People v. ClaytonPeople v. Clayton
FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 3, 1999, Jenny Kim and Gary Kim were working at a jewelry and music store in Long Beach. Around noon, appellant and three other men entered the store. As two of the men held Gary Kim at gunpoint, appellant grabbed Jenny Kim by her
Unable to open the cash register himself, appellant directed Jenny Kim to open it. After she did so, he ordered her to return to the back of the store and lie face down on the floor. Jenny Kim could not see what was happening elsewhere in the store, but she heard Gary Kim being beaten and kicked, and then she heard a single gunshot. Gary Kim died instantly from a gunshot wound to the back of the head.
Three of the perpetrators were arrested soon after the murder, and some of the jewelry taken during the robbery was recovered. Several months later, appellant was arrested. In an interview with police, appellant initially denied any knowledge of the crimes. But eventually he admitted he had spent the night before the offenses with one of the perpetrators and confessed he was in the store during the robberies and murder. However, appellant denied involvement in any plan to commit a robbery and insisted he did not know a robbery was about to take place when he entered the store. Appellant also asserted he pushed Jenny Kim over the counter for her protection when it appeared that one of the perpetrators was going to shoot her. After Jenny Kim had opened the cash register and appellant had walked her back to the rear of the store, appellant saw one of the men taking money from the cash register. Appellant decided to leave, and as he reached the door he heard the gunshot. Appellant maintained he had no part in the killing.
The trial court sentenced appellant to 25 years to life plus one year for the firearm enhancement on count 1, plus seven years four months for the remaining counts and the enhancement. This court affirmed the judgment on appeal. (Clayton, supra, B143748.)
On April 23, 2019, appellant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to
I. Appellant Stated a Prima Facie Case for Relief Under Section 1170.95; the Superior Court‘s Summary Denial of the Petition Based on Its Own Findings of Fact Violated the Statutory Procedures Mandated Under Section 1170.95, Subdivisions (c) and (d)
The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 to “amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842 (Gentile); People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723 (Martinez).) To accomplish this objective, Senate Bill No. 1437 amended the natural and рrobable consequences doctrine by adding
The Legislature also “amended
Subdivision (a) of
If the record of conviction does not indicate ineligibility as a matter of law, the superior court must appoint counsel (if requested) and accept briefing from the parties on the issue of whether the petitioner is ” ‘entitled to relief.’ ” (Drayton, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 976; Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 332–333, rev.gr.) At this stage, with the benefit of the parties’ briefing, the superior court may conduct a more thorough review of the record, including the jury instructions, verdict form(s), and any special findings or enhancement allegations the jury found true to determine if the petition makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. (People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 815 (Duchine); People v. Gomez (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1, 16, review granted Oct. 14, 2020, S264033; see Verdugo, at pp. 335–336.)
In conducting its prima facie review under
If, after the parties’ briefing, the petitioner has mаde a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief because there remains no proof of ineligibility as a matter of law, “the court shall issue an order to show cause” why relief should not be granted. (
Upon issuance of the order to show cause under
Here, appellant‘s petition for resentencing satisfied the requirements of
But the jury had already unanimously found the evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was an aider and abettor with actual malice or was a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Given this finding, there was nоthing in the record of conviction to support the superior court‘s determination at the prima facie stage that appellant was ineligible for relief under
The Attorney General agrees with appellant that the superior court erred in summarily denying the petition at the prima facie review stage, but argues that the correct remedy is to remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing in accordance with
The prosecution‘s burden in an evidentiary hearing under
In Ramirez, before the defendant sought relief under
Although Ramirez involved a court finding on habeas that the evidence did not support the jury‘s special circumstance finding, our analysis of
Like our determination on habeas that substantial evidence did not support Ramirez‘s special circumstance, the jury‘s rejection of the special-circumstance allegation in this case constitutes a prior finding by the jury that appellant did not act with reckless indifference to human life or was not a major
Respondent‘s arguments that the matter should nevertheless be remanded to afford the prosecution a second opportunity to attempt to prove appellant was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life—the very facts the jury already unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt rejected—are without merit.
As we explained in Ramirez, “Each section of a statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and harmonizing related sections to the extent possible. [Citation.] The first sentence of subdivision (d)(2) expressly provides that the parties may waive a hearing and stipulate to eligibility for relief. The next sentence mandates vacatur and resentencing due to a prior court finding. The provision‘s placement in the same subparagraph suggests that both sentences аre meant to streamline the process, one with a waiver, the other with a presumption. If we directed the trial court to issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing to consider whether to vacate defendant‘s murder conviction, as respondent suggests, this would not change the subdivision‘s mandate. It would serve no purpose other than delay.” (41 Cal.App.5th at p. 932.)
