MFW WINE CO., LLC, A6 WINE COMPANY, AND GECC2 LLC D/B/A BLOOMSDAY CAFE v. PENNSYLVANIA LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD; LOG CABIN PROPERTY, LP, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL THOSE SIMILARLY SITUATED v. PENNSYLVANIA LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD
No. 75 MAP 2022, No. 76 MAP 2022
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT
July 2, 2024
TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.
Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court dated May 27, 2022 at No. 251 MD 2020 and No. 292 MD 2020. ARGUED: November 30, 2023
JUSTICE DONOHUE
In MFW Wine Co., LLC v. PLCB, the Commonwealth Court issued a declaratory judgment that PLCB failed to perform its statutory duty to implement procedures to facilitate the direct shipment of special orders to customers.2 The court also issued a writ of mandamus compelling PLCB to comply with that duty. After prevailing in the declaratory judgment and mandamus actions in MFW I, Wine Vendors applied for mandamus damages pursuant to Section 8303 as well as for costs, interest, and attorneys’ fees. Based on Wine Vendors’ success in MFW I, Log Cabin brought an action for mandamus damages under Section 8303.3
PLCB defended the claims by asserting that it was not a person within the meaning of Section 8303 and that, even if it was a person, sovereign immunity4 barred mandamus damages because it is an agency of the Commonwealth. It also challenged any prospective award of attorneys’ fees for the underlying mandamus action as barred by sovereign immunity for the same reasons. The Commonwealth Court rejected those
PLCB appeals both decisions as collateral orders under
Background
MFW I
In 2016, the General Assembly amended Section 305(a) of the Liquor Code to allow for the direct purchase and shipment of alcohol products not otherwise available from PLCB through its Fine Wine and Good Spirits stores (PLCB Stores).
Section 305(a) prohibited PLCB from charging handling fees for special orders delivered directly to a customer under the new system, and PLCB was to implement the
Wine Vendors initiated an action against PLCB in the Commonwealth Court‘s original jurisdiction seeking a declaratory judgment that they had a statutory right to the direct shipment of special-order liquor or alcohol to customers from licensed importers or licensed vendors and seeking mandamus relief to enforce that right. Id. at 52. The Commonwealth Court granted relief on both fronts.7 First, the court held that the clear and unambiguous language of both amendments, read pari materia, provided that although PLCB has discretion on what procedure it adopts to implement these transactions, it does not have the discretion to prevent them. Id. at 57. Second, under its mandamus power, the Commonwealth Court directed PLCB to implement a direct
MFW II
Wine Vendors filed an application in the Commonwealth Court for relief seeking damages, costs, interest, and attorneys’ fees.8 PLCB filed an answer asserting that Wine Vendors were not entitled to damages because PLCB was a government entity entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity (barring both damages and any related attorneys’ fees), and that even if the General Assembly had waived PLCB‘s sovereign immunity, PLCB was not a person within the meaning of the mandamus relief created by Section 8303.9 Alternatively, PLCB argued that if neither defense applied, it was entitled to discovery and a hearing to assess Wine Vendors’ damages. PLCB conceded that Wine Vendors were entitled to costs under
(1) Attorney‘s fees are not an item of taxable costs except to the extent authorized by section 2503 (relating to right of participants to receive counsel fees).
(2) The prevailing party should recover his costs from the unsuccessful litigant except where the:
(i) Costs relate to the existence, possession or disposition of a fund and the costs should be borne by the fund.
(ii) Question involved is a public question or where the applicable law is uncertain and the purpose of the litigants is primarily to clarify the law.
(iii) Application of the rule would work substantial injustice.
(3) The imposition of actual costs or a multiple thereof may be used as a penalty for violation of general rules or rules of court.
Log Cabin
Five days after MFW I was decided, Log Cabin filed a complaint
alleging that it and those similarly situated have been unlawfully compelled to pick up and pay a handling fee to PLCB on every bottle of [special order] liquor or wine it purchased since June 1, 2017 (allowing PLCB to collect millions of dollars in handling fees) and, pursuant to Section 8303 of the Judicial Code … and MFW I, they are entitled to recover damages in the form of all handling fees paid and pick-up expenses incurred due to PLCB‘s inaction since June 1, 2017, plus costs, prejudgment interest, and attorneys’ fees.
After PLCB appealed MFW I, Log Cabin‘s action was stayed by joint application until this Court affirmed MFW I. PLCB then filed a preliminary objection to Log Cabin‘s complaint, alleging that Log Cabin
failed to state a viable cause of action because: (1) PLCB is entitled to sovereign immunity and cannot be held liable for damages under Section 8303 of the Judicial Code; (2) PLCB is not a person within the meaning of Section 8303 of the Judicial Code and, thus, is not liable for mandamus damages thereunder; and (3) mandamus damages are only available under Section 8303 of the Judicial Code to those that bring and successfully obtain mandamus relief, which Log Cabin has not.
Log Cabin, 276 A.3d at 868. Log Cabin filed a timely response, arguing: (1) sovereign immunity does not apply; (2) PLCB is a person under Section 8303 of the Judicial Code; and (3) Log Cabin need not have been a party to MFW I to recover mandamus damages. Id.
The Commonwealth Court ordered PLCB‘s Preliminary Objections to Log Cabin to be listed for argument consecutive to argument on Wine Vendors’ Application. Log Cabin, 276 A.3d at 868. Following those arguments, the Commonwealth Court issued closely divided decisions in Log Cabin and MFW II.
