New Albany-Plain Local Schools Board of Education et al., v. Franklin County Board of Revision et al.,
Nos. 22AP-732, 22AP-733, 22AP-737, 22AP-738, 22AP-743, 22AP-744, 22AP-746, 22AP-747, 22AP-748, 22AP-749, 22AP-750, & 22AP-751
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
October 19, 2023
2023-Ohio-3806
BOGGS, J.; MENTEL and LELAND, JJ., concur.
(BTA Nos. 2022-1515, 2022-1260, 2022-1507, 2022-1503, 2022-1501, 2022-1708, 2022-1446, 2022-1447, 2022-1448, 2022-1449, 2022-14311, & 2022-1714) (REGULAR CALENDAR)
[Cite as New Albany-Plain Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2023-Ohio-3806.]
DECISION
Rendered on October 19, 2023
On brief: Rich & Gillis Law Group, LLC, Mark H. Gillis, and Kelley A. Gorry, for appellants.
On brief: Zaino Hall & Farrin, LLC, Steven K. Hall, and Robert C. Maier, for appellee ANSA Propco Partnership, LP.
On brief: Vesha Law Firm, LLC, Sterling Weiser, Nicholas C. Vesha, and Jim Lewis, for appellees Dhanlazmi, LLC, and Riaan Raman, LLC.
On brief: Bailey Cavalieri, LLC, Joshua D. DiYanni, and Graycen M. Wood, for appellees 32 Viotis Dr., LLC, Eakin Place Holdings, LLC, and Eakin Brooksedge Apartments, LLC.
On brief: Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP, and Kelvin M. Lawrence, for appellees UHS-161 N. Fourth, LLC; District at Linworth TIC1, LLC; District at Linworth TIC2, LLC; District at Linworth TIC3, LLC; District at Linworth TIC4, LLC; District at Linworth TIC5, LLC, and; District at Linworth TIC6, LLC.
On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Proseсuting Attorney, and William J. Stehle, for appellees Franklin County Auditor and Board of Revision.
BOGGS, J.
{¶ 1} Presently before this court are 12 appeals from 8 decisions of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA“), in each of which the BTA dismissed for lack of jurisdiction an appeal from a decision of the Franklin County Board of Revision (“BOR“). Appellants are the New Albany-Plain Local Schools Board of Education (case No. 22AP-732), the South-Western City Schools Board of Education (case Nos. 22AP-733, 22AP-737, and 22AP-738), the
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} Each of these appeals stems from a decision of the BTA dismissing for lack of jurisdiction an appellant board of education‘s appeal of a decision of the BOR, concerning the valuation of property located within their respective school districts for tax year 2021. In dismissing the appeals, the BTA relied on its recent decision in North Ridgeville City Schoоls Bd. of Edn. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA No. 2022-1152, 2022 Ohio Tax LEXIS 2518 (Oct. 31, 2022). In North Ridgeville, the BTA applied recent amendments to
{¶ 3} In their appeals to this court, the boards of education argue that the BTA‘s analysis in North Ridgeville was erroneous and that the H.B. 126 amendments to
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶ 4} In each of the 12 appeals before this court, the aрpellants boards of education raise 11 identical assignments of error:
- The Decision is unreasonable and unlawful because the BTA relied solely upon its erroneous decision in North Ridgeville[.]
