People v. DworakPeople v. Dworak
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Liu, Cantil-Sakauye, Corrigan, Cuéllar, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins
Defendant Douglas Edward Dworak was sentenced to death in 2005 for the rape and murder of Crystal Hamilton. The jury found Dworak guilty of one count each of murder and rape (
I. FACTS
A. Guilt Phase
1. Prosecution Case
The prosecutor‘s theory at trial was that Dworak, who had previously been convicted of rape and who admitted to a history of consensual sexual encounters with prostitutes during times of stress in his marriage, sought out nonconsensual sex the evening of April 20, 2001, after he and his wife had an argument, and while his wife was out of town. The prosecutor speculated that the victim, Crystal Hamilton, may have mistaken Dworak‘s white pickup truck for that of her father, who was on his way to
The prosecutor opened hеr case with testimony from Cynthia W. concerning Dworak‘s prior convictions. In October 1986, Cynthia was returning home from a shopping trip when Dworak approached her in her driveway. Dworak grabbed her from behind and put a large hunting knife to her throat. They struggled; Cynthia‘s glasses fell off and she sustained a cut on her thumb. Dworak took Cynthia to the back of her car, put his finger in her vagina, and raped her. He then told her to “stay put” or else he would come back and hurt her. After Dworak left, Cynthia ran inside her home and called her husband and then 911. She provided a statement to the police and identified Dworak as the perpetrator. Dworak was 20 years old at the time. He was convicted of rape and sexual penetration with a foreign object while using a weapon and was sentenced to 18 years in state prison.
Dworak was paroled to Ventura County in 1996. In 1999, he married Susannah Dworak. They fought frequently, and Dworak described Susannah as a “raging bitch” who “got on [his] case about everything,” including his fishing trips with friends to Mussel Shoals, among other places. Dworak told detectives that he was “sexually frustrated” and sought to have sex with prostitutes in Ventura because there “just wasn‘t any sex happening.”
Susannah worked for an oral surgery group. On the weekend of April 21, 2001, Susannah was scheduled to attend a
Dworak was employed at a general contracting company. He was “on-call” the weekend of April 21 but did not work either day. A neighbor testified that Dworak stopped by to talk that weekend; Dworak told the neighbor that his wife was away and that he was “out living it up and playing pool and — at the local bars and going down to Ventura and staying out late.” The neighbor testified that Dworak seemed to be in good spirits and told her, ” ‘[W]hen the cat‘s away, the mouse will play.’ ”
Crystal Hamilton was 18 years old in April 2001. She lived in Oxnard with her father, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Michael Hamilton and two siblings. She frequently wore small jewelry items; Hamilton‘s sister recalled that she was wearing a bracelet when she left home the day before her death to attend a small gathering at the home of Matt Zeober, a friend and former classmate. Zeober lived with his mother, Robyn Jones, in Ventura. During that gathering, which took place on Friday, April 20, Zeober, Hamilton, and some friends smoked marijuana and used methamphetamines. Hamilton spent the night at Zeober‘s home.
Hamilton remained at Zeober‘s house the next day. In the afternoon, Hamilton called her father asking for a ride home. Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton was in Corona and told Crystal he could pick her up that evening. Hamilton made other calls
Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton arrived at the grocery store around midnight, driving a white pickup truck with no toolbox, but Hamilton was not there. He drove around looking for her in the parking lot, then drove to Zeober‘s home. The lights were off, and he did not knock on the door. Hamilton occasionally failed to appear when she made arrangements to meet her father, so he was not overly concerned at that point and did not call the police.
Jorge Valdez was fishing at Mussel Shoals Beach around dawn on Sunday, April 22, when he saw what looked like a body. The beach was approximately an 18-minute drive from the Ralphs store where Hamilton had planned to meet her father. Valdez went to a nearby fire station to report what he saw. Firefighters found Hamilton‘s body lying naked in the surf.
The firefighters recovered Hamilton‘s body and observed signs of lividity and rigor mortis, a cut over her left eye, and bruising around her hips. There was no clothing or jewelry on the body. Police searched the area but found no clothing, jewelry, or other evidence connected to Hamilton.
The autopsy revealed numerous injuries on Hamilton‘s body, including blunt-force trauma to the head; abrasions on her left breast, right shoulder, ribs, and hips; bruising on her left
Dr. O‘Halloran described abrasions on a “relatively protected” area of Hamilton‘s neck that is not usually injured when a person falls down, explaining that “in manual strangulations, fingernails often leave” such marks. Hamilton had petechial hemorrhages in her eyes, which Dr. O‘Halloran described as “a very common finding in manual strangulations.” He acknowledged these can also occur as a result of CPR or violent vomiting but added there was no evidence that either had occurred here. There was sand and water in Hamilton‘s lungs. The toxicology report was positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana in amounts sufficient to affect Hamilton‘s “brain function, that is, she probably got high on it,” but “not a level that generally is accepted to cause death.”