Commonwealth Court Decisions
Judge Covey wrote for the same 3-2 majority in MFW II and Log Cabin and was joined by Judges Cannon and McCullough. Judge Wojcik authored the dissenting opinions in both cases and was joined by President Judge Cohn Jubelirer.
MFW II
In MFW II, The Commonwealth Court first addressed whether PLCB is a person within the meaning of Section 8303. MFW II, 276 A.3d at 1232-35. After recognizing the
The court observed that the SCA definition of person excluded only the Commonwealth, not its agencies, as contrasted with the broader term used in Section 8501 of the Sovereign Immunity Act,
The MFW II Court next examined Commonwealth v. Runion, 662 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1995), where this Court overturned a holding that the Commonwealth was a person
The MFW II Court rejected PLCB‘s reliance on Runion because 1) Runion was superseded by subsequent legislative action; 2) it had strictly construed a penal statute, whereas Section 8303 is subject to a more liberal construction to effectuate its purpose and to promote justice;14 3) Runion did not involve a Commonwealth agency‘s defiance of a statutory mandate; and 4) Runion mistakenly stated that an 1992 amendment to Section 1991 of the SCA had excluded government entities of the Commonwealth from its definition of person, when in fact that amendment added government entities to the definition while simultaneously excluding the Commonwealth. MFW II, 276 A.3d at 1234 (citing Section 2 of the Act of Dec. 18, 1992, P.L. 1333 (1992 SCA Amendment)).
Next, the Commonwealth Court examined the context in which Section 8303 was enacted, concluding that it was specifically intended to impose mandamus damages against a Commonwealth agency, as such a remedy was available under its predecessor, the Mandamus Act of 1893. Id. Decisions by the Commonwealth Court had recognized
The court next considered Wine Vendors’ claims for mandamus damages, costs, interest, and attorneys’ fees. Id. at 1235-41. Addressing PLCB‘s claim that sovereign immunity barred recovery of mandamus damages under Section 8303, the court first cited intermediate appellate court decisions holding that sovereign immunity did not bar mandamus actions generally,15 and cases explicitly permitting mandamus damages against Commonwealth entities.16 MFW II, 276 A.3d at 1236. The court recognized, however, that damages recoverable under mandamus against a government entity must
The Commonwealth Court granted Wine Vendors’ Application subject to PLCB‘s right to discovery and/or a hearing limited to damages, interest, and attorneys’ fees. Id.
MFW II Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Wojcik would have found that the parties’ interpretations of the meaning of person are both reasonable and, therefore, that person is ambiguous when applied to Section 8303 as to whether it included PLCB. MFW II, 276 A.3d at 1242-43 (Wojcik, J., dissenting) (joined by Cohn Jubelirer, P.J.). Applying principles of statutory interpretation to resolve the ambiguity, the dissent looked at the history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and concluded that its purpose has always been ‘to protect the fiscal security of the government by shielding the Commonwealth and its agents’ from financial liability. Id. at 1243 (quoting Dorsey v. Redman, 96 A.3d 332, 340 (Pa. 2014) (emphasis omitted). In that regard, the dissent observed that the shield of sovereign immunity originally developed as a common law doctrine and is the general rule that can only be bypassed when specifically authorized by the General Assembly as is now codified in
Judge Wojcik next found that Section 8522 of the Sovereign Immunity Act is the exclusive location for the General Assembly‘s specific waivers of sovereign immunity, and that there is no waiver for mandamus damages under that provision. Id. at 1244. Additionally, the dissent found Runion instructive here because
only a person may be liable for mandamus damages under Section 8303‘s clear terms, governmental agencies of this Commonwealth are not so liable. [Runion, 662 A.2d at 621].
PLCB is a governmental agency of the Commonwealth protected by sovereign immunity. Therefore, for purposes of Section 8303, PLCB is not a person liable for mandamus damages.
Further, the dissent argued that the MFW II majority had overlooked that statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign. Id. Applying strict construction principles to Section 8303, following Runion‘s interpretation of person under the SCA, and given the absence of a specific waiver of sovereign immunity for mandamus damages in the Sovereign Immunity Act, the dissent would have determined that PLCB was not liable for mandamus damages under Section 8303.
Log Cabin
As the procedural posture of Log Cabin concerned a ruling on preliminary objections in the nature of demurrer, PLCB challenged the legal sufficiency of the complaint and was required to show with certainty that the law will not permit recovery, with any doubt to be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary objections. Log Cabin, 276 A.3d at 869 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Commw. 2010)).
The Log Cabin Court first addressed PLCB‘s sovereign immunity claim, which was the same one it made in MFW II. Id. at 869-72. Log Cabin argued that PLCB acted outside of the scope of its official duties, that sovereign immunity did not apply to Section 8303, and that the General Assembly has made it abundantly clear in other contexts that sovereign immunity does not permit a state agency to retain unlawfully collected funds. Id. at 869.
The court acknowledged the general rule that the Commonwealth, its agencies, and its individual officials and employees are immune from suits for damages. Id. at 870 (citing, inter alia,
Alternatively, the Log Cabin Court did not find the absence of a specific waiver for mandamus damages under the Sovereign Immunity Act to be relevant here if PLCB acted outside of its authority, as
The Log Cabin Court also rejected PLCB‘s claim that it was not a person within the meaning of Section 8303, applying nearly identical rationale to that expressed in MFW II. Log Cabin, 276 A.3d at 872-75.
