BOARD OF EDUCATION OF GAHANNA-JEFFERSON LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, APPELLANT, v. ZAINO, TAX COMMR., ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 00-983
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
September 26, 2001
93 Ohio St.3d 231 | 2001-Ohio-1335
Submitted February 28, 2001. APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 99-K-1562.
COOK, J.
{¶ 1}
I
{¶ 2} Appellee Duke Realty, L.P. (“Duke“) owns real property located within an area of Columbus, Ohio, designated as a CRA. Appellant Board of Education of the Gahanna-Jefferson Local School District (“Gahanna-Jefferson“) filed a complaint with the commissioner under
{¶ 3} The BTA affirmed the commissioner‘s decision, relying almost exclusively on its recent decision in Vandalia-Butler City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Tracy (Apr. 14, 2000), B.T.A. Nos. 98-M-358 and 98-M-359, unreported. Although the BTA acknowledged that Gahanna-Jefferson ” ‘may have a remedy by appeal to a court of common pleas’ ” under
{¶ 4} The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
II
{¶ 5} When reviewing an appeal from the BTA, we must ascertain whether the BTA‘s decision is reasonable and lawful. Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 496, 497, 739 N.E.2d 783, 785. Although we will generally not disturb the BTA‘s determinations on the weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses, we will not hesitate to reverse a BTA decision that is based on an incorrect legal conclusion. See SFZ Transp., Inc. v. Limbach (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 602, 604, 613 N.E.2d 1037, 1039. In this case, we must decide whether the BTA correctly interpreted
R.C. 3735.65 et seq.
{¶ 6} In
{¶ 7} To obtain an exemption for new or remodeled property located in a CRA, the owner must file an application with the housing officer designated by the legislative authority.
{¶ 8} Besides the authority granted by
{¶ 9} The CRA statutory scheme also contains an appeals process.
R.C. 5715.27
{¶ 10} In contrast to
{¶ 11} One of these exceptions in
{¶ 12}
Reconciling the Statutes
{¶ 13} There is no dispute that Gahanna-Jefferson is a “board” that is authorized by
{¶ 14} The relevant starting point for our analysis is
“If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, they shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both. If the conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception
to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later adoption and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.”
{¶ 15} When two statutory provisions are alleged to be in conflict,
{¶ 16} As noted above,
{¶ 17} The lack of an explicit preclusion of commissioner involvement makes
{¶ 18} The fact that
{¶ 19} Reading the relevant statutes together and giving effect to both
Decision reversed and cause remanded.
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur.
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent.
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.
{¶ 20} The majority today holds that as
{¶ 21} The relevant starting point for our inquiry is
“If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, they shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both. If the conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later adoption and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.”
{¶ 22} In Johnson‘s Markets, Inc. v. New Carlisle Dept. of Health (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 28, 567 N.E.2d 1018, we were presented with the issue of whether the Ohio Department of Agriculture had exclusive authority to regulate sanitary
{¶ 23} Similarly, in Schindler Elevator Corp., we compared
{¶ 24} In Toledo Business & Professional Women‘s Retirement Living, Inc. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 255, 56 O.O.2d 153, 272 N.E.2d 359, the taxpayer sought a property tax exemption pursuant to a general statutory exemption for property operated exclusively for charitable purposes, i.e., homes for the aged operated by nonprofit corporations. We denied the exemption, holding that the enactment of an intervening exemption specifically for homes for the aged limited us to applying specific criteria. Specifically, we stated that the power to grant tax exceptions “is lodged exclusively in the General Assembly, and once it has chosen a specific subject for tax exemption, and defined the criteria, the function of the executive and judicial branches is limited to applying those criteria to a particular case, or to interpreting them if necessary. Any other interpretation of Section 2 of Article X of our Constitution would constitute an usurpation of the
{¶ 25} In Rickenbacker, we explained that Toledo requires that “a property, to be exempt, must qualify under the criteria of the statute specifically applicable to that property.” Rickenbacker Port Auth. v. Limbach (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 628, 631, 597 N.E.2d 494, 496. Rickenbacker involved a conflict between
{¶ 26} We held that “[i]f a port authority could exempt its property under a statute other than
{¶ 27} I believe that the instant case presents a conflict between
{¶ 28} It is true that
{¶ 29} The board argues that, notwithstanding these specific procedures granting jurisdiction to the housing officer designated by the legislative authority, the Tax Commissioner has concurrent jurisdiction to revoke exemptions under
{¶ 30} Appellant board also cites Fid. S. & L. Co. v. Strabala (May 1, 1986), Columbiana App. No. 84-C-36, unreported, 1986 WL 5284, for the proposition that the auditor and housing officer have concurrent jurisdiction to remove properties. However, Fidelity does not stand for this proposition, holding only that the removal of property from the exempt list by the county auditor is a ministerial act required
{¶ 31} In conclusion, I would find that
{¶ 32} For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals.
F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
Green & Hughes Co., L.P.A., and Martin J. Hughes III, for appellant.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Phyllis J. Shambaugh, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Tax Commissioner.
Thompson, Hine & Flory, L.L.P., and Peter D. Welin, for appellee Duke Realty, Inc.