GROVEPORT MADISON LOCAL SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLEE, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES; PUBLIC STORAGE/PUBLIC STORAGE BUSINESS TRUST, APPELLANT.
No. 2012-1476
Supreme Court of Ohio
October 24, 2013
137 Ohio St.3d 266, 2013-Ohio-4627
FRENCH, J.
Submitted June 5, 2013
[Cite as Groveport Madison Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 137 Ohio St.3d 266, 2013-Ohio-4627.]
FRENCH, J.
{1} This case concerns the 2008 tax-year valuation of real property in Franklin County, Ohio. The Franklin County Board of Revision (“BOR“) reduced the auditor‘s valuation of the property in response to a valuation complaint, but on appeal, the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA“) remanded with instructions that the BOR dismiss the valuation complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the complaint misidentified the owner of the subject property. A successor owner of the property now argues that the BTA erred in concluding that the BOR lacked jurisdiction. We agree. Therefore, we reverse and remand this matter to the BTA.
Facts and Procedural History
{2} On March 31, 2009, the John W. Messmore Living Trust filed a valuation complaint, seeking a reduction of the Franklin County auditor‘s valuation of a 3.781-acre self-storage facility in southeast Columbus for tax-year 2008. The valuation complaint consists of a preprinted form prescribed by the Tax Commissioner. See
{3} In response to the trust‘s complaint, the Groveport Madison Local Schools Board of Education (“BOE“) filed a countercomplaint, requesting retention of the auditor‘s valuation of $2,167,100.
{4} At a hearing before the BOR, the trust submitted an appraisal, which valued the property at $1,600,000 as of January 1, 2008. Contrary to the trust‘s identification of itself as the owner of the subject property, the appraisal and the auditor‘s property record, which was also submitted to the BOR, identify the owner of the property as Hamilton-33 Partnership. The cover letter to the appraisal is addressed to John Messmore, Hamilton-33 Partnership. Both the appraisal and the property record list the property owner‘s address as 3540 LaRochelle Drive in Columbus, the same address listed for the trust on the valuation complaint. Despite these inconsistencies regarding the identity of the property owner, the BOE did not contest the trust‘s standing or the BOR‘s jurisdiction to hear the valuation complaint. On May 27, 2010, the BOR ordered a reduction of the property value to $1,600,000, as requested by the trust.
{5} The BOE appealed the BOR‘s order to the BTA. The BOE‘s notice of appeal identifies the trust as the complainant and Hamilton-33 Partnership as the owner of the subject property. On May 29, 2012, Hunter notified the BTA that the subject property had been sold at sheriff‘s sale and that the new property owner was Public Storage of Glendale, California.
{6} On July 29, 2012, the BOE moved the BTA to remand this matter to the BOR with instructions to dismiss the trust‘s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The BOE argued that “the Complaint fails to meet a core procedural requirement and must be dismissed,” because it did not identify Hamilton-33 Partnership as the owner of the property. Public Storage opposed the BOE‘s motion. It conceded that the trust did not hold legal title to the property when the complaint was filed, but argued that the trust had standing to file the valuation complaint under
{7} The BTA granted the motion to remand for dismissal, holding that the BOR lacked jurisdiction over the trust‘s complaint because the complaint did not correctly identify the legal owner of the subject property. The BTA refused to address Public Storage‘s arguments regarding the trust‘s standing. It stated that those arguments “have no bearing on whether the property owner, as listed on line 1 of the complaint, was proper.” BTA No. 2010-A-1290, 2012 WL 3279121, at *2 (July 31, 2012). Public Storage appealed to this court pursuant to
Analysis
{8} This case presents an issue regarding the jurisdictional sufficiency of the trust‘s valuation complaint. We review that issue of law de novo. Akron Centre Plaza, L.L.C. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 128 Ohio St.3d 145, 2010-Ohio-5035, 942 N.E.2d 1054, ¶ 10, citing Toledo Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 490, 2010-Ohio-253, 924 N.E.2d 345, ¶ 14, fn. 2, and State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio-4163, 871 N.E.2d 1167, ¶ 8.