- The Decision is unreasonable and unlawful because in North Ridgeville, the BTA ignored the plain meaning of the unambiguous words the General Assembly used in the revisions to
R.C. 5717.01 [.] - The BTA committed legal error in North Ridgeville by failing to recognize that the General Assembly‘s use of the phrase “a subdivision that files” in
R.C. 5717.01 as the operative language in present tense applies prospectively only [to] present and future actions and does not include past actions[.] - The Decision is unreasonable and unlawful because the BTA failed to apply the rules of grammar and violated the rules of statutory construction in North Ridgeville in interpreting the present tense language in
R.C. 5717.01 as including any complaints filed prior to the effective date of the legislation[.] - The BTA committed legal error in North Ridgeville after correctly determining that the revisions to
R.C. 5717.01 are clear and unambiguous but then utilizing the General Assembly‘s perceived legislative intent as support for its interpretation of the revisions directly inconsistent with the actual words used by the General Assembly[.] - The BTA committed legal error in North Ridgeville by rewriting the language of the revisions to
R.C. 5717.01 asfollows: “except that a subdivision with respect to property the subdivision does not own or lease may not appeal the decision of the board of revision.” North Ridgeville, at *2 (“Therefore, we hold that boards of education now have no appeal rights to this Board unless the board of education owns or leases the property“); Id. at *5 (“***in order to lawfully appeal a board of revision decision to this Board, the appellant cannot be a subdivision that does not own or lease the property at issue in the original complaint“). - The Decision is unreasonable and unlawful as the BTA failed to recognize in North Ridgeville that the General Assembly‘s retention of the former appeal right in
R.C. 5717.01 preserves the existing appeal rights of those entities for any complaint filed prior to the effective date of the revisions[.] - The BTA committed legal error in North Ridgeville by concluding that the revisions to
R.C. 5717.01 did not incorporate the new definitions of “subdivision” [or rather “legislative authority of a subdivision“], “original complaint” and “counter-complaint” from revisedR.C. 5715.19 , effective for tax year 2022, when the plain meaning of the language used by the General Assembly in the revisions toR.C. 5717.01 clearly and unambiguously incorporates these definitions[.] - The Decision is unreasonable and unlawful because the BTA held in North Ridgeville that the new definitions in
R.C. 5715.19 , effective for tax year 2022, had no new meaning when the General Assembly retained the terms “board“, “legislative authority“, “public official“, and “complaints” from formerR.C. 5717.01 in the revisions toR.C. 5717.01 [.] - The BTA erred in North Ridgeville in concluding that “jurisdiction is not conferred on appeal merely because the underlying cause of action was validly filed” when Appellant Board of Education never argued that the right to appeal was vested in a validly filed complaint[.]
- The BTA erred in North Ridgeville by comparing the revisions to
R.C. 5717.01 to the revisions toR.C. 5717.04 because the language the General Assembly used in the revisions toR.C. 5717.04 is not even remotely comparable to the words the General Assembly used in the revisions toR.C. 5717.01 [.]
(Emphasis sic.) (Appellants’ Briefs at 1-5.) The assignments of error identify what the appellants contend are legal errors in the North Ridgeville decision since the BTA‘s decisions in these appeals contain little analysis beyond citation to North Ridgeville.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶ 5} “When reviewing a BTA decision, we determine whether the decision is reasonable and lawful; if it is both, we must affirm.” NWD 300 Spring L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 151 Ohio St.3d 193, 2017-Ohio-7579, ¶ 13, citing
is based on an incorrect legal conclusion.‘” Westerville City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 146 Ohio St.3d 412, 2016-Ohio-1506, ¶ 26, quoting Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 232 (2001). We review questions of law, including questions of statutory interpretation, de novo. Sheffield Crossing Station, L.L.C. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-687, 2020-Ohio-6938, ¶
{¶ 6} These appeals present legal questions regarding the BTA‘s jurisdiction, resolution of which turns on the proper application of
IV. ANALYSIS
{¶ 7} The BTA, county boards of revision, and boards of education are all creatures of statute, and as such they have only the jurisdiction, power, and duties the General Assembly has expressly given them. Ross at ¶ 9, citing Steward v. Evatt, 143 Ohio St. 547 (1944), paragraph one of the syllabus; Kohl‘s Illinois, Inc. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Revision, 140 Ohio St.3d 522, 2014-Ohio-4353, ¶ 23; Hall v. Lakeview Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 63 Ohio St.3d 380, 383 (1992). Here, we are concerned with the statutory authority of boards of education to challenge real-property valuations, their ability to appeal a board of revision‘s decision to the BTA, and the BTA‘s jurisdiction to adjudicate such an appeal.
