THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JESSE TRAVIS BRADFORD, Appellant.
Docket No. 118674
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
March 24, 2016
2016 IL 118674
Opinion filed March 24, 2016.
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Karmeier, and Theis concurred
OPINION
¶ 1 Following a bench trial, the circuit court of McLean County convicted the defendant, Jesse Bradford, of burglary and sentenced him to three years in prison. On appeal, defendant contended the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he remained within a store without authority and with the intent to commit a theft therein, within the meaning of the burglary statute. See
¶ 2 Defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rules 315 and 612 (
BACKGROUND
¶ 3 Defendant was charged by indictment with one count of burglary by “knowingly and without authority remain[ing]
¶ 4 At defendant‘s bench trial, the State presented the testimony of Stephen Norton, an asset protection associate at a Walmart store in Bloomington, Illinois. On July 19, 2012, Norton observed defendant enter the Walmart during the store‘s regular business hours. Norton recognized defendant and continued to observe all of his movements and activities inside the store. At all times, defendant stayed in areas of the store which were open to the public.
¶ 5 Defendant first picked up two DVDs from a store display near the cash registers. He then brought the DVDs to the customer service desk and conducted a “no-receipt” return in exchange for a Walmart gift card. Next, defendant went to the men‘s apparel department, where he picked up a hat, removed the price tag, and put it on. Defendant then went to the shoe department and picked up a pair of shoes. He placed the shoes in a Walmart bag which he produced from his pocket. Defendant proceeded to the cash registers, where he joined a male individual who had accompanied him to the store. Defendant paid for his friend‘s merchandise using the same gift card he had received in exchange for the DVDs. He did not attempt to pay for the hat or the shoes. When defendant and his friend left the store, Norton and his partner approached them and identified themselves. Defendant refused to speak and kept walking, while the friend ran in another direction. Norton called the Bloomington police department and followed defendant on foot until the police arrived.
¶ 6 Bloomington police officer Ryne Donovan testified that he was called to the scene of a retail theft. He saw defendant outside the Walmart store alongside two of the store‘s security personnel. Officer Donovan handcuffed defendant and brought him inside the store. Defendant confessed to taking the DVDs, conducting a fraudulent no-receipt return, and stealing a hat, shoes, and a 20-ounce bottle of Dr. Pepper. He also confessed to paying for his friend‘s merchandise with the Walmart gift card he obtained from the DVDs. The State introduced into evidence a photograph depicting the hat, shoes, and Dr. Pepper found on defendant‘s person, as well as the two DVDs.
¶ 7 At the close of the State‘s case, the defense moved for a directed verdict. While conceding the evidence was sufficient to prove the crime of retail theft, defendant argued there was insufficient evidence of burglary as defined in section 19-1(a) of the Criminal Code (
¶ 8 Defendant appealed, arguing there was no evidence that he remained within the store without authority as required by the burglary statute. The appellate court affirmed defendant‘s conviction. 2014 IL App (4th) 130288. The court held, as a matter of law, that a defendant‘s act of remaining within a building open to the public is ” ‘without authority’ ” if it is accompanied by an intent to steal. Id. ¶ 28. In the instant case, “[a]ny authority defendant may have had to remain in the store was implicitly withdrawn once he formed the intent to steal from Walmart.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 34. Although the court did not identify the precise moment at which defendant began to unlawfully remain in the store, it held that defendant remained without authority “as he moved
ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal to this court, defendant repeats the same argument he raised in the appellate court, i.e., that the State failed to prove him guilty of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt because there was insufficient evidence that he “remained within” the store without authority.
¶ 11 When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the required elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67. It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the facts. People v. Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d 363, 375 (1992). Accordingly, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for the fact finder on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. Id. On appeal from a criminal conviction, we will not reverse the trial court‘s judgment unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of the defendant‘s guilt. Id.
¶ 12 Section 19-1(a) of the Criminal Code provides, in part, that “[a] person commits burglary when without authority he or she knowingly enters or without authority remains within a building, *** or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein a felony or a theft.”
¶ 13 Defendant was charged with, and convicted of, the second type of burglary: “knowingly and without authority remain[ing] within the building of Walmart, with the intent to commit therein a felony or a theft,” in violation of section 19-1(a).
¶ 14 Our primary goal in statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature‘s intent. People v. Giraud, 2012 IL 113116, ¶ 6. The best indication of this intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. The words and phrases in a statute should be construed in light of other relevant provisions and not in isolation. People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12. We may consider the reason for the law, the problems to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one way or another. Id. Where the language is plain and unambiguous, it must be applied without resort to further aids of statutory construction. People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 214 (2005). Where the language is ambiguous, however, we may consider external sources, such as legislative history, in order to discern the intent of the legislature. Id. The construction of a statute is a question of law which is reviewed de novo. People v. Davison, 233 Ill. 2d 30, 40 (2009).
