhorn inquired of the defendant whether he continued in his wish to represent himself and warned him that it was unwise to proceed without counsel. The defendant responded that he wished to represent himself.
On this record, we find that there was substantial compliance with
The defendant nonetheless contends that Judge Locallo‘s admonishments were insufficient to satisfy the requirements of
We reject the defendant‘s contention. Under the specific circumstances of this case, the admonishments given by Judge Locallo were sufficient to comply with
Further, it is clear that the trial judge, in accepting the defendant‘s waiver of counsel, was aware that Judge Locallo had admonished the defendant in accordance with
It would have been preferable for the trial judge accepting the waiver to admonish the defendant in accordance with
The defendant also charges that, aside from timing, Judge Locallo‘s admonishments were insufficient to satisfy
“Where a defendant knows the nature of the charges against him and understands that as a result of those charges he may receive the death penalty, his knowledge and understanding that he may be eligible to receive a lesser sentence pales in comparison.” Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d at 333-34.
Likewise, in Johnson, this court held a waiver of counsel to be valid despite the fact that the trial court had failed to specifically advise the defendant that he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment. This court relied upon the fact that the defendant had been fully apprised that he could receive the death penalty. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d at 132-34.
In this case, as in Coleman and Johnson, the information omitted from the admonishments did not invalidate the defendant‘s waiver of counsel. Here, as in those cases, the defendant was fully aware of the range of sentences possible for the most serious charge against him, first degree murder, including the possibility of the death sentence. Given that, the importance of the defendant‘s having specific knowledge of the minimum and maximum sentences for the significantly less serious charge of burglary clearly “pales in comparison.” Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d at 334. Accordingly, we hold that Judge Locallo‘s admonishments, despite the omission of the sentences for burglary, substantially complied with
In addition, the record as a whole clearly demonstrates that the defendant‘s decision to waive counsel was made freely, knowingly and intelligently. The defendant first expressed his desire to represent himself at
All of these circumstances, combined with the detailed admonishments of Judge Locallo, compel the conclusion that the defendant knew and understood the nature of the charges against him, the sentencing possibilities, and his right to counsel, all of the matters encompassed by
In a related claim, the defendant charges that his waiver of counsel was invalid because his reason for the waiver was irrational, pointing to the testimony at the fitness hearing that the defendant planned to use the trial to broadcast his philosophy. We do not agree that the defendant‘s waiver may be invalidated on such a basis. We have found that the defendant‘s waiver was made knowingly and intelligently, and in substantial compliance with the mandates of
Alternatively, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to readmonish him regarding his waiver of counsel prior to the sentencing hearing. This court has held that, in the absence of circumstances indicating that the waiver is limited, a valid pretrial waiver of counsel by a defendant who is advised that he has the right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings is operative at sentencing. People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119, 145-47 (1987); People v. Baker, 92 Ill. 2d 85, 95 (1982). We find no indication in the record that the defendant‘s pretrial waiver of counsel was limited to trial only. Further, we note that, prior to the sentencing hearing, the trial court inquired of the defendant whether he persisted in his desire to represent himself and advised him against proceeding pro se. The defendant informed the trial court that he wished to continue representing himself. Readmonishment of the defendant prior to sentencing was not required.
Other-Crimes Evidence
The defendant also charges that he was denied a fair trial by the introduction of irrelevant and inflammatory evidence of other crimes he committed. During trial, the State introduced evidence demonstrating that the defendant had attempted to murder Charles Stroupe and had murdered Frank Ringi. The defendant contends that this evidence was irrelevant and its introduction requires a new trial. We find no grounds for reversal.
The defendant raised no objection to the admission of any of the challenged evidence. Consequently, the defendant waived any error in the admission of this evi
For the foregoing reasons, we reject the defendant‘s claims that he is entitled to a new trial. The defendant has raised the point, and the State agrees, that it was error for the trial court to enter judgment on three counts of murder, where there was only one victim. Accordingly, the conviction for felony murder and the conviction for knowing murder are vacated. People v. Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill. 2d 353, 377 (1990) (when multiple murder convictions have been entered for the same act, the less culpable convictions must be vacated). The defendant‘s convictions for intentional murder and burglary are affirmed.