Dr. O‘Halloran determined that the cause of death was a homicide, and he opined that she likely died from drowning, though the evidence strongly indicated she was also manually strangled, perhaps while in the water. Based on the paramedics’
Dr. O‘Halloran did not observe any injuries in the vaginal area. Seminal fluid, sand, and seaweed were present inside Hamilton‘s vagina. A forensic scientist at the Ventura County Sheriff‘s Department who later examined the vaginal swabs described the amount of sperm as “off the charts,” indicating that it was deposited within one hour and 15 minutes of her death or much less, assuming she was ambulatory after intercourse. If she was not ambulatory (i.e., had laid down before intercourse and never got back up), the sperm could have been deposited 11 to 12 hours before her death. He acknowledged that this was the first examination he had conducted on sperm found in someone floating in cold water and that colder temperatures could have slowed degradation and prolonged sperm life. He also acknowledged that he did not prepare his sample using the same method as the studies he relied on.
An analysis of the vaginal swabs confirmed the presence of both sperm and nonsperm cellular material. A DNA profile from the sperm portion was submitted to the California Department of Justice‘s convicted offender DNA data bank . In March 2002, the Department of Justice notified the Ventura County Sheriff that the DNA profile frоm the sperm portion of the vaginal swabs matched the DNA profile on file for Dworak. The detective assigned to the case determined that Dworak was a sex offender and asked to be notified when Dworak next reported for mandatory registration.
Detectives interviewed Dworak again on June 11; a videotape of this interview was played for the jury. This time, Dworak described the White prostitute as “mid-twenty something” with short “bleach blonde” hair. Again, he described her as looking “kind of ragged, kind of rough,” but this time he said she was not wearing makeup. Dworak was again shown a picture of Hamilton, and he again denied recognizing her.
On July 22, detectives executed a search warrant on Dworak‘s home and place of business. During the search, Dworak spoke with detectives; an audiotape of this interview was played for the jury. Again, he was shown a photograph of Hamilton and said he did not recognize her. Dworak was told that physical evidence implicated him in a sexual assault, to which he responded, “I don‘t mess with little kids,” and again stated he did not recognize Hamilton. He reiterated that outside
At the time of Hamilton‘s death, Dworak drove a white pickup truck similar in style to that driven by Hamilton‘s father. Following his arrest in 2003, Dworak‘s truck was searched. A stain on the driver‘s seat reacted to a screening test, indicating it may have been human blood, but the sample was too small to confirm. No DNA was found in the stain.
The jury was taken to view four locations relevant to the prosecutor‘s case: the outside of Zeober‘s home; the location of the Ralphs store; the south end of Mussel Shoals Beach, where Hamilton‘s body was found; and the north end of the beach, where a patrol officer from the Ventura Port District opined that Hamilton might have drowned based on the tides and currents at the time of her death. Dworak was known to fish and picnic at Mussel Shoals Beach, and he once told a friend of his that “if they went there early enough, nobody else would be there.”
2. Defense Case
Scott Osler, one of Dworak‘s best friends, was with Dworak from 11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on April 21, shooting pool at the Hilltop Bar in Oak View. He testified that Dworak picked him up that day in his white pickup truck, which had a toolbox in the bed (in contrast to a similar truck driven at the time by Hamilton‘s father).
Dr. Robert Bux was an associate coroner and medical examiner for EI Paso County, Colorado. Before testifying, Dr. Bux reviewed the autopsy photographs, the death investigation report, autopsy report, and Dr. O‘Halloran‘s trial testimony. Dr.
B. Penalty Phase
The prosecution‘s case in aggravation primarily relied on evidence from the guilt phase trial concerning the circumstances of the charged crime and Dworak‘s prior felony conviction for rape and sexual penetration with a foreign object (and related criminal activity involving force or violence). The following additional evidence was presented at the penalty phase:
Hamilton‘s father and grandfather testified about how Hamilton‘s death affected them and their families, including descriptions of her unique qualities as a person such as her
Rather than recalling Cynthia W. to the stand, the prosecutor called Allen Brambrink, a Napa County Sheriff‘s Department employee, to testify about the impact of the crime on Cynthia W. Brambrink testified that he knew Cynthia W. as a fellow county employee. When he saw her on the day of the crime, her hand was covered with a large bandage. He put his arm around her and could feel her tremble as she hugged him. He explained that there was “[s]omething about her demeanor,” adding, “She needеd something, and I — I just responded to my instincts.”
Dworak called nine witnesses at the penalty phase: eight members of his family and a corrections expert. His niece testified to their close relationship; Dworak never acted inappropriately with her, and she did not believe he raped Cynthia W. or raped and killed Hamilton. Dworak‘s older brother and his sister-in-law described him as a good and helpful person; Dworak‘s older sister and his brother-in-law offered similar testimony. His sister testified that she did not believe Dworak raped Cynthia W. and acknowledged that she sent a card to Cynthia W. on the anniversary of the crime that read in part, “Happy Anniversary and many, many more. Just a little something for you to remember your RAPE. May you get AIDS, bitch. Having your son lie to cover up your blindness of being able to see your true rapist!” (Double underscoring omitted).
