ANGELA M. NAGLE, Plaintiff, v. EAST GREENBUSH CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT; BOARD OF EDUCATION OF EAST GREENBUSH CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT; and individually and in their official capacity as members of the Board: SHAY HARRISON; MARK MANN; KATHERINE MACIOL; KAREN CURRAN; JOHN DUNN, JR.; MICHAEL BUONO; JENNIFER MASSEY; JOANN TAYLOR; KATHLEEN CURTIN; and SUSAN GARRIGAN-PIELA, Defendants.
1:16-cv-00214 (BKS/ATB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
February 21, 2018
Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, United States District Judge
For Plaintiff:
Ryan M. Finn
E. Stewart Jones Hacker Murphy, LLP
28 Second Street
Troy, NY 12180
For Defendants:
Eileen M. Haynes
Malcolm B. O’Hara
Bartlett, Pontiff, Stewart & Rhodes, P.C.
One Washington Street, P.O. Box 2168
Glens Falls, NY 12801
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Angela M. Nagle brings this action alleging: (1) gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended by the Pregnancy
II. FACTS1
A. Plaintiff’s Employment as Superintendent
Plaintiff was hired as the Superintendent of Schools for the East Greenbush Central School District in July 2008. (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶¶ 1, 10). Her employment agreement, which had an initial term ending on June 30, 2011, was extended through several amendments, the last of which was signed in 2012 and prolonged her contract until June 2016. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 12). The contract would expire automatically unless the District’s Board of Education notified Plaintiff no later than one year prior to the end of the contract term (i.e., by June 1, 2015) that it intended to renew; failure to provide such written notification of renewal constituted notice of nonrenewal under the contract. (Id. ¶ 15). Plaintiff could also be terminated for cause, in which case she was
Under the contract, the Board had to “promptly and discreetly refer to the Superintendent, for her study and recommendation, any and all criticisms [and] complaints . . . regarding the administration of the District or the Superintendent’s performance of her duties.” (Dkt. No. 16-13, ¶ 3(C); Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 49). Further, the Board and the Superintendent were to meet periodically to discuss performance, working relationships, and communicative processes to address any concerns that may arise. (Dkt. No. 16-13, ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 50). In practice, however, the Board brought to Plaintiff’s attention any such criticism or complaints during her annual reviews.2 (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 51). The annual reviews were broken down by the Superintendent’s annual goals—which changed from year to year—and then again by certain standards the Board wanted the Superintendent to meet. (Id. ¶ 38). The Board’s 10 standards remained the same from year to year: (1) district leadership and culture; (2) policy and governance; (3a) board communication; (3b) community relations; (3c) staff/student communication; (4) organizational management; (5) curriculum planning; (6) instructional leadership; (7) human resource management; and (8) values and ethics of leadership. (Id. ¶ 39).
B. Initial Term (2008–2011)
In her first few years as a Superintendent, Plaintiff made improvements in academics, developing programs that benefited the District and raised the District’s scores. (Id. ¶ 17). Some Board members, however, had concerns about her leadership style, felt that she often took an
According to Defendant Harrison, Plaintiff’s “aggressive tone toward staff,” such as her comments about the performance of the administrative team, was “unprofessional and unproductive.” (Dkt. No. 16-12, ¶ 6; see also Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 22). He provides the example of Assistant Superintendent of Curriculum Kitty Summers, who Plaintiff criticized in an October 2010 executive session of the Board, claiming Ms. Summers “was not doing a good job and should be let go.” (Dkt. No. 16-12, ¶ 6). Defendants contend that the Board dismissed Ms. Summers based on incomplete information that Plaintiff provided. (Id. ¶ 19). Plaintiff responds that the Board “fully supported the actions taken against Kitty Summers at the time.” (Dkt. 23-1, ¶ 95). Further, Defendants contend that Plaintiff “made questionable comments about teachers and members in the community, one of whom then joined the Board,” had “a contentious relationship with some members of the District’s administrative staff,” and was “overly critical of these individuals to the Board.” (Dkt. 16-83, ¶¶ 20, 28, 29). Plaintiff disputes these assertions. (Dkt. No. 22, ¶ 20).
According to Defendants, Plaintiff requested that Board members not speak to members of the community, administrative staff, or faculty (and vice versa) unless she was present—a request that some interpreted as an improper attempt to control the flow of information. (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶¶ 23, 24). Plaintiff denies ever directing staff and board members to avoid communicating. (Dkt. No. 22, ¶¶ 23, 24). Defendants assert that Board members were concerned about Plaintiff’s failure to communicate on various other issues. (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 55).
According to Defendants, these new members “took a much less aggressive tone toward the staff and sought to work collaboratively with the teachers and administrators in the District,” which caused Plaintiff to “moderate[] her tone about the staff in her reports to the Board.” (Id.). Plaintiff rejects these characterizations. (Dkt. No. 22, ¶ 26).
C. 2011–2012 School Year
In her annual review for the 2011-2012 school year,4 some Board members commented that Plaintiff needed to work on her interactions with members of the administrative staff, members of the public, counterparts at Questar III Board of Cooperative School Districts (“BOCES“)—an organization funded by school districts, of which the District was a member, enabling school districts to share instructional, administrative, and financial resources to promote economy and efficiency—teachers, and students; however, other Board members noted improvement in her leadership, communication, and tone. (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 46; Dkt. No. 16-18, at 4–10). Some Board members also suggested that Plaintiff improve her instructional leadership, human resource management, and delegation of duties, although others expressed positive views. (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 46; Dkt. No. 16-18, at 13–16).