{9} A county board of revision‘s jurisdiction to hear and rule on complaints is defined by statute. Elkem Metals Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 81 Ohio St.3d 683, 686, 693 N.E.2d 276 (1998), citing
{10} In hearing and ruling on complaints, a board of revision must first examine the complaint to determine whether it meets the jurisdictional requirements set forth in
{11}
{12} This court has generally treated full compliance with
{13} In Stanjim, we found that a prior version of the complaint form used here was “clearly designed to elicit information required by
{14} The board of revision‘s jurisdiction, however, does not hinge on complete, technical compliance with the complaint form, and errors in completing the complaint form do not necessarily bar the board of revision from exercising jurisdiction. Toledo Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn., 124 Ohio St.3d 490, 2010-Ohio-253, 924 N.E.2d 345, at ¶ 15. Notably, failure to provide information requested by the complaint form is not a jurisdictional defect when the requested information does not fulfill a specific statutory or constitutional requirement. Knickerbocker Properties, Inc. XLII v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, 119 Ohio St.3d 233, 2008-Ohio-3192, 893 N.E.2d 457; Nucorp, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 64 Ohio St.2d 20, 21, 412 N.E.2d 947 (1980).
While this court has never encouraged or condoned disregard of procedural schemes logically attendant to the pursuit of a substantive legal right, it has also been unwilling to find or enforce jurisdictional barriers not
clearly statutorily or constitutionally mandated, which tend to deprive a supplicant of a fair review of his complaint on the merits.
(Emphasis added.) Nucorp at 22.
{15} Knickerbocker is particularly relevant to this case. There, the BTA rejected the property owner‘s argument that the board of education had failed to invoke the board of revision‘s jurisdiction because the complaint listed an incorrect address for the property owner. We acknowledged that “[w]hen a statute specifically requires a litigant to perform certain acts in order to invoke the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal (or the jurisdiction of a court to review an administrative decision), the performance of such acts usually constitutes a prerequisite to the tribunal‘s jurisdiction.” (Emphasis sic.) Knickerbocker at ¶ 10.
{16}
{17} The BOE has not identified a statutory requirement that a complainant correctly identify the legal owner of the subject property in its valuation complaint, and we find no such requirement in
{18} Here, as in Knickerbocker, the BOR has direct access to the identity of the property owner. Under
{19} The BOE argues that identification of the property owner in the complaint is necessary to invoke the BOR‘s jurisdiction because it “runs to the core of procedural efficiency.” This court first discussed the “core of procedural efficiency” in Akron Std. Div. of Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Lindley, 11 Ohio St.3d 10, 12, 462 N.E.2d 419 (1984), to distinguish between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional statutory filing requirements. We have subsequently applied a core-of-procedural-efficiency test in the context of tax-valuation proceedings. See, e.g., 2200 Carnegie, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 135 Ohio St.3d 284, 2012-Ohio-5691, 986 N.E.2d 919, ¶ 24 (notification requirement in
{20} This court recently addressed the jurisdictional requirements for contesting a property valuation. See Shinkle, 135 Ohio St.3d 227, 2013-Ohio-397, 985
{21} In Shinkle, the complaint did not state the reduction in value sought, as required by
{22} The cases in which this court has applied a core-of-procedural-efficiency test to conclude that a requirement is jurisdictional have one factor in common: they involve a failure to comply with a requirement imposed by statute. The distinction between statutory and nonstatutory requirements is evident in Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 591, 687 N.E.2d 723, in which we addressed jurisdictional challenges based on the manner in which the complainants answered questions on the complaint form. The relevant questions involved the increase or decrease in taxable value sought (question seven) and the complainants’ justification for the requested increase or decrease (question eight). We held that question eight did not elicit factual information required by
{23} Because there is no statutory requirement that a complainant correctly name the property owner in a valuation complaint, we need not determine whether the failure to correctly name the property owner runs to the core of procedural efficiency. The procedural importance of particular information cannot make the provision of that information a jurisdictional barrier absent a statutory or constitutional requirement. See Nucorp, 64 Ohio St.2d at 22, 412 N.E.2d 947. Thus, the trust‘s failure to identify Hamilton-33 Partnership as the property owner does not constitute a jurisdictional defect that precludes the BOR from reviewing the trust‘s complaint.
{24} Although we conclude that it is not a jurisdictional requirement to correctly name the owner of the subject property in a valuation complaint, our de novo review mandates that we also consider whether the trust otherwise invoked the BOR‘s jurisdiction, when the only basis for standing asserted on the face of the complaint is the trust‘s erroneous identification of itself as the titled owner of the subject property.