Unique to Log Cabin, the Commonwealth Court addressed whether Log Cabin could recover damages under Section 8303 since it was not the successful mandamus petitioner in MFW I. The court noted that Log Cabin could still join MFW I‘s class action or bring its own mandamus claim because, as PLCB conceded at oral argument before the Commonwealth Court, the PLCB had still not fulfilled its statutory duty at that time. Id. at 876-77. The Log Cabin Court concluded that, because PLCB is clearly liable to licensed vendors, importers, and licensees for provable mandamus damages under Section 8303[,] and neither that provision nor any caselaw expressly preclude Log Cabin‘s claim, it does not appear with certainty that Log Cabin cannot recover damages from PLCB. Id. at 877.20 Thus, the court overruled PLCB‘s preliminary objections.21
Log Cabin Dissent
The dissent in Log Cabin, in its entirety, read as follows:
I dissent. For the reasons set forth in my Dissenting Opinion filed in MFW [I], I do not agree that [PLCB] is a person subject to damages under Section 8303 of the Judicial Code,
42 Pa.C.S. § 8303 . Therefore, unlike the Majority, I would sustain PLCB‘s preliminary objection in the nature of demurrer on the basis that Log Cabin[]‘s claim is barred by sovereign immunity.
Issues
In the appeal from MFW II, PLCB raises one question for our review:
Whether Section 8303 of the Judicial Code … creates an exception to sovereign immunity in actions seeking damages, costs, interest, and attorneys’ fees against Commonwealth agencies?
PLCB‘s MFW Brief at 4.
In the appeal from Log Cabin, PLCB raises one similar, albeit narrower question for our review:
Whether Section 8303 of the Judicial Code … creates an exception to sovereign immunity in actions seeking damages against Commonwealth agencies?
PLCB‘s Log Cabin Brief at 4.
Both questions incorporate an essential issue: whether PLCB is a person within the meaning of Section 8303. Before addressing these issues, we must decide whether the orders underlying these appeals are ripe for appeal.
Collateral Order Jurisdiction
Wine Vendors and Log Cabin contend that Log Cabin‘s and MFW II‘s sovereign immunity rulings are not collateral orders under
As a general rule, an appellate court‘s jurisdiction extends only to review of final orders. Shearer v. Hafer, 177 A.3d 850, 855 ([Pa.] 2018); see also
Pa.R.A.P. 341(a) ([A]n appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of a ... trial court.). A final order is an order that disposes of all claims and of all parties or is entered as a final order pursuant to a determination of finality by a trial court or other government unit.Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) , (3). As we have previously stated, [t]he final order rule reflects the long-held limitation on review by both federal and state appellate courts[,] and [c]onsidering issues only after a final order maintains distinctions between trial and appellate review, respects the traditional role of the trial judge, and promotes formality, completeness, and efficiency. Shearer, 177 A.3d at 855.
Nonetheless, the collateral order doctrine, which has been codified in Rule 313, permit[s] immediate appellate review of certain [non-final] collateral orders. Id. at 856; see also Rae v. Pa. Funeral Dirs. Ass‘n, 977 A.2d 1121, 1125 ([Pa.] 2009).
J.C.D. v. A.L.R., 303 A.3d 425, 429–30 (Pa. 2023).
Under
In Brooks, we held that the Commonwealth Court erred in quashing the notice of appeal from the denial of summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds. In that case, Wanda Brooks alleged that she sustained an injury when she walked into an unmarked glass wall at a Family Court building in Philadelphia, and filed negligence claims against the building‘s architect, the City of Philadelphia, and the Family Court. Brooks, 259 A.3d at 361. The Family Court asserted in a new matter that it was immune from tort claims under the Sovereign Immunity Act and moved for summary judgment. Id. Brooks countered that the General Assembly had waived the Family Court‘s sovereign immunity under the real estate exception set forth in
We applied
Under the second prong, we considered the importance of the sovereign immunity issue, which involves contemplation of the importance of the right involved by weighing the interests that immediate appellate review would protect against the final judgment rule‘s interests in efficiency through avoiding piecemeal litigation. Id. We also required that the order must involve deeply rooted rights that go beyond the interests of parties involved in the particular dispute. Id. In that regard, we again agreed with the Commonwealth Court that the Family Court‘s sovereign immunity defense was too
Finally, under the third prong, we disagreed with the Commonwealth Court‘s determination that the Family Court‘s sovereign immunity defense would not be irreparably lost if the case continued to final judgment. The Commonwealth Court had found that because the Family Court could assert sovereign immunity on appeal from a final judgment, the issue could not be irreparably lost. Id. at 364-65. However, that order was contrary to the principle that sovereign immunity applies to the legal process itself, not just to final judgments. Id. at 372-73.23 Thus, we concluded that the third
In the instant matter, Appellees have similarly challenged whether the rulings in MFW II and Log Cabin addressing PLCB‘s sovereign immunity defense are appealable as of right under
We agree with PLCB that the issues before us are separable and distinct from the underlying action for damages based on the same rationale we expressed in Brooks. Here, whether Appellees can substantiate their Section 8303 damages, and in what amount, are wholly independent questions from whether PLCB is a person from whom such damages are recoverable under Section 8303 and whether such damages are barred by sovereign immunity. Brooks is not distinguishable. The issues are separable and distinct.