D. 2012–2013 School Year
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s “problems with personnel began again” during the 2012–2013 school year. (Id. ¶ 32). According to Defendants, “Plaintiff was overly critical of Michael Leonard, the Athletic Director,” complaining about the way he dressed, his communication style, and typos in his written work. (Id. ¶ 21). Mr. Leonard felt Plaintiff “belittled him in meetings with other administrators” and “did not acknowledge his accomplishments and gave him unfair reviews.” (Id. ¶ 32). Defendants maintain that, while Mr. Leonard and some other administrative staff spoke to Board members about their concerns, they did not bring a formal complaint against Plaintiff because of fear of retaliation. (Id. ¶¶ 30–32).
Plaintiff denies that “these individuals were mistreated or that an atmosphere of retribution was created.” (Dkt. No. 22, ¶¶ 30–31). She asserts that she “did not have a contentious relationship” with these individuals, “did not demean, belittle nor . . . was overly critical of them,” “did not isolate any of these individuals and was always cordial and polite to each of them.” (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶ 78). With regard to Mr. Leonard in particular, Plaintiff states that he was “supervised by Michele Bowman, Assistant Superintendent for Personnel and Professional Development,” not by Plaintiff, and that he “received strong performance evaluations” from Ms. Bowman. (Id. ¶ 83). She does concede, however, that she “felt Mr. Leonard had some improvements to make” and attempted to “help him improve.” (Id. ¶ 84). Plaintiff sought disciplinary charges against Mr. Leonard on the ground that he was “insubordinate“; Defendants contend these charges were unsupported. (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 33).
Defendants also claim that Plaintiff “informed the Board that she was having problems” with Ms. Bowman in December 2012, “at a time when Ms. Bowman was preparing to go on a medical leave for surgery on her foot.” (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 34). According to Defendants, Plaintiff “said that Ms. Bowman was becoming a disruptive force among the Administrative Staff,” stated that her “work had been sloppy,” and “blamed Ms. Bowman for the problems with the search” for a principal at Green Meadow. (Id.). Defendants contend that Board members “were concerned that [Plaintiff] had not voiced these concerns” before the extension of Ms. Bowman’s contract, and that they asked Plaintiff to update the Board about Ms. Bowman’s performance, which Plaintiff purportedly never did. (Id. ¶ 35). Plaintiff disputes these assertions, stating that Ms. Bowman had “some problems meeting deadlines” but improved after she spoke to her, that “the Board was notified that there was no longer an issue,” and that Plaintiff “never claimed that [Ms. Bowman] was a disruptive force or that she was contentious.” (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶ 212).
Defendants bring up Plaintiff’s purported problems with Marty Mahar, an assistant principal at Columbia High School. (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 36). Per their account, Plaintiff “prevented Marty Mahar . . . from obtaining a Principal position at Green Meadow Elementary School” when she informed the Board that “Mr. Mahar had illegally added time to his tenure,” and told Defendant Harrison that “Mr. Mahar was struggling with scheduling at the high school.” (Id.). Plaintiff responds that the decision not to hire Mahar was taken by a committee and that the Board “unanimously agreed that he was not the best candidate.” (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶¶ 97–98). She also asserts that her concerns about Mr. Mahar were well-founded. (Id. ¶¶ 102–105).
E. 2013–2014 School Year
Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s “communications and personnel management issues continued” during the 2013–2014 school year. (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 47). For example, according to Defendants, Plaintiff told the Board in January or February 2014 that Matt Sloan, the principal of Goff Middle School,6 had performance issues, but she did not provide updates on his progress when the Board considered him for tenure a few months later. (Id. ¶¶ 47, 53, 54; Dkt. No. 16-12, ¶ 29). Plaintiff responds that she did not bring up any concerns about Mr. Sloan but simply
In May 2014, Plaintiff, through her attorney, sought a three-year extension and some modifications to her contract. (Dkt. No. 16-83; ¶ 65; Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶ 44; Dkt. No. 23-7). In response, the Board’s attorney wrote that he had discussed the request with Defendant Harrison, who had indicated that “the Board was not of a mind to address contract modification at this time” for “reasons not pertaining to [Plaintiff] in any fashion or to her performance.” (Dkt. No. 23-7). The Board’s attorney opined that “the Board was more of a mind to look at the contract and any changes (including the term of same) at a later date.”8 (Dkt. No. 23-7).
Another issue concerned the continuing tensions between the District and BOCES. (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶¶ 57, 58). The District’s relationship with BOCES deteriorated over the years, partly because the District objected to paying BOCES for certain post-retirement benefit plans
According to Defendants, a “main component of the breakdown between BOCES and the District . . . was the personality conflict between Plaintiff and BOCES Superintendent James Baldwin,” which led Plaintiff to skip BOCES meetings. (Id. ¶ 60). Defendant Harrison recounts meeting with Dr. Baldwin in fall 2013 “to attempt to repair the relationship” between the District and BOCES, but “Dr. Baldwin told [him] that Plaintiff was rude and belittling during BOCES superintendent meetings.” (Id. ¶ 62). Despite that meeting, “the tensions between BOCES and the District continued,” as “the District started to create the STEM programs.” (Id.). Plaintiff, on the other hand, states that Dr. Baldwin “bullied and harassed” her, and that Defendant Harrison “supported [her] decision to miss some of the meetings.” (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶ 172). Plaintiff was concerned that Dr. Baldwin would attempt to have her terminated. (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 63). Further, Plaintiff contends that, “at times, [BOCES’] relationship with [her] was actually quite positive,” (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶ 163), and that Defendant Harrison “himself fueled the negative relationship with BOCES by frequently engaging in unprofessional written tirades between himself, Dr. Baldwin, and Andy DeFeo, Dr. Baldwin’s Assistant Superintendent,” (id. ¶ 164).
