ROBERT PEASE v. THE CHARLOTTE HUNGERFORD HOSPITAL ET AL.
(SC 19761)
Supreme Court of Connecticut
Argued December 8, 2016—officially released May 2, 2017
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa, Robinson and Vertefeuille, Js.*
Michael G. Rigg, for the appellant (named defendant). Michael C. Conroy, for the appellee (plaintiff).
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Opinion
VERTEFEUILLE, J. The dispositive question presented by this appeal is whether a prevailing party in
The following procedural history is relevant to our disposition of this appeal. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendants, the hospital and one of its employees, Kateri D. Veillette, a registered nurse, for personal injuries allegedly sustained as a result of medical malpractice.1 The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the hospital, and the trial court, Pickard, J., rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. The hospital then filed a bill of costs and, following the court clerk‘s approval of the bill, the plaintiff sought review by the trial court. See
Approximately five months later, the hospital filed a motion to hold the plaintiff in contempt of court. Claiming that the award of costs was a court order, and thus amenable to contempt, the hospital alleged that the plaintiff had not paid any of the awarded costs and speculated that the plaintiff had the ability to comply with the order,2 but simply refused to do so. By way of initial remedy, the hospital requested that the court issue a written order that the plaintiff must pay $5965 in accordance with the court‘s taxation of costs by some date certain. The hospital did not and does not contend that, prior to moving for contempt, it pursued any of the postjudgment remedies that our legislature has authorized under chapter 906 of the General Statutes, including executing the award of costs; see
Following a hearing, the court denied the hospital‘s motion for contempt. In its order, the court “agree[d] with the plaintiff that an award of costs to the prevailing party following a jury trial is not an order that should be enforced with the contempt power” and “suggest[ed] that the [hospital] consult the normal methods of enforcing a judgment in General Statutes chapter 906 or the possibility of a suit on the debt . . . .” The court also declined to issue an order requiring that the plaintiff pay the costs by a definite date.
The hospital appealed to the Appellate At the outset, we must determine whether the trial court‘s denial of a postjudgment motion for contempt is an appealable final judgment. See State v. Johnson, 301 Conn. 630, 640, 26 A.3d 59 (2011). The hospital contends that it is. The plaintiff disagrees, arguing that the present appeal should be governed by the jurisdictional test that we apply to interlocutory orders under State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 463 A.2d 566 (1983), and that the denial of a motion for contempt does not satisfy either prong of the Curcio test—it neither terminates a separate and distinct proceeding nor so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them. We agree with the hospital that the denial of a postjudgment motion for civil contempt constitutes an appealable final judgment.3 Although neither party cites to it, our decision most directly on point is Potter v. Board of Selectmen, 174 Conn. 195, 384 A.2d 369 (1978). In Potter, this court had held in a prior proceeding that the plaintiff was improperly denied a permit to operate a mobile home park. See id., 196. Subsequently, the defendant town denied the plaintiff the necessary building and health permits relating to the project and he sought a contempt order. Id. On appeal, we reviewed the trial court‘s denial of a finding of contempt on the merits, noting that such determinations are final adjudications that are within our power to review. See id., 196–97. We did so despite the fact that the plaintiff had not exhausted his available remedies and could have pursued independent administrative appeals from the denial of his requests for the permits in question. See id., 199 n.2. Although Potter came to us in a unique procedural posture, we have since cited the case for the general proposition that denial of a postjudgment motion for contempt is a final judgment subject to appellate review. See Pritchard v. Pritchard, 281 Conn. 262, 272–73, 914 A.2d 1025 (2007). The Appellate Court also has read Potter broadly for the conclusion that “the denial of a motion for contempt is a final judgment for purposes of appeal . . . .”4 Willocks v. Klein, 38 Conn. App. 317, 320, 660 A.2d 869 (1995); see Johnson v. Clark, 113 Conn. App. 611, 617, 967 A.2d 1222 (2009) (same). Moreover, to the extent that the Curcio test, which governs interlocutory appeals, applies to the present case, we disagree with the plaintiff‘s contention that the first prong of that test is not satisfied. Our Curcio jurisprudence is animated by the principle that parties should not repeatedly interrupt ongoing litigation to conduct piecemeal appeals, especially when they will have the opportunity to challenge all pertinent rulings after the litigation culminates in a final judgment. See Melia v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 202 Conn. 252, 257–58, 520 A.2d 605 (1987); State v. Curcio, supra, 191 Conn. 30–31. Here, however, both the underlying litigation and the ancillary contempt proceedings have terminated. There is no ongoing proceeding or litigation the completion of which the parties must await, and we do