THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GREGORY ODELL HUDSON, Defendant and Appellant.
No. S122816
Supreme Court of California
June 19, 2006
Rehearing Denied August 23, 2006
38 Cal.4th 1002 | 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 632 | 136 P.3d 168
Jeffrey A. Needelman, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Joseph P. Lee, Jeffrey A. Hoskinson, Donald E. De Nicola, Jaime L. Fuster and Zee Rodriguez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KENNARD, J.—A conviction of any of the offenses involving fleeing from a pursuing peace officer‘s motor vehicle requires, among other things, that the officer‘s vehicle be “distinctively marked.” (
We conclude that a peace officer‘s vehicle is distinctively marked if its outward appearance during the pursuit exhibits, in addition to a red light and a siren, one or more features that are reasonably visible to other drivers and distinguish it from vehicles not used for law enforcement so as to give reasonable notice to the person being pursued that the pursuit is by the police. We further conclude that a trial court must, on its own initiative, instruct the jury that the statutory phrase “distinctively marked” requires that, in addition to the red light and siren, the peace officer‘s vehicle must have features that distinguish it from vehicles not used for law enforcement, and that here the trial court‘s failure to so instruct the jury requires reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
I.
On the evening of January 4, 2002, Los Angeles Police Officers Andrew Buesa, who was in uniform, and Richard Ludwig were on patrol in a Ford Crown Victoria car near 54th Street and Wilton Place in Los Angeles. Officer Buesa, the driver, described the car as not a “marked vehicle” but “a plain car with forward-facing interior red light and a blue amber blinking light in the back.” The red light was directly under the rearview mirror.
Just before 11:00 p.m., the two officers saw a man standing next to a parked car in which defendant was in the driver‘s seat. The man handed defendant money in exchange for an item wrapped in cellophane and, after looking towards the officers, ran away.
When defendant drove off, the two officers followed in their car. As defendant accelerated and turned right onto another street, Officer Buesa turned on his car‘s red light and the siren. When defendant pulled his car over to the side of the road, Buesa got out of his car and ordered defendant at least five times to get out of his car. Defendant, however, drove away. The officers again pursued defendant with the car‘s red light and siren on. During the pursuit, defendant ran two stop signs and a red light, causing another car to swerve suddenly to avoid a collision; at one point, Officer Buesa saw
A search of the car revealed some crumbled off-white solids later determined to be cocaine base; a bottle labeled “hydrochloride” (a “cutting agent” to increase the weight of cocaine); and white residue on an electronic scale, on the electronic buttons for the window and the locks, on the outside of the driver‘s side door, and on defendant‘s left hand.
Defendant was charged with transportation of a controlled substance (
The trial court gave a modified version of the standard jury instruction for the offenses of fleeing from, or attempting to elude, a pursuing peace officer‘s vehicle. (See CALJIC No. 12.85 (1999 rev.).) The modified instruction told the jury that the statutory “term ‘distinctively marked’ does not necessarily mean that the police vehicle must be marked with an insignia or logo,” and it was for the jury “to determine whether the circumstances, which may include evidence of a siren or red lamp, [were] sufficient to inform any reasonable person that he was being pursued by a law enforcement vehicle.”
The jury found defendant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced him to imprisonment of four years for transporting a controlled substance, four years for possession for sale of cocaine base (the sentence was stayed under
The Court of Appeal affirmed. We granted defendant‘s petition for review.
II.
Our Courts of Appeal have reached conflicting holdings on the meaning of the statutory requirement that the peace officer‘s vehicle be “distinctively marked.”
In People v. Estrella (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 716 (Estrella), the Court of Appeal noted that subdivision (a)(3) of
In People v. Mathews (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 485, 489-490, the Court of Appeal followed the approach in Estrella, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th 716, concluding that a pursuing officer‘s vehicle equipped with red lights, siren, and with wigwag headlights was distinctively marked.
Thereafter, in People v. Chicanti (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 956 (Chicanti), the Court of Appeal disagreed with the holding of Estrella, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at page 723, that indicia other than a red light and a siren were necessary to make a pursuing peace officer‘s vehicle “distinctively
Defendant, on the other hand, contends that a reading of
To resolve the conflict in these two views, we apply basic principles of statutory construction to ascertain the legislative intent in using the phrase “distinctively marked.” Because the language of a statute is generally the most reliable indicator of the Legislature‘s intent, we look first to the words of the statute, giving them their ordinary meaning and construing them in context. If the language is unambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute controls. (Fitch v. Select Products Co. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 812, 818; People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 810.)