In 2014, Defendant Buono, BOCES’ Human Resources Director, was elected to the Board. (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 64). In June 2014, Defendants Dunn and Curtin met with Dr. Baldwin and Gladys Cruz of BOCES to attempt to mend the relationship. (Id. ¶ 66). Subsequently, at the regularly scheduled Board meeting in June 2014, Defendants Dunn and Curtin reported that the meeting with BOCES was productive and that the two organizations were attempting to resolve their differences. (Id. ¶ 67). According to Defendants, “[i]mmediately following this presentation, the Plaintiff publicly denounced BOCES for an unrelated issue concerning student
Plaintiff recalls that, later during that meeting, Defendant Taylor suggested that Plaintiff attend a BOCES meeting relating to OPEB.10 (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶ 170). Plaintiff’s response was “We’ll see.” (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 70; Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶ 170). Whereas Defendants claim that “Board Members felt that Plaintiff’s attitude was disrespectful and unprofessional,” Plaintiff explains that her response “had to do with the simple fact that this was going to be a very contentious meeting” and, having just found out that she was pregnant, she “was worried about the stress given [her] history of miscarriages.” (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶ 170). Further, Plaintiff maintains that the Board never informed her about their “outrage” at her response. (Id. ¶ 172).
In her 2013–2014 annual review, issued on July 10, 2014, Plaintiff received positive comments in various areas, including academics and education policy. (Dkt. No. 16-24, at 6–8). Plaintiff asserts that, when she met with Dr. Harrison to go over the review, he told her that the Board was very pleased with her performance and that she should “stay the course as [she] was doing a great job.” (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶ 6). In the review, however, some Board members noted that
F. 2014–2015 School Year
In July 2014, Plaintiff told Defendant Harrison that she was pregnant; she informed the other Board members in August 2014. (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 76).
In August 2014, Plaintiff received a survey from the New York State Education Department seeking input from component BOCES school districts concerning the direction BOCES should take following Dr. Baldwin’s retirement. (Id. ¶ 77). According to Plaintiff, the survey was directed to the districts’ superintendents, requested their “comments and opinions,” and “encouraged [the superintendents] to review the survey process and these options with [the superintendents’] Board and include their initial comments, as appropriate.” (Dkt. No. 23-1,
Among other things, Plaintiff’s letter mentioned “the harassment and bullying that has occurred by BOCES employees to employees of the component schools” and “the displeasure of component schools over how [the OPEB accrual situation] was handled“; it also suggested that “consideration should be given to merging Questar III and Capital Region BOCES,” and asked
Defendants contend that Plaintiff miscommunicated with Board members in August and September 2014 concerning an objection by building principals to the completion of local education plans. (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 89). Defendant Harrison asked that only the officers of the administrators’ union attend an upcoming executive session of the Board, but all principals showed up. (Id.). Defendants blame Plaintiff for the mix-up, which Plaintiff disclaims. (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶ 189).
Although Defendants assert that no Board members treated Plaintiff in a demeaning manner or made any negative comments about her pregnancy before she left on maternity leave, and that Defendant Harrison did not avoid Plaintiff or unduly cancel meetings, (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶¶ 90, 91, 93), Plaintiff has a different recollection. She “noticed several changes in the manner
In September 2014, Plaintiff approached Defendant Harrison about a contract extension, and the Board met to consider the request on October 22, 2014.14 (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 94). At the Board meeting, Defendant Garrigan-Piela congratulated Plaintiff on her pregnancy. (Id. ¶ 92). A majority of Board members expressed concern about Plaintiff’s leadership style and communication problems, and raised the BOCES issue.15 (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 95). The Board voted 6 to 3 against extending her contract. (Id.).
In December 2014, Sean Crall, the president of the teachers’ union, asked Lawrence Edson, who was acting superintendent while Plaintiff was on leave, for a personal leave of absence on behalf of a teacher, Laura Lyons, who needed to care for her young child.17 (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 99). Plaintiff does not specifically deny that “Mr. Edson called Plaintiff who told him to deny the request,” (id. ¶ 99), but she maintains that she “was on a medical leave at the time this occurred” and that “it was Mr. Edson who rejected the maternity leave request, not [her],” (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶ 205). Mr. Crall emailed and called Plaintiff, who told him that there was “no contractual provision to allow two separate maternity leaves for one child.” (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶ 204). According to Defendants, Plaintiff also told Mr. Crall that the Board denied the request because it was untimely. (Dkt. No 16-83, ¶ 100). Plaintiff denies making that statement; instead, Plaintiff contends that she told Mr. Crall that the Board would need to approve a memorandum of understanding before granting the request. (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶ 205). The Board ultimately granted Ms. Lyons’ leave request.18
Plaintiff prematurely gave birth to twins on January 6, 2015, and the two infants were placed in the neonatal intensive care unit for almost a month. (Id. ¶¶ 18–19). Defendant Garrigan-Piela congratulated Plaintiff on the birth of her twins at a Board meeting in January 2015, and Defendants Garrigan-Piela and Curran sent congratulatory notes to Plaintiff while she
Plaintiff returned from maternity leave on March 16, 2015. (Id. ¶ 23). Plaintiff asserts that she “continued to notice a change in behavior by members of the Board” and that some members “seemed surprised that [she] had come back to work.” (Id. ¶ 25). She describes a pattern of avoidance. (Id. ¶¶ 26–30).
