People v. DraytonPeople v. Drayton
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facie showing, the trial court should not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations.
Appellant John Lewis Drayton appeals from the trial court‘s summary denial of his petition filed pursuant to
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 14, 1991, Mr. and Mrs. Ward and their teenage daughter, who were asleep at their residence in Salinas, were woken in the middle of the night.2 They discovered four men, one of whom was Drayton, inside their house. Two of the men were armed. The men asked where the safe was. One of the men told the teenage daughter he was going to rape her, and he placed a firearm inside her vagina. Drayton told the man who threatened to rape the girl not to do it.
Drayton had a gun and held Mrs. Ward down on the floor during the robbery with his foot placed in the middle of her back. Drayton hit Mrs. Ward in the head with his gun. The gun “grazed [her]” and did not hurt her. Two of
In 1991, Drayton and three codefendants were charged by information with murder (
On March 3, 1992, Drayton was convicted by guilty plea of murder (
The probation report filed in connection with Drayton‘s sentencing indicates that Drayton‘s sole prior conviction was a misdemeanor violation of
In January 2019, Drayton filed on his own behalf a petition for resentencing pursuant to
On March 18, 2019, the Monterey County District Attorney‘s Office (district attorney) filed an opposition to Drayton‘s petition to recall his sentence. The district attorney acknowledged that Drayton was neither the actual killer of Mr. Ward, nor had he been found to have intentionally aided and abetted the murder. The district attorney implicitly acknowledged that Drayton had been convicted of murder on a theory of felony murder.
Although individuals convicted of murder on a felony-murder theory are potentially eligible for relief under
The district attorney acknowledged that the record was “unclear” about Drayton‘s role in planning the robbery but stated it was undisputed that Drayton went to the Ward home, participated in the robbery, and pointed a gun at Mrs. Ward. The district attorney argued these factors were enough to make Drayton a “major participant.” In addition, the district attorney contended that Drayton acted with reckless indifference to human life because, among other factors, he was present at the crime scene, brought his gun to the crime, and did not assist Mr. Ward after he had been shot. The district attorney asserted that, because Drayton “is culpable under the new law for committing felony murder his petition must be denied.”4 The district attorney attached to the opposition the transcript from Drayton‘s preliminary hearing, the information, the minute orders for the change of plea and sentencing hearings, and Drayton‘s probation report.
On March 27, 2019, Drayton, represented by counsel, filed a response to the district attorney‘s opposition to his petition for resentencing. Drayton argued that the trial court should issue an order to show cause and conduct a hearing “where the evidence will show whether [Drayton] acted with reckless indifference to human life” (some capitalization omitted).
Drayton argued that, by his actions, he prevented the killing of Mrs. Ward and the rape of her daughter. Drayton also asserted that before the evening of the crime he had not met the coperpetrator who planned the robbery and killed Mr. Ward, and Drayton was not aware of the man‘s propensity to violence. In addition, Drayton voluntarily surrendered to the police the next day. Drayton asserted that, “while this was a horrible nightmare the family went through, [Drayton] took the little steps he could to protect and minimize the danger to Ms. Ward and [her daughter]. He did not act with a reckless
indifference to human life. In fact, without the efforts [Drayton] took this may have turned out to be a multiple homicide case.”
On May 17, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on Drayton‘s petition and denied it without hearing argument or taking evidence. In its oral ruling the trial court stated, “The court agrees with the People‘s position that petitioner is not eligible for resentencing. . . . [¶] The facts of this case are particularly egregious. Petitioner and other armed co-conspirators or individuals entered an inhabited residence in the middle of the night with the intention of stealing money from a safe. [¶] The occupants, Mr. and Mrs. Ward and their 17-year-old daughter, were inside. Mr. and Mrs. Ward were in bed in the master bedroom when confronted by two of the individuals and ordered onto the floor. One of the individuals put a gun in Mr. Ward‘s mouth demanding to know the location of the safe. The couple‘s 17-year-old daughter was brought into the master bedroom. [¶] Petitioner, who had entered the residence also with a firearm, hit Mrs. Ward on the head with the firearm, placed his foot on her back, pinning her to the floor. Ordered her not to move, restrained her in that position for approximately 20 minutes. [¶] During this home invasion or burglary/robbery, a gun was placed in the vagina of the 17-year-old girl apparently in an effort to get Mr. Ward to reveal the location of the safe. One individual also threatened to rape the 17-year-old girl in front her parents. [¶] Mr. Ward was taken into a closet, presumably in search of this safe. A struggle ensued, and he was shot and killed. [¶] The armed individuals were inside the residence approximately 48 minutes. [¶] Petitioner pleaded guilty to first degree murder, admitted an enhancement for personal use of a
Drayton appeals the trial court‘s summary denial of his petition.
