THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. DEVINE, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE PAUL STRALKA, Respondent.
No. 102962
Supreme Court of Illinois
October 18, 2007
226 Ill. 2d 445
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Roger L. Longtin and Catherine J. Casey, Special Assistant Attorneys General, of DLA Piper US LLP, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent Honorable Paul Stralka.
Edwin A. Burnette, Public Defender, of Chicago
CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Kilbride, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Burke specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Justices Freeman and Fitzgerald.
OPINION
The question presented in this case is whether the circuit court exceeded its lawful authority when it vacated a juvenile delinquency finding over 11 months after the date the minor pled guilty and was sentenced for the offense. We must also consider whether mandamus relief would now be appropriate to compel the court to reinstate the delinquency finding.
The State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship pursuant to section 5-520 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (
BACKGROUND
D.D. was a 16-year-old with no prior criminal record at the time he was arrested by the Berwyn police on May
On May 17, 2005, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship in connection with the crime, charging D.D. with unauthorized possession or storage of a weapon—a Class A misdemeanor (
At the guilty plea hearing on June 23, 2005, defense counsel filed a motion requesting that the guilty plea be vacated upon successful completion of probation. The State told the court that it opposed the motion to vacate, but that it would “stand by” the offer it made to defense counsel. Defense counsel responded that he too would “stand by the agreement,” but that the minor wanted to have the opportunity to have the adjudication erased from his record. The court then stated that it would acсept the plea agreement and sentence the minor to one year of probation, 30 days of community service and order him to participate in the victim-impact and violence-prevention programs. Finally, the court stated that it would “enter and continue” the motion to vacate the delinquency adjudication over the State‘s objection. The court set a one-year status date for June 2, 2006.
On June 6, 2006, a hearing on the motion to vacate
The State objected to vacating the delinquency finding, emphasizing the seriousness оf the charge and also noting that a full year had not passed since the probation order was entered. Judge Stralka granted the motion to vacate the delinquency finding. He also ordered that D.D.‘s probation be terminated and the case closed.
The Cook County State‘s Attorney filed a motion in this court for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition (see
ANALYSIS
A writ of mandamus may be awarded if the petitioner establishes a clear legal right to relief, a clear duty of the public official to act, and a clear authority in the public official to comply with thе writ, as well as the lack of other adequate remedies. People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d 457, 465 (2004). Although mandamus generally provides affirmative rather than prohibitory relief (People ex rel. Waller v. McKoski, 195 Ill. 2d 393, 398 (2001)), it can be used to compel the undoing of an act (Noyola v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 179 Ill. 2d 121, 133 (1997)).
Similarly, a writ of prohibition may be used to “‘prevent a judge from acting where he has no jurisdic-
We believe that the points raised by the parties correspond most closely with the question of whether a writ of prohibition is appropriate under the circumstances. The key inquiry here, then, is whether the action taken by Judge Stralka in vacating the lawfully entered delinquency finding almost one year after it was entered based on the minor‘s subsequent good behavior was either (1) outside of the court‘s jurisdiction, or (2) beyond the judge‘s legitimate authority. The State contends that the judge‘s action exceeded his lawful authority because it runs contrary to a number of well-established legal principles, including this court‘s rules on how guilty pleas may be vacated, the important statutory distinctions between court supervision and probation, the exclusive authority of the governor tо grant clemency, and the comprehensive legislative scheme for the expungement and sealing of delinquency findings.
We begin our analysis with an overview of the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 5-325 of the Act provides that law enforcement is to forward information to the State‘s Attorney whenever law enforcement has knowledge that a crime has been committed by a minor.
Delinquency proceedings based on a petition filed by the State‘s Attorney are separated into three judicial determinations or phases—a findings phase, an adjudicatory phase and a dispositional phase. The first phase involves a trial and a determination of guilt. See
Once a petition is filed alleging that a minor is delinquent, a trial must be held within 120 days of a written demand made by any party.
The Act clearly provides that if court supervision is not an option because of the State‘s Attorney‘s objection, the cause must proceed through to the conclusion of the findings stage.
The second stage is where the court decides whether or not to adjudicate the minor a ward of the court. If the court has found that the minor is guilty, it shаll set a time for a sentencing hearing to be conducted under section 5-705 of the Act.