According to Defendants, the Board discussed Plaintiff’s request for a contract extension again in March 2015 “to find out whether any member’s position had changed.” (Dkt. No 16-83, ¶ 106). This time, the Board voted 9 to 0 against renewing Plaintiff’s contract—a development Defendants appear to attribute to intervening events, including the aforementioned October 2014 collective response from superintendents regarding BOCES, as well as the events surrounding Ms. Lyons’ leave request. (Id.). Defendants assert that they then approached Plaintiff through the intermediary of counsel to express interest “in pursuing an amicable parting . . . with regard to the last year on her contract,” not to “demand Plaintiff’s resignation” but to seek “a possible settlement.” (Id. ¶ 107). Plaintiff states that the proposal was “a financial payout in exchange for [her] leaving before the end of [her] term,” which she refers to as a “buy-out.” (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶ 34). Plaintiff made a settlement offer on April 24, 2015. (Id. ¶ 38). According to Plaintiff, over the next “several weeks,” Defendants did not counter her offer, but there were rumors—which she first heard in December 2014, and which she attributes to Defendants—that Plaintiff would not return the following school year. (Id. ¶¶ 39, 41).
G. 2015–2016 School Year
In August 2015, Plaintiff sent a letter to the District community expressing her “dismay” at leaving the district. (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 110). In September 2015, Plaintiff gave a PowerPoint presentation at her annual welcome-back meeting, saying, “[I]f you want to make enemies, try changing something.” (Id. ¶ 111). Plaintiff explains that “[t]his was not a shot at the Board, and, in the context of my speech it was clear that I was discussing and reflecting on my career and mentioned that several of the initiatives that were the most successful were met with opposition at first because change is difficult in a school system.” (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶ 207). Defendants assert that the Board viewed these comments differently and felt it was an attempt to denigrate the Board in front of the staff and faculty. (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 112).
Defendants maintain that Plaintiff’s problems with administrators continued in the 2015–2016 school year. In September 2015, Plaintiff asked Dr. Pampel, the Assistant Superintendent for Curriculum, to be copied on all of Dr. Pampel’s correspondence with staff and building principals. (Id. ¶ 113; Dkt. No. 16-80). At the time, Dr. Pampel was in the hospital recovering
Additionally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s relationship and communications with the Board did not improve during that time. (Id. ¶ 124). They state that Plaintiff did not inform the Board about certain events to which the Board was invited and did not provide the Board with information about who was covering administrative duties and committee meetings when administrators were on leave; Plaintiff denies these assertions. (Id. ¶¶ 118–119, 123–124; Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶¶ 111, 197, 211). On November 13, 2015, the Board sent Plaintiff a memorandum setting forth its expectations for the remainder of the year. (Dkt. No. 16-51; Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 120). Plaintiff interpreted the memorandum as “direct[ing] [her] to cease any communication with the school community unless it was approved or edited” by the Board, and she thought the Board “wanted [her] to become invisible“—as a result, she felt “humiliated.” (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶ 200).
In January 2016, the Board denied Plaintiff’s request to speak at a press conference being held by local politicians to discuss certain educational initiatives. (Dkt. No. 16-52; Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 120). Defendant Harrison’s email denying the request stated that the Board was “not comfortable with the nature of this press conference” and was “concerned with potential negative ramifications from Governor Cuomo by being the only school district represented at this event.”
Around the time that Plaintiff’s contract expired on June 30, 2016, (id. ¶ 51), an issue arose concerning the payout of her unused vacations days, (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 125). Mr. Edson and the District’s counsel—with no involvement from the Board—calculated that Plaintiff’s contract only allowed her to be paid for 10 of the 32 unused vacation days listed on her paystubs and one unused vacation day for the 2015–2016 school year. (See Dkt. No. 16-67, ¶¶ 11–18; Dkt. No. 16-57, ¶¶ 26–32; Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 126; Dkt. No. 22, ¶ 126).20 According to Mr. Edson, the contract only allowed Plaintiff to carry over 10 days each year, and the report showing 32 days included 21 days that the contract required her to use during the first year that she was a superintendent. (Dkt. No. 16-67, ¶¶ 11-14). Plaintiff was ultimately paid for 19 days of unused vacation time, according to Mr. Edson, because Plaintiff provided documentation indicating that eight sick days had mistakenly been counted as used vacation days. (Id. ¶ 17; Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 126).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under
If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must “set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 250; see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24; Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). “When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.” Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 2003). Still, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), and cannot rely on “mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Title VII Discrimination Claim21
Discrimination claims under Title VII are generally evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. Maraschiello v. City of Buffalo Police Dep‘t, 709 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2013); St. Mary‘s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). First, the plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506. “The requirements to establish a prima facie case are ‘minimal,’ and a plaintiff‘s burden is therefore ‘not onerous.‘” Bucalo v. Shelter Island Union Free Sch. Dist., 691 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted) (first quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506; then quoting Tex. Dep‘t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S 248, 253 (1981)). The establishment of a prima facie case creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506. The burden then shifts to the defendant, who must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Id. at 507. If the defendant carries that burden, the presumption of discrimination “drops from the picture,” and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who must “come forward with evidence that the defendant‘s proffered, non-discriminatory reason is a mere pretext for actual discrimination.” Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000); see Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp., LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 845 (2d Cir.2013). “The plaintiff must produce not simply some evidence, but sufficient evidence to support a rational finding that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons proffered by the [defendant] were false, and that more likely than not [discrimination] was the real reason for the [employment action].” Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 42 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1. Prima Face Case
To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position she held; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action took place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Bennett v. Hofstra Univ., 842 F. Supp. 2d 489, 497 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 491-92 (2d Cir. 2009)); see also N.Y. State Office of Mental Health v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 210 A.D.2d 686, 687 (3d Dep‘t 1994). The fourth prong of this test may be satisfied either by “(1) direct evidence of discriminatory intent, or (2) a showing by the Plaintiff that ‘[she] was subjected to disparate treatment . . . [compared to persons] similarly situated in all material respects to . . . [herself].‘” Bennett, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 497 (second alteration in original) (quoting Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000)). There is no dispute that Plaintiff satisfies the second and third prongs. (See Dkt. No. 16-84, at 18 (conceding that Plaintiff was qualified for the position of superintendent, and that failure to renew a contract is an adverse employment action)). The other prongs are contested.