Second, under the second
a right is important if the interests that would go unprotected without immediate appeal are significant relative to the efficiency interests served by the final order rule. Additionally, the order must involve rights deeply rooted in public policy
Blystone, 119 A.3d at 312 (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Here, Wine Vendors and Log Cabin presume an affirmative answer to a question before us in this appeal regarding whether PLCB’s novel sovereign immunity claim lacks merit, but that question has no place in our analysis under Rule 313’s second prong. In Brooks, we found that the right to a sovereign immunity defense is too important to evade review before final judgment. Brooks, 259 A.3d at 372. Furthermore, whether citizens can be made whole for damages incurred as a result of a government agency’s failure to perform its statutory obligations is a matter of importance involving questions of public accountability that go well-beyond the individual litigants in this case.
Finally, Appellees argue that delay will not irreparably harm PLCB because PLCB already lost in the underlying mandamus and declaratory judgment actions, and that “[a]ll that remains is a damages calculation.” Wine Vendors’ Brief at 4. However, if sovereign immunity applies to bar damages against PLCB under Section 8303, or if Section 8303’s definition of “person” does not encompass a Commonwealth agency, the failure to address those questions until after Section 8303 damages are awarded would result in discovery proceedings and a wholly unnecessary phase of litigation of indeterminate expense, undermining the public purpose of sovereign immunity.
Appellees downplay that burden by relying on our statement in Brooks that “the protections of immunity are irreparably lost when a party goes to trial.” Brooks, 259 A.3d at 373. They argue that the trial phase has already occurred here—the litigation in MFW I—but for an assessment of damages. But in Brooks, we were applying a broader principle that “the protections of sovereign immunity are irreparably lost if a governmental entity must litigate a case to final judgment before it can obtain appellate review of an adverse ruling on its invocation of sovereign immunity.” Id. (emphasis added). At best,
Because PLCB has satisfied all three prongs under Rule 313, we conclude that the matter in both appeals involves collateral orders appealable as of right.
Parties’ Arguments
PLCB
PLCB first contends that MFW II and Log Cabin conflict with the doctrine of sovereign immunity because, as an agency of the Commonwealth, it is entitled to sovereign immunity against claims for damages.26 PLCB stresses that any statutory exceptions concerning sovereign immunity have traditionally been strictly construed. PLCB’s Brief at 15 (citing Mullin v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp., 870 A.2d 773, 779 (Pa. 2005) (“Because of the clear intent to insulate the government from liability, the exceptions to sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed.”)). PLCB highlights that, in Mullin, we stated that the General Assembly enacted the Sovereign Immunity Act to “insulate the Commonwealth and its agencies from liability except in certain specified
PLCB contends the Sovereign Immunity Act exclusively defines the circumstances under which Commonwealth parties may be sued in tort. Id. at 16 (citing
By contrast, PLCB categorizes Section 8303 “as a general provision which does not specifically address or provide for the waiver of sovereign immunity” especially when strictly construed. Id. at 16-17. PLCB asserts that the Commonwealth Court failed to apply strict construction to Section 8303 when ascertaining the General Assembly’s intent to waive sovereign immunity for mandamus damages. Id. at 17.
Relying primarily on Runion, PLCB criticizes the Commonwealth Court’s finding that PLCB is a “person” under Section 8303 through the court’s incorporation of the SCA definition. Id. As previously noted, in Runion, a criminal defendant challenged an award of restitution to the Department of Public Welfare under a prior version of
Next, PLCB asserts that Meyer v. Community College of Beaver County, 93 A.3d 806 (Pa. 2014) (“Meyer II”), provides further support for the proposition that the General Assembly did not intend to waive PLCB’s sovereign immunity when it amended the SCA definition of “person” in 1992 to include Commonwealth agencies but not the Commonwealth. PLCB argues that in Meyer II
a similar linguistic question which [a]ffected the scope of coverage under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Laws (UTPCPL). The UTPCPL defined a “person” as “natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships, incorporated or unincorporated associations, and any legal entities.”
73 P.S. § 201-2(2) . However, this Court ultimately held that a community college was not a “person” subject to liability under the UTPCPL. See Meyer [II], 93 A.3d at 808. It based its decision in part on the historical importance of sovereign and governmental immunity, and the unlikelihood that the General Assembly would use general language to define “person” so as to effectively waive immunity for government agencies.
Id. at 18-19.
Focusing on MFW II, PLCB next argues that Wine Vendors are not entitled to attorneys’ fees because mandamus damages are “barred by sovereign immunity.” PLCB’s Brief at 19. Nonetheless, even if sovereign immunity did not apply to those
Wine Vendors
Wine Vendors assert that sovereign immunity has never applied to mandamus damages, and this is “obvious” because citizens must be made whole when the government violates their “clear legal rights.” Wine Vendors’ Brief at 18-19 (quoting Chilli v. Sch. Dist. of City of McKeesport, 6 A.2d 99, 99 (Pa. 1939) (“Mandamus … can only be obtained when there is a clear legal right in the relator and a positive duty of the defendant to be performed[.]”)). Wine Vendors warn that, “[o]therwise, an agency could violate ‘clear legal rights’ with impunity.” Id. at 19.
Wine Vendors contend that the ability to obtain mandamus damages against Commonwealth agencies dates back at least to the Mandamus Act of 1893, the predecessor to Section 8303.29 Id. At that time,
sovereign immunity was the common law and would remain so for another eighty-five years. But sovereign immunity did not apply to mandamus damages, which were expressly provided for by statute. This remains the case now, even after the General Assembly restored sovereign immunity by statute “where it formerly existed” before this Court abrogated common law sovereign immunity in 1978. Balshy, 475 A.2d at 185.