Dworak‘s wife, Susannah, testified that she loved him deeply and that he was very close with his family. Dworak had told Susannah that he was wrongly convicted of raping Cynthia W. She acknowledged that they would argue about money and went through marriage counseling at the end of 2001. She said their marriage was getting better and they were thinking of starting a family before his arrest.
James Esten, an expert on the California prison system, opined that Dworak would bе an “above average” inmate with useful skills as a teacher‘s aide based on his prior incarceration record. He acknowledged that Dworak obtained early release on his prior conviction for good behavior and would not have the same incentives while serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.
II. GUILT PHASE ISSUES
A. Exclusion of Defense Evidence
Before trial, and over the opposition of defense counsel, the prosecution moved to exclude defense evidence relating to third party culpability and victim character. Dworak contends the trial court erred in granting these motions. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence.
(a) Facts
The day after Hamilton‘s body was found, police searched Robyn Jones‘s home, the last place Hamilton was seen before her murder, with Jones‘s consent. Among other items, detectives found a bucket in the carport that contained a pair of wet, sandy jeans. Jones told the detectives she did not know where they had come from. One year later, Jones told detectives that she remembered two of her friends, Jay Campbell and Cindy Kinnaird, had gone to the beach on a date ” ‘the night Crystal was killed.’ ” Jones assumed they had come to her house to change clothes, an assumption confirmed by both Campbell and Kinnaird in separate statements to detectives. DNA evidence obtained from the jeans was later matched to a sample provided by Campbell. The prosecutor moved to exclude any testimony or evidence regarding the jeans, arguing “there was never anything connecting” the jeans to the crime.
Around the same time Jones told officers about Campbell and Kinnaird, she also told friends and detectives that her friend Danny Carroll may have been involved in Hamilton‘s rape and murder. Moving to exclude any evidence regarding Carroll, the prosecutor described him as “a long time drug user, low-level dealer, and occasional boyfriend” of Jones, adding that Dworak‘s “[m]arginal evidence” linking Carroll to the crime was insufficient to satisfy the admissibility standard set in People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826 (Hall).
Opposing the prosecutor‘s motion to exclude this evidence, Dworak pointed to statements from Jones that Carroll shaved his mustache and pubic hair shortly after the time of the crime; statements from Zeober that Carroll had stolen Jones‘s car on
The court granted both of the prosecutor‘s motions. As to Campbell‘s jeans, the court found no evidence connecting either the jeans or Campbell himself to Hamilton. Regarding Carroll, the court found there was no evidence “that actually puts [Carroll] in proximity” to Hamilton or linking any of the proffered evidence to the crime here. The court described the evidence proffered by Dworak as “weak[]” and found it would “not meet[] the threshold requirement that would reasonably create a doubt” as to Dworak‘s guilt.
(b) Discussion
We review the trial court‘s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 292.) We have rejected any special rule governing evidence of third party culpability, explaining that “courts
We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court‘s decision to exclude evidence or testimony relating to Carroll or to the jeans linked to Campbell found in Jones‘s carport. As the trial court explained, there was no evidence placing Carroll in proximity to Hamilton at the time of her death, and any link between the jeans found in Jones‘s garage and Hamilton‘s death rested on speculation. Although the jeans could be seen as circumstantial evidence that Campbell was involved in Hamilton‘s death, such an inference requires speculation that the sand and water on the jeans were from the beach on which Hamilton‘s body was found, combined with additional speculation that this was the result of Campbell‘s presence at Hamilton‘s murder and not, as Campbell stated, a separate visit to the beach that same weekend. The trial court reasonably concluded that the probative value of this evidence related to
For the same reasons, we reject Dworak‘s further contentions that the trial court‘s exclusion of the evidence deprived him of his rights to present a defense, to compulsory process, and to confrontation, and thereby also violated his right to a reliable penalty determination under the
2. Victim Character Evidence
Rachel Daniels had been one of Hamilton‘s closest friends. According to the prosecutor‘s motion in limine, Daniels was “a regular drug-user, and frequently had relationships with men to exchange for dope and/or money.” Through Daniels, Hamilton met John Figueroa. A few months before Hamilton‘s death, Figueroa rented a motel room where Daniels, Hamilton, Zeober, and others “smoked drugs and partied.” Hamilton called Figueroa the night of her death while looking for a ride home, but no witness placed Hamilton with Daniels or Figueroa on the weekend of her death. In a statement to police given two months after Hamilton‘s death, while in custody for being under the influence, Daniels stated that Hamilton was not engaged in prostitution but had been sexually active.
The prosecutor successfully moved to exclude any evidence regarding Hamilton‘s use of drugs and activities in the week before her death, including any evidence relating to Daniels and Figueroa. Dworak argued the evidence was relevant to explain “to the jury the possible actions taken by . . . Hamilton at the time this occurred,” actions “other than just going to Ralphs
We find no abuse of discretion. The trial court reasonably found such evidence to be irrelevant, as it rested solely on speculation as to what might have occurred after Hamilton left Jones‘s home. (See People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 711.) Nor was Dworak preсluded from presenting evidence that Hamilton may have gone somewhere other than Ralphs that evening, as the court permitted him to cross-examine Zeober about whether Hamilton was attempting to call older men whom she “associated with” for a ride home that night.