With regard to the first prong, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not a member of a protected class covered by Title VII, as amended by the PDA—namely, “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,”
Albin v. LVMH Moet Louis Vuitton, Inc., No. 13-cv-4356, 2014 WL 3585492, at *4, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92627, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2014) (“Distinguishing among previously pregnant women to determine who is still affected by pregnancy requires selecting a temporal cutoff based on the facts of the given case. . . . [But] a pattern has developed in this Circuit establishing a loose line at approximately four months from the date of birth.” (citations omitted)). Further, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that she is a member of the class protected more generally by Title VII to the extent her claims challenge discriminatory gender stereotypes regarding caregiver responsibilities. See Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 122 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding, in an equal protection case, that “stereotyping of women as caregivers can by itself and without more be evidence of an impermissible, sex-based motive“); Ellis v. Century 21 Dep‘t Stores, 975 F. Supp. 2d 244, 277 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (explaining, in a Title VII case, that “[s]tereotyping of women as caregivers may, without more, be sufficient evidence of
The fourth prong “is a flexible [standard] that can be satisfied differently in differing factual scenarios.” Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 1996). In pregnancy discrimination cases, it must be shown either that the plaintiff‘s “position remained open and was ultimately filled by a non-pregnant employee,” or that “the discharge occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 1995). “An inference of discrimination can be drawn from circumstances such as ‘the employer‘s criticism of the plaintiff‘s performance in . . . degrading terms; or its invidious comments about others in the employee‘s protected group; or the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group; or the sequence of events leading‘” to the adverse employment action. Id. (quoting Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 468 (2d Cir. 2001)). “Showing an employer‘s motivation to discriminate is ‘usually’ accomplished through the ‘cumulative weight of circumstantial evidence.‘” United States v. City of New York, 713 F. Supp. 2d 300, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Rosen v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1991)).
Defendants contend that Plaintiff‘s position was not “open” when the Board decided not to renew her contract because Plaintiff was still in that position, and further that the temporal proximity between Plaintiff‘s pregnancy and the Board‘s decision does not give rise to an inference of discrimination because that temporal proximity is not “accompanied by other circumstantial evidence” of discrimination. (Dkt. No. 16-84, at 19 n.4, 19-20). Both arguments are unconvincing. First, there is no dispute that the superintendent position was not eliminated—and therefore, remained “open“—and that a man was ultimately hired to fill that position. (Id. at
2. Nondiscriminatory Reasons for Adverse Employment Action
As Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination with respected to the Board‘s decision not to renew her contract, a presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden shifts to Defendants to demonstrate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse decision or action. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802; United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 93 (2d Cir. 2011). Defendants have satisfied that burden here. Defendants have submitted evidence that the decision not to renew was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, including: (1) Plaintiff‘s persisting communication problems with the Board, (e.g., Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶¶ 55, 56, 72, 74, 89); (2) Plaintiff‘s human resource management problems and difficult relationships with staff and administrators, (e.g., id. ¶¶ 42, 47, 53-54, 72, 74); and (3) Plaintiff‘s opposition to Board directives, (e.g., id. ¶¶ 70, 85, 88). (See Dkt. No. 16-
3. Pretext
A plaintiff‘s burden at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis is to produce “sufficient evidence to support a rational finding that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons proffered by the [defendant] were false, and that more likely than not [discrimination] was the real reason for the [employment action].”24 Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 42 (alterations in original) (quoting Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 714 (2d Cir.1996)). In other words, the Court must “now ask whether, without the aid of the presumption” of discrimination raised by the prima face case, the plaintiff “has raised sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the decision to fire [her] was based, at least in part, on [her gender].”25 Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130, 141 (2d Cir. 2008). “[A] plaintiff may rely on evidence comprising her prima facie case, including temporal proximity, together with other evidence such as inconsistent employer explanations, to defeat summary judgment at that stage.” Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 847 (2d Cir. 2013). Pretext may be shown, inter alia, “by demonstrating weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions in the employer‘s proffered legitimate”