Wine Vendors further argue that the text of Section 8303 clearly undermines PLCB’s sovereign immunity claim. Id. at 20. They contend that by the very nature of mandamus actions, Section 8303 logically applies to government agencies. Id. (citing
Furthermore, Wine Vendors argue that sovereign immunity has never barred mandamus damages. Id. at 22. Even after the General Assembly enacted the Sovereign Immunity Act, Wine Vendors maintain that it cannot be read to have expanded sovereign immunity when it only purported to restore sovereign immunity principles that had been abrogated by Mayle. Id.30 Wine Vendors note that this Court recognized this continuity in Dorsey, 96 A.3d at 342 (observing that the General Assembly had codified the “preexisting immunity scheme”). They contend this restoration salvaged sovereign immunity regarding tort claims but had no effect on mandamus damages that had never been barred by the doctrine. Wine Vendors’ Brief at 23. Additionally, Wine Vendors cite examples of mandamus damages awards in the years that followed the enactment of the Sovereign Immunity Act in cases such as City of Pittsburgh and Temple University v. Commonwealth Department of Public Welfare, 521 A.2d 986 (Pa. Commw. 1987). Id. at 23-24.
Next, Wine Vendors argue that Section 8303 should not be strictly construed because the lower court “did not hold that Section 8303 is an ‘exception’ to sovereign immunity[;] it correctly held that sovereign immunity does not apply to mandamus actions.” Id. at 27. They maintain that strict construction only applies to claims within the scope of sovereign immunity. Id. They point to Log Cabin, where the lower court explicitly stated that claims brough pursuant to Section 8303 or its predecessor never “required a waiver” because such actions were “never barred by sovereign immunity in the first place.” Id. (quoting Log Cabin, 276 A.3d at 871). Thus, Wine Vendors contend that the rule requiring strict construction of exceptions to sovereign immunity do not apply to Section 8303. Id. at 28. For the same reason, they argue that Section 8521’s language that “no provision” of Title 42, outside of the Sovereign Immunity Act, “shall constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity” is inapplicable here because, although Section 8303 is in Title 42, mandamus damages under Section 8303 do not require a waiver as they have never been subject to sovereign immunity. Id. at 28 n.6. They contend that to hold otherwise would also call into question the Declaratory Judgment Act,
But no one contends that the absence of a specific statutory waiver of sovereign immunity for declaratory judgment actions means parties cannot bring such actions against the Commonwealth. They do not, as this very case
demonstrates. Like mandamus actions, declaratory judgment actions do not need a waiver because sovereign immunity never barred them in the first place.
Furthermore, Wine Vendors argue that sovereign immunity does not apply when “agencies [] act outside the scope of their authority.” Id. at 28. For instance, they point to Justice v. Lombardo, 208 A.3d 1057 (Pa. 2019), where “this Court overturned a Commonwealth Court ruling vacating a jury’s finding that a state trooper acted outside the scope of his duties (and was therefore not entitled to sovereign immunity) based on evidence that he handcuffed and used force against the plaintiff due to personal animus.” Id. at 30 (citing Justice, 208 A.3d at 1066-67, 1075-76). Wine Vendors fault PLCB for failing to consider the scope-of-authority issue, even though “the concept is repeatedly referenced in the statutes it cites.” Id. at 31 (citing
Wine Vendors next contest PLCB’s argument that it is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 8303. Initially, they argue that PLCB was already determined to be a “person” when this Court affirmed MFW I, because declaratory relief under
Similarly, Wine Vendors argue that because PLCB concedes that they are entitled to costs, it admits to being a “person” within the meaning of Section 8303. See PLCB’s
Wine Vendors also argue that regardless of whether PLCB is a “person” within the meaning of the SCA, the SCA definitions only apply “unless the context clearly indicates otherwise[.]”
The context in which the General Assembly used the word “person” in Section 8303[,] and the context in which it amended the default definition of “person” in 1992—demonstrate that the General Assembly never intended to exclude Commonwealth agencies from the scope of Section 8303’s action to recover damages from a defendant in a mandamus action who is “adjudged … to have failed or refused without lawful justification to perform a duty required by law.”
Wine Vendors’ Brief at 39 (quoting
Wine Vendors point out that other provisions in the Judicial Code that were codified in the same year as Section 8303 consistently use terms like participant, litigant, and party that incorporate the word “person,” such that, if read consistently across the Judicial Code to exclude Commonwealth agencies as a “person,” would preclude Commonwealth agencies from recovering costs, counsel fees, or even participating as a party in declaratory judgment actions. Id. at 40.
Nevertheless, Wine Vendors also claim that the amendment to the SCA definition of “person,” if anything, supports their interpretation, because even before the definition of “person” included “government entity,” the courts “routinely authorized” Section 8303 relief. Id. Therefore, if the SCA definition is applied to Section 8303, Wine Vendors
Wine Vendors next assail PLCB’s reliance on Meyer II and Runion. They aver that in Meyer II,
this Court considered whether a local government agency could be sued as a “person” under the provision in the [UTPCPL] that authorizes private actions:
73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a) . The UTPCPL has its own statutory definition of “person,” which includes the phrase “any other legal entities.”Id. § 201-2(2) . This Court held that whether the phrase “any other legal entities” should be construed to include local governmental entities was ambiguous in the context of the UTPCPL—but in light of the prior law, the purpose of the UTPCPL, and the consequences of holding that it applies to governmental agencies, the Court concluded that the General Assembly did not intend the UTPCPL to be applied to local government agencies. [Meyer II,] 93 A.3d at 811-15.Those same considerations show why the General Assembly’s use of “person” in Section 8303 clearly did intend it to apply to Commonwealth agencies. First, the prior law was the Mandamus Act, which not only existed outside of sovereign immunity but expressly provided for awards of mandamus damages against Commonwealth defendants. Second, the purpose of a mandamus action and Section 8303 is to hold government entities and officials accountable when they shirk their duties. And third, the consequence of excluding Commonwealth agencies from the reach of Section 8303 is that agencies like PLCB that flout their statutory obligations and persist in collecting fees the General Assembly has mandated they stop collecting will not be held accountable for their conduct.