¶ 15 Defendant contends that a person who commits theft after lawfully entering a public place is not guilty of burglary by remaining unless he exceeds the physical scope of his authority. In other words, burglary by remaining requires
¶ 16 In Vallero, the defendant entered a dairy during business hours for the purpose of applying for a job. 61 Ill. App. 3d at 414. Defendant was instructed to complete a job application form in the office area of the dairy. After defendant left, it was discovered that a number of payroll checks were missing. Defendant later forged signatures on the checks and attempted to cash them. He was convicted of burglary, theft, and five counts of forgery. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the burglary conviction based on insufficient evidence that defendant remained in the dairy without authority. Id. at 415-16. According to the court, defendant could not be found guilty of burglary by remaining because he did not form the intent to steal until after he lawfully entered the dairy. Nor did he hide inside the dairy until after it had closed in order to commit a theft. Id. at 415 (citing People v. Manning, 46 Ill. App. 3d 877 (1977)). The concurring justice agreed there was no evidence that defendant “remained” in the dairy pursuant to the burglary statute, where defendant was permitted to enter the dairy, his presence on the premises was at all times lawful, and he did not remain there beyond authorized hours. Id. at 416 (Stengel, J., specially concurring).
¶ 17 In McDaniel, the defendant entered a Walmart store during the store‘s regular business hours. 2012 IL App (5th) 100575, ¶ 3. A loss prevention agent saw defendant pick up three fishing reels from a store shelf and remove them from their packages. Defendant then placed the empty packages back on the shelf and secreted the reels inside his coat. The store‘s agents stopped defendant after he walked past the cash registers without paying for the reels. Id. ¶ 4. A jury convicted defendant of burglary by unauthorized remaining, and the appellate court reversed defendant‘s conviction. Id. ¶ 9. The court found that defendant entered the store lawfully, never exceeded the physical scope of his authority, and left immediately after stealing the reels. At all times, defendant remained within the general retail area of the store. Thus, although defendant was guilty of retail theft, he was not guilty of burglary by remaining within the store without authority. Id. ¶¶ 16, 19.
¶ 18 The McDaniel court contrasted the facts in that case with those in People v. Richardson, 2011 IL App (5th) 090663, and People v. Glover, 276 Ill. App. 3d 934 (1995), where the defendants’ burglary convictions based on unlawful remaining were affirmed. McDaniel, 2012 IL App (5th) 100575, ¶¶ 14-16. In those cases, the defendants’ initial entrances onto the premises were lawful. However, the defendants then entered areas of the premises which were off-limits to the public, in order to commit thefts. Id. ¶¶ 14, 15, 16 (citing Richardson, 2011 IL App (5th) 090663, ¶ 17 (defendant stole cash and lottery
¶ 19 Based on the aforementioned case law, defendant argues that he never exceeded the scope of his physical authority to be in the Walmart. He contends that burglary by remaining is not intended to apply to ordinary shoplifting. Rather, it refers to situations in which a person lawfully enters a place of business, but, in order to commit a theft or felony: (1) hides and waits for the building to close; (2) enters an unauthorized area within the building; or (3) continues to remain on the premises after being asked to leave. Since defendant lawfully entered the Walmart during regular business hours, shoplifted merchandise within public areas of the store, and left while the store was still open, defendant argues that he committed retail theft, a Class A misdemeanor, rather than burglary, a Class 2 felony.
¶ 20 In the State‘s view, the facts in the instant case are distinguishable from those in Vallero and McDaniel. The State notes that, instead of leaving the premises immediately after committing a single act of theft, defendant lingered in the store and continued to steal merchandise following his fraudulent no-receipt return. Defendant‘s subsequent thefts, the State argues, are sufficient evidence that defendant‘s authority to remain in the store was implicitly withdrawn. The State proposes that an individual who engages in a “discrete act of remaining” within a store with the intent to commit a theft is guilty of burglary by remaining. In support of this theory, the State relies on People v. Weaver, 41 Ill. 2d 434 (1968), which interpreted the portion of the burglary statute criminalizing burglary by entering. See
¶ 21 In Weaver, police officers driving by a well-lit Laundromat at night spotted the defendant standing near a vending machine, the door of which was open. Police discovered keys to the vending machine inside vehicles belonging to defendant and his codefendant, as well as more than $50 in coins in defendant‘s pocket. Defendant was convicted of burglary, possession of burglary tools, and theft. Weaver, 41 Ill. 2d at 435. On appeal to this court, defendant argued there was insufficient evidence of burglary since the Laundromat was open to the public at the time in question, he could have entered as a business invitee, and his presence in the store was as consistent with his innocence as with his guilt. This court rejected defendant‘s argument. Id. at 438-39.