Plaintiff‘s evidence of pretext is slim. Plaintiff argues that her annual evaluations contained “numerous examples of positive comments” in the same areas where Defendants claim she was deficient. (Dkt. No. 23, at 11). She terms these comments “contradictions,” and she contends that, based on these positive comments, “a jury certainly can doubt and disregard defendants’ claim of underperformance.” (Id.). But the issue is whether the District‘s reasons for deciding not to extend her contract are pretextual, and Plaintiff has failed to identify any contradiction or inconsistency in the District‘s rationale for its decision. Plaintiff argues that the record shows that she “was excelling as Superintendent” and “was outperforming in her role,” (Dkt. No. 23, at 19). But an employee‘s disagreement with an employer‘s evaluation “does not prove pretext.” Shabat v. Billotti, No. 96-7638, 1997 WL 138836, at *2, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5133, at *5 (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 1997) (quoting Billet v. CIGNA Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 825 (3d Cir. 1991)); Valentine v. Standard & Poor‘s, 50 F. Supp. 2d 262, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that “plaintiff‘s subjective disagreement with his reviews is not a viable basis for a discrimination claim“), aff‘d, 205 F.3d 1327 (2d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff argues that there were procedural irregularities because the Board failed to comply with its obligation to promptly and discretely refer any and all criticisms and complaints to her. She claims that “the District never called a meeting to discuss the various concerns it
In any event, Plaintiff has also pointed to other evidence to establish pretext: (1) the statement by the Board‘s attorney in May 2014 that the Board was not ready to vote on her contract renewal for “reasons not pertaining to [Plaintiff] in any fashion or to her performance,” (Dkt. No. 23-7, at 1), coupled with Defendant Harrison‘s statement “around the same time that there was nothing to worry about, that there was [sic] no problems with [her] performance,” (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶ 46); (2) the “change in attitude” by some Board members that Plaintiff observed after she announced her pregnancy, (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶¶ 8-12); and (3) the comments that several Board members made about her pregnancy,27 (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶¶ 13-14). Considering
B. Equal Protection Discrimination Claim
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff‘s equal protection claim, which she brings under
Nevertheless, Defendants point out that Plaintiff has “not shown that the District and Board had a policy of discrimination as is required to establish [municipal] liability under
C. ADA Discrimination Claim32
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff‘s discrimination claim under the ADA on the grounds that she was not disabled (or perceived as disabled by the District) and was not discriminated on the basis of disability. (See Dkt. No. 16-84, at 30). Like Title VII claims, ADA discrimination claims are governed by the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
The ADA defines a “disability” as, inter alia, “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual.”
Plaintiff states that “she was hospitalized as a result of her premature labor, caused by complications,” and that the complications from pregnancy “affected ‘major life activities‘” and “her ability to work and care for herself.” (Dkt. No. 23, at 6). She describes serious health issues faced by her twins and her resulting hospitalization. (See Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶¶ 15, 17-19). These circumstances are sufficient to raise a triable of fact as to whether Plaintiff was disabled. See Sam-Sekur, 2012 WL 2244325, at *7, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83586, at *24 (“Only in extremely rare cases have courts found that conditions that arise out of pregnancy qualify as a disability. In these cases, ‘it is the physiological impairment that results from complications that renders the person disabled.‘” (quoting Conley v. United Parcel Serv., 88 F. Supp. 2d 16, 20 (E.D.N.Y. 2000))). Further, she avers that she spoke with a number of Board members about her medical issues, (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶¶ 15, 21), which raises an issue of fact regarding Defendants’ awareness of her disability. See Karam v. County of Rensselaer, No. 13-cv-1018, 2016 WL 51252, at *17, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 368, at *52 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2016) (“A discrimination claim based on a perceived disability requires a plaintiff to show that the ‘employer perceived him as having a disability as defined in the ADA.‘” (quoting Thomsen v. Stantec, Inc., 483 Fed. App‘x 620, 622 (2d Cir. 2012))).
Nevertheless, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima case of disability discrimination. She has adduced no evidence to satisfy the fourth prong of the prima facie case: the record is entirely devoid of any indication that the Board‘s decision not to renew her contract was tied to her disability, the complications she faced during her pregnancy, or her children‘s medical
D. FMLA Interference Claim
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff‘s FMLA interference claim because “Plaintiff received all the leave to which she was entitled.” (Dkt. No. 16-84, at 30). Plaintiff does not respond to that argument. Under the FMLA, an eligible employee may take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid leave each year in order to care for his or her newborn child. See
To establish a claim that an employer denied or interfered with substantive rights under the FMLA,34 a plaintiff must prove that: (1) she is an eligible employee under the FMLA; (2) the defendant is an employer as defined in the FMLA; (3) she was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) she gave notice to the defendant of his intention to take leave; and (5) she was denied FMLA benefits. See Smith v. Westchester County, 769 F. Supp. 2d 448, 464-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). As there is no dispute that Plaintiff received all her FMLA benefits, (Dkt. No. 16-83, ¶ 103; Dkt No. 22, ¶ 103), Plaintiff cannot establish the fifth element of her FMLA interference claims. Therefore, her FMLA interference claim fails as a matter of law.
