People v. QuickPeople v. Quick
Daniel Grant Quick appeals his conviction by plea to possession for sale of a controlled substance (
Facts and Procedural History
Atascadero Police Officer Matthew Chesson received a call from a narcotics detective that appellant had just left his residence in a black Mercury. Earlier that day, Officer Chesson was advised that appellant was involved in narcotics activity and had multiple firearms.
Officer Chesson followed appellant, saw him commit three Vehicle Code violations and stopped him. He explained to appellant that his brake lights were not working properly. Appellant said that he had recently rewired the car and may have incorrectly connected the wires. Officer Chesson noticed that appellant‘s pupils were constricted, he was exhibiting facial tremors, and open sores on his face. These were symptoms of a person under the influence of a controlled substance. Appellant admitted using Percocet and marijuana earlier in the day.
Appellant was asked to step out of the car for a field sobriety test. He refused. Officer Chesson knew that appellant
Officer Chesson conducted field sobriety tests, determined that appellant was under the influence of a controlled substance, and arrested appellant for driving under the influence.
Sergeant Jason Carr assisted in the arrest and ordered that appellant‘s vehicle be towed because it was blocking a driveway. The driveway owner, a friend of appellant, said that the vehicle could stay parked where it was. However, it was parked 24 inches into the roadway creating a traffic hazard.
Officers conducted a vehicle inventory search, finding 25.9 grams of methaphetamine (259 to 518 single doses) in the jacket pocket, two methamphetamine pipes, and a Taser.
Denying the motion, the trial court found that Officer Chesson had a rational suspicion to effectuate the traffic stop and probable cause to arrest appellant for driving under the influence of a controlled substance. It also said that appellant “took steps . . . which made it difficult or impossible for the police to do a simple search incident to the arrest when he locked the car and threw the keys in it.” Officer Chesson “had legal authority to search the interior of the car since he was arresting [appellant] for [being] under the influence of a controlled substance or driving under the influence.” Finally, it found that the inventory
Standard of Review
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court‘s factual findings, express or implied, if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1119.) “We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search . . . was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (Ibid.) “If there is conflicting testimony, we must accept the trial court‘s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, its evaluations of credibility, and the version of events most favorable to the People, to the extent the record supports them. [Citations.]” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 342.)
Inventory Search
Appellant contends that the search was an unlawful ruse to facilitate a narcotics investigation. This contention is refuted by the record and the trial court‘s factual findings. Vehicle inventory searches are a well-defined exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. (Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 371.) Under the community caretaking doctrine, police may, without a warrant, impound and search a vehicle so long as they do so in conformance with the standardized procedures of the local police department and in furtherance of a community caretaking purpose. (People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761-762.) “The authority of
Sergeant Carr impounded the vehicle because it was blocking a driveway and parked two feet out in the roadway. He said that it was a narrow road and that “two cars [would] have a difficult time passing” one another “[e]ven if that vehicle wasn‘t there.” Officer Chesson did not believe appellant‘s vehicle was in immediate danger of being hit, but agreed it could have led to a collision if another car tried to drive by or an inattentive driver did not see the vehicle sticking out.
Appellant argues that the vehicle was “hovering” between the dirt and road pavement and not a traffic hazard. Sergeant Carr‘s testimony was clear: the vehicle was blocking a driveway and parked far enough out in the roadway to create a traffic hazard. The sergeant‘s testimony was corroborated by Officer Chesson and photos of the parked vehicle.
The vehicle was impounded pursuant to
Sergeant Carr explained that the inventory search was required to document what was in the vehicle and to protect the tow company and the police department. Although Sergeant Carr was aware of the narcotics investigation, he testified that the sole purpose of the impound search was to inventory what was in the vehicle and to verify that nothing was missing when the vehicle was returned to appellant.
Search Incident to Arrest
In the alternative, the trial court found that the search was incident to a lawful arrest and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Citing Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332 (Gant), appellant argues that the search was unreasonable because the officers had no reason to believe that evidence relevant to the arrest for driving under the influence of a controlled substance would be found in the vehicle. In Gant the defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license,
In People v. Nottoli, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th 531, defendant was arrested for driving with an expired license and for being under the influence of a controlled substance. (Id., at p. 540.) A deputy searched Nottoli‘s vehicle and found drug paraphernalia, a firearm, and a cell phone photo of Nottoli posing with firearms. (Id., at p. 541.) The Court of Appeal held that the search was valid pursuant to Gant. Although it was unreasonable to believe evidence of the expired license offense would be found in the car, defendant‘s “arrest for ‘being under the influence of a controlled substance’ supplied a reasonable basis for believing that evidence ‘relevant’ to that type of offense might be in his vehicle. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 553.) “The presence of some amount of the controlled substance or drug paraphernalia in the interior of the vehicle would be circumstantial evidence tending to corroborate that a driver was in fact under the
Appellant admitted using Percocet and marijuana earlier in the day and was under the influence of a controlled substance when driving. When he stepped out of the vehicle to perform the field sobriety tests, he threw his jacket and keys into the car, rolled up the window, and locked and shut the door. Officer Chesson thought it was “odd” behavior but consistent with what someone driving under the influence would do if trying to hide drugs. In accordance with Gant, “the focus of the inquiry is entirely upon the nature of the offense of arrest, rather than the particular facts of the case. [Citation.]” (People v. Evans, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 748.) “[W]hen a driver is arrested for driving under the influence, or being under the influence, it will generally be reasonable for an officer to believe evidence related to that crime might be found in the vehicle. [Citations.] It is certainly logical and reasonable to expect that items related to alcohol or drug consumption, such as alcoholic beverage bottles or drug paraphernalia, might readily be contained in the intoxicated driver‘s car.” (Id., at p. 750.) The trial court did not err in finding that the search was reasonable and incident to the arrest for driving under the influence of a controlled substance. (Ibid.;
The judgment (order denying motion to suppress evidence) is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
YEGAN, J., Acting P. J.
We concur:
PERREN, J.
TANGEMAN, J.