II. DISCUSSION
Drayton and the Attorney General agree the trial court erred in finding that Drayton had not made a prima facie case for relief under
With respect to the showing required under
A. Redefinition of Felony Murder by Senate Bill No. 1437
Senate Bill No. 1437, which went into effect on January 1, 2019, amended
There is no dispute that Drayton was neither the actual killer of Mr. Ward nor was convicted on the theory that he had the intent to kill Mr. Ward. Therefore, Drayton‘s liability for murder following the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 turns on whether he “was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
Individuals like Drayton, who believe they were convicted of murder for an act that no longer qualifies as murder following the crime‘s redefinition in 2019, may seek vacatur of their murder conviction and resentencing by filing a petition in the trial court. This petition process was also created by Senate Bill No. 1437 and is codified at
B. Section 1170.95
1. Overview
2. Trial Court‘s Review of the Petition and the “Prima Facie Showing”
The trial court here appointed counsel for Drayton shortly after he filed his petition, so Drayton‘s appeal does not raise the question—currently under review by the California Supreme Court—when the duty to appoint counsel arises. (See People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1128 (Lewis), review granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260598 [limiting review to two questions: “(1) May superior courts consider the record of conviction in determining whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief under Penal Code section 1170.95? [and] (2) When does the right to appointed counsel arise under Penal Code section 1170.95, subdivision (c)?“].)
By its text,
If the trial court determines a petitioner has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief, the court proceeds to the “second” inquiry into the prima facie showing under
1170.95(c) of a “prima facie showing that [the petitioner] is entitled to relief.” (
In so doing, “[w]e apply well-settled principles of statutory construction. Our task is to discern the Legislature‘s intent. The statutory language itself is the most reliable indicator, so we start with the statute‘s words, assigning them their usual and ordinary meanings, and construing them in context. If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute‘s plain meaning governs. On the other
As an initial matter, we observe that it is not the meaning of “prima facie showing” itself that is ambiguous. “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 851; see also Black‘s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) [defining a “prima facie case” as “[a] party‘s production of enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party‘s favor“].) However,
At least one Court of Appeal has looked to habeas corpus procedures for guidance. In Verdugo, the Second District stated “[t]he nature and scope of
subdivision (c)‘s second prima facie review, made following a round of briefing by the prosecutor and counsel for petitioner, is equivalent to the familiar decisionmaking process before issuance of an order to show cause in habeas corpus proceedings, which typically follows an informal response to the habeas corpus petition by the Attorney General and a reply to the informal response by the petitioner. (See
We agree that, at least with respect to the prima facie showing under
The availability of the writ of habeas corpus derives from both the United States and California Constitutions. (
A court receiving a petition for habeas corpus relief “evaluates it by asking whether, assuming the petition‘s factual allegations are true, the petitioner would be entitled to relief. [Citations.] If no prima facie case for relief is stated, the court will summarily deny the petition. If, however, the court finds the factual allegations, taken as true, establish a prima facie case for relief, the court will issue an [order to show cause].” (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474475.) When reviewing a petition seeking habeas corpus relief, a court should not reject the petitioner‘s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. (See In re Serrano (1995) 10 Cal.4th 447, 456 (Serrano)8; see also In re Lawley (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1231, 1241 [observing ” ‘[t]he
However, if the record, including the court‘s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.” (Serrano, supra, 10 Cal.4th at
p. 456.) In habeas corpus, these facts refuting the allegations are often raised in the prosecution‘s informal response to the petition. (See
Drayton agrees that habeas corpus procedures provide an appropriate guide for the trial court‘s assessment of the prima facie showing of entitlement to relief under
The Attorney General correctly points out the significant differences between
We agree with the Attorney General that, with respect to the overall structure of
Using the habeas corpus procedures as a guide to the legislative intent with respect to the court‘s review of the ” ‘prima facie showing that [the petitioner] is entitled to relief’ ” under
If, accepting the facts asserted in the petition as true, the petitioner would be entitled to relief because he or she has met the requirements of
3. The Trial Court Erred Under Section 1170.95(c)
The Attorney General asserts our standard of review of the trial court‘s order is de novo, because it involves the construction and interpretation of a statute. Drayton notes that there is no case law on the appropriate standard of review. Appellate review of petitions in similar context, such as Proposition 47, typically involves multiple standards of review. (See People v. Sledge (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1089, 1095–1096 [” ‘Where an appeal involves the interpretation of a statute . . . the issue on appeal is a legal one, which we review de novo. [Citation.] Where the trial court applies disputed facts to such a statute, we review the factual findings for substantial evidence and the application of those facts to the statute de novo.’ “].) Here, our analysis of the trial court‘s order focuses on the trial court‘s interpretation of
The trial court erred under
Turning to the second step under
The trial court agreed with the course suggested by the prosecution. Based on facts drawn from the testimony at the preliminary hearing, the court “f[ound] that petitioner was a major participant in the underlying felony, both the burglary and the robbery.” The court also found that Drayton “acted with reckless indifference to human life,” which the court characterized as “blatantly apparent by his conduct, being armed and his participation in this event, as well as the conduct of his co-conspirators, the other individuals.”
At this stage of the petition review process, governed by
Drayton‘s petition asserted facts which, if accepted as true, fulfilled the requirements for relief listed in
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court‘s order denying the petition and remand with directions to issue an order to show cause under
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying Drayton‘s petition to vacate his murder conviction and for resentencing is reversed. The matter is remanded to the superior court with directions to issue an order to show cause (
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Danner, J.
WE CONCUR:
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Elia, Acting P.J.
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Bamattre-Manoukian, J.