If the trial court determines that the minor is to be made a ward of the court, the court shall determine at the third stage the proper disposition best serving the interests of the minor and the public.
Where, as here, the circuit court‘s power to act is controlled by statute, the court must proceed within the strictures of the statute, and may not take any action that exceeds its statutory authority. In re Jaime P., 223 Ill. 2d 526, 540 (2006). Moreover, a court exercising jurisdiction over a minor pursuant to the provisions of the Act is not at liberty to reject or embellish its statutory authority even if there is a perceived need or desirability for such action. In re Jaime P., 223 Ill. 2d at 540.
From the foregoing overview of the Act, we believe that it is clear that a trial judge has no discretion to vacate a finding of delinquency under the circumstances of the present case. The Act gives the State‘s Attorney discretion to prosecute violations of the criminal law in juvenile court and further gives him or her the right to proceed to trial and reject court supervision. Placing the minor on probation and later vacating the delinquency finding, as was done here, is tantamount to granting supervision, and it essentially circumvents the State‘s right to reject supervision.
The legislature has expressly provided that probation is an appropriate sentencing option for a minor who is found guilty (
Judge Stralka argues that what was done in the
D.D. and Judge Stralka argue that section 5-710(3) of the Act gives the court authority to vacate a delinquency finding at any time until the proceedings are finally closed and discharged. But this interpretation misreads the statute. It is true that the juvenile court judge rеtains jurisdiction over the wardship and sentencing aspects of the case until the minor reaches the age of 21 or the judge enters a final order closing the case and discharging the minor.
The action taken here also runs afоul of a number of other established legal principles, including the way final sentencing orders are normally treated. A finding of guilt and a finding of delinquency are the same in a juvenile delinquency case (In re J.N., 91 Ill. 2d 122, 128 (1982)), and that finding coupled with the disposition is a final and appealable judgment under the Act (see In re D.D., 212 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (2004); In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 326 (1995); In re J.N., 91 Ill. 2d at 127-28). Even though the sentencing disposition creates the final and appealable order, the sentencing disposition itself is subject to modification in the trial court until final closing and discharge of the minor, which only automatically occurs when the minor reaches 21 years of age. See In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 326. Nothing in the Act or the case law of this state, however, gives the delinquency finding the same status so that it too can be modified at any time. Instead, juvenile court judges are restricted to considering timely motions to withdraw guilty pleas pursuant to
D.D. and Judge Stralka argue that even if section 5-710(3) of the Act does not confer authority to vacate a delinquency finding, such authority exists based on the broad discretion afforded by the Act to rehabilitate minors and to provide an individualized assessment. We disagree.
While rehabilitation of the minor remains one of the chief goals of the Act (In re Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d 510, 520 (2006)), this goal must be reconciled with the overriding concerns of protecting the public and holding juvenile offenders accountable for violations of the law (In re Jaime P., 223 Ill. 2d at 535-36; People v. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d 157, 165-67 (2006)). This court recently reiterated this precept by stating that
“The Juvenile Court Act was ‘radically altered’ when the Generаl Assembly amended the Act with Public Act 90-590, effective January 1, 1999. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d at 165, citing
705 ILCS Ann. 405/5-101 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1999). ‘The amendatory changes renumbered the sections and largely rewrote article V of the Act to provide more accountability for the criminal acts of juveniles ***.’ Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d at 165. The 1999 amendments provided a new purpose and policy section, which begins: ‘(1) It is the intent of the General Assembly to promote a juvenile justice system capable of dealing with the problem of juvenile delinquency, a system that will protect the community, impose accountability for violations of law and equip juvenile offenders with competencies to live responsibly and productively.’705 ILCS 405/5-101(2) (West 1998). This policy statement ‘represents a fundamental shift from the singular goal of rehabilitation to include the overriding concerns of protecting the public and holding juvenile of-fenders accountable for violations of the law.’ Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d at 167; In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 317 (2001).” In re Jaime P., 223 Ill. 2d at 535-36.
Specifically, the purpose and policy section of article V declares the following to be important purposes to effectuate the intent of the legislature:
“(a) To protect citizens from juvenile crime.
(b) To hold each juvenile offender directly accountable for his or her acts.
(c) To provide an individualized assessment of each alleged and adjudicated delinquent juvenile, in order to rehabilitate and to prevent further delinquent behavior through the development of competency in the juvenile offender. As used in this Section, ‘competency’ means the development of educational, vocational, social, emotional and basic life skills which enable a minor to mature into a productive member of society.”
