Pease v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital
157 A.3d 1125
| Conn. | 2017Background
- Pease sued Charlotte Hungerford Hospital (the hospital) for medical malpractice; jury verdict for the hospital and judgment entered for defendants.
- The hospital filed a bill of costs; after review, the trial court awarded $5,965 in expert fees and other costs to the hospital.
- Approximately five months later the hospital moved to hold Pease in civil contempt for failing to pay the taxed costs, seeking an order requiring payment by a date certain. The hospital did not first pursue statutory postjudgment collection remedies under chapter 906.
- The trial court denied the contempt motion, concluding an award of costs is not an order that should ordinarily be enforced by contempt and suggesting the hospital use statutory remedies or a suit on the debt.
- The hospital appealed; the Connecticut Supreme Court transferred the case and addressed (1) whether denial of the contempt motion is an appealable final judgment and (2) whether contempt is an appropriate enforcement tool for ordinary monetary awards of costs.
Issues
| Issue | Pease's Argument | Hospital's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is denial of a postjudgment contempt motion an appealable final judgment? | Denial is not appealable under Curcio because it neither terminates a separate proceeding nor conclusively determines rights. | Denial is a final, appealable judgment (relying on Potter and Appellate Court precedent). | Denial of a postjudgment contempt motion is an appealable final judgment. |
| May a trial court use its inherent contempt power to enforce an award of costs/ordinary monetary judgment? | Contempt is a drastic remedy and generally inappropriate to enforce routine monetary awards; statutory postjudgment remedies under chapter 906 are the normal route. | The court has inherent authority to coerce compliance and may enforce costs by contempt without exhausting statutory remedies. | As a matter of law, courts should not use contempt to enforce ordinary monetary awards of costs except in extraordinary circumstances (none alleged here). |
| Did the trial court err by not making a willfulness finding before denying contempt? | Trial court properly denied contempt as a matter of law and thus need not reach willfulness. | Trial court should have considered willfulness and made factual findings. | Because contempt was not an appropriate enforcement vehicle here, the court did not err in denying the motion without a willfulness finding. |
| Should Connecticut follow majority rule limiting contempt for debt collection? | N/A (Pease urges majority approach). | N/A (hospital urged broader contempt use). | Connecticut adopts the majority approach: contempt typically not available to collect ordinary monetary judgments or taxed costs outside family-law or extraordinary contexts. |
Key Cases Cited
- Potter v. Board of Selectmen, 174 Conn. 195 (1978) (denial of postjudgment contempt treated as final adjudication subject to appellate review)
- Fox v. First Bank, 198 Conn. 34 (1985) (affirming contempt sanction for payment defaults but dissent questioned using contempt to enforce ordinary debts)
- In re Dean, 246 Conn. 183 (1998) (traces statutory limitations and history on contempt as sanction for failure to pay installment orders)
- Woodbury Knoll, LLC v. Shipman & Goodwin, LLP, 305 Conn. 750 (2012) (describes contempt as an important and drastic judicial power that should not be trivialized)
- AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 260 Conn. 232 (2002) (standards for reviewing contempt rulings; cited for standard-of-review guidance)