Id. at 45-46. Wine Vendors also contend that Runion cannot save PLCB’s interpretation, largely in line with the rationale of the lower court in MFW II. Id. at 46-48.
Log Cabin
Log Cabin’s arguments on the merits also track those raised by Wine Vendors. It contends that PLCB is a “person” under Section 8303 because 1) the law of the case applies, as PLCB did not contest that it was a “person” for purposes of the declaratory
As to whether sovereign immunity bars mandamus damages under Section 8303, like Wine Vendors, Log Cabin contends that the text of Section 8303 authorizes recovery of mandamus damages, id. at 17-18, and that neither the common law nor the current statutory regime governing sovereign immunity has ever barred mandamus damages, id. at 19-23. Consequently, Log Cabin maintains that this Court need not strictly construe Section 8303 as an exception to the doctrine to reach the correct result. Id. at 24-26. It also argues that sovereign immunity does not apply when a government agency acts outside the scope of its authority, a principle embedded in the Sovereign Immunity Act. Id. at 26-30.34
PLCB’s Reply35
PLCB argues that its concession that sovereign immunity did not apply to the underlying mandamus action in MFW I was not an admission that it does not apply to mandamus damages. Id. at 6-7. It also contends that there is no waiver of sovereign immunity if PLCB acted outside of its agency authority. Id. at 8-11. PLCB accuses Log Cabin and Wine Vendors of conflating “the merits with sovereign immunity” because “if
Analysis
Is PLCB a “person” under Section 8303?
We first consider whether PLCB is a “person” within the meaning of Section 8303. If the answer to that question is no, then PLCB is not susceptible to liability for damages in a mandamus action and its immunity from damage claims based on sovereign immunity is not implicated. To interpret the meaning of “person” under Section 8303, we resort to well established principles guiding our interpretation of the meaning of statutes:
Statutory interpretation is a matter of law, and our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. As this case requires us to engage in statutory interpretation, we are mindful of our paramount objective to give effect to the intent of our General Assembly in enacting the particular statute under review. When words of a statute are clear and explicit, we must follow them. It is only when the language is not explicit that we may examine other considerations.
U.S. Venture, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 255 A.3d 321, 334 (Pa. 2021) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Section 8303 provides:
§ 8303. Action for performance of a duty required by law
A person who is adjudged in an action in the nature of mandamus to have failed or refused without lawful justification
“Person” is not defined in the Judicial Code, but it is defined in Section 1991 of the SCA:
§ 1991. Definitions
The following words and phrases, when used in any statute finally enacted on or after September 1, 1937, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, shall have the meanings given to them in this section:
* * *
“Person.” Includes a corporation, partnership, limited liability company, business trust, other association, government entity (other than the Commonwealth), estate, trust, foundation or natural person.
PLCB does not dispute that the SCA definition applies to Section 8303. On its face, that definition includes PLCB as a “government entity” that is not “the Commonwealth.”
PLCB argues that we must avert our eyes from the plain, unambiguous meaning of “person” in the SCA due to our decision in Runion. Runion asked whether the
As correctly determined by the Commonwealth Court in both MFW II and Log Cabin, Runion is not controlling for multiple reasons. Most important among those reasons for our interpretive purposes, Runion’s interpretation of the definition of “person” under the SCA contained a patent error which, upon reflection, leaves no room for difference of opinion and must be abandoned.
Runion presumed an ambiguity in the definition of “victim,” not an ambiguity in the SCA regarding whether a “person” could include a government agency. Seeking to define “victim” after finding that ambiguity, the Runion Court strictly construed the term “victim” in the defendant’s favor (i.e., against awarding restitution to a government agency). However, it found no ambiguity in the SCA definition of “person,” finding that “the Department of Public Welfare, as a Commonwealth entity, is expressly excluded from
Prior to 1992, the SCA defined “person” without any reference to the Commonwealth or its subdivisions. It provided: “‘Person.’ Includes a corporation, partnership, and association, as well as a natural person.”
“‘Person.’ Includes a corporation, partnership, limited liability company, business trust, other association, government entity (other than the Commonwealth), estate, trust, foundation or natural person.”
1 Pa.C.S. § 1991 (as amended).
As the Commonwealth Court correctly ascertained, the General Assembly added “government entity” to the definition of “person,” while simultaneous excluding “the Commonwealth.” Thus, the Runion Court unquestionably misread the amendment to the SCA definition of “person” as doing precisely the opposite of what it actually did. We will not perpetuate this obvious error and, thus, we overrule Runion for its interpretation of the definition of “person” in the SCA.38
We also reject the notion that strict construction principles apply in these appeals to our interpretation of “person” under the SCA, as we do not apply that interpretative principle in contravention to the unambiguous language of a statute. “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under
PLCB’s reliance on Meyer II to demonstrate that it is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 8303 is also unconvincing. In Meyer II, we considered whether a community college could be sued for unfair trade practices under the UTPCPL, which provides “a private cause of action for ‘persons’ injured by other ‘persons’ employment of unfair trade practices.” Meyer II, 93 A.3d at 808. While that superficially suggests similarity to the instant matter in that Meyer II revolved around whether a government entity constituted a “person” that could be sued in contravention to sovereign immunity principles, the comparison ends there. The UTPCPL contains its own definition of “person” that does not explicitly include government entities, but instead defines the term as including “natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships, incorporated or unincorporated associations, and any other legal entities.”
