THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. ANITA ALVAREZ, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE VINCENT GAUGHAN et al., Respondents.
No. 120110
Supreme Court of Illinois
December 1, 2016
2016 IL 120110
Original action for mandamus. Writ awarded.
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defender, and Ginger Leigh Odom, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for respondent Steven Castleberry.
CHIEF JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 The petitioner, Anita Alvarez, State‘s Attorney of Cook County, seeks a writ of mandamus (see
¶ 2 BACKGROUND
¶ 3 Following a jury trial, Steven Castleberry was convicted in the circuit court of Cook County of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (
¶ 4 The circuit court disagreed with the State, concluding that the legislature had intended the enhancement to be applied only once under the circumstances. Consequently, the circuit court sentenced Castleberry to a 9-year term of imprisonment on each conviction, adding the 15-year enhancement to only one of the sentences. The two sentences were ordered to run consecutively, for a total term of 33 years’ imprisonment.
¶ 5 Castleberry appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the 15-year enhancement was unconstitutional and, therefore, should not have been applied by the circuit court at all. The appellate court rejected Castleberry‘s arguments. However, the appellate court went on to address the State‘s contention that the 15-year enhancement was a mandatory statutory requirement that had to be added to the sentence for each of the two counts on which defendant had been convicted. The appellate court agreed with the State and, invoking the then-extant “void sentence rule,” remanded the matter to the circuit court for resentencing. 2013 IL App (1st) 111791-U, ¶ 38.
¶ 6 We allowed defendant‘s petition for leave to appeal (
¶ 7 Our opinion in Castleberry—issuing that admonishment and abolishing the “void sentence rule” as a means to correct sentences that do not comport with statutory mandates—was filed on November 19, 2015. On November 23, 2015, State‘s Attorney Alvarez filed in this court a motion for leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus, seeking—as the State had sought in the course of Castleberry‘s direct appeal—imposition of the 15-year mandatory sentencing enhancement with respect to each of Castleberry‘s convictions. Judge Gaughan and Castleberry are named as respondents. The attached proof of service indicates that service was effected upon Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defender of the Office of the State Appellate Defender; the Honorable Vincent M. Gaughan, Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County; and “Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of the State of Illinois.” The Office of the State Appellate Defender subsequently filed objections to Alvarez‘s motion on behalf of Castleberry, and its attached proof of service reflects service upon State‘s Attorney Alvarez, Attorney General Madigan, Judge Gaughan, and Castleberry.
¶ 8 Of all the filings of record, there are none by the Attorney General. The Attorney General, despite notice of this proceeding, has not objected, nor has she taken a position contrary to that advanced by State‘s Attorney Alvarez.
¶ 9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 ”Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to compel a public officer to perform nondiscretionary official duties.” People ex rel. Senko v. Meersman, 2012 IL 114163, ¶ 9. This court will award mandamus only if the petitioner establishes a clear right to the relief requested, a clear duty of the public officer to act, and clear authority of the public officer to comply with the writ. Id.
¶ 11 In its criminal case against Castleberry, the State ultimately proceeded to trial on two counts of the original eight-count indictment. Those counts alleged that Castleberry violated
¶ 12 Castleberry answers by arguing that (1) a conflict in statutes defeats a “clear right to relief,” (2) the State‘s Attorney does not have standing to sue in this court on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois, and (3) the relief sought is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. We note, at the outset, that counsel for respondent Castleberry conceded, at oral argument, that the 15-year sentence add-on should have been applied to each of Castleberry‘s convictions. In that respect, everyone appears to agree—as do we.2
¶ 13 The appellate court so held (2013 IL App (1st) 111791-U, ¶¶ 37-38), then cited, as authorization for its remand for resentencing, this court‘s decision in People v. White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶¶ 20-21, 26 (“a court exceeds its authority when it orders a lesser or greater sentence than that which the statute mandates,” and such a sentence is “illegal and void“). In Castleberry, this court stated that the “appellate court *** had no authority in this case to vacate the circuit court‘s sentencing order in response to the State‘s argument.” Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 25. In fact, prior to this court‘s repudiation of Arna in Castleberry, the appellate court did have that authority, and it was correct to cite White
¶ 14 As this court has recently reiterated, laches is an equitable principle that bars recovery by a litigant whose unreasonable delay in bringing an action for relief prejudices the rights of the other party. Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., 2016 IL 119518, ¶ 51. Stated differently, “it must appear that a plaintiff‘s unreasonable delay *** has prejudiced and misled defendant, or caused him to pursue a course different from what he would have otherwise taken.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 51. The determination of whether laches applies depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Tully v. State, 143 Ill. 2d 425, 432-33 (1991).
