THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ELJOE MADDOX, Appellant.
Crim. No. 5683
In Bank. Supreme Court of California
Feb. 28, 1956.
Appellant‘s petition for a rehearing was denied March 21, 1956.
46 Cal.2d 301
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, Assistant Attorney General, and Leo. J. Vander Lans, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
Roy Cleek testified that on June 23, 1954, he visited defendant‘s home in Oakland and bought a $10 “paper” of heroin, as he had done many times in the preceding six months. He used defendant‘s equipment to take a shot of heroin and left it on the kitchen table. Both Cleek and Joe Davis testified that at about 3:30 p.m., Davis came to defendant‘s residence, bought a “paper” from defendant, and used the same equipment to take a shot of heroin. Shortly after 4:30 p.m. Cleеk and Davis left the premises and had not gone far when they were arrested by Officers Taylor and Hilliard of the Oakland Police Department. Officer Taylor testified that he had the premises under surveillance for about a month, that he saw known users of narcotics frequenting them, and that on June 23d he and Officer Hilliard arrived at their lookout a few minutes before Cleek and Davis left defendant‘s home. Davis told the officers thаt he had been to defendant‘s home and had taken a shot of heroin. Officer Taylor and Davis then went to defendant‘s door and knocked. Officer Taylor heard a male voice say, “Wait a minute” and also heard the sound of retreating footsteps. He kicked the door open and rushed to the kitchen where he saw defendant with a spoon in his hand running toward the bedroom. He grappled with defendant, who threw thе spoon into the bedroom. He found a small parcel containing two hypodermic needles, a syringe, and an eye dropper on the kitchen table. There were traces of heroin on the sрoon. Within two hours after the officers arrived, seven persons came to the premises, five were known to Officer Taylor as narcotics users, and a sixth had needle marks on his arm.
Defendant testified in his own bеhalf and denied that he had sold heroin to Cleek or Davis or had ever had heroin in his possession. Cleek was a friend of his who visited him that day for a friendly conversation, and Davis came to discuss a new fender fоr defendant‘s car. After Cleek and Davis left, defendant discovered the parcel on the kitchen table and concluded that one of his visitors had left it. He
Defendant contends that the spoon and hypodermic equipment were illegally obtained and therefore inadmissible. The attorney general contends that the officеrs had reasonable cause to arrest defendant for the commission of a felony, that they could lawfully enter his premises to make the arrest, and that the seizure of the evidence was lawful as an incident to the arrest. He also contends that since no objection was made in the trial court, the admissibility of the evidence cannot be challenged for the first time on appeal.
This case was tried before the decision in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905]. We held in People v. Kitchens, ante, p. 260 [294 P.2d 17], that the rule that the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a proper objection in the trial court, is not applicable to appeals based on the admission оf illegally obtained evidence in cases tried before the decision in the Cahan case. In such cases, however, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the officers acted legally. (People v. Farrara, ante, p. 265 [294 P.2d 21].)
Moreover, in the present case Officer Taylor had defendant‘s home under surveillance for about a month and had observed known narcotics users frequenting it, and the information Davis gave him before the arrest was reasonable cause for the arrest. (See People v. Boyles, 45 Cal.2d 652, 656 [290 P.2d 535];
Defendant contends, however, that the arrest was illegal because Officer Taylor did not comply with
The question is thus presented whether or not evidence obtained by a search incident to an аrrest must be excluded when the officer has reasonable cause to make the arrest and search but fails to comply with the requirements of
The answer to this question must be sought in the basic rеasons for the exclusionary rule. We considered those reasons again in People v. Martin, supra, 45 Cal.2d 755, and expressly rejected the theory that evidence is excluded to redress or punish a past wrong. The evidence is excluded “on the ground that the government must not be allowed to profit by its own wrong and thus encouraged in the lawless enforcement of the law.” (45 Cal.2d at p. 761.)
Accordingly, we held in the Martin case and in People v. Boyles, supra, 45 Cal.2d 652, 654, that illegal conduct that was entirely unrelated and collateral tо the securing of the evidence objected to does not render that evidence inadmissible. (See also Rogers v. Superior Court, ante, pp. 3, 10-11 [291 P.2d 929].) An example of such conduct would be the failure to comply with the requirements of
The demand and explanation requirements of
It must be borne in mind that the primary purpose of the constitutional guarantees is to prevent unreasonable invasions of the security of the people in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, and when an officer has reasonable cause to enter a dwelling to make an arrest and as an incident to that arrest is authorized to make a reasonable search, his entry and his search are not unreasonable. Suspects have no constitutional right to destroy or dispose of evidence, and no basic constitutional guarantees are violated because an officer succeeds in getting to a place where he is entitled to be more quickly than he would, had he complied with
When, as in this case, he has reasonable grounds to believe a felony is being committed and hears retreating footsteps, the conclusion that his peril would be increased or that the felon would escape if he demanded entrance and explained his purpose, is not unreasonable. In this proceeding we are not concerned with whether or not the officer‘s failure to do so would have justified defendant in using force to protect his person or property, or whether or not a jury in a trespass action might conclude that reasonable cause for the officer‘s failure to comply with the demand and explanation requirements did not exist. Moreover, since the officer‘s right to invade defendant‘s privаcy clearly appears, there is no compelling need for strict compliance with the requirements of
We conclude therefore that when there is reasonable cause to make an arrest and search and the facts known to him before his entry are not inconsistent with a good faith belief on the part of the officer that compliance with section
The judgment and order are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
Shenk, J., concurred in the judgment.
CARTER, J.--I concur in the judgment of affirmance because I believe that on the record before us the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was engaged in the commission of a felony at the time the search was executed аnd that the evidence obtained as the result of the search was therefore admissible against him.