{25} The BOE argues that the issue of the trust‘s standing is separate and distinct from the BOR‘s subject-matter jurisdiction and that standing is not at issue here because the BTA addressed only subject-matter jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the statutory or constitutional authority to adjudicate a case. Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11. Lack of standing, on the other hand, challenges a party‘s capacity to bring an action, not the subject-matter jurisdiction of the tribunal. State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 77, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). But, the General Assembly has incorporated the requirement for standing into the jurisdictional requirements for filing a valuation complaint, as set forth in
{26} Standing is determined as of the commencement of the action. Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 24. The parties do not dispute that the trust was required to have had standing when it filed its complaint in order to invoke the BOR‘s jurisdiction. To establish standing as a property owner under
{27} Public Storage argues that the trust had standing to file a valuation complaint even though it did not hold legal title to the subject property. It contends that the trust had standing, pursuant to
{28} In Soc. Natl. Bank, this court addressed the relationship between standing and the board of revision‘s jurisdiction. Society National Bank filed a complaint on January 12, 1996, seeking a reduction in the assessed value of property for tax-year 1995. Society owned the subject property from at least January 1, 1995, through December 29, 1995. Thus, Society owned the property on the tax-lien date but not when it filed its complaint. Society‘s complaint identified the owner of the property as “Society National Bank f.n.a. Toledo Trust Company [Owner as of 1-1-95].” Id. at 401. In response to the request on the complaint to identify the complainant, “if other than owner,” Society responded, “N/A.” Id.
{29} When a person files a complaint against the property of another, the burden to establish standing lies with the complainant. Soc. Natl. Bank, 81 Ohio St.3d at 403, 692 N.E.2d 148. Although a complainant‘s assertion of standing in its complaint may constitute a prima facie showing of standing, the BTA challenged Society‘s standing based on Society‘s admission in its complaint that it had sold the property in question. The BTA held that Society lost standing to file a valuation complaint once it no longer held title to the property. Id. at 402. Looking to
{30} Soc. Natl. Bank refutes the notion that a failure to accurately identify the basis of the complainant‘s standing on the face of a valuation complaint precludes the board of revision‘s exercise of jurisdiction. Like the trust in this case, Society alleged standing as the owner of the subject property but was not the owner when it filed its complaint. In light of the challenge to its standing, Society‘s subsequent failure to offer evidence at the board of revision hearing or before the BTA led us to conclude that Society failed to meet its burden of proving standing. See also Village Condominiums Owners Assn. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 106 Ohio St.3d 223, 2005-Ohio-4631, 833 N.E.2d 1230, ¶ 9 (reviewing the auditor‘s property records, a declaration of condominium ownership,
{31} As in Soc. Natl. Bank, a challenge to the trust‘s standing required that evidence be submitted to establish the trust‘s right to maintain the valuation complaint. To that end, Public Storage submitted documentation to the BTA to demonstrate that the trust owned three properties in Franklin County when it filed its complaint.3 Unlike in Soc. Natl. Bank, the record contains evidence that
the trust qualified as an entity entitled to file a valuation complaint pursuant to
Conclusion
{32} Because there is no statutory requirement that a valuation complaint accurately identify the legal owner of the subject property, identification of the owner is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Accordingly, the BTA erred in concluding that the complaint‘s misidentification of the property owner divested the BOR of jurisdiction. Moreover, once Public Storage submitted evidence that the trust owned other real property in Franklin County when it filed its complaint, the BTA should have determined whether the trust had standing to file its complaint. We therefore reverse the BTA‘s decision, and we remand this matter to the BTA to determine whether the trust had standing, pursuant to
Decision reversed and cause remanded.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and O‘DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and O‘NEILL, JJ., concur.
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only.
Sleggs, Danzinger & Gill Co., L.P.A., Todd W. Sleggs, and Robert K. Danzinger, for appellant.
Rich & Gillis Law Group, L.L.C., Mark H. Gillis, Karol C. Fox, Jeffrey A. Rich, and Allison J. Crites, for appellee Groveport Madison Local Schools Board of Education.
Notes
[T]he auditor shall give notice of each complaint in which the stated amount of overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or incorrect determination is at least seventeen thousand five hundred dollars to each property owner whose property is the subject of the complaint, if the complaint was not filed by the owner or the owner‘s spouse, and to each board of education whose school district may be affected by the complaint.