B. Exclusion of Victim Photograph
Dworak next claims the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting three photographs of Hamilton proffered by the prosecutor while excluding a booking photograph of Hamilton proffered by Dworak. Hamilton argues that the booking photograph would have provided a more accurate view of Hamilton at the time of her death and would therefore explain why he did not recognize her from the photographs shown to him by detectives. We find no error.
The prosecutor moved to admit three photographs of Hamilton while she was alive. The first photograph, taken weeks or months before Hamilton‘s death, was shown to Dworak during his first interview with detectives on May 12, 2003, and again during his third interview on July 22, 2003. The second photograph, taken several months earlier, was shown to Dworak during his second interview on July 11, 2003. Each time
The third photograph was taken approximately two years before Hamilton‘s death. It dеpicted Hamilton holding a cat while standing in front of a fireplace with family photographs behind her. In the picture, Hamilton was wearing the type of jewelry she normally wore, including a bracelet the prosecutor argued would have created the type of bruising observed on her wrist during the autopsy. Again over Dworak‘s objection, the trial court found the photograph to be admissible but ordered that it be cropped and blurred to depict only the articles of jewelry and not the cat or family photographs.
Dworak does not renew his objection to the three admitted photographs. Instead, he limits his argument to the trial court‘s purported error in denying his own motion to admit a booking photograph of Hamilton taken at the time of one of her juvenile arrests. According to defense counsel, the prosecutor‘s photographs would “presumably reflect what . . . [Hamilton] looked like when she was not using drugs” and so were irrelevant to show what she would have looked like “when she was using drugs and ‘on the street.’ ” By contrast, defense counsel argued, the booking photograph would “more accurately reflect[] how she appeared when she was using drugs and how she may have appeared to [Dworak] when he came into contact with her.”
As presented by Dworak in his motion to admit the photograph, the relevance and thus admissibility of the booking photograph depends on the existence of the foundational fact that it more accurately depicted Hamilton on the night at issue because it showed her under the influence of narcotics. “The determination regarding the sufficiency of the foundational evidence is a matter left to the court‘s discretion.” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 47, citing People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 466.) The trial court reasonably concluded that Dworak had not laid a sufficient foundation for this evidence, and we find no abuse of discretion in its decision to exclude the evidence.
C. Exclusion of Newspaper Articles
During Dworak‘s first interview with the detectives in this matter, Detective Debbie Rubright told Dworak that they were investigating a crime that occurred two years ago involving a vehicle that matched a description of his car. She emphasized it was “still an ongoing investigation” so they would “only release a little bit of information as possible” during the interview. One of the detectives then showed Dworak a picture of Hamilton and asked whether he recognized her or had seen her in April 2001. Dworak asked, “How old is she?” Detective Melissa Smith replied, “I think she‘s 19. She would have been.” Dworak then stated, “She would have been.” Shortly thereafter,
After the close of evidence from both parties, Dworak moved to introduce into evidence three newspaper articles from April 2001 concerning Hamilton‘s death. Dworak argued the articles were relevant to explain his statement to the detectives that the victim was deceased because it was a “matter of common knowledge throughout the county of Ventura” that Hamilton had died, and that the coroner had concluded her death was a homicide. The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the prosecutor that Dworak had not laid a proper foundation for the evidence.
We agree with the trial court that Dworak made no offer of proof that he had read the articles before he was interviewed by the detectives. Without this foundation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that had not been shown to have any probative value. (
D. Evidence of Other Crimes
As noted, the trial court admitted evidence of Dworak‘s prior convictions for sexual offenses under
1. Admissibility
As a general rule, “propensity evidence is not admissible to prove a defendant‘s conduct on a specific occasion.” (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 299; see
Dworak was accused of the sexual offense of rape and with the special circumstance of murder in the commission of rape. Under
“By reason of [
As Dworak acknowledges, the prior offenses at issue were proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial, and the trial court‘s inquiry appropriately emphasized that the degree of certainty that Dworak committed the prior crime was high, given that he was convicted of that crime. Nor is there any serious contention that the evidence was not probative on the question of whether he committed a sexual offense in this instance. The trial court accordingly concluded that the evidence was not likely to “mislead or in any way confuse this jury in terms of what it‘s being admitted for.” In fact, the trial court declined to admit evidence of a different prior sexual offense — an alleged attempted rape — due to lack of certainty that Dworak committed that crime, noting that such evidence would distract jurors from the main inquiry by turning the trial into a mini-trial on the alleged prior offense.