not see any different termination point at which an appeal will be more appropriate. Accordingly, aside from certain exceptions not relevant to the present appeal, a completed contempt hearing generally has been treated as a separate and distinct proceeding for Curcio purposes. Compare Beveridge v. Beveridge, 7 Conn. App. 11, 14–15, 507 A.2d 502 (1986) (motion for contempt deemed appealable under first prong of Curcio because it can proceed independently), with N.D.R. Liuzzi, Inc. v. Lighthouse Litho, LLC, supra, 144 Conn. App. 621–22 (contempt finding did not terminate separate and distinct proceeding because further hearing on contempt motion was required to address outstanding issues), and Zirinsky v. Zirinsky, 87 Conn. App. 257, 274–75, 865 A.2d 488 (2005) (striking two counts from contempt motion was not appealable final judgment because those claims were not sufficiently severable from overall contempt motion), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 916, 871 A.2d 372 (2005). For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court‘s denial of the hospital‘s motion for contempt constituted an appealable final judgment. Having established jurisdiction, we turn next to the merits of the hospital‘s claim that the trial court improperly denied the motion for contempt without first determining whether the plaintiff‘s failure to pay was wilful. The hospital‘s argument proceeds in three steps. First, the hospital posits that the court decided, as a matter of law, that it lacked the inherent authority to coerce the plaintiff to comply with the award of costs and, therefore, declined to conduct a factual determination as to whether the plaintiff was in contempt. Second, the hospital contends that a trial court does in fact possess the inherent authority to use its contempt power to compel compliance with an order taxing costs. Third, the hospital argues that a judgment creditor may seek to enforce a monetary judgment or taxation of costs through a motion for contempt without first pursuing the various postjudgment remedies afforded by chapter 906, and that it is not an abuse of the court‘s discretion to enforce such a judgment or award via contempt even if the statutory remedies have not been exhausted. The plaintiff, by contrast, contends that the trial court properly recognized that contempt is a “drastic” remedy; Woodbury Knoll, LLC v. Shipman & Goodwin, LLP, 305 Conn. 750, 766 n.12, 48 A.3d 16 (2012); that, The standard by which we review a trial court‘s denial of a motion for civil contempt hinges on the rationale for the court‘s ruling. To the extent that the trial court concluded as a matter of law that it lacked the authority to find the plaintiff in contempt, our review is plenary.6 See AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 260 Conn. 232, 239–40, 796 A.2d 1164 (2002). Whether and under what circumstances a prevailing party may enforce an award of costs by a motion for contempt are questions of first impression for this court. Although we did not squarely confront the issue, our decisions in Fox v. First Bank, 198 Conn. 34, 501 A.2d 747 (1985), and In re Dean, 246 Conn. 183, 717 A.2d 176 (1998), are instructive. In Fox v. First Bank, supra, 198 Conn. 39–40, this court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff‘s action as a sanction for contempt, after the plaintiff thrice failed to make installment payments ordered by the trial court. Applying a highly deferential standard of review, the majority concluded that the facts of the case “demonstrate[d] sufficient disregard for the court‘s order and deliberate disregard of the authority of the court to warrant the trial court‘s imposition of a sanction for noncompliance.” Id., 40. Writing in dissent, however, Justice Shea argued that this court should not have reached the question of whether dismissal was an appropriate sanction because, from the outset, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to find the plaintiff in contempt for failure to make payments on a debt arising from a court order. Id., 41–42. Justice Shea explained that “[t]he practice of imprisonment for ordinary debts was abandoned long ago and it defies credulity to assume that the court . . . in entering the order that is the basis for the finding of contempt intended that the plaintiff‘s noncompliance might result in her incarceration or other punishment for contempt. It would be most unusual for a court to make its contempt power available to a creditor in the collection of an ordinary debt. . . . The plaintiff‘s default on the debt she owed the defendant did not . . . subject her to punishment for contempt.”7 (Citation omitted.) Id., 43 (Shea, J., dissenting). In Fox, however, the plaintiff, having conceded that her failure to obey the court‘s order was punishable by contempt, opted not to challenge either the Subsequently, in In re Dean, supra, 246 Conn. 184, we considered whether a judge of the Superior Court had properly been censured for his failure to comply with a court order requiring him to make weekly installment payments. In tracing the history of In the absence of any controlling authority from this court or clear guidance from the legislature,8 the hospital directs our attention to three decisions of the Appellate Court to support its theory that finding the plaintiff in contempt under the circumstances of this case would have been an appropriate exercise of the trial court‘s inherent authority: Rozbicki v. Gisselbrecht, 152 Conn. App. 840, 100 A.3d 909 (2014), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 