The statute at issue requires “[t]he peace officer‘s motor vehicle” to be “distinctively marked.” (
Because the presence of a red light and a siren on a car are generally associated with police cars, not cars driven by ordinary citizens, one might conclude that these two distinguishing features by themselves would make the car displaying them “distinctively marked.”
Thus, for purposes of
III.
As noted at the outset, defendant was charged with, among other things, violating
The trial court modified the proposed instruction as follows: “The term ‘distinctively marked’ does not necessarily mean that the police vehicle must be marked with an insignia or logo. The jury is to determine whether the circumstances, which may include evidence of a siren and red lamp, are sufficient to inform any reasonable person that he was being pursued by a law enforcement vehicle.” The court then incorporated that modified definition of “distinctively marked” into the standard jury instruction defining the offense of attempting to elude a pursuing peace officer with willful disregard of the safety of persons or property. (See CALJIC No. 12.85 (1999 rev.).) Defense counsel objected to the modified part of the instruction on the ground that it left out the statutory requirement that the police vehicle be distinctively marked, but he did not offer an alternative instruction.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the statutory phrase “distinctively marked” was not a technical term peculiar to the law, and that defendant had forfeited his right to challenge the jury instruction at issue by failing to request clarification or amplification of the instruction. Defendant contends that the rule of forfeiture invoked by the Court of Appeal is inapplicable when the trial court has given a legally incorrect instruction. Defendant further argues that because the statutory phrase “distinctively marked” does have a technical meaning unique to the law at issue, the trial court had a duty to give, on its own initiative, a legally correct instruction. There is merit to both contentions.
Defendant‘s failure to request clarification or amplification of the instruction at issue does not result in a forfeiture of his challenge. “Generally,
We now consider defendant‘s contention that the trial court had a duty, on its own initiative, to give a legally correct instruction.
“The rules governing a trial court‘s obligation to give jury instructions without request by either party are well established. ‘Even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law that are . . . necessary to the jury‘s understanding of the case.’ [Citations.] That obligation comes into play when a statutory term ‘does not have a plain, unambiguous meaning,’ has a ‘particular and restricted meaning’ [citation], or has a technical meaning peculiar to the law or an area of law [citation].” (People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 988.) “A word or phrase having a technical, legal meaning requiring clarification by the court is one that has a definition that differs from its nonlegal meaning.” (People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 574; accord, People v. Roberge, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 988.)
In common parlance, the phrase “distinctively marked,” when used to describe a police car, could include such distinguishing features as a red light or a siren. (See Webster‘s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 659, col. 1; id., p. 1382, col. 3.)
Accordingly, a trial court must tell the jury that in determining whether the statutory requirement that the pursuing police officer‘s vehicle be distinctively marked is met, it should consider the physical features of the vehicle itself that distinguish it from vehicles not used for law enforcement. To be distinctively marked, a vehicle must have, in addition to a red light and siren, one or more distinguishing physical features that are reasonably visible to other drivers during the pursuit. A trial court, however, need not instruct the jury that any particular form or specific type of mark is necessary. (See Estrella, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 722 [
Because the trial court here gave the jury an incorrect instruction defining the statutory term “distinctively marked,” we next consider whether the error requires a reversal of the judgment.
IV.
The statutory requirement that the pursuing peace officer‘s vehicle be distinctively marked is an element of the offense of evading a pursuing peace officer‘s vehicle. (
Here, we cannot conclude that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the instructional error did not contribute to the jury‘s verdict. The instruction was wrong in two respects, both of which were prejudicial to defendant. First, the court‘s instruction, by advising the jury that the circumstances it could consider “may include evidence of a siren and red lamp,” allowed the jury to determine that
The instructional error prejudiced defendant because the jury could have found that the police vehicle here was not distinctively marked. The model of the car does not qualify as a distinctive mark because even if, as Officer Buesa testified, black-and-white police cars commonly are Ford Crown Victorias, there was no evidence at trial that this model was used exclusively by the police and not by other motorists. The blue amber lights might be a distinctive mark, but under the circumstances a jury could have determined that this feature was not reasonably visible to other drivers.
Defendant contends the record contains insufficient evidence that the pursuing police car was “distinctively marked” to support his conviction for violating
DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as it affirms defendant‘s conviction of violating
George, C. J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., and Corrigan, J., concurred.
MORENO, J., Dissenting.—The majority reverses defendant‘s conviction for evading a police officer because the trial court failed to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that it could not consider that the police vehicle was equipped
On the night of January 4, 2002, Los Angeles Police Officers Andrew Buesa and Richard Ludwig were on patrol in a gray Ford Crown Victoria “dual purpose” police vehicle equipped with a forward facing red light under the interior rearview mirror, a “blue amber blinking light in the back,” and a siren. Ford Crown Victorias are the same make and model of automobile used for some black-and-white police cruisers. The officers turned a corner and saw defendant, who was seated in his vehicle, appear to sell drugs to a man standing next to the vehicle. The man standing outside defendant‘s vehicle noticed the officers’ vehicle and immediately fled between some houses. The officers turned on the vehicle‘s emergency lights and defendant‘s vehicle sped away, accelerating so rapidly that its tires lost traction.