705 ILCS 405/5-101(1)(a) ,(1)(b) ,(1)(c) (West 2004).
Our analysis of a statute is governed by a consideration of the legislature‘s objective in enacting it. In re Jaime P., 223 Ill. 2d at 535-36. Here, we believe thе legislature intended to hold juveniles accountable for their crimes by giving discretion to the State‘s Attorney to reject court supervision and to proceed to prosecution. The finding of guilt and a disposition of probation constitute a final and appealable order. While the disposition can be modified, nothing in the Act allows for—and we do not believe that the legislature intended—a delinquency finding to be vacated in the manner and under the circumstances presented here. Our interpretation is consistent with the overriding concerns of the Act of protecting the public and holding juvenile offenders accountable.
There are also a number of collateral ways that the public is protected by the finding of delinquency. Other statutes require that minors who are found delinquent based on certain sex offensеs register with law enforcement (
Additionally, Judge Stralka‘s order vacating the delinquency finding interferes with the statutory scheme for expungement of juvenile law enforcement and court records. Section 5-915 of the Act provides two different subsections for expunging records, with different criteria and time limits for obtaining expungement.
The purposes of the Act with respect to rehabilitation and providing minors with an individualized assessment are adequately served by the statutory provisions that give the court discretion to modify the sentencing disposition. Judge Stralka was admirably promoting these concerns when he terminated the minor‘s probation early and closed the case based on the minor‘s good behavior. The judge, however, stepped just beyond the edge of his legitimate authority when he vacated the delinquency finding itself that was lawfully imposed 11 months previously.
The cases relied upon by D.D. and Judge Stralka for assertion of the court‘s general equitable powers as sufficient authority in this situation are distinguishable and do not support their position. In In re M.R.H., 326 Ill. App. 3d 565 (2001), the State insisted on prosecution of a minor for retail theft after he stole $0.59 worth of merchandise. The trial court denied the minor‘s motion for a station house adjustment because the State wanted to prosecute. The minor later filed a motion requesting that upon a finding of guilt, he not be adjudicated a ward of the court. Prior to a resolution of this motion, the minor pled guilty and was found guilty of retail theft. At
The appellate court reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings. In re M.R.H., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 568. It found that the plain language of section 5-705 of the Act allows the court to determine whether it is in the best interests of the minor to be adjudicated a ward of the court and that such a determination must be made before the entry of the sentencing disposition. In re M.R.H., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 568. Accordingly, the appellate court remanded the cause for a hearing to determine whether or not it was in the best interests of the minor or the public that he be made a ward of the court. In re M.R.H., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 568. The court found that its resolution of the issue rendered it unnecessary for it to address whether the trial court had the authority to impose supervision after disposition. In re M.R.H., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 568.
We find nothing in In re M.R.H. to support D.D.‘s and Judge Stralka‘s position. The holding that the trial court possesses discretion not to adjudicate a minor a ward of the court following a delinquency finding is merely a straightforward application of the plain language of the statutory provisions that wе have set forth above. If anything, In re M.R.H. actually supports the State‘s position, as the appellate court left intact the trial court‘s finding that it had no discretion to avoid prosecution of the minor and that it must proceed to a determination of guilt where the State insists on prosecution.
In re St. Louis, 67 Ill. 2d 43 (1977), is also not helpful
This court affirmed the expungement order. In re St. Louis, 67 Ill. 2d at 48. It found that the circuit court possessed the inherent equitable authority to order expungement and that such authority was properly exercised. In re St. Louis, 67 Ill. 2d at 47-48. It offered two reasons for its holding. First, it was clear that if the arrestee were an adult he would be entitled to expungement, and second, even though the Juvenile Court Act was silent as to the expungement, this did not necessarily imply that such records could be retained where they served no discernible purpose. In re St. Louis, 67 Ill. 2d at 46-47. Finally, this court noted that the circuit court‘s order was consistent with the specific goal of the Juvenile Court Act to protect minors from the disclosure of information. In re St. Louis, 67 Ill. 2d at 47.