Sentencing
Eligibility Determination
The defendant‘s first claim of error with regard to sentencing is directed at the trial court‘s finding that he was eligible for the death penalty. As noted, the defendant was found eligible based on two statutory eligibility factors: (1) that the defendant intentionally killed
The defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of death eligibility. Rather, the defendant contends that the eligibility finding must be reversed because it was made summarily by the trial court without a hearing on the issue. The record supports the defendant‘s factual assertions in this regard. According to the record, immediately after the trial court issued its guilty verdict at trial, the court went on to find the defendant eligible for the death penalty without hearing any additional evidence or argument. Later in the proceeding, the State informed the court that it was prepared to proceed with the eligibility hearing and the trial judge responded that he would not hold such a hearing because he had already found the defendant eligible. The State subsequently requested that the trial court inquire of the defendant whether he wished to present any evidence on eligibility. The trial court refused, stating:
“THE COURT: No. Doesn‘t need to be. I found as a matter of law that he is eligible. So, whatever he says is not going to have any consequence because the law says he‘s eligible.”
After reviewing these comments and others made by the trial court, we conclude that the trial court did, as the defendant here claims, dispense with a hearing on eligibility and make a summary finding of eligibility. This conduct by the trial court was clearly in violation of our death penalty statute. The death penalty statute expressly requires that a separate sentencing hearing be conducted for the dual purposes of “determin[ing] the existence of factors set forth in subsection (b) [eligibility factors]” and “consider[ing] any aggravating or mitigat
Our review of the record further reveals, however, that at no time prior to or during the sentencing proceedings did the defendant demand a hearing on eligibility, request that he be permitted to present evidence on the issue, or otherwise object to the trial court‘s handling of the issue. Thus, we are compelled to find that the defendant acquiesced in the summary procedure employed by the trial court, and thereby waived this claim of error for review. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). The fact that the defendant was proceeding pro se does not excuse his failure to preserve an error for review. People v. Long, 39 Ill. 2d 40, 43 (1968). This is particularly true here, where the defendant was provided with standby counsel who were available to assist him. Long, 39 Ill. 2d at 43. Moreover, the defendant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the trial court‘s actions. As discussed later in this opinion, the evidence supporting the defendant‘s eligibility, at least under the factor set forth in section 9-1(b)(11) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (
We emphasize, however, that we do not condone the procedure employed here of summarily deciding a defendant‘s eligibility for the death penalty. The evidence presented at a defendant‘s culpability trial is properly considered in making the eligibility determination. However, a trial court may not simply combine the eligibility determination with the culpability trial. Not only does the statute provide otherwise, fairness militates against such a procedure. The issues to be decided at the culpability trial differ from those to be decided for death eligibility. Not all those convicted of murder may be found eligible for the death penalty, and the requirement of a statutory eligibility factor fulfills the constitutional requirement of “‘narrow[ing] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and *** reasonably justify[ing] the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.‘” People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 36 (1995), quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235, 249-50, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2742 (1983). The culpability trial focuses only on whether the defendant is guilty of murder, not on the further consideration of whether he is also eligible for the death penalty. Under this scheme, a defendant cannot be expected to defend against both a guilty verdict and a finding of eligibility at the culpability trial.
The dissent strenuously urges that reversal of the defendant‘s sentence is warranted on this ground. The basis for the dissent‘s belief that this error requires reversal in this case is less than clear. The bulk of the
Parenthetically, we are compelled to point out that the dissent, in discussing People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132 (1996), misstates the holding of that case. The dissent states that in Brown, this court reversed a death sentence on the ground that the trial court committed error in immediately proceeding to determine eligibility after finding the defendant guilty. Brown, however, did not even address the propriety of the trial judge‘s actions in this regard, let alone order reversal on that ground. Rather, reversal of the defendant‘s death sentence in Brown was predicated wholly on the fact that the defendant‘s pretrial waiver of a jury for death sentencing was invalid because the trial judge, in obtaining the waiver, misinformed the defendant that he must waive a jury for sentencing as a precondition to waiving a jury for trial. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d at 154-161. No similar facts are present here, and the dissent‘s suggestion that Brown compels reversal in this case is not accurate.
In a related contention, the defendant argues that reversal is required because the trial court‘s summary
Jury Waiver at Sentencing
The defendant waived a jury for his capital sentencing hearing. The defendant now claims that his waiver was not knowing and intelligent because the trial court failed to inform him that the vote of one juror could preclude a sentence of death. This claim is without merit. We have repeatedly held that a valid capital sentencing jury waiver does not require the trial court to admonish the defendant that the vote of a single juror is sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. People v. Todd, 154 Ill. 2d 57, 72 (1992); People v. Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d 271, 295 (1987). This court has held it is sufficient, for a valid capital sentencing jury waiver, for the trial court to explain to the defendant that he is waiving the right to have a jury consider the capital sentencing issues and that the sentencing decision would, therefore, be made by the judge alone. People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 156 (1996); People v. Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d 259, 301 (1995). The record reveals that the trial court‘s admonishments to the defendant prior to accepting the sentencing jury waiver met these requirements. The defendant‘s contention that his sentencing jury waiver was invalid is therefore rejected.