¶ 22 We held that evidence that a defendant enters a place of business in order to commit a theft is sufficient to satisfy the “without authority” element of burglary by entering. Id. at 439. The “authority to enter a business building, or other building open to the public, extends
¶ 23 In the appellate court below, the court agreed with the State that Weaver‘s definition of “without authority,” for purposes of burglary by entering, also applies to burglary by remaining. Citing Weaver, the court held, “just as a defendant‘s entry is ‘without authority’ if it is accompanied by a contemporaneous intent to steal, so too must a defendant‘s remaining be ‘without authority’ if it also is accompanied by an intent to steal.” (Emphases in original.) 2014 IL App (4th) 130288, ¶ 28. Throughout defendant‘s multiple acts of shoplifting, his purpose for being in the Walmart was not consistent with the purpose for which the store was open to the public. Id. ¶ 34. Thus, in the court‘s view, the evidence presented at trial that defendant “remained” in the store with the intent to commit a theft was sufficient in itself to convict defendant of burglary by remaining within. Id.
¶ 24 After examining the statutory language and weighing the parties’ arguments, we find that defendant presents the only reasonable reading of the burglary statute. In determining legislative intent, we may consider the consequences of construing the statute one way or another, and we presume that the legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12. Defendant‘s interpretation offers a reasonable, workable test by which courts may evaluate whether a defendant is guilty of burglary by remaining within a place without authority. The State‘s version, on the other hand, is unworkable, has the potential to lead to absurdity, and is inconsistent with both the retail theft statute and the historical development of the burglary statute.
¶ 25 First, under the State‘s reading, adopted by the appellate court below, it is not clear what evidence would be sufficient to establish that a defendant “remains” within a public place in order to commit a theft. The appellate court provided no guidance as to what a defendant must do, or what duration of time he must spend in a place, to remain there without authority. Secondly, the court‘s ruling arbitrarily distinguishes between a defendant who shoplifts one item in a store and leaves immediately afterward, and a defendant who shoplifts more than one item or lingers inside a store before leaving. We do not believe the General Assembly intended to classify a single act of shoplifting as a Class A misdemeanor (
¶ 26 Furthermore, we agree with defendant that the appellate court‘s analysis conflicts with the legislative intent in enacting the retail theft statute.
¶ 27 Since the retail theft statute was enacted 14 years after the burglary statute‘s “remaining within” provision became law (
¶ 28 Finally, we reject the appellate court‘s interpretation of the “remaining within” language for the additional reason that it is at odds with the historical development of the burglary statute. Prior to 1961, the Criminal Code contained five separate provisions pertaining to burglary: burglary, attempted burglary, burglar found in building, possession of burglary tools, and burglary with explosives.
¶ 29 While the pre-1961 burglary statute did not define “burglar found in building,” the dictionary defines the word “find” as “to discover” or “to obtain by searching.” Webster‘s New International Dictionary 330, 348 (1924). The “burglar found in building” provision necessarily implies, then, that the building or area where a defendant is found or discovered was closed to him or the public. It is unreasonable to say that a person is “found” or “discovered” when he is present in a store which is open to the public, during the store‘s regular business hours. Accordingly, based on the history of the statute, we agree with defendant that burglary by remaining in a public building comprises only
¶ 30 We thus hold that an individual commits burglary by remaining in a public place only where he exceeds his physical authority to be on the premises. Under this definition, burglary by remaining includes situations in which an individual enters a public building lawfully, but, in order to commit a theft or felony, (1) hides and waits for the building to close (People v. Manning, 46 Ill. App. 3d 877, 878-79 (1977), aff‘d in part and rev‘d in part, 71 Ill. 2d 132 (1978)), (2) enters unauthorized areas within the building (Richardson, 2011 IL App (5th) 090663, ¶¶ 4-5, 8; Glover, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 938-39), or (3) continues to remain on the premises after his authority is explicitly revoked. Conversely, an individual who enters a building lawfully, shoplifts merchandise within areas which are open to the public, then leaves during business hours, is guilty of ordinary retail theft. See McDaniel, 2012 IL App (5th) 100575, ¶ 19.
¶ 31 In the case at bar, the State failed to prove that defendant remained within the Walmart without authority within the meaning of the burglary statute. See
CONCLUSION
¶ 33 We conclude that no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime of burglary by remaining in the store without authority. We further hold that the appellate court erred in concluding that there was sufficient evidence upon which a fact finder could have based defendant‘s conviction for burglary.
¶ 34 For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts.
¶ 35 Judgments reversed.