In re St. Louis was decided before the adoption of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 with its many changes in the area of juvenile law. It was also decided long before this court‘s recent holding in In re Jaime P. that the circuit court‘s power to act is controlled by statute in juvenile cases and that “the court must proceed within the statute‘s strictures.” In re Jaime P., 223 Ill. 2d at 540.
CONCLUSION
We hold that, while a juvenile sentencing disposition is a final and appealable order and the circuit court retains jurisdiction to modify the sentencing disposition and wardship, nothing in the Act gives the circuit court the authority to modify the finding of delinquency once the disposition becomes final and appealable. Instead, this court has held that section 2-1401 petitions are applicable to juvenile cases and that Rule 604(d) strictly applies to juvenile cases. Here, the minor did not file a section 2-1401 petition, nor did he file a motion to vacate his guilty plea in compliance with Rule 604(d). Accordingly, the delinquеncy finding was not subject to modification 11 months after the minor was sentenced to probation.
For the foregoing reasons, the writ of prohibition is allowed and the circuit court of Cook County is directed to reinstate the finding of delinquency against D.D. and to vacate the portion of its order that vacated D.D.‘s delinquency finding.
Writ awarded.
Today the court unanimously holds that the Juvenile Court Act does not authorize a circuit court to vacate a finding of delinquency subsequent to the juvenile‘s successful completion of probation. While I agree that, under the law, this is the correct determination, I write separately to express my concern that our decision takes away a valuable and necessary tool from the juvenile court judges of this state.
As the record reflects, for more than 30 years juvenile court judges have engaged in thе practice of vacating delinquency findings following a juvenile‘s successful completion of probation. Juvenile court judges—like Judge Stralka, here—have utilized this practice as a means of dispensing justice and achieving fairness when, in the exercise of their discretion, the circumstances of a particular case warrant such action.
The stated purpose of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 is “to secure for each minor subject hereto such care and guidance, preferably in his or her own home, as will serve the safety and moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community.”
Our determination that the Juvenile Court Act does not afford a trial judge “discretion to vacate a finding of delinquency” is based, in part, on the fact that the practice of “[p]lacing the minor on probation and later vacating the delinquency finding *** is tantamount to granting supervision, and it essentially circumvents the State‘s right to reject supervision.” 226 Ill. 2d at 454;
“Continuance under supervision.
(1) The court may enter an order of continuance under supervision for an offense other than first degree murder, a Class X felony or a forcible felony (a) upon an admission or stipulation by the appropriate respondent or minor respondent of the facts supporting the petition and before proceeding to adjudication, or after hearing the evidence at the trial, and (b) in the absence of objection made in open court by the minor, his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian, the minor‘s attorney or the State‘s Attorney.” (Emphasis added.)
705 ILCS 405/5-615(1) (West 2004).
As our opinion makes clear, under section 5-615(1), court supervision is not an available option if the State‘s Attorney objects. In such cases, the matter must proceed to the conclusion of the findings stage. See 226 Ill. 2d at 452. Consequently, although a juvenile court might have
Prior to 1982, the statute did not permit the State‘s Attorney to object. In In re T.W., 101 Ill. 2d 438, 440-41 (1984), we noted:
“The portion of section 4-7(1) [now section 5-615(1)] requiring the State‘s Attorney‘s consent to a continuance under supervisiоn was added by section 1 of Public Act 82-973. (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 37, par. 704-7, Historical Note, at 182 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).) Prior to this amendment, the only parties whose consent was required were the minor or the minor‘s parents, guardian, custodian or responsible relative. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 37, par. 704-7 [now
705 ILCS 405/5-615(1) (West 2004)].) A continuance under supervision is the most lenient disposition available for delinquency petitions under the Juvenile Court Act, except for dismissal of the petition. If the parties entitled to voice objections to a continuance under supervision do not do so and the juvenile complies with the conditions imposed by the court, section 2-11(1)(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1982 Supp., ch. 37, par. 702-11(1)(c) [now705 ILCS 405/5-915(1)(c) (West 2004)]) permits the juvenile, after reaching age 17, to petition the court for expunction of all law-enforcement and juvenile records relating to incidents occurring befоre age 17. Thus, assuming court approval of the petition, the juvenile who successfully completes supervision may have his juvenile record expunged.”
It is unclear why the legislature amended this portion of the statute to permit the State‘s Attorney to object.