{¶ 8} “[T]here is no inherent right to appeal an administrative decision; rather, the right must be conferred by statute.” Yanega v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 156 Ohio St.3d 203, 2018-Ohio-5208, ¶ 10, citing Midwest Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Deerfield Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 91 Ohio St.3d 174, 177 (2001). Moreover, “‘[w]here a statute confers the right of appeal, adherence to the conditions thereby imposed is essential to the enjoyment of the right conferred.‘” Id., quoting Am. Restaurant & Lunch Co. v. Glander, 147 Ohio St. 147 (1946), paragraph one оf the syllabus. Accordingly, we turn to the statutory
framework that sets forth the process for filing challenges to real-property valuations for tax purposes and for appealing the determinations of those challenges.
A. R.C. 5715.19 and 5717.01
{¶ 9}
{¶ 10} Under the pre-H.B. 126 version of
{¶ 11} ”
{¶ 12} As to who may file a complaint, the pre-H.B. 126 version of
(A) * * * the board of county commissioners; * * * the board of township trustees of any township with territory within the county; the board of education of any school district with any
territory in the county; or the mayor or legislative authority of any municipal corporation with any territory in the county may file such a complaint [i.e. “a complaint against any of the [enumerated] determinations for the current tax year“] regarding any such determination affecting any real property in the county[.]
* * *
(B) Within thirty days after the last date such complaints may be filed, the auditor shall give notice of each complaint in which the stated amount of overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or incorrect determination is at least seventeen thousand five hundred dollars in taxable value * * * to each board of education whose school district may be affected by the complaint. Within thirty days after receiving such notice, a board of education * * * may file a complaint in support of or objecting to the amount of alleged overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or incorrect determination stated in a previously filed complaint or objecting to the current valuation.
(Emphasis added.) There is no dispute that the appellants boards of education were authorized under the pre-H.B. 126 version of
B. H.B. 126
{¶ 13} In April 2022, while the underlying valuation challenges were pending before the BOR, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 126, which took effect on July 21, 2022. As relevant here, Section 1 of H.B. 126 amended
filed for tax year 2022 or any tax year thereafter.”1 2022 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126, Section 3(A).
{¶ 14} As amended by H.B. 126,
An appeal from a decision of a county board of revision * * * may be taken by * * * any board, legislative authority, public official, or taxpayer authorized by [
R.C. 5715.19 ] to file complaints against valuations or assessmеnts with the auditor, except that a subdivision that files an original complaint or counter-complaint under that section with respect to property the subdivision does not own or lease may not appeal the decision of the board of revision with respect to that original complaint or counter-complaint.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 15} The exception, like the general rule, refers to
{¶ 16} The H.B. 126 amendments to
(A) * * * Subject to division (A)(6) of this section4, * * * the legislative authority of a subdivision * * * may file such a complaint [i.e., “a complaint against any of the [enumerated]
determinations for the current tax year“] regarding any such determination affecting any real property in the county[.] (B) A board of education, subject to this division * * * may file a counter-complaint in support of or objecting to the amount of alleged overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or incorrect determination stated in a previously filed original complaint or objecting to the current valuation * * * only if the original complaint states an amount of overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or incorrect determination of at least [$17,500] in taxable value.
{¶ 17} The question before this court resolves to whether the H.B. 126 amendments to
C. North Ridgeville
{¶ 18} The BTA first considered the impact of the H.B. 126 amendments in North Ridgeville, 2022 Ohio Tax LEXIS 2518. It began by considering when the H.B. 126 amendments to
{¶ 19} The BTA rejected the board of education‘s argument that applying the amended version of
{¶ 20} Finally, the BTA rejected the argument that the General Assembly‘s incorporation into the relevant statues the terms “original complaint” and “counter-complaint,” coupled with the statement in Section 3(A) of H.B. 126 that the amendments to
would be wrong to conclude that they have no legal meaning until an appeal emanates from a complaint filed for tax year 2022 or later.” Id.
{¶ 21} Having concluded that the amended version of
{¶ 22} The assignments of error in these appeals stem from the premise that the BTA‘s decision in North Ridgeville, upon which the BTA relied here, constituted an erroneous interpretation and application of amended
D. The amendments to R.C. 5717.01 took effect on July 21, 2022
{¶ 23} Before turning to the dispositive assignments of error, we first agree with the BTA that H.B. 126, including its changes to
{¶ 24} Because we conclude, as addressed more fully below, that the newly added exception in
E. The exception in R.C. 5717.01 , as amended by H.B. 126, applies only to appeals from board of revision decisions on original complaints or counter-complaints filed under amended R.C. 5715.19
{¶ 25} Because they are dispositive, we turn to the appellants’ eighth and ninth assignments of error, in which they argue that the exception in amended
THE BTA COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE REVISIONS TO
R.C. 5717.01 DID NOT INCORPORATE THE NEW DEFINITIONS FROMR.C. 5715.19 WHEN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CLEARLY INTENDED SUCH INCORPORATION.
