676 N.E.2d 162 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1996
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *344
Appellant, Juliana H.J. Brooks, is a licensed medical doctor who was formerly employed by appellee, the Ohio State University ("OSU"). On March 2, 1992, appellant filed suit in the Ohio Court of Claims asserting numerous claims against the state arising out of the alleged actions of five OSU employees: Dr. John S. McDonald, Chairman of the Department of Anesthesiology of the OSU College of Medicine and Professor of Anesthesiology; Dr. Gaylynn J. Speas, Clinical Assistant Professor of Anesthesiology and Surgery for the OSU College of Medicine; Dr. William L. Smead, Associate Professor in the Department of Surgery for the OSU College of Medicine, Chief of the Division of General Vascular Surgery and Vice Chair of the Department of Surgery; Dr. Hagop Mekjhian, Professor of Medicine in the Department of Internal Medicine, Assistant Vice President for Health Services, Associate Dean of Clinical Affairs for the OSU College of Medicine and Medical Director of OSU Hospitals; and Dr. Charles A. Bush, Associate Professor in the Department of Internal Medicine for the OSU College of Medicine. In her complaint, appellant requested a determination, pursuant to R.C.
On April 24, 1992, the Court of Claims stayed this action pending resolution of a companion case which had been filed in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, wherein appellant asserted claims against the Ohio State Anesthesia Corporation ("OSAC"), a private corporation comprising all of the physicians practicing anesthesiology at OSU Hospitals, arising out of the same actions which form the basis for this lawsuit. The common pleas court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of OSAC and that decision was affirmed on appeal to this court.Brooks v. Ohio State Anesthesia Corp. (Mar. 14, 1995), Franklin App. No. 94APE08-1138, unreported, 1995 WL 116690.
On May 21, 1992, the Court of Claims temporarily lifted the stay in order for the court to consider a motion to dismiss filed by appellee on May 18, 1992. On July 21, 1992, the Court of Claims dismissed appellant's claims against appellee, which alleged violations of Sections 1983, 1985 and 1986, Title 42, U.S. Code, and the federal and state constitutions. On May 11, 1995, the Court of Claims lifted the stay and the case was set for hearing.
Prior to the hearing, appellee filed a motion for partial summary judgment, based on the immunity that peer review/quality assurance committee members are entitled to under R.C.
"[T]he court hereby GRANTS a protective order pursuant to R.C.
A hearing was commenced on September 21, 1995, wherein testimony was heard on the immunity issue. Numerous exhibits were entered into evidence during the hearing, while others were sealed pursuant to court order. On October 16, 1995, the court entered a written decision and entry finding that appellant's claims against each of the five OSU employees were based on actions they took in the course of their duties as members of various quality assurance committees at OSU Hospitals and that, in performing these duties, they acted within the scope of their employment with OSU. The court also found that none of the five OSU employees acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner against appellant. As a result, the court found that all five OSU employees were entitled to personal immunity, pursuant to R.C.
Appellant now brings this appeal, asserting the following assignment of error:
"The court of claims erred when it granted five state employees individual immunity for their actions."
Within this assignment of error, appellant has presented two issues for review. The first is appellant's assertion that the trial court erred in construing R.C.
R.C.
"Proceedings and records of all review committees described in section
Appellant asserts that the first sentence of R.C.
The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that "[w]here general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of things, the general words will be construed as applying only to things of the same general class as those enumerated." Light v.Ohio Univ. (1986),
R.C.
"No hospital, no state or local society, and no individual who is a member or employee of any of the following committees shall be liable in damages to any person for any acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct within the scope of the functions of the committee:
"(A) A utilization review committee, quality assurance committee, * * * which is a member of the hospital or of which the hospital is a member * * *;
"(B) A board or committee of a hospital * * * reviewing professional qualifications or activities of the hospital medical staff * * *; *348
"* * *
"(E) A peer review committee, professional standards review committee, * * * composed of doctors, * * * psychologists, or registered pharmacists;
"* * *
"* * * No person who provides information under this section and provides such information without malice and in the reasonable belief that such information is warranted by the facts known to him shall be subject to suit for civil damages as a result thereof."
Appellant asserts that R.C.
R.C.
"Any information, data, reports, or records made available to a quality assurance committee or utilization committee of a hospital * * * shall be confidential and shall be used by the committee and the committee members only in the exercise of the proper functions of the committee. * * * A right of action similar to that a patient may have against an attending physician for misuses of information, data, reports, or records arising out of the physician-patient relationship, shall accrue against a member of quality assurance committee or utilization committee for misuse of any information, data, reports, or records furnished to the committee by an attending physician. * * *"
Appellant asserts that the confidentiality requirement in R.C.
In sum, appellant argues that the trial court's misinterpretation resulted in the trial court's granting a broad protective order and motion in limine. In addition, *349
appellant contends that the trial court's decision extended the protection in R.C.
The paramount goal in the interpretation or construction of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent in enacting the statute. Featzka v. Millcraft Paper
(1980),
In Gates v. Brewer (1981),
This court finds that R.C.
This court finds that the trial court correctly applied R.C.
Appellant's second issue presented for our review is that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the five OSU employees were entitled to immunity. Appellant asserts that the evidence shows that their actions were outside the scope of their employment and were done with malice. In essence, appellant is asserting that the trial court's decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
When reviewing a trial court's decision to determine whether it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a court of appeals is guided by the presumption that the findings of the trial court were correct. The rationale for the presumption is that the trial court is in the best position to view witnesses and observe their demeanor, voice inflections and gestures.Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984),
An employee's acts are within the scope of his employment unless the act is so divergent that the very nature of it severs the relationship between an employer and employee. WieboldStudio, Inc. v. Old World Restorations, Inc. (1985),
In this case, there is competent, credible evidence showing that the five OSU employees were acting within the scope of their employment and were not acting with malicious purpose, in bad faith or in a reckless or wanton manner against appellant. While it is true that some of the actions of the five OSU employees may be considered unjustified, unnecessary or excessive, none of them were so divergent as to sever the employer/employee relationship so as to take the action outside the scope of employment. While other individuals may have handled the incidents regarding appellant differently, appellant did not demonstrate that the five OSU employees acted with malice as defined in Jacobs.
Based on the foregoing, this court finds that the Court of Claims did not err when it granted the five OSU employees individual immunity for their actions, and appellant's assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
TYACK and CLOSE, JJ., concur.