The defendant also suggests that his jury waiver was invalid because he was not specifically told by the trial court that he had the right to a jury for the eligibility determination. As noted above, however, we have found that the trial court‘s admonishments to the defendant were sufficient to effectuate a valid sentencing jury waiver. Further, our review of the record reveals that
Reevaluation of Fitness Prior to Sentencing
The defendant next claims that reversal of his death sentence is warranted because the trial court erred in rejecting standby counsel‘s request for a reevaluation of the defendant‘s fitness prior to sentencing. Shortly after the trial court issued its verdict finding the defendant guilty, standby counsel for the defendant asked the court to order the defendant examined for fitness for sentencing. The trial court refused this request, stating that the defendant had already been found fit.
On appeal, the defendant acknowledges that he was found fit to stand trial after a lengthy pretrial hearing. The defendant does not claim that, subsequent to that hearing, a bona fide doubt of his fitness was raised such that the trial court was required to hold a fitness hearing prior to sentencing.
The decision whether to order a fitness examination is expressly left to the discretion of the trial court because it is in a superior position to observe and evaluate the defendant‘s conduct.
The defendant also makes the vague assertion that a new fitness examination was required because the trial court “knew” that the defendant was receiving antipsychotic medications. This assertion is groundless. The trial court‘s knowledge that the defendant was receiving such medications was gained from the testimony presented at the defendant‘s fitness hearing. Thus, the trial court certainly took this information into account in making the pretrial fitness determination. There is no evidence that the administration of antipsychotic drugs to the defendant was changed in any manner that would have required a revisitation to the issue of his fitness prior to sentencing.
Constitutionality of Section 9-1(b)(11)
The defendant asserts that his death sentence must be vacated because he was found eligible on the basis of an unconstitutionally vague eligibility factor. As noted, the defendant was found eligible for death on the basis of two eligibility factors: (1) murder in the course of a felony (
Section 9-1(b)(11) provides that a statutory eligibility factor exists if:
“the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable expectation that the death of a human being would result therefrom.”
720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1992).
This court has already held that section 9-1(b)(11) is not unconstitutionally vague, finding that its terms place the necessary restraint on the sentencer‘s discretion to impose death. People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 191-92 (1996); People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 356, 372-73 (1993).
In this case, the evidence overwhelmingly supported a finding of eligibility based on section 9-1(b)(11). The evidence showed that the defendant coldly and meticulously planned the murder of Dr. Sullivan. Some time prior to the crime, the defendant decided to commit the murder of a plastic surgeon in order to “strike out” against the perpetrators of “fake Aryan cosmetics.” In furtherance of this goal, the defendant perused the yellow pages of the telephone book and selected Dr. Sullivan as his target, based on the size of his advertisement. A few days prior to the crime, the defendant called Dr. Sullivan‘s office and made an appointment under a false name. At the scheduled date and time, the defendant went to Dr. Sullivan‘s office for the purpose of carrying out his plan. The defendant waited to commit the murder until he was in the office with Dr. Sullivan so that he could be sure that he was murdering the right man. In addition, the defendant stated that he had planned
Existence of Statutory Mitigating Factor
The defendant also contends that reversal of his death sentence is warranted because the trial court effectively ignored the existence of a statutory mitigating factor. The defendant claims the evidence showed that, at the time of the murder, he was acting under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance within the meaning of section 9-1(c)(2) of the death penalty statute.
The defendant also claims that brief questioning of Dr. Markos by the trial court, designed to ascertain if the doctor considered the defendant to be mentally ill, demonstrates that the trial court applied an erroneous interpretation of the statutory factor. This conclusion is not supported. The trial court expressly stated that it had considered the mitigating factors set forth in the death penalty statute. We find no indication in the record that the trial court failed to properly evaluate these factors. The questioning referred to by the defendant constituted nothing more than the trial court‘s effort to clarify a portion of Dr. Markos’ testimony, which he found confusing. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court‘s determination that this statutory mitigating factor was not present.