First, we determined that under the common law at the time of the UTPCPL’s adoption, sovereign immunity would have generally applied to suits that involved depriving the Commonwealth of property, and that it was unlikely that the General
PLCB contends that Meyer II expresses the importance of considering the historical applications of sovereign immunity when considering whether a statute purports to create causes of action that affect public coffers without expressly waiving sovereign immunity, and that is true enough. However, Meyer II was interpreting the UTPCPL definition of “person” applicable only to the UTPCPL, which is distinct from the SCA definition applicable to Section 8303 in the most critical sense—the UTPCPL definition makes no reference to government entities at all. Critically, in Meyer II, our statutory interpretation began by identifying an ambiguity as to whether the UTPCPL definition included government entities, whereas there is no ambiguity in Section 1991’s inclusion of government entities. Thus, Meyer II does not inform our interpretation of definition of “person” applicable to Section 8303.
Section 8303 provides that a “person who is adjudged in an action in the nature of mandamus to have failed or refused without lawful justification to perform a duty required by law shall be liable in damages to the person aggrieved by such failure or refusal.”
Sovereign Immunity
Having concluded that PLCB is a “person” susceptible to damage claims under Section 8303, the question remains whether Section 8303 conflicts with the Sovereign Immunity Act. PLCB maintains that Section 8303 necessarily conflicts with the Sovereign Immunity Act if it is a person subject to mandamus damages. We disagree that such a conflict exists as the history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in this Commonwealth
§ 11. Courts to be open; suits against the Commonwealth
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct.
legal charlatanry in the grave of its discredited monarchial grandsires[,]” he opined: “This Court, then as today, seemed to believe that it is enough to say ‘sovereign immunity’ and all the processes of law and of man‘s brain will stop functioning as if in the terrified presence of a charging lion.” Husser v. Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 228 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. 1967) (Musmanno, J., dissenting) (quoting Boorse v. Springfield, 103 A.2d 708, 714 (Pa. 1954) (Musmanno, J., dissenting)). Justice Musmanno was persistent in expressing his distaste for the doctrine. See id. (lamenting the “the archaic, unsportsmanlike, reason-defying, bizarre, self-stultifying, monumentally unjust, cruel, brutal, undemocratic piece of pedantical nonsense known as sovereign immunity.“).
Former Chief Justice Samuel Roberts, who shared his first five years on this Court with Justice Musmanno, carried the crusade against sovereign immunity forward, culminating with his authorship of Mayle. He signaled what was soon to come while writing the Opinion in Support of Reversal in Tarantino v. Allentown State Hosp., 351 A.2d 247, 248 (1976), in which an equally-divided court affirmed the application of sovereign immunity by the Commonwealth Court. See Tarantino, 351 A.2d at 248 (“As on every other occasion when this Court has reaffirmed the doctrine of sovereign immunity, depriving citizens of the Commonwealth of their day in court, I disagree.“) (joined by Nix & Manderino, JJ.). The previous year, Justice Roberts wrote in dissent that “the doctrine of sovereign immunity ought, in its entirety, to be consigned to the judicial scrapheap[.]” McCoy v. Commonwealth Liquor Control Bd., 326 A.2d 396, 397 (Pa. 1974); see also Sweigard v. Pennsylvania Dep‘t of Transp., 309 A.2d 374, 376 (Pa 1973) (“The majority again allows a judicially-created anachronism to deprive a litigant of his day in court.“) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (joined by Nix & Manderino, JJ.), Brown v. Commonwealth, 305 A.2d 868, 871 (Pa. 1973) (“[T]here is no rational reason why the majority could not and should not now judicially abrogate the doctrine of sovereign immunity in toto[.]“) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (joined by Nix & Manderino, JJ.), Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 301 A.2d 849, 854 (Pa. 1973) (“I believe that the language of the Constitution itself fails to provide any basis for the majority‘s assumption that in Pennsylvania [sovereign] immunity is constitutionally mandated.“) (Nix, J., dissenting) (joined by Roberts, J.).
In reaction, two months after Mayle was decided in 1978, the General Assembly enacted
§ 2310. Sovereign immunity reaffirmed; specific waiver
Pursuant to
section 11 of Article 1 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania , it is hereby declared to be the intent of the General Assembly that the Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity. When the General Assembly specifically waives sovereign immunity, a claim against the Commonwealth and its officials and employees shall be brought only in such manner and in such courts and in such cases as directed by the provisions ofTitle 42 (relating to judiciary and judicial procedure) or62 (relating to procurement) unless otherwise specifically authorized by statute.
Having reaffirmed sovereign immunity as a legislative preference, the General Assembly enacted the Sovereign Immunity Act in 1980 to define its application. The Sovereign Immunity Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
§ 8521. Sovereign immunity generally
(a) General rule.--Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no provision of this title shall constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity for the purpose of
(b) Federal courts.--Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal
§ 8522. Exceptions to sovereign immunity
(a) Liability imposed.--The General Assembly, pursuant to
(b) Acts which may impose liability.--The following acts by a Commonwealth party may result in the imposition of liability on the Commonwealth and the defense of sovereign immunity shall not be raised to claims for damages caused by:
(1) Vehicle liability.