See, e.g., case No. 22AP-732, Appellant‘s Brief at 25.
{¶ 26} Our paramount concern in construing a statute is legislаtive intent. State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Johnson, 106 Ohio St.3d 160, 2005-Ohio-4384, ¶ 21, citing State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, ¶ 21. To discern legislative intent, we first consider the statutory language, reading the words and phrases in context, according to rules of grammar and common usage.
{¶ 27} When statutes explicitly refer to each other, they are to be read in pari materia. Faieta v. World Harvest Church, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-527, 2008-Ohio-6959, ¶ 89, citing Brooks v. Ohio State Univ., 111 Ohio App.3d 342, 349 (10th Dist.1996); Ohio Bus Sales, Inc. v. Toledo Bd. of Edn., 82 Ohio App.3d 1, 7 (6th Dist.1992), citing Beach v. Beach, 99 Ohio App. 428, 434 (2d Dist.1955). “It is the duty of this court to construe statutes which explicitly refer to each other so that they are consistent and harmonious with a common policy and give effect to the legislative intent.” Brooks at 349, citing Suez Co. v.
Young, 118 Ohio App. 415 (6th Dist.1963). The fact thаt the General Assembly simultaneously amended both
{¶ 28} As amended by H.B. 126, effective July 21, 2022,
{¶ 29} Amended
counter-complaint under”
{¶ 30} It was only with the passage of H.B. 126 that the General Assembly added the terms “original complaint” and “counter-complaint” to
{¶ 31} Appellees acknowledge that the terms “original complaint” and “counter-complaint” did not appear in the former
{¶ 32} Even though the terms “original complaint” and “counter-complaint” may have beеn used in common parlance to distinguish between the types of challenges brought
under former
{¶ 33} Undermining the argument thаt the General Assembly was simply bringing the statutory scheme into alignment with general usage of the terms “original complaint” and “counter-complaint” is the General Assembly‘s failure to consistently use those new terms in place of the more general “complaints against valuations or assessments” throughout amended
{¶ 34} The General Assembly‘s use of different words within the interconnected clauses of
It could have instead simply continued, “except that a subdivision that files a complaint under [
{¶ 35} “It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that ‘the General Assembly is not presumed to do a vain or useless thing, and that when language is inserted in a statute it is inserted to accomplish some definite purpose.‘” State v. Wilson, 77 Ohio St.3d 334, 336 (1997), quoting State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Euclid, 169 Ohio St. 476, 479 (1959). We therefore may not treat the General Assembly‘s incorporation of the terms “original complaint” and “counter-complaint” into
V. CONCLUSION
{¶ 36} The appellants boards of education in these appeals are not “subdivision[s] that file[d] an original complaint or counter-complaint under”
{¶ 37} For these reasons, we sustain the boards of education‘s eighth and ninth assignments of error and deny their remaining assignments of error as moot. We accordingly reverse the decisions of the BTA and remand these appeals to the BTA for further procеedings consistent with this decision and the law.
Decisions reversed; causes remanded.
MENTEL and LELAND, JJ., concur.
Notes
(a) If the complaint is based on a determination described in division (A)(1)(d) or (e) of this section, the property was (i) sold in an arm‘s length transaction, as described in section 5713.03 of the Revised Code, before, but not after, the tax lien date for the tax year for which the complaint is to be filed, and (ii) the sale price exceeds the true value of the property appearing on the tax list for that tax year by both ten per cent and the amount of the filing threshold determined under division (J) of this section;
(b) If the complaint is filed by a legislative authority or mayor, the legislative authority or, in the case of a mayor, the legislative authority of the municipal corporation, first adopts a resolution authorizing the filing of the original complaint at a public meeting of the legislative authority.