In assessing the remoteness of the crimes, the trial court said Dworak “spent nine years in prison following his conviction for that rape offense and had been released on parole for just a matter of is it three or four years in this particular case before the offense occurred?” to which the district attorney confirmed “not quite four.” Dworak argues the trial court overlooked the two years he had been off probation before the charged offense was committed. It is possible that the trial court misunderstood the timeline and failed to note that some time had passed during which Dworak was neither incarcerated nor on probation. It is also possible that this level of nuance was lost in the court‘s explanation of its tentative ruling. In either case, we find no error on the basis of the court‘s remoteness inquiry. In People v. Harris (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 727, the court found a gap of 23 years to be “a long time” and therefore to weigh in favor of exclusion. (Id. at p. 739.) But Harris observed that the ” ‘staleness’ of an offense is generally relevant if and only if the defendant has led a blameless life in the interim.” (Ibid.) Dworak was incarcerated or on parole for the prior offenses for the bulk of the time between the two incidents. (See People v. Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, 62 [crimes committed 15 and 21 years before the charged offense were not so remote as to require exclusion where defendant had been in prison for much of the intervening time]; People v. Pierce (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 893, 900 [finding no error in admitting a 23-year-old rape conviction
Dworak contends that the two incidents were similar only if the jury were to agree with the prosecutor that Hamilton was raped. In addition, he notes a number of factual differences between the two acts: Cynthia W. was older than Dworak, and the incident took place outside her home and involved the usе of a knife. By contrast, Hamilton was younger than Dworak, and there is no specific evidence as to where the crime took place or whether a knife or other weapon was used. The proper focus of the trial court‘s inquiry is on the type of sex offense at issue (here, forcible rape), and differences in the manner in which the acts were committed or in the characteristics of the victims, while potentially relevant, are not dispositive. (See People v. Loy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 63 [” ‘[T]he charged and uncharged crimes need not be sufficiently similar that evidence of the latter would be admissible under
As to the potential for undue prejudice and the likelihood of confusion, the trial court observed that “the evidence of the rape of Cynthia W. is certainly less inflammatory than the evidence that‘s to be received in this case concerning the alleged rape and murder of Crystal Hamilton.” Dworak contends that Cynthia W.‘s testimony was itself prejudicial — more so than
Finally, Dworak argues the jury may have been confused or distracted by a motivation to further punish him for his crimes against Cynthia W. because the jury knew he had served only nine years of his 18-year sentence for those crimes, a point emphasized by the prosecutor during her closing argument. Dworak did not raise this concern in the trial court; in fact, while arguing about the type of evidence that should be permitted regarding the crimes against Cynthia W., defense counsel acknowledged, “The fact that Mr. Dworak spent time in prison for that conviction is appropriate.” In Falsetta, we explained that “the prejudicial impact of the evidence is reduced if the uncharged offenses resulted in actual convictions and a prison term, ensuring that the jury would not be tempted to convict the defendant simply to punish him for the other offenses, and that the jury‘s attention would not be divertеd by having to make a
In sum, we cannot say that the trial court‘s approach, even if not the only approach available, was an abuse of discretion.
2. Instructional Claim
Dworak also contends that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.50.01 before and after Cynthia W.‘s testimony. As given, CALJIC No. 2.50.01 provided in relevant part: “If you find that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense, you may, but are not required to, infer that the defendant had a disposition to commit sexual offenses. If you find that the defendant had this disposition, you may, but are not required to, infer that he was likely to commit and did commit the crimes of which he is accused. [¶] However, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed prior sexual offenses, that is not sufficient by itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the charged crimes. If you determine an inference properly can be drawn from this evidence, this inference is simply one item for you to consider, along with all other evidence ultimately received in this trial, in determining whether the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crimes. [¶] Unless you are otherwise instructed, you must not consider this evidence for any other purpose.”
Assuming Dworak did not forfeit this claim by failing to object at trial and thereby provide the trial court an opportunity to consider whether a modification to the instruction might be appropriate (see People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 309; People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011–1012), he still cannot show prejudice. The jury found Dworak guilty of rape and found the rape-murder special circumstance to be true.
E. Testimony Regarding Susannah Dworak
Over Dworak‘s objection, the court permitted two witnesses to testify to the demeanor of Dworak‘s wife, Susannah, around the time of Hamilton‘s death, from which the prosecutor argued it could be inferred that Dworak and his wife had fought and that Dworak was angry and sexually frustrated the weekend Hamilton died, leading him to seek nonconsensual sex.
The office administrator for the oral surgery group where Susannah worked testified that Susannah did not work on Friday, April 20. She further testified that Susannah called in that day to say she was taking a vacation day and would not be in to work, and that Susannah was “upset” and “crying” during that call. A second coworker testified that she, Susannah, and two other employees attended a job certification conference that weekend in Irvine. This coworker testified that Susannah was “quite upset,” adding that “[Susannah] had a rough day Friday, evidently, and she was, you know, very upset, very emotional, and she showed signs of that.”
