Myers v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.Myers v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.
DECISION
Rendered on April 28, 2022
On brief: Ohio Justice & Policy Center, Gabriel M. Fletcher, and Mark Vander Laan, for appellee. Argued: Gabriel M. Fletcher.
On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, Lauren D. Emery, and Michelle Brizes, for appellant. Argued: Michelle Brizes.
APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio
JAMISON, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC“), appeals from a judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio granting plaintiff-appellee‘s motion for relief from judgment. The judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio is affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In July 2017, appellee was an inmate in the custody and control of appellant at the Allen-Oakwood Correctional Institutiоn. According to appellee, he informed ODRC‘s employees that other inmates, including his cellmate, Brock Daniels, were planning to
{¶ 3} At trial, appellee presented evidence that he informed the CO he feared for his safety and needed proteсtion from Daniels, but the CO told him that he was not sure he could help appellee because of a staffing shortage on the holiday. Appellee was not afforded any additional protection and on July 4, 2017, he was attacked by Daniels and injured.
{¶ 4} On February 28, 2019, appellee filed his complaint against ODRC in the Court of Claims of Ohio alleging negligence. On February 6, 2020, a magistrate of the court of claims conducted a bench trial at the correctional institution. On June 8, 2020, the magistrate issued a decision recommending judgment for appellee.
{¶ 5} The magistrate found that appellee proved he sustained injuries on July 4, 2017, when he was assaulted by his cellmate, and that ODRC was at fault because it had constructive notice of the impending assault. Accordingly, the magistrate found in favor of appellee on his negligence claim and recommended judgment for appellee. On the issue of appellee‘s damages, however, the magistrate found that appellee “produced very little evidence” to establish the extent of his injuries and the magistrate recommended a damage award of only $1,000.
{¶ 6} Appellee timely filed objections to the magistrate‘s decision arguing that the magistrate erred in valuing appellee‘s damages at $1,000 without providing a fair and reasonable opportunity to present evidence on the nature and extent of his injuries.
{¶ 7} In overruling appellee‘s objection and adopting the magistrate‘s decision, the court of claims concluded that appellee‘s failure to file a trial transcript in support of his objection required the court to accept the magistrate‘s factual findings and restrict its review to the magistrate‘s legal conclusions. The court of claims noted that the issues of liability and damages had not been bifurcated for trial and appellee, pro se, was obligated to produce evidence to establish the extеnt of his injuries. Based on the magistrate‘s finding that appellee produced very little evidence on the issue of damages, the court of claims, on August 3, 2020, overruled appellee‘s objection, adopted the magistrate‘s recommendation, and awarded appellee $1,000.
{¶ 8} Appellee timely appealed to this court from the August 3, 2020 judgment. On November 9, 2020, while appellee‘s appeal from the August 3, 2020 judgment was pending
{¶ 9} On February 8, 2021, the court of claims issued a decision granting the motion for partial relief from judgment upon finding that a serious misunderstanding occurred at the trial regarding damages. The court of claims scheduled the case for an evidentiary hearing to redetermine appellee‘s damages.
{¶ 10} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this court from the February 8, 2021 judgment and appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal arguing the February 8, 2021 judgment, was not a final, appealable order because the issue of appellee‘s damages had not yet been determined. In a memorandum decision issued by this court on July 13, 2021, we denied the motion to dismiss the appeal concluding the February 8, 2021 judgment “fits within the language of
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 11} Appellant assigns the following error for our review:
The Court of Claims erred awarding Plaintiff relief under
Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 60(B)(5) .
III. Standard of Review
{¶ 12} A trial court‘s ruling on a motion for relief from judgment, pursuant to
A. Assignment of Error
{¶ 13} In appellant‘s sole assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court of claims erred when it granted appellee relief, pursuant to
{¶ 14} To prevail under
{¶ 15} ” ‘Civ.R. 60(B)(5) is intended as a catch-all provision reflecting the inherent power of a court to relieve a person from the unjust operation of a judgment, but it is not to be used as a substitute for any of the other more specifiс provisions of Civ.R. 60(B).’ ” Wireless Resource LLC v. Garner, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1038, 2012-Ohio-2080, ¶ 16, quoting Caruso-Ciresi, Inc. v. Lohman, 5 Ohio St.3d 64 (1983), paragraph one of the syllabus. “The grounds for invoking this provision should be substantial.” Star Merchandise, LLC v. Haehn, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-39, 2016-Ohio-8018, ¶ 32, citing Caruso-Ciresi at paragraph two of the syllabus. ” ‘The key requirements of Civ.R. 60(B)(5) are extraordinary circumstances and undue hardship.’ ” Haehn at ¶ 32, quoting State ex rel. Minnis v. Lewis, 10th Dist. No. 93AP-812, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 6458 (Dec. 30, 1993).
{¶ 16} Relief under
{¶ 17} This court has previously determined, however, that
{¶ 18} The court of claims determined that this case presented extraordinary circumstances justifying relief under
When deciding whether extraordinary relief is justified, the Court believes it must take into consideration all the surrounding circumstances and determine whether a reasonable person in the same or similar position would have made the same decision. Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of Defendant who participated in a trial held at a state institution. The parties agree that Plaintiff actively prosecuted his case at every stage of this case. It is also undisputed that Plaintiff dismissed medical witnesses that he had subpoenaed to testify at trial. The Court finds that Plaintiff, through his motion and attachments, established that it was his intention to present damages evidеnce on the day of trial. It was only after he heard opposing counsel and the magistrate state several times that the only important issue needing addressed at trial was whether Defendant had notice of the attack that Plaintiff began dismissing the witnesses there to testify regarding his injuries. Furthermore, Defendant also dismissed its medical witnesses. Additionally, Plaintiff limited his own testimony to the issue of liability. Upon review of the record, the Court finds that, absent the unique circumstances presented at this trial proceeding, Plaintiff reasonably would have called at least some of the subpoenaed medical witnesses to testify or, at the very least, provided testimony of his own regarding his injuries. Accordingly, the Court finds that relief from judgment is justified pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(5).
(Feb. 8, 2021 Decision at 17.)
{¶ 20} There is no dispute that the trial at the correctional institution was not bifurcated as to the issues of liability and damages and that еvidence relevant to both liability and damages would be received at the trial. Nevertheless, the trial transcript shows that prior to hearing the evidence, the magistrate made the following comment on the record: “One thing I would say before we start is, I- -, I- - just looking at the number of witnesses that have been listed on these pretrial statements, and I wanted to talk to everybody before we got started.” (Feb. 6, 2020 Tr. at 6.) The transcript reveals that a confusing colloquy subsequently ensued regarding the particular liability question at issue. Immediately following this discussion, the magistrate commented as follows: “So, just to focus, all we‘re really concerned about today is whether ODRC had notice of this assault. With that in mind, I‘m hoping that can eliminate quite a few witness conflicts.” (Emphasis added.) (Tr. at 9.) The magistrate subsequently informed appellee: “I don‘t want to get too bogged down in calling it an assault or a fight. I mean the important part is, did they have notice of the altercation.” (Emphasis added.) (Tr. at 11.) The magistrate‘s comment was followеd up with the following colloquy:
The Court: I mean that‘s all that really matters. So I guess, Mr. Myers with that in mind, I kind of would forewarn you that I reserve the right - - if I‘m hearing things I don‘t really think are relevant to the decision, I might just ask you to move along or say, hey, we don‘t really need to hear.
Mr. Myers: Absolutely
The Court: Okay.
(Tr. at 11.)
{¶ 21} The trial transcript evidences the fact that appellee believed, based on the statements made by the magistrate, that the court would only be entertaining evidence on the issue of ODRC‘s notice of the impending assаult. At one point during appellee‘s case in chief, the magistrate asked appellee “who do you think you‘ll be calling after Mr. Simonson?” Appellee responded “since they‘re [sic] not moving to any kind of healthcare stuff. I think we‘ll wrap it up with Ms. Sherman.” (Tr. at 31-32.)
The Court: It sounded to me like we weren‘t calling the medical people.
Mr. Myers: Yeah.
[Counsel for Defendant]: We don‘t intend to - -
Mr. Myers: No, I - -
[Counsel for Defendant]: Okay, so I can - - who can I release, then?
The Court: Let me - - one second. I just want to make it clear on the record. There‘s a lot of people talking. We - - all the parties agree we‘re not calling the medical folks?
Mr. Myers: Absolutely, yes, sir.
[Counsel for Defendant]: Just to confirm, you‘re okay with releasing Dental Hygienist Ann Lovejoy?
Mr. Myers: Yes.
[Counsel fоr Defendant]: Okay. And Nurse Practitioner Tyler Niese?
Mr. Myers: Yes.
[Counsel for Defendant]: Okay. And Nurse Brooke Shaw?
Mr. Myers: Yes.
(Tr. at 53-55.)
{¶ 23} The above-cited transcript references and the record of proceedings in the court of claims support the conclusion that appellee was unfairly prevented from introducing evidence as to the nature and extent of his physical and emotional injuries because of comments by the magistrate, on the record, which created confusion as to the issues to be determined at trial. The recоrd also supports the conclusion by the court of claims that “absent the unique circumstances presented at this trial proceeding, [appellee] would have reasonably called at least some of the subpoenaed medical witnesses to testify or, at the very least, provided testimony of his own regarding his injuries.” (Decision at 17.)
{¶ 25} This court has stated that ” ‘[c]ourts should not generally use Civ.R. 60(B)(1) to relieve pro se litigants who are careless or unfamiliar with the legal system.’ ” Gamble Hartshorn, LLC v. Lee, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-35, 2018-Ohio-980, ¶ 26, quoting Dayton Power & Light v. Holdren, 4th Dist. No. 07CA21, 2008-Ohio-5121, ¶ 12. We have also noted ” ‘[a] party who is informed of court action against him and fails to seek legal assistance does so at his risk and such conduct cannot be said to constitute “excusable neglect” under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) or (5) unless a compelling reason is presented, like a serious illness.’ ” Gamble Hartshorn, LLC at ¶ 29, quoting Yuhanick v. Cooper, 7th Dist. No. 96-CO-45, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5527 (Nov. 16, 1998).
{¶ 26} It is reasonable to conclude from the transcript that appellee was dissuaded by the magistrate from producing witness testimony and other evidence regarding the extent and nature of his injuries. In my view, the transcript permits an inference that appellee was given the impression by the magistrate that he would have an opportunity to present such evidence at a subsequent proceeding.
{¶ 27} It is not lost on this court that appellee‘s opportunity to prepare his case for trial was necessarily more difficult given his status as an inmate in the custody and control of ODRC, the opposing party. For example,
{¶ 28} Moreover, the trial in this matter was conducted at an ODRC facility, and each of the witnesses subpoenaed by appellee to give testimony on the nature and extent of
{¶ 29} Appellee nevertheless produced sufficient evidence at trial to prevail on the issue of liability. The record also shows that appellee adequately prepared his case for trial on the issue of damages, even though his pro se inmate status presented certain disadvantages. Under the particular circumstances of this case, it was certainly reasonable for the court of claims to concluded that appellee would have produced evidence to support a greater award of damages had the magistrate not created confusion and uncertainty regarding the issue to be decided at trial.
{¶ 30} In Reichert v. Reichert, 23 Ohio App.3d 67 (9th Dist.1985), the trial court entered judgment for defendant in a medical malpractice action. When one of the parties discovered that the trial court had not reviewed relevant deposition testimony the trial court granted relief undеr
{¶ 31} In Dunn Specialty Steels, Inc. v. World Metals, Inc., 135 Ohio App.3d 367 (9th Dist.1999), the court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff relief under
{¶ 32} Here, the court of claims initially overruled appellee‘s objection to the magistrate‘s decision and adopted the magistrate‘s decision as its own. After being further advised of the circumstances surrounding the damage award and having been provided
{¶ 33} ODRC next contends that the trial court erred when it considered appellee‘s claim for relief under
{¶ 34} To be sure, a “mistake” for purposes of relief under
{¶ 35} There is no question in this case appellee‘s motion for relief from judgment was timely filed, and the record supports the conclusion that appellee was prepared to
{¶ 36} This court has explained that ” ‘[the] grounds for invoking Civ.R. 60(B)(5) should be substantial.’ ” Stuller v. Price, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-29, 2003-Ohio-583, ¶ 49, quoting Caruso-Ciresi at paragraph two of the syllabus. “The basis for relief must arise from circumstances chargeable to the court оr otherwise beyond the control of the moving party. Such a basis does not include an error or omission created by the failure of a party to produce evidence when that party has the duty and the opportunity to do so.” Stuller at ¶ 49, citing Templin v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 2d Dist. No. 12261, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1739 (Apr. 8, 1991).
{¶ 37} In Stuller, the trial court granted summary judgment to defendant in plaintiffs’ medical malpractice action. Plaintiffs-appellees filed a motion for relief from the judgment arguing that their trial attorney mistakenly omitted certain dispositive averments from their expert physicians’ affidavit in opposition to defendant‘s motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion for relief from judgment and we affirmed. This court determined that the attorney‘s error was not the type of mistake that would justify relief under
{¶ 38} By contrast, appellee‘s decision in this case to release his medical witnesses and limit his own testimony to the issue of liability was not a failure attributable solely to appellee. Appellee was provided with notice that the trial at the correctional institution was
{¶ 39} However, shortly after the proceeding commenced, comments by the magistrate on the record, and the magistrate‘s discussions with ODRC‘s counsel, led appellee to believe that the only issue to be decided at the institutional trial was ODRC‘s notice of the assault upon appellee by his cellmate. The record shows that neither the magistrate nor opposing counsel subsequently addressed or clarified the scope of the proceedings. Though ODRC had no legal obligation to correct аny misconception created by the magistrate‘s comments, the magistrate has a duty of fairness and impartiality to clarify the issues to be determined at trial.
{¶ 40} The court of claims found that a reasonable person in appellee‘s position would have reached the same conclusion regarding the scope of the trial and likely would have released the subpoenaed medical witnesses and limited his own testimony to the issue of liability. When applying an abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. The purpose of
{¶ 41} For the foregoing reasons, appellant‘s sole assignment of error is overruled.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 42} Having overruled appellant‘s sole assignment of error, the judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
LUPER SCHUSTER, P.J., concurring in judgment only.
DORRIAN, J., concurring in judgment only.