The officers pursued defendant‘s vehicle, turning on their siren, and defendant pulled his vehicle to the curb. Officer Buesa, who was in uniform, left his patrol vehicle and repeatedly ordered defendant to get out of his vehicle. Defendant ignored these orders and again drove away, accelerating rapidly. Defendant finally was apprehended after a high-speed chase involving several police vehicles, during which defendant almost collided with another vehicle and failed to stop for two stop signs and a red traffic signal. The officers found cocaine base and drug paraphernalia in defendant‘s vehicle.
In addition to drug offenses, defendant was charged with a felony violation of
The jury convicted defendant of violating
The trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to define the statutory term “distinctively marked,” because that term has a plain and unambiguous meaning that the jury could understand without further instructions. (People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 988.) The majority disagrees because it concludes that the term “distinctively marked” has a technical, legal meaning that differs from its common meaning, because “a peace officer‘s vehicle is distinctively marked if its outward appearance during the pursuit exhibits, in addition to a red light and a siren, one or more features that are reasonably visible to other drivers and distinguish it from vehicles not used for law enforcement so as to give reasonable notice to the person being pursued that the pursuit is by the police.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1006.)
The majority reasons that the circumstances that a police vehicle has a red light and siren must be disregarded in determining whether it is “distinctively marked” within the meaning of
Similarly, in People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 240, 243, we interpreted
We never have held, as does the majority in the present case, that the circumstance that the same evidence may, but does not always, establish two separate elements of an offense renders one of those elements surplusage.
In the present case, the requirement that a police vehicle must be distinctively marked can be satisfied, in part, by the same evidence used to establish the additional requirements that the vehicle exhibit a red lamp that is visible from the front and that the suspect reasonably should have seen, and sound a siren as reasonably necessary. This does not render any of these three separate requirements excessive or nonessential. If the requirement that the vehicle be distinctively marked was removed from the statute, a jury would automatically find that a defendant evaded a police officer if the vehicle exhibited a red light and sounded a siren as necessary. The addition of the requirement that the vehicle be distinctively marked means that the jury will find that the defendant evaded a police officer only if the jury determines, from the totality of the circumstances, including the red light and siren, that the vehicle was distinctively marked. Thus, the requirement that the vehicle
This conclusion is supported by the decision in People v. Chicanti (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 956, in which the Court of Appeal considered and rejected the contrary reasoning in People v. Estrella (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 716, upon which the majority relies: “We respectfully disagree with the Estrella concern that the ‘distinctively marked’ requirement would be rendered ‘mere surplusage’ if the red lamp and siren could be used as the basis for a finding the vehicle was distinctively marked. The requirements are separate elements, and a reasonable trier of fact which found the red lamp was lighted and siren was on may or may not also conclude under the circumstances of a particular case that the red lamp and siren satisfy the distinctive marking element.” (People v. Chicanti, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 962; see People v. Shakhvaladyan (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 232, 237.)
I might reach a different conclusion if multiple elements of an offense invariably were satisfied by the same evidence, but that is not the situation here. For example, a jury applying the statute in the present case might reasonably determine that a red sports car used as an undercover police vehicle that exhibited a red light and was equipped with a siren that it did not use was not distinctively marked within the meaning of the statute. Even if this hypothetical undercover red sports car sounded its siren in addition to exhibiting a red light, a jury still reasonably could find that the vehicle was not distinctively marked within the meaning of the statute. The court‘s jury instruction in the present case, after all, did not require the jury to find that the vehicle was distinctively marked if it exhibited a red light and sounded a siren as necessary; the instruction merely permitted the jury to consider these facts in determining “whether the circumstances . . . are sufficient to inform any reasonable person that he was being pursued by a law enforcement vehicle.” I see nothing wrong with this instruction.
The jury in this case was instructed “to determine whether the circumstances, which may include evidence of a siren or red lamp,” established that the vehicle was distinctively marked. The term “distinctively marked” is common parlance, and a jury easily can understand the term without the need for special instructions. The fact that the jury was permitted, but not required, to conclude, depending upon all of the circumstances, that a vehicle exhibit-
Chin, J., concurred.
Respondent‘s petition for a rehearing was denied August 23, 2006, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Corrigan, J., did not participate therein. Chin, J., and Moreno, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.