The testimony from Susannah‘s coworkers linked the prosecutor‘s theory that Dworak sought nonconsensual sex the night of Hamilton‘s murder with his own statements to investigators that when he and Susannah were not getting along, he would become sexually frustrated and would seek out sexual encounters. The prosecutor relied on this testimony during closing argument to characterize Dworak as “angry,” adding that “you know that he and his wife got in a huge fight
Dworak objected to this testimony on the grounds that it was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative. Specifically, Dworak argues there was no evidence as to the reason why Susannah was upset. But Dworak‘s own statements to investigators that he and Susannah were having marital problems around the time of Hamilton‘s death, that Susannah was “just a raging bitch basically,” and that they were fighting “all the time,” as well as his neighbor‘s testimony that Dworak regularly complained that Susannah nagged him and was “riding his case,” provided a basis from which the jury could rationally infer that Susannah was upset because she and Dworak had been fighting and that Dworak therefore had a motive to seek nonconsensual sex on the weekend of Hamilton‘s death. In light of this other evidence and the prosecutor‘s case as a whole, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding this testimony — consisting of five lines of testimony from two minor witnesses — more probative than prejudicial.
F. Testimony from Victim‘s Father
Dworak contends the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to elicit testimony from the victim‘s father,
During Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton‘s testimony, the prosecutor asked whether Crystal had spoken to him about her future. Dworak objected, and a hearing was held at sidebar. The prosecutor explained that based on Dworak‘s opening statement that Hamilton was neither raped nor murdered, “it appears as though there will be an implication that this could have been either a suicide or an accidental death wherein Crystal wandered off out into the ocean or did something to — that amounts to taking her own life.” The trial court overruled Dworak‘s hearsay objection, explaining that such testimony “would certainly be probative if in fact she is discussing with her dad future plans to either continue her education or other career-related activities, things of that nature which would suggest that she would not be a person, as far as [Lieutenant] Colonel Hamilton might know, that might be inclined to do something to hurt herself.” Defense counsel then clarified that it was “never the intent of the defense in this matter to raise any kind of issue that this young lady committed suicide, never.” The trial court responded that it expected any testimony regarding Crystal‘s future plans to be very brief, and the prosecutor agreed.
In front of the jury, Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton was again asked whether, in April 2001, Hamilton spoke of her intentions in the “near future.” He answered, “There were a couple of things she was looking at. One longer range was college. A shorter range, something in the medical field, and she
There is some ambiguity in the record as to the basis upon which the trial court admitted this evidence. After defendant objected on relevance and hearsay grounds, the prosecutor argued that Dworak was “going to attempt to prove this was no murder” and that the prosecution was “entitled to present evidence [in response] that this is not a girl who‘s planning on taking her own life. She made plans about going to college, getting a job, joining the military. She was a normal, happy kid.” Defense counsel responded, “It‘s hearsay,” and the prosecutor replied, “Statement of intention.” These comments indicate that the prosecutor sought admission of the statements under the
Although the record is not as clear as it might be, it appears the trial court admitted the evidence under the hearsay exception set forth in
Evidence admitted under
In addition to his state law evidentiary claim, Dworak contends that the trial court‘s erroneous admission of this hearsay testimony violated his right to confrontation and due process under the federal Constitution. (
Even if we were to assume error, it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The testimony at issue comprised just 13 lines of testimony. Dworak notes only two instances in which the prosecutor referred to this evidence during her closing argument; in each case, it was coupled with other evidence suggesting Hamilton did not intend to harm herself, including her repeated telephone calls to her father to secure a ride home. Moreover, the pathology evidence showing evidence of premortem wounds, coupled with expert testimony that Hamilton‘s death followed shortly from intercourse with Dworak, belies any notion that her death was self-inflicted. We see no reasonable possibility that the jury would have returned a verdict more favorable to Dworak without this brief testimony.
G. Alleged Instructional Error
Dworak contends that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on consciousness of guilt evidenced by willfully false statements. We reject the claim.
The court instructed the jury with the language of CALJIC No. 2.03: “If you find that before this trial the defendant made a willfully false or deliberately misleading statement concerning the crimes for which he is now being tried, you may consider that statement as a circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of guilt. However, that conduct is not sufficient
Dworak contends that this instruction improperly duplicated more general circumstantial evidence instructions, was unfairly partisan and argumentative, permitted the jury to draw an irrational inference about his guilt, and intruded upon the jury‘s factfinding function. Dworak acknowledges that we have rejected substantially similar challenges. (See, e.g., People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 653 [collecting cases].) Even assuming the argument is not forfeited, Dworak offers no persuasive reason for us to reconsider these conclusions.
H. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Dworak contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by denigrating defense counsel and witnesses. We reject this claim.
During her closing argument, the prosecutor addressed the opinion from the defense expert, Dr. Bux, that Hamilton was not raped. She described Dr. Bux as a “hired mouthpiece, really, who would say what they pay him to say,” characterized his opinion as one “bought by the defense,” and added that “[f]or $3,600, defendant bought an outrageous, antiquated and preposterous opinion about rape.” Further, in mentioning the fact that Dr. Bux agreed Hamilton suffered injuries premortem yet said he did not see evidence of a violent struggle, the prosecutor said: “Well, I guess for $3,600, people will say contradictory things.” Dworak‘s counsel objected to the first and third of these statements, but the trial court overruled both objections on the ground that counsel has wide latitude in argument.
” ’ “To preserve a misconduct claim for review on appeal, a defendant must make a timely objection and ask the trial court to admonish the jury to disregard the prosecutor‘s improper remarks or conduct, unless an admonition would not have cured the harm.” ’ ” (People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 480.) Although Dworak made timely objections to two of the statements at issue, he did not request an admonition of the jury. Dworak argues that requesting an admonition would have been futile and therefore was unnecessary to preserve this issue for review. The “general rule” requiring objection and request for admonition to preserve a misconduct claim does not “apply when the trial court promptly overrules an objection and the defendant has no opportunity to request an admonition.” (People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 1001.) This exception applies to both the “hired mouthpiece” and “outrageous, antiquated and preposterous opinion” statements made by the prosecutor about Dr. Brux set forth above. Dworak did not object to the prosecutor‘s use of the phrase “bought by the defense” or “contrаdictory statements,” both of which occurred close in time to the statements Dworak did object to. For that reason, we will assume for the sake of argument that the entirety of this claim is properly presented. Even so, we
” ’ “Under the federal Constitution, a prosecutor commits reversible misconduct only if the conduct infects the trial with such ’ “unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Sattiewhite, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 480.) Misconduct that falls short of a federal due process violation may nevertheless violate state law if it “involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the court or jury.” (People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1031.) In evaluating such a claim, we are cognizant that ” ‘[a] prosecutor is given wide latitude to vigorously argue his or her case and to make fair comment upon the evidence, including reasonable inferences or deductions that may be drawn from the evidence.’ ” (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 768.) We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct under an abuse of discretion standard (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 213), asking whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an objectionable fashion (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 734).
Dworak contends that the prosecutor‘s statements amounted to prosecutorial misconduct because “she suggested to the jury it should in effect disregard Dr. Bux‘s testimony because defense counsel had paid him to say what counsel wanted him to say.” We rejected a similar claim in People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 614. In Cook, the prosecutor commented on the fees paid to a defense expert witness, stating ” ‘for 124 hours at $225 per hour, Dr. Wilkinson comes up with something that excuses this man‘s responsibility.’ ” (Id. at p. 613.) The defendant argued that this statement “impugn[ed] defense counsel‘s integrity for having, in effect, bought the
Dworak relies on People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97 for the proposition that it is impermissible for a prosecutor to argue that defense counsel fabricated a defense and procured a witness‘s perjury. But the prosecutor‘s actions here stopped short of the actions in McLain, where the prosecutor outright stated defense counsel shopped around and found somebody willing to come in and lie. (McLain, at p. 112.) The prosecutor did use hyperbolic language in calling the expert a “hired mouthpiece,” but we have said that using colorful or hyperbolic language generally will not by itself establish prosecutorial misconduct. (See People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 793.)
I. Review of Sealed Material
Before and during trial, the court denied Dworak access to a witness‘s medical records following an in camera review. Dworak now asks this court to review those records to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying him
1. Background
As discussed, Dworak‘s neighbor testified about her interactions with Dworak in April 2001. Before trial, the prosecutor moved to exclude evidence relating to the witness‘s treatment for Vicodin addiction at a treatment hospital in November 2004. Dworak subpoenaed all of the witness‘s psychological and psychiatric records from the hospital in order to determine whether the severity of her addiction would have affected her ability to perceive and recollect events from that time period. The court agreed that such evidence would be relevant and ordered the hospital to deliver the records under seal to the court.
After reviewing the records, the trial court ruled that Dworak was not entitled to pretrial discovery of the records. Citing People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117 (Hammon), the court balanced Dworak‘s right to cross-examination against the privacy interest in those medical records and concluded that disclosure was not warranted at that time, saying that while “there may be a very slight bit of information that would be of assistance to [Dworak] in this matter[,] . . . I can‘t overemphasize how slight that information is.” The court added that it would revisit the issue depending on the scope of Dworak‘s opening statement and his cross-examination of the witness.
During the cross-examination of this witness, defense counsel asked, “With regard to the Vicodin that you were taking at the time that you had this cоnversation with Mr. Dworak in which he stated that he had been out in Ventura in 2001, with
2. Discussion
Dworak does not contest the trial court‘s decision to review the psychological and psychiatric records at issue in camera, acknowledging that
“Parties who challenge on appeal trial court orders withholding information as privileged or otherwise nondiscoverable ‘must do the best they can with the information they have, and the appellate court will fill the gap by objectively reviewing the whole record.’ ” (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 493; see People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 74.) We have reviewed the records and agree with the trial court‘s assessment that they contain little of any plausible value to the defense. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting disclosure of the materials.
J. Guilt Phase Cumulative Error
Dworak asserts that the combined errors during the guilt phase warrant reversal of his conviction. With respect to the guilt phase, we have assumed for sake of argument that the trial court‘s instruction pursuant to
III. PENALTY PHASE CLAIMS
A. Evidence and Argument Regarding Lack of Remorse
Dworak claims the trial court erred by allowing evidence and argument suggesting Dworak lacked remorse for the crimes. The prosecutor arguably crossed the line by briefly arguing that evidence of lack of remorse constituted aggravating
Before the penalty phase, Dworak moved to exclude any evidencе suggesting he lacked remorse. The trial court tentatively denied the motion with respect to “acts or conduct at the immediate scene of the crime . . . versus post-crime evidence” but cautioned the prosecutor that “argument in this area can become a mine field.”
During the prosecutor‘s case in aggravation, she solicited testimony from Dworak‘s mother-in-law (over Dworak‘s objection on the ground of relevance) that she saw Dworak “laugh and joke and be happy between April of 2001 [when Hamilton was killed] and July 2003 [when Dworak was arrested].” In a similar vein, the prosecutor asked Dworak‘s wife, “Did you ever in between April 22nd of 2001 and July of 2003 see any sign of what you would call remorse in your husband.” The trial court sustained Dworak‘s objection on the ground of speculation. The prosecutor repeatedly referred to this evidence during her closing argument to suggest Dworak lacked remorse for the crimes.
We have routinely held that evidence of lack of remorse is admissible so long as it does not amount to a direct or indirect comment on the defendant‘s invocation of the right to silence. (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 674; People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 855; People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1067–1068, revd. on another ground sub nom. Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318.) Dworak asks us to reconsider those decisions but provides no reasoned basis for us to do so. We adhere to our prior decisions and find no error in admitting
But Dworak also claims the prosecutor overstepped by relying on evidence during closing argument as an aggravating factor. Lack of remorse is not a statutory aggravating factor. (
Some of the prosecutor‘s comments suggesting a lack of remorse were offered in the appropriate context of negating the existence of certain mitigating factors. For example, the prosecutor permissibly referred to the testimony of Dworak‘s wife and mother-in-law on how “wonderful and happy-go-lucky the defendant was” to demonstrate a lack of mitigating
Although prosecutors can argue lack of remorse and point to facts in the record that show the defendant was not remorseful, they must take care not to suggest that lack of remorse can be considered in aggravation. Other comments from the prosecutor appeared to argue a lack of remorse as evidence in aggravation. For example, after explaining to the jury that she was transitioning to evidence in aggravation, the prosecutor returned to the point that “while Crystal Hamilton‘s
More troubling, the prosecutor alluded to defendant‘s laсk of remorse during his interview with detectives two years after the crime as part of her argument regarding her case in aggravation: “Two years later when the police talk to him about his crime, when they show him a picture of her, what does he do? Does he break down sobbing and apologizing for what he‘s done? For what happened that night? Does he admit everything that we know he did to her but explain it in some way, give some explanation that mitigates what he did to her? No, no, no, no. He lies and lies. Turns on the manipulation, turns on the charm, ‘cause that‘s his character.” Dworak did not raise any objections to the statements made by the prosecutor when discussing evidence in aggravation.
In the absence of prejudice to the fairness of a trial, a prosecutor‘s errant remarks do not require reversal. (People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 214.) “[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.) Here, we need not resolve whether the prosecutor‘s statements rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct because we find no reasonable possibility that the error affected the jury‘s death verdict. The bulk of the prosecutor‘s case in aggravation concerned other evidence in support of a death verdict, including the circumstances of the crime and Dworak‘s prior instances of violent criminal conduct including rape and forcible sexual penetration with use of a knife. In the context of the prosecutor‘s argument as a whole, thе passing comments about the
B. Victim Impact Evidence
As noted, the prosecutor presented victim impact testimony about the effect of Hamilton‘s death on her family as evidence of the circumstances of the capital crime (
First, Dworak argues that victim impact testimony must be limited to witnesses who were present at the crime. Second, he argues that victim impact testimony must be limited to characteristics of the victim known to the defendant at the time of the crime or those that reasonably should be known. And third, he argues that victim impact testimony must be restricted to testimony relating to the victim of the capital crime. We have repeatedly rejected each of these claims. (See, e.g., People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 73 [questioning whether evidence of the circumstances of a noncapital crime and its direct aftermath on the victim of that crime constitutes victim impact evidence as it is traditionally understood and, in any event, finding no error]; see also People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1031 [collecting cases].) Dworak provides no persuasive reason to depart from these precedents, and we decline to do so.
C. Cumulative Error
As noted, Dworak asserts that the combined errors during the guilt and penalty phase warrant reversal of his conviction, his death sentence, or both. Reviewing both the guilt and penalty phase claims, we have assumed for sake of argument that the trial court‘s guilt phase instruction pursuant to
D. Constitutional Challenges to the California Death Penalty
Dworak raises myriad challenges to the constitutionality of California‘s death penalty regime. While he acknowledges we have consistently found similar claims to be meritlеss, he nevertheless asks us to reconsider our precedent. We decline to do so.
Dworak contends that California‘s capital punishment scheme violates the Eighth Amendment because it “fails to
Both this court and the high court have held that the current application of
Though he did not object below, Dworak now argues that
CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment.
LIU, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.