38 Conn. App. 317 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1995
The defendant
The underlying judgment in this matter is based on an agreement of the parties, executed on November 24, 1992, that called for the transfer of certain property from the defendant to the plaintiff within ninety
On appeal, the defendant argues, however, that he is aggrieved by the postjudgment order setting the time within which he must comply with the order of transfer in the underlying judgment.
The defendant claims to be appealing from the court’s order specifically setting the date for the closing as on or before April 5,1994. The defendant cannot demonstrate that he is aggrieved by this order, since it extends, rather than limits, the period within which he may comply with the judgment.
The defendant agrees that although the denial of a motion for contempt is a final judgment for purposes of appeal; Potter v. Board of Selectmen, 174 Conn. 195, 196, 384 A.2d 369 (1978); he is not aggrieved by the court’s denial of the motion for contempt because he did not bring the motion but rather was the party against whom it was brought. The defendant has failed to establish that his interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision from which he is appealing.
The right of appeal is purely statutory, originating in § 52-263.
We conclude that the defendant is neither aggrieved by the decision of the court, nor does he appeal from a final judgment.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The defendant is an attorney acting pro se.
General Statutes § 52-263 provides: “Upon the trial of all matters of fact in any cause or action in the superior court, whether to the court or jury, or before any judge thereof when the jurisdiction of any action or proceeding is vested in him, if either party is aggrieved by the decision of the court or judge upon any question or questions of law arising in the trial, including the denial of a motion to set aside a verdict, he may appeal to the court having jurisdiction from the final judgment of the court or of such judge, or from the decision of the court granting a motion to set aside a verdict, except in small claims cases, which shall not be appealable, and appeals as provided in sections 8-8 and 8-9.”
The parties were notified prior to oral argument to be prepared to address these issues. The defendant declined our offer to continue the matter and indicated that he was prepared to argue.
If a party claims a lack of conformity between the agreement and the judgment rendered by the court, that party may properly appeal from the denial of the court of that party’s motion to correct the judgment. Bank of Boston Connecticut v. DeGroff 31 Conn. App. 253, 256, 624 A.2d 904 (1993).
The trial court noted: “All right, judgment is still in effect. The closing is continued and will take place within ninety days ... I kind of like to have a specific date ... I know you object generally, Mr. Klein, and I don’t ask you to agree to that, but just in terms of the date being a fixed date of April 5, 1994, rather than ninety days from today. Does anybody have a problem with that?” Neither party objected to that date.
Since aggrievement implicates appellate jurisdiction, the issue of the appellant’s lack of aggrievement must be reviewed even if such a claim was not raised at the trial level. Winchester Woods Associates v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 219 Conn. 303, 307, 592 A.2d 953 (1991).
See footnote 2.