I recognize that, in In re T.W., we upheld the amendment in the face of a constitutional challenge, on separation of powers grounds, holding that People v. Phillips, 66 Ill. 2d 412 (1977), was “dispositive of the issue.” See In re T.W., 101 Ill. 2d at 441. However, I question the T.W. court‘s reliance on Phillips.
In Phillips, the issue was the constitutionality of sec-
In my view, Phillips does not provide solid underpinning for the decision in In re T.W. First, Phillips did not involve a minor, nor did it interpret a statute within the Juvenile Court Act, an act which affords minors special protections and safeguards and directs judges to consider the best interests of the minors appearing before them. Moreover, in Phillips, the court distinguished the provisions of the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act from a California drug addict diversion statute found to be unconstitutional in People v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 59, 520 P.2d 405, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1974), holding:
“Our statute is readily distinguishable from the California statute. The required consent of the appropriate probation or parole authority in our act does not constitute a veto of the exercise of judicial authority. The participation of these officers is involved only in the determination of whether a defendant is eligible for consideration. If a defendant is not on probation or parole, naturally these officers are not involved, but if a defendant is on probation or parole and elects to take treatment under the plan it is necessary to have the cooperation of the probation or parole officer whose duty and responsibility it is to supervise the defendant. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 204-4 (probation officer), and ch. 38, par. 1003-
14-2 (supervising parole officer).) Without the assured cooperation of these officers the success of any treatment program would be seriously jeopardized. It is only after the eligibility requirements are satisfied that the court determines whether or not the defendant should be admitted to treatment under the Act.” Phillips, 66 Ill. 2d at 417-18.
In my view, section 5-615(1) of the Juvenile Court Act is more akin to the California statute because it permits the State‘s Attorney to exercise veto power over the court‘s exercise of its judicial authority to grant court supervision to a minor. Our decision in In re T.W. bears revisiting.
However, even if section 5-615(1) is not unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds, the statute raises, in my mind, equal protection concerns. I note that a similarly situated adult may be placed on supervision without the State‘s Attorney‘s approval. Section 5-6-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections (
“The court may, upon a plea of guilty or a stipulation by the defendant of the facts supporting the charge or a finding of guilt, defer further proceedings and the imposition of a sentence, and enter an order for supervision of the defendant, *** after considering the circumstances of the offense, and the history, character and condition of the offender, if the court is of the opinion that:
(1) the offender is not likely to commit further crimes;
(2) the defendant and the public would be best served if the defendant were not to receive a criminal record; and
(3) in the best interests of justice an order of supervision is more appropriate than a sentence otherwise permitted under this Code.”
I observe, as well, that other jurisdictions permit juvenile court judges to grant orders of supervision or “consent decrees” without restriction. See, e.g., In re Rousselow, 341 N.W.2d 760 (Iowa 1983) (interpreting
It is not my intent to cast aspersions on the State‘s Attorneys because they choose to prosecute juveniles in these cases. When a juvenile commits an act which constitutes a crime, it is the State‘s Attorney‘s role to prosecute and to seek adjudication so as to protect the public. However, giving the State‘s Attorney the authority to deny the grant of supervision to juveniles runs counter to the State‘s Attorney‘s prosecutorial role. As a practical matter, it is not reasonable to expect that the State‘s Attorney, while zealously and vigorously prosecuting his or her case in an effort to secure an adjudication, can then step back and make an objective determination regarding the minor‘s suitability to receive court supervision. See, e.g., In re M.R.H., 326 Ill. App. 3d 565 (2001) (State insisted on prosecution of a minor for retail theft after he stole $0.59 worth of merchandise).
Whether leniency in the form of court supervision should be granted to a minor is a decision best left to an impartial and neutral party—the judge, who is mandated to ensure that the Act is “administered in a spirit of humane concern, not only for the rights of the parties, but also for the fears and the limits of understanding of all who appear before the court.”
In light of the above, I urge the legislature to reexamine the Juvenile Court Act. In my view, our statutory scheme, which denies a juvenile court judge the discretion to vacate findings of delinquency based on subsequent good behavior, and also permits the State‘s Attorney to object to court supervision and, thereby, preclude the court from electing supervision as a disposition, unduly ties the hands of the judge who is commissioned with the task of acting in the best interests of the minor and raises constitutional concerns.
JUSTICES FREEMAN and FITZGERALD join in this special concurrence.
CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS