People v. Dworak
11 Cal.5th 881
| Cal. | 2021Background
- Defendant Douglas Edward Dworak was convicted of the 2001 rape and murder of Crystal Hamilton; jury found rape, murder, and the special circumstance that the murder occurred during rape; death sentence imposed and automatic appeal followed.
- Physical evidence: victim found naked in surf at Mussel Shoals Beach; autopsy showed premortem injuries, signs consistent with manual strangulation and drowning; seminal fluid (large amount) in vagina; DNA from sperm matched Dworak via the DOJ offender databank.
- Dworak had a prior 1986 rape and sexual-penetration conviction and admitted post-marital consensual encounters with prostitutes; he denied knowing Hamilton in multiple police interviews; his white pickup resembled the victim’s father’s truck.
- Prosecution presented prior-rape victim testimony and victim-impact evidence; defense presented an alternative medical examiner, alibi/witness testimony about defendant’s whereabouts, and various excluded theory/evidence offers (third-party suspects, victim’s booking photo, newspaper articles).
- Trial court admitted prior sexual-offense evidence under Evidence Code §1108 and instructed with CALJIC No. 2.50.01 and CALJIC No. 2.03; court also conducted in‑camera review of sealed medical records requested by defense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exclusion of third‑party culpability evidence (Carroll, Campbell’s jeans) | Evidence was speculative and not tied to the crime; exclusion proper under Evid. Code §352 | Evidence could raise reasonable doubt about Dworak’s guilt | No abuse of discretion; proffered evidence too speculative and outweighed by risk of delay/prejudice/confusion (Hall standard) |
| Exclusion of victim booking photograph/newspaper articles | Prosecutor: not properly founded or relevant | Dworak: would explain why he didn’t recognize victim; articles showed public knowledge victim was dead | No abuse of discretion; booking photo lacked foundation that it showed victim on drugs; newspapers not shown to have been seen by Dworak before interview |
| Admission of prior sexual‑offense evidence under Evid. Code §1108 | Admissible to show propensity for sexual offenses unless excluded under §352 | Unfairly prejudicial, too remote, dissimilar, confusing; instructional error in CALJIC No. 2.50.01 | Admitted; trial court did not abuse discretion balancing §1108/§352; any instructional claim nonprejudicial because jury found felony‑murder (so propensity relevant) |
| Admission of victim‑father’s hearsay statements under Evid. Code §1250; confrontation challenge | Statements show victim’s intent/plans and rebut suicide theory; admissible as state‑of‑mind hearsay | Testimony was hearsay and testimonial (Confrontation Clause) | Admissible under §1250 as probative of state of mind; not testimonial so Crawford did not bar admission; any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Prosecutor’s comments denigrating defense expert and implying counsel “bought” testimony | Comments were fair argument about paid‑expert bias | Improper denigration, prejudicial misconduct | No reversible misconduct; prosecutors have latitude to argue bias of paid experts (Cook); remarks not sufficiently prejudicial |
| Instructional challenge to CALJIC No. 2.03 (false statements/consciousness of guilt) | Instruction permissible as circumstantial evidence guidance | Instruction duplicated other instructions and invited irrational inference | Claim rejected; precedent upholds instruction |
| Penalty‑phase argument re: lack of remorse as aggravation | Some prosecutor argument implicated lack of remorse as aggravating; much used properly to negate mitigation | Improper to use lack of remorse as aggravating factor | Some comments crossed line but any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given other aggravating evidence |
| Sealed medical/psych records in camera review | Court properly balanced privacy and relevance; records provided little usable impeachment | Defense should have access for impeachment/ability to cross‑examine | Supreme Court independently reviewed sealed record and found no abuse of discretion in denying disclosure |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Hall, 41 Cal.3d 826 (Cal. 1986) (standard for evaluating third‑party culpability evidence)
- People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal.4th 903 (Cal. 1999) (guidance on Evidence Code §1108 and §352 balancing)
- People v. Cook, 39 Cal.4th 566 (Cal. 2006) (prosecutor may argue paid‑expert bias in closing)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (confrontation clause testimonial‑statement framework)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967) (harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard for constitutional error)
- People v. Hammon, 15 Cal.4th 1117 (Cal. 1997) (psychotherapist/psychiatric privilege and pretrial discovery limits)
- Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (U.S. 1994) (constitutionality of victim‑impact evidence in capital cases)
- People v. Molano, 7 Cal.5th 620 (Cal. 2019) (application of §1108 in sexual‑offense prosecutions)
- People v. Daveggio and Michaud, 4 Cal.5th 790 (Cal. 2018) (standard of review for §1108 admissibility)
- People v. Rhoades, 8 Cal.5th 393 (Cal. 2019) (rejection of due‑process challenge to §1108)