Given the clear mandate in
DISPOSITION
The order denying Clayton‘s petition to vacate his murder conviction and for resentencing is reversed. The matter is remanded to the superior court with directions to grant the petition, vacate Clayton‘s murder conviction, and resentence him on the remaining counts.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
LUI, P. J.
I concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
I respectfully dissent.
While I agree with the majority and thе parties that the trial court erred in denying appellant‘s petition at the prima facie stage, I disagree with the majority that the proper remedy is to grant the petition. Rather, I adopt the Attorney General‘s position that the matter should be remanded for the superior court to consider evidence presented by the prosecutor at a hearing at which new evidence may be permitted (
Here, in contrast, the “not true” finding by the jury as to the special circumstance does not prove, as a matter of law, that a court or jury affirmatively found appellant was not a major participant who acted with reckless indifference. “[A] jury verdict acquitting a defendant of a charged offense does not constitute a finding that the defendant is factually innocent of the offense оr establish that any or all of the specific elements of the offense are not true.” (In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 554, citing United States v. Watts (1997) 519 U.S. 148, 155.) The not true finding on the special circumstance was a general verdict indicating reasonable doubt existed as to the special circumstance overall,
The jury here was instructed with the standard CALJIC instructions that both the felony-murder theory and the felony-murder special circumstance required it to find that appellant committed a robbery or aided and abetted a robbery, and that he or the perpetrator of the robbery caused the death of a person. The jury was further instructed that in order to find the special circumstance true, it had to make the additional finding that appellant had the intent to kill, was a major participant in the robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life, or was the actual killer; conversely, for a felony-murder conviction without the special circumstance, it could find the killing was accidental or unintentional. However since the jury found appellant guilty of felony murder but the special circumstance not true there was no requirement that the jurors had to agree why the elements of the special circumstance were not met. Thus the not true finding in this case does not trigger
There are at least two ways the jury could have come to its verdicts without affirmatively rejеcting the theory that appellant was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference. First, it could have rejected the robbery-murder special circumstance because it found that an element other than the
Second, the jury was instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.832 which stated, “if the circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the truth of a special circumstance and the other to its untruth, you must adopt the interpretation which points to its untruth, and reject the interpretation which points to its truth.” Finally, CALJIC No. 8.83.13 instructed the jury, “if the evidence as to any specific intent mental state is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the existence of
Given these instructions it is possible that the jury found appellant was a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life and that the murder occurred “during” the robbery, but did not find the murder occurred in order to carry out or advance the robbery. The jury could have been unable to determine appellant‘s exact role in the murder and returned a not true finding without affirmatively determining whether he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. In People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903 (Santamaria) the defendant was convicted of murder, but the jury found the knife use allegation not true. The defendant‘s conviction was overturned on appeal, and a new information charging the defendant with murder but omitting the knife use allegation was filed. Based on the prior verdicts, the defendant argued that the prosecution should be prohibited (under collateral estoppel) from arguing that the defendant used a knife in commission of the murder. (Id. at pp. 908–909; see People v. Palmer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, 865.)
Our Supreme Court explained, however, that in California, “as long as each juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
As in Santamaria, the not true finding on the special circumstance allegation does not mean the jury affirmatively found appellant was not the actual killer or that he was not a major participant with reckless indifference to human life—that verdict may have only reflected that the jury was unsure about
Reading those instructions together it is reasonable to conclude that the jurors either all had to agree apрellant was the killer, or all agree he had an intent to kill or was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (See People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 927.) Thus, the jury could have understood the instructions as requiring a not true finding on the special circumstance if some jurors believed that the victim was killed unintentionally, while others believed appellant was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The evidence could have supported
As in Santamaria, there may have been a reasonable doubt that appellant was the direct perpetrator, that he was an aider and abettor, or that he was a major participant with reckless indifference to human life, but no such doubt that he was one of the three. (Santamaria, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 919.) In that scenario the jury would have to return a not true finding on the special circumstance enhancement but would be permitted to find appellant guilty of felony murder. Under Santamaria, that outcome reflеcts that the jury may have simply been unable to determine appellant‘s role.
I recognize that the motivation for enactment of
CHAVEZ, J.