Finally, the defendant raises two constitutional challenges to the Illinois death penalty statute. The defendant first contends that the statute is unconstitutional because it places a burden of proof on the defendant which precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence. This court has previously rejected this argument (see People v. Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d 201, 247 (1993)), and we decline to reconsider that holding. The defendant also contends that the death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it does not sufficiently minimize the risk of arbitrarily or capriciously imposed death sentences. We decline to reconsider our previous holding rejecting this constitutional challenge. See People v. Tenner, 157 Ill. 2d 341, 390 (1993).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the defendant‘s convictions for intentional murder and burglary and affirm his death sentence. We vacate, however, the defendant‘s convictions for knowing and felony murder. We hereby direct the clerk of this court to enter an order setting Wednesday, January 15, 1997, as the date on which the sentence of death entered by the circuit court of Cook County shall be carried out. The defendant shall be executed in the manner provided by law.
Convictions affirmed in part and vacated in part; sentences affirmed.
Although I concur in the majority‘s affirmance of the defendant‘s burglary and intentional murder convictions in this case, I disagree with its conclusions concerning the propriety of the death sentence hearing. Specifically, I am deeply troubled by the majority‘s treatment of the trial judge‘s summary finding that defendant was eligible for the death penalty. The trial judge here not only failed to follow the procedure established by the legislature in conducting the hearing, but also misstated the law to a pro se defendant. These errors, taken together, cast serious doubt on the integrity of the proceeding which we review today. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion.
I
Our death penalty statute expressly provides that upon the State‘s request, the court “shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine the existence of factors set forth in subsection (b) [eligibility factors] and to consider any aggravating or mitigating factors as indicated in subsection (c). The proceeding shall be conducted *** before the court alone if the defendant waives a jury for the separate proceeding.”
The transcript of proceedings in this case reveals
“[THE COURT]: There‘s really nothing that the court can add to what has already been added by virtue of the totality of the evidence in this case and so, therefore, it now becomes my obligation and responsibility to tell Mr. Jonathan Haynes that he is guilty in the manner and form as charged in the indictment. That is the finding of the court, and judgment will be entered on the finding.
Please step up, Mr. Haynes. Mr. Haynes, under the charge that has been placed against you, this is felony murder. A felony murder carries with it a possible sentence of death. And since the court has found you guilty in manner and form as charged in the indictment, and since one of the allegations in the indictment was that you committed this first degree murder in the course of the perpetration of another felony, that being burglary, that makes you eligible to have death imposed upon you as a sentence in this case.
The law states that under these circumstances, a Defendant having been found guilty under the felony murder count of the indictment has a right to have the determination made as to whether or not death should be imposed by a fact finder, either a jury or by the court. And I now ask you at this time, do you understand what I have just stated?
MR. HAYNES: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: Do you wish to confer again with [standby counsel] with reference to your rights now as to whether you wish to have a jury hear and make a determination as to what the sentence should be in this case or whether you wish the court to make that determination? Do you wish to—confer with [stand-by] counsel on that issue?
MR. HAYNES: No, I do not.
THE COURT: What is your desire? Do you wish a jury
to hear and make a determination as to the sentence to impose upon you after you have been found guilty of first degree felony murder or do you wish to [sic] court to make that determination? MR. HAYNES: I will let the court decide.
THE COURT: I will ask you at this time, therefore, to sign the jury waiver which states that you waive your constitutional right to have a jury determine what your punishment should be in this case, and are willing to submit this issue to a court sitting without a jury.
* * *
Mr. Haynes, I‘m passing to you a document which if you sign it means that you will waive your constitutional right to have a jury hear evidence and determine what the sentence should be in this case after a finding of guilty. I want you to be absolutely clear that you understand what you are signing when you sign this document. Do you understand that?
MR. HAYNES: Yes. Yes, I do.” (Emphasis added.)
At this point in the proceedings, stand-by counsel requested to have defendant ordered examined for a determination of his fitness to be sentenced. The court denied the request. The following colloquy then occurred:
“MR. PAYNTER [Assistant State‘s Attorney]: Your Honor, the People at this time would just merely wish to supplement the action the court has taken by filing with the court a motion to conduct a sentence proceeding to determine the imposition of the death penalty.
THE COURT: Proceed.
MR. PAYNTER: We are prepared to proceed on the eligibility.
THE COURT: No, I find him eligible. So we don‘t have to have any evidence presented on that issue. I find that the law is such that he is charged with felony murder. He has been found guilty of felony murder.
With felony murder, one of the sentences that is possible for a felony murder is the death penalty. So I find him based upon the evidence that has been presented in the trial, that he is eligible to have the death penalty imposed upon him.
MR. PAYNTER: The court also takes judicial notice the Defendant is over the age of 18.
THE COURT: Yes.” (Emphasis added.)
The court then continued the proceeding to the following week, stating that “[t]here‘s been a finding of eligibility for the imposition of the death penalty.”