Plaintiff‘s retaliation claims under Title VII (including the PDA), the Equal Protection Clause, Title IX, the ADA, and the FMLA must be analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Ya-Chen Chen v. City Univ. of N.Y., 805 F.3d 59, 74 (2d Cir. 2015) (Title VII and Equal Protection Clause retaliation); Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy of Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81, 92 (2d Cir. 2011) (Title IX retaliation); Hong Yin v. N. Shore LIJ Health Sys., 20 F. Supp. 3d 359, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (ADA retaliation); Davis-Bell v. Columbia Univ., 851 F. Supp. 2d 650, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Title VII retaliation); Bennett, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 499 (Title VII retaliation); Bond v. Sterling, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 300, 303 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (FMLA retaliation). Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2013). If Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason existed for its action. Id. at 129. If the employer demonstrates a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action, the burden shifts back to the employee to establish that the employer‘s action was caused by a retaliatory motive.35 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534. The four prongs of a prima facie case of retaliation are that: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected activity; (2) the defendant was aware of the activity; (3) the defendant took adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Summa, 708 F.3d at 125.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants retaliated against her by taking the following actions after she took “protected medical leave” and after “she filed with the EEOC“: (a) “dissemination of false statements regarding her performance“; (b) “issuance of a counseling memorandum“; (c) “excessive scrutiny of her work“; (d) “refusing to pay her vacation pay upon separation terms“; and (e) “changes in her duties,” including the requirement that she “submit all work to the Board before dissemination” and the Board‘s refusal to “allow her to perform tasks she used to perform, including public advocacy for education.” (Dkt. No. 23, at 24). In moving for summary judgment on those claims, Defendants argue that “Plaintiff‘s allegations do not describe materially adverse working conditions” and therefore cannot make out retaliation claims. (Dkt. No. 16-84, at 27). Defendants also argue that they have articulated legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons and that Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact on pretext. The Court agrees. While Plaintiff has
1. Prima Facie Case
a. Dissemination of False Statements
The Court reviewed Plaintiff‘s declaration and found no support for her claim that the Board disseminated “false statements regarding her performance.” (Dkt. No. 23, at 24).
b. Counseling Memorandum
Nor is there any record of a “counseling memorandum.” There is a November 13, 2015 memorandum that the Board sent her regarding “Transition Expectations,” (Dkt. No. 16-51) (the “Transition Memorandum“), which required that Plaintiff preclear with the Board certain communications prior to distribution.37 That requirement is discussed below.
c. Excessive Scrutiny
Plaintiff claims that she was subjected to “excessive scrutiny” following her EEOC complaint. (Dkt. No. 23, at 24). She states that, in 2014-2015, Board members “did not attend a single community budget meeting but, a year later, “the Board took a very active interest at being at every event [she] attended,” and that she felt that she was being “watched and stalked.” (Dkt.
d. Vacation Day Payout
Plaintiff claims that Defendants retaliated by “refusing to pay” out her accrued vacation days when her employment with the District expired. (Dkt. No. 23, at 24). As set forth above, however, she has failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding that assertion. (See supra note 20). Defendants paid out all the accrued days to which Plaintiff was eligible under her contract, even adding eight days that Plaintiff claimed were sick days that had been miscounted as used vacation days. (See Dkt. No. 16-67, ¶ 11; Dkt No. 16-83, ¶ 126).
e. Changes in Duties
Plaintiff also claims that her duties changed after her maternity leave and EEOC filing. (See Dkt. No. 23, at 24; Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶¶ 193-196). She was no longer “included in the process of developing and creating Board goals through a collaborative process with the Board,” (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶ 193), invited to executive meetings between the Board and staff or union leadership, (id. ¶ 194), or invited to the Board‘s 2015 retreat, (id. ¶¶ 195-196). Further, Plaintiff interpreted the November 2015 Transition Memorandum as a directive “to cease any communication with the school community unless it was approved or edited by” the Board. (Id. ¶ 200).38
Whether a reassignment of job duties “is materially adverse depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff‘s position, considering all the circumstances.” Kessler v. Westchester Cty. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 209 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting White, 548 U.S. at 71). Plaintiff contends that nonparticipation in Board meetings and processes “made it very difficult for [her] to perform [her] job,” that it was “a major change to [her] duties,” and that “it is unheard of for a school district board to develop annual goals without the input of the Superintendent.” (Dkt. No. 23-1, ¶¶ 193-194, see also id. ¶ 196). According to Plaintiff, the directive requiring preapproval of certain communications “had never happened in [her] career,” and she felt “humiliated” and “had difficulty attending meetings with other superintendents as a result of the shame [she] felt.” (Id. ¶ 200). As for the Board‘s denial of her public speaking request, Plaintiff stated that it was the first time she was “denied the opportunity to advocate for public education by speaking at events even though [she] had previously been allowed in all prior years of employment,” and that the denial “limited [her] exposure and served to further hinder her job search.” (Id. ¶ 199). Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that there is a material issue of fact as to whether the changes in her job responsibilities constituted an adverse action.
2. Nonretaliatory Reasons for Adverse Employment Action
Given that Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the job changes she describes were materially adverse, the next step in the analysis is to assess the reasons advanced by Defendants to justify those changes. With regard to Plaintiff‘s exclusion from Board processes, Defendant Harrison denies that, “after she filed the EEOC complaint, the Board began
With regard to the requirement in the Transition Memorandum that Plaintiff share certain communications with the Board before distribution, Defendants explain that the requirement was prompted by Plaintiff‘s negative comments toward the Board. (Dkt. No. 26, at 11). Defendant Harrison explained that, in August 2015, Plaintiff sent a “welcome back” letter to the school community, which stated: “[I]t is with great dismay that my tenure with [the District] is ending.” (Dkt. No. 16-12, ¶ 89; Dkt. No. 16-47). Defendant Harrison “felt that this language was unprofessional and was meant to paint the Board in an unflattering light.” (Dkt. No. 16-12, ¶ 89). The following month, at the annual staff assembly before the beginning of the school year, Plaintiff purportedly “prepared a power point which included a slide” that stated: “[I]f you want to make enemies, try changing something.” (Id. ¶ 90). According to Defendant Harrison, “Board members felt that this was a shot at the Board,” and he felt that “this was deliberate attempt by [Plaintiff] to paint the Board in an unflattering light.” (Id.).
Lastly, with regard to the Board‘s denial of Plaintiff‘s request to participate in the January 2016 press conference, Defendants attached a contemporaneous email that explained the Board‘s rationale. (See Dkt. No. 16-52). Per the Board‘s January 5, 2016 email to Plaintiff, the Board was “not comfortable with the nature of this press conference” and was “concerned with potential negative ramifications from Governor Cuomo by being the only school district
Having considered the above explanations, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden to proffer legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for the complained-of changes in duties.
3. Pretext
The third step in the analysis is to determine whether Plaintiff has adduced any evidence of pretext. Plaintiff, however, has failed to show how Defendants’ legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for the changes in job duties are pretextual. Instead, she contends that her pretext arguments concerning the discrimination claims “are equally applicable to the retaliation claim.” (Dkt. No. 23, at 24). But the pretext issue here is not the same. For her discrimination claims, Plaintiff had to proffer evidence that the real reason that Defendants did not renew her contract was pregnancy or gender discrimination, as opposed to the nondiscriminatory reasons advanced by Defendants, and she successfully raised a triable issue of fact in that regard by pointing to, among other things, a change in attitude and various comments by Board members after she announced her pregnancy. By contrast, for her retaliation claims, Plaintiff had to proffer evidence that the real reason for the complained-of actions (the changes in job duties) was her engaging in protected activity (taking medical leave and filing the EEOC complaint), as opposed to the nonretaliatory reasons advanced by Defendants. Yet she has not pointed to any evidence in
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact on her retaliation claims under Title VII, the Equal Protection Clause, the ADA, and the FMLA.
F. Title IX Discrimination Claim
The parties dispute whether Plaintiff may proceed with her Title IX discrimination claim in parallel with her Title VII discrimination claim. (See Dkt. No. 16-84, at 30-31; Dkt. No. 23, at 25-26). This question subsumes two distinct issues that have split courts of appeals outside, and district courts within, the Second Circuit: (1) whether Title IX provides a private right of action for an employee of a federally funded educational institution who alleges gender discrimination;40 and (2) if such a private right of action exists, whether such employee must nevertheless proceed under Title VII exclusively to the extent Title VII applies to her claim.
Although Title IX does not contain an express private right of action,41 the Supreme Court in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), applied the factors it set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), to determine whether “Congress intended to make a remedy
In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of Title IX in the context of passing on the validity of regulations promulgated under its public enforcement provision. See N. Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982). The Court held that Title IX protects both employees and students at federally funded educational institutions against gender discrimination. Id. at 530 (“The legislative history thus corroborates our reading of the statutory language and verifies the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that employment discrimination comes within the prohibition of Title IX.“). More than 20 years later, the scope of Title IX‘s implied private right of action came before the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005). Writing for a majority of five justices, Justice O‘Connor opined that Title IX‘s private right of action reached a retaliation claim brought by a gym teacher who had complained of gender discrimination against a girls’ basketball team that he coached. Id. at 171 (holding that Title IX‘s implied right of action “encompasses claims of retaliation . . . where the funding recipient retaliates against an individual because he has complained about sex discrimination“). Read together, Cannon, Bell, and Jackson support the proposition that Title
As to the second issue—whether Title VII is an exclusive remedy that forecloses private enforcement of Title IX by employees of federally funded educational institutions—courts have reached different conclusions based on the legislative history of the two statutes and also based on contrasting policy considerations. Compare Gardner, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 128 (concluding, based on the legislative history of the two statutes, that Title IX does not cover claims by employees because Title VII was amended for that purpose), with Kohlhausen, 2011 WL 1404934, at *11, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42055, at *32 (reading Title IX‘s legislative history as placing a “heavy emphasis on employment discrimination in educational institutions“); compare also Gardner, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 127-28 (expressing concern that Title IX employee claims would “circumvent” Title VII‘s prerequisites, such as exhaustion of administrative remedies), with Henschke, 821 F. Supp. at 172 (noting that Congress meant Title IX to “serve as an additional protection against gender-based discrimination in educational programs receiving federal funding regardless of the availability of a remedy under Title VII“).
These issues would have to be decided in an appropriate case; this lawsuit, however, is a poor vehicle for resolving them now. Here, Plaintiff‘s Title VII and IX claims are entirely duplicative: they are based on the same operative facts (Defendants’ allegedly discriminatory
V. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 16) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part in accordance with this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and it is further
ORDERED that the case shall proceed to trial: against the District and the Board on the Title VII and PDA discrimination claim in the First Cause of Action; and against the individual Defendants under
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 21, 2018
Syracuse, New York
Brenda K. Sannes
U.S. District Judge