922, 108 A.3d 1123 (2015), Montagnese v. Spicer, 130 Conn. App. 301, 22 A.3d 702 (2011), and Clement v. Clement, 34 Conn. App. 641, 643 A.2d 874 (1994). In each of those decisions, the hospital posits, the Appellate Court affirmed a finding of contempt on the basis of a party‘s failure to comply with a court‘s financial order. None of those decisions is binding on this court, however, and we do not find any to be persuasive authority for the hospital‘s position. In Spicer, the parties entered into an agreement to resolve a summary process action, whereby the plaintiff property owner agreed to pay the defendant, who lived with the plaintiff, $75,000 in exchange for her agreement to vacate the property. Montagnese v. Spicer, supra, 130 Conn. App. 303. After the defendant vacated the premises, the plaintiff failed to pay the full sum due under the stipulated judgment and the defendant filed several motions for contempt. Id. When the plaintiff then failed to make Similarly, in Gisselbrecht, the Appellate Court was asked to rule not on the propriety of the trial court‘s contempt finding but, rather, on the distinct question whether that court had jurisdiction to act on the motion for contempt. See Rozbicki v. Gisselbrecht, supra, 152 Conn. App. 845. That case also is readily distinguishable, insofar as the contempt issued against an attorney who was assessed—and refused to pay—the costs of videotaping a deposition after the court determined that he had been using the discovery process in an abusive and unprofessional manner, potentially in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.10 See id., 842–45; Rozbicki v. Gisselbrecht, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-10-6001830-S (May 30, 2013). The hospital‘s reliance on Clement is also misplaced. That was a dissolution of marriage case and thus, like Gisselbrecht, is readily distinguishable. See footnote 4 of this opinion. Moreover, the question of whether the plaintiff in Clement had properly been found to be in contempt of the court‘s dissolution decree was deemed to be moot because the contempt finding was vacated during the pendency of the appeal. See Clement v. Clement, supra, 34 Conn. App. 651. In none of the cases cited by the hospital, then, did the Appellate Court affirmatively conclude that a trial court may use its inherent contempt powers to enforce an ordinary monetary judgment or award of costs. In the absence of controlling or persuasive Connecticut authority, we look to the law of other jurisdictions. See Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction, 299 Conn. 740, 754, 12 A.3d 817 (2011). Under ordinary circumstances, neither the federal courts nor the majority of our sister states permit a litigant to be held in civil contempt merely for failure to pay an award of costs or satisfy a routine monetary judgment. See L. Shepard, “Creditors’ Contempt,” 2011 BYU L. Rev. Connecticut is one of a handful of states that have not adopted a constitutional amendment prohibiting debtors’ prisons. Id., 1035. Nevertheless, as Justice Shea persuasively argued in his dissenting opinion in Fox v. First Bank, supra, 198 Conn. 42–43, the history and public policy rationales that have led our sister courts to bar the use of the contempt power to enforce ordinary monetary judgments counsel the same result here. Con-necticut abolished imprisonment for contractual debt by statute as early as 1838; see Armstrong v. Ayres, 19 Conn. 540 (1849); and, as noted, the legislature has continued to restrict the types of debt for which contempt is a permissible sanction. See In re Dean, supra, 246 Conn. 195. As have our sister states, Connecticut has rejected the practice of imprisonment for debt as inhumane, unjust, and generally ineffective. See T. Myers, “Prison or Payment? Benthamism, the Modern Debtors’ Prison, and Its Historical Roots,” 8 Wash. U. Jurisprudence Moreover, we see no reason why scarce judicial resources—both trial and appellate—should be consumed and the “legal thumbscrew”13 of contempt brought to bear in a case such as this, particularly when the legislature has provided prevailing parties with a full complement of statutory collection remedies. As we explained in Woodbury Knoll, LLC v. Shipman & Goodwin, LLP, supra, 305 Conn. 765 n.12, “contempt . . . should be considered an important and drastic power of the court . . . .” Relying on contempt for the collection of routine debts “runs the risk of trivializing this power.” Id., 766 n.12. In most instances, the statutory postjudgment remedies authorized by chapter 906 of the General Statutes will be fully adequate to meet the needs of the judgment creditor in normal collection situations. See T. Myers, supra, 8 Wash. U. Jurisprudence Rev. 272. The hospital has failed to articulate any reason why those remedies are inadequate to address its claim for payment.14 Accordingly, we see no reason why Connecticut should diverge from the majority rule that, outside of the marital dissolution and child support context, ordinary monetary judgments and taxations of costs are not subject to enforcement by civil contempt absent extraordinary circumstances. Insofar as the hospital failed to allege any extraordinary circumstances that might justify a departure from the general rule,15 we conclude, as a matter of law, that the trial court properly denied the motion for contempt without first determining whether the plaintiff‘s failure to pay was wilful. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other justices concurred.I
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