At the beginning of the next court session, the trial judge stated to defendant that “this is the sentence hearing. The State is asking that you be sentenced to death, and under the statute, there is a sentencing hearing required because the Court has found that you are eligible to have the death penalty imposed. Do you still desire and wish to represent yourself in this sentencing hearing?” (Emphasis added.) Defendant responded affirmatively. The following exchange between the assistant State‘s Attorney and the trial judge then occurred:
“MR. NELSON: Judge, we addressed the eligibility question on Friday.
We‘d ask you to inquire of the defendant if there was any evidence he wished to offer on that particular issue.
THE COURT: No. Doesn‘t need to be. I found as a matter of law that he is eligible. So, whatever he says is not going to have any consequence because the law says he‘s eligible.” (Emphasis added.)
II
The majority concludes that the “trial court did, as the defendant here claims, dispense with a hearing on eligibility and make a summary finding of eligibility. This conduct by the trial court was clearly in violation of our death penalty statute.” 174 Ill. 2d at 247. The majority, however, goes on to hold that “at no time *** did the defendant demand a hearing on eligibility, request that he be permitted to present evidence on the issue, or otherwise object to the trial court‘s handling of the issue *** and thereby waived this claim of error for review.” 174 Ill. 2d at 248. I find this resolution of defendant‘s contentions, on the basis of waiver, disconcerting on two levels.
Under my reading of our death penalty statute, a defendant is not under any obligation to “demand” a hearing on eligibility. The statute mandates that the trial court “shall” conduct such a hearing upon the State‘s request. See
It is with these concerns in mind, perhaps, that the majority ultimately concludes that defendant “has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the trial court‘s actions.” 174 Ill. 2d at 248.1 The reason the majority gives for this conclusion is that the evidence of defendant‘s eligibility was “overwhelming.” 174 Ill. 2d at 248. That may be so, but the harm caused by the trial judge‘s error affected more than mere eligibility. Contrary to the majority‘s position, I believe that the trial court‘s determination of defendant‘s death eligibility, made before the State even filed its motion for a death sentencing hearing, resulted in two distinct problems which mandate reversal.
First, the trial judge preempted the State from going forth with its case of death eligibility. Indeed, when the prosecutor attempted to adduce its evidence of eligibility, the trial judge replied, erroneously, that we “don‘t have to have any evidence presented on that issue. He has been found guilty of felony murder.” Not only does this statement presuppose that the State
More important, the trial judge‘s statement demonstrates a disregard of the fact that not all defendants found guilty of felony murder at trial are ipso facto death eligible at sentencing. A capital sentencing scheme must provide a “‘meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.‘” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 883, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932 (1976), quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, 392, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (1972) (White, J., concurring). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the eligibility phase of a death sentence hearing plays a “constitutionally necessary” function by “circumscrib[ing] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877-78, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235, 251, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2743 (1983). This phase of the hearing safeguards against arbitrary and capricious sentencing because it
III
Despite the trial judge‘s failure to adhere to the statute‘s procedural requirements and his numerous misstatements of the law throughout these proceedings, the majority holds that the trial court‘s admonishments to the defendant “were sufficient to effectuate a valid sentencing jury waiver.” 174 Ill. 2d at 252. I strongly disagree.
After the trial judge had found, sua sponte, defendant eligible for the death penalty, he undertook to ascertain if the defendant wished to waive a jury for his hearing. As noted, our death penalty statute grants defendants the right to choose a jury for their death sentencing hearing even when they are convicted at a bench trial. See
IV
Accordingly, I cannot agree with my colleagues that because there is evidence in the record to support a finding of eligibility, defendant suffered no prejudice from the trial judge‘s actions. In the past, this court has required “a high standard of procedural accuracy” in death sentencing hearings in order to ensure that “the penalty is applied in as uniform a manner as possible within the framework of an adversary proceeding.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Walker, 91 Ill. 2d 502, 517 (1982). In fact, this court recently, in a unanimous decision, reversed a sentence of death imposed by the same trial judge for actions similar, in part, to those reviewed here today. See People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 163 (1996) (finding error where trial judge immediately proceeded to determine death eligibility after finding defendant guilty of murder). Given the similarity of the complained-of actions in the case at bar, I see no reason for today‘s departure from such recent precedent.
Where, as here, the trial judge takes it upon himself to declare a defendant death eligible immediately after finding that defendant guilty and prior to the State‘s formal request for a death sentencing hearing, the resultant “hearing” loses the appearance of an adver
JUSTICES MILLER and McMORROW join in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.