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(2) Medical-professional liability.
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(3) Care, custody or control of personal property.
* * *
(4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and sidewalks.
* * *
(5) Potholes and other dangerous conditions.
* * *
(6) Care, custody or control of animals.
* * *
(7) Liquor store sales. --The sale of liquor at Pennsylvania liquor stores by employees of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board created by and operating under the
* * *
(9) Toxoids and vaccines.
* * *
(10) Sexual abuse.
* * *
Because
Similar to
As we later explained in Dorsey, “[a]t its core, ... Meyer eschewed a rote approach to determining immunity.” Dorsey, 96 A.3d at 341. In Dorsey, the administratrix of the decedent‘s estate sued the county register of wills and its surety, arguing that the register had improperly granted letters of administration to a third party without securing bonding as required under the PEF Code. Id. at 335. At issue in Dorsey was whether the 1980 Tort Claims Act immunized the Register of Wills from suit under
the enactment in 1980 of the Tort Claims Act was in response to our Court‘s abolition of the common law doctrines of governmental and sovereign immunity in the mid–1970s. Indeed, common law immunity was in full force and effect in 1970 when the liability provision for registers was enacted. It seems highly unlikely that, at the same time the General Assembly was codifying the preexisting immunity scheme which our Court abolished, the legislature also aimed to silently undermine a particularized form of liability protection of estate assets which was previously on the books and coexisted with common law immunity.
Id. at 342 (citations omitted).
The rationales of Meyer and Dorsey align with the Commonwealth Court‘s holdings below, best encapsulated in Log Cabin. Therein, the lower court explained that while the Sovereign Immunity Act superseded Mayle‘s abolition of sovereign immunity, it did not purport to create a wholly new sovereign immunity doctrine but had, instead, returned to the status quo that existed prior to Mayle. Under the common law framework in which
First, unlike tort actions, mandamus actions were never prohibited by sovereign immunity before or after the Sovereign Immunity Act. See Dombrowski v. City of Philadelphia, 245 A.2d 238, 241 (Pa. 1968) (observing that even before the Mandamus Act of 1893, “a private litigant” was permitted to “maintain a mandamus action to enforce a public duty when that plaintiff has an individual and beneficial interest in the litigation independent of that which is held by the public at large). Within that milieu, Section 16 of Mandamus Act of 1893, on which
We addressed damages under the Mandamus Act of 1893 in Langan v. School District of Pittston, 6 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1939), where a teacher “instituted mandamus proceedings to compel the school directors of the City of Pittston to restore her teaching contract.” Langan, 6 A.2d at 773. Although the school district asserted that the teacher could not recover damages because they were not pled in her mandamus complaint, this Court held that no such pleading was required because “of the peculiar nature of mandamus proceedings and the fact that until the writ issued damages would not be ascertained.” Langan, 6 A.2d at 774. We noted in Langan that the damages provision of the Mandamus Act of 1893 was “much the same as” those set forth in the Act of June 14, 1836, P.L. 621. Indeed, Section 24 of the Act of June 14, 1836 provided that when a writ of mandamus issued, the successful litigant “shall recover his damages and costs, in the
Second, the text of both
Nothing in the Sovereign Immunity Act undermines this understanding that it was intended to reinstitute the pre-Mayle contours of the doctrine rather than replace it. The Sovereign Immunity Act specifically references
Third,
Fourth, much like
Finally, we ascertain no other public policy consideration that would suggest that
Attorneys’ Fees
Finally, we address PLCB‘s assertion that Wine Vendors’ claim for attorneys’ fees are also barred by sovereign immunity. PLCB‘s argues this is because Wine Vendors’ claim for mandamus damages lacks legal justification, the claim for attorneys’ fees is also not cognizable. As we have determined that mandamus damages under
For the reasons set forth above, we hold PLCB is a “person” within the meaning of
Chief Justice Todd and Justices Dougherty, Wecht and Mundy join the opinion.
Justice Brobson did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
Notes
§ 1726. Establishment of taxable costs
(a) Standards for costs.--The governing authority shall prescribe by general rule the standards governing the imposition and taxation of costs, including the items which constitute taxable costs, the litigants who shall bear such costs, and the discretion vested in the courts to modify the amount and responsibility for costs in specific matters. All system and related personnel shall be bound by such general rules. In prescribing such general rules, the governing authority shall be guided by the following considerations, among others: (continued…)
§ 2503. Right of participants to receive counsel fees
The following participants shall be entitled to a reasonable counsel fee as part of the taxable costs of the matter:
* * * *
(6) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees as a sanction against another participant for violation of any general rule which expressly prescribes the award of counsel fees as a sanction for dilatory, obdurate or vexatious conduct during the pendency of any matter.
* * * *
(9) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees because the conduct of another party in commencing the matter or otherwise was arbitrary, vexatious or in bad faith.
§ 7540. Parties
(a) General rule.--When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, such municipality shall be made a party and shall be entitled to be heard.
Mayle, 388 A.2d at 710.The most popular theory of the origin of sovereign immunity of the American states is that it is a carryover from the English doctrine that “the King can do no wrong.” Although this maxim may originally have been a misstatement of the early English law, by the time of Henry III (mid-13th Century), it was settled feudal law that the King could not be sued in his own courts without his consent.