¶ 15 We note, first, that there is no indication of unreasonable delay on the part of the State. The State argued its point in the circuit court, and it raised the matter immediately thereafter before the appellate court, where defendant was bringing his own challenge to the imposition of the enhancement. Despite our subsequent observations in Castleberry regarding the theoretical and constitutional infirmities of the “void sentence rule,” it remained a viable means of correcting the circuit court‘s sentencing error when the State pursued it and the appellate court acted, and it had the advantage of facilitating resolution of all related sentencing issues in one proceeding before a single tribunal. Notwithstanding the contemporaneous availability of mandamus as an alternative means of rectifying sentences that did not comport with statutory mandates (see, e.g., Meersman, 2012 IL 114163, ¶ 21), we will not find the State less than diligent in choosing this avenue of redress while it existed.
¶ 16 Moreover, it is clear that Castleberry suffered no prejudice. Even assuming, arguendo, undue delay on the part of the State, we note, on just one of his convictions, Castleberry was sentenced to 24 years’ imprisonment. In the proof of service attached to his objections to Alvarez‘s motion for leave to file the petition for writ of mandamus, his address is listed as Menard Correctional Center. It is reasonable to assume he will be incarcerated for some time. This is not, as his counsel posited in answer to a question from the bench during oral argument before this court, a situation where an inmate is about to walk out the prison door when the State seeks correction of his sentence. In his brief, Castleberry suggests that the State‘s delay in seeking mandamus is “inherently prejudicial to the public, because the delay has a chilling effect on a defendant‘s right to
¶ 17 We conclude there was neither unreasonable delay in the State‘s assertion of sentencing error and its attempt to rectify that error, nor any conceivable prejudice to Castleberry. Hence, laches does not apply.
¶ 18 Nor do we find Castleberry‘s contention of statutory conflict of arguable merit or an impediment to granting the State‘s clear right to mandamus relief. Castleberry suggests application of the mandatory sentence enhancement at this juncture would conflict with
¶ 19 As this court noted in People v. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421, 431-32 (1997), those provisions3 were consistent with and incorporated the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), wherein the Court reasoned that due process of law
“requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant‘s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.” Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725, 89 S. Ct. at 2080. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d at 432.
Obviously, the punitive concerns addressed by those statutes are not implicated in this case. Castleberry has not challenged the unlawfully lenient sentence imposed upon him by the trial judge. Castleberry‘s sentencing claim on appeal was in fact rejected by the appellate court (see 2013 IL App (1st) 111791-U, ¶ 36) and is not at issue here. There is no reason to believe that Castleberry will be the victim of judicial vindictiveness if this cause is—pursuant to vindication of the State‘s position herein—remanded for resentencing and imposition of the statutorily required firearm enhancement. This case does not present the circumstances sections 5-4.5-50(d) and 5-5-4(a) were intended to address. Imposition of the enhancement on remand is not discretionary. Thus, it cannot be the medium for judicial vindictiveness. That disposition is mandated by an enactment of the legislature, given these facts. It seems to us unreasonable to suggest that the legislature intended sections 5-4.5-50(d)
¶ 20 Castleberry also appears to suggest that this court‘s ability to order correction of his sentence, to bring it into compliance with the statutory mandate, was dependent upon the void sentence rule. In his brief to this court, Castleberry asserts:
“The abolition of Arna‘s void sentence rule makes clear that the circuit court may not increase Castleberry‘s sentence under the judicially-created exception to the prohibition against such increases. Because the original sentence in this case was not void, the trial court is precluded from increasing it. ***
Thus, where the State is asking for Judge Gaughan to increase Castleberry‘s sentence, but the circuit court is prohibited by Illinois law from increasing Castleberry‘s sentence, and no exceptions to this statutory prohibition exist here, the State‘s Attorney has not established the requisite factors for mandamus relief to lie.”
¶ 21 However, the State is not asking Judge Gaughan to increase Castleberry‘s sentence; it is asking this court to order Judge Gaughan to correct his sentence, which necessarily entails an increase. To the extent Castleberry is suggesting otherwise, we note there is no jurisdictional impediment here.
¶ 22 Finally, we address Castleberry‘s argument that the State‘s Attorney of Cook County—and by logical extension any State‘s Attorney—has no standing to bring a mandamus action in this court to seek correction of a sentence not authorized by statute. Castleberry acknowledges that, in numerous cases cited in the State‘s brief, “this Court allowed the State‘s Attorney to appear as a relator in this Court.” Indeed, the State avers, “over the past 140 years, this Honorable Court has decided many cases where a State‘s Attorney appeared as a relator and sought extraordinary relief of a writ of mandamus or prohibition in matters arising out of a criminal matter.” State‘s Attorney
¶ 23 Notwithstanding the historical practice represented by those cases, Castleberry argues that lack of standing was not asserted therein; thus, “[t]hose cases are not contrary to this point.” In support of his revelatory position, Castleberry cobbles together generic authority from diverse sources, arguing that “the Attorney General is the only officer authorized to
¶ 24 Castleberry begins with this quote extracted from this court‘s opinion in People ex rel. Scott v. Briceland, 65 Ill. 2d 485 (1976): “[T]he Attorney General is the sole officer authorized to represent the People of this State in any litigation in which the People of the State are the real party in interest ***.” Id. at 500 (discussing Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304 (1915), and its incorporation into the 1970 Constitution (
¶ 25 Fergus involved, inter alia, a legislative enactment that purported to strip the Attorney General of powers and duties relating to insurance and transfer them to the insurance superintendent. Fergus, 270 Ill. at 334-35. This court found that action impermissible and, pursuant to that finding, declared appropriations to the insurance superintendent “for legal services and for traveling expenses of attorneys and court costs in prosecutions for violations of insurance laws *** unconstitutional and void.” Id. at 342.
¶ 26 In Briceland, an action was brought seeking a declaratory judgment that only the Attorney General was empowered to institute and prosecute cases before the Pollution Control Board. The Briceland plaintiffs also sought an injunction barring the Environmental Protection Agency from pursuing actions before the Pollution Control Board. This court held that a provision of the Environmental Protection Act authorizing the Environmental Protection Agency to prosecute cases before the Pollution Control Board was unconstitutional because “the Attorney General is the sole officer entitled to represent the interests of the State in litigation conducted before the Pollution Control Board.” Briceland, 65 Ill. 2d at 500.
¶ 27 Neither Briceland nor Fergus addressed the powers of State‘s Attorneys vis-à-vis the Attorney General. As this court observed in County of Cook ex rel. Rifkin v. Bear Stearns & Co., 215 Ill. 2d 466 (2005):
“Like the Attorney General, a State‘s Attorney is a constitutional officer. The 1870 Illinois Constitution provided that there ‘be elected a state‘s attorney in and for each county in lieu of the state‘s attorneys now provided by law.’
Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI, § 22 . This court has held that the State‘s Attorney is a State officer under the 1870 Constitution. Hoyne v. Danisch, 264 Ill. 467, 470-73 (1914). The 1970 Illinois Constitution contains a similar provision: ‘A State‘s Attorney shall be elected in each county in 1972 and every fourth year thereafter for a four year term.’Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 19 . In Ingemunson v. Hedges, 133 Ill. 2d 364, 369-70 (1990), we reaffirmed the holding in Hoyne, noting that the debates of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1970 indicate the drafters of the 1970 Constitution agreed that State‘s Attorneys should be classified as state, rather than county, officers.” Id. at 474-75.
Further, we noted that a “State‘s Attorney is a constitutional officer with rights and duties ‘analogous to or largely coincident with the Attorney General, though not identical, and the one to represent the county or People in matters affected with a public interest.’ ” Id. at 476 (quoting People ex rel. Kunstman v. Nagano, 389 Ill. 231, 249 (1945)). This court concluded that “[t]he State‘s Attorney‘s powers are analogous to and largely coincident with those of the Attorney General and it follows, therefore, that the legislature may not usurp those constitutionally derived powers.” Id. at 478.
¶ 28 In support of his position, Castleberry cites two legislative enactments, arguing that they restrict the authority of State‘s Attorney Alvarez to act in this instance. He first resorts to
¶ 29 Castleberry does not mention
¶ 30 Even if the legislature could, constitutionally, usurp or diminish the powers of State‘s Attorneys and the Attorney General heretofore recognized—and Rifkin, Briceland, and Fergus suggest the legislature cannot—we do not read the statutes cited by Castleberry—prescribing certain duties of the Attorney General and State‘s Attorneys, respectively—as diminishing or circumscribing their powers, yet that is what Castleberry contends. That the Attorney General has a duty “[t]o appear for and represent the people of the State before the supreme court in all cases in which the State or the people of the State are interested” (see
¶ 31 To be sure, the Attorney General is the chief law enforcement officer of the state and, as such, is afforded a broad range of discretion in the performance of public duties, including the discretion to institute proceedings in any case of purely public interest. Lyons v. Ryan, 201 Ill. 2d 529, 539 (2002). The primacy of the Attorney General in that respect is not open to question. However, in reaffirming the Attorney General‘s discretionary preeminence in such matters, even this court has blurred the line between the authority of the Attorney General and that of State‘s Attorneys. See id. (citing, in support of Attorney General‘s discretionary authority, cases referencing the State‘s Attorneys’ discretionary authority).4
¶ 32 Though the Attorney General undoubtedly could have instituted and prosecuted this mandamus action—and consistent with
¶ 34 In view of Castleberry‘s concession, indeed the agreement of all concerned—the parties, the appellate court, and this court—that, pursuant to subsections (d)(1) and (a)(8) of the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute and this court‘s precedent, two convictions based on two separate acts of sexual penetration while armed with a firearm warrant the imposition of two separate sentence enhancements, one for each offense, we issue a writ of mandamus, ordering the respondent judge to vacate his sentencing order and resentence Castleberry, imposing the mandatory firearm enhancement on both of Castleberry‘s convictions. In so doing, as aforesaid, we reject Castleberry‘s contentions that (1) the relief sought is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches, (2) a conflict in statutes defeats a “clear right to relief,” and (3) the State‘s Attorney does not have standing to sue in this court on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois.
¶ 35 Writ awarded.