COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DEMETRIUS CARLOS COLEMAN
No. 19 WAP 2021
IN THE
DECIDED: NOVEMBER 23, 2022
[J-21-2022] [MO: Brobson, J.] Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered February 9, 2021
DISSENTING
JUSTICE WECHT
On November 24, 2016, Demetrius Coleman led police on a high-speed chase along Route 30 in Allegheny County. The chase ended in tragedy when Coleman—who was travelling at speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour, weaving in and out
Coleman was charged, and later convicted, of three counts of third-degree murder. Typically, a conviction for third-degree murder carries a maximum sentence of forty years.1 However, upon notice from the Commonwealth,
The question in this case is whether this anti-recidivist provision
When interpreting a
The first step required in any exercise in statutory interpretation is a consideration of whether the contested statutory term is ambiguous. This is because “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity,”7 the plain language controls, even if that language appears to be inconsistent with the General Assembly‘s intent. “[T]he letter of [the statutory language] is not to be disregarded under the
A “statute is ambiguous when there are at least two reasonable interpretations of the text.”9 Stated differently, when a statute can be read “in two different ways and the statutory language is reasonably capable of either construction, the language is ambiguous.”10 Here, the Majority finds the phrase “previously been convicted at any time” to be clear and unambiguous,”11 i.e., susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation. This conclusion is perplexing in view of the embedded redundancy within the statutory phrase. This redundancy gives rise, at a minimum, to substantial and reasonable dispute as to the meaning of this phrase.
It is not at all challenging to ascertain the common meaning or understanding of the two terms at the heart of the instant dispute. The first is the term “previously,” which indisputably refers to events that occurred at some earlier point in time. When a person says to another that “I have previously seen a medical specialist,” no one reasonably can dispute that the person‘s visit to the specialist happened at some point prior to the conversation. The phrase “at any time,” taken in isolation, similarly presents little definitional complexity. Taking the General Assembly at its words, “at any time” literally means at any point in time, including any that comes before, after, or simultaneous to, the reference point.
The Majority bypasses the patent redundancy that results when the two terms—“previously” and “at any time“—are used in the same phrase. Because “at any time” means “any point in time,” the phrase necessarily includes those things that have already occurred. In other words, “at any time” includes all those things that have happened “previously.” That means that, if the Majority‘s interpretation is the only reasonable one, the term “previously” is not only redundant; it also can be written out of the statute without any consequence to the Majority‘s understanding of the term. However, we are required under the Act to construe each statute in a manner that “give[s] effect to all its provisions.”12 We are not permitted to rewrite statutes, nor to interpret them in a way that eliminates one of the General Assembly‘s chosen terms, as the Majority does here.
The Majority concludes that “previously” and “at any time” can operate in the same statute without redundancy by ignoring the fact that the former term is entirely subsumed by the latter. The Majority correctly defines “previously” to refer to those events that have happened “before in time.”13 Then, the Majority ventures that the term “at any time” serves only to resolve any lingering doubts as to whether a simultaneous, or near-simultaneous, conviction also triggers the mandatory life sentence. When ascertaining whether a statute is ambiguous, we are required to give each contested term its plain meaning. Although the Majority does so with regard to “previously,” it loses its way
It is easy to see this redundancy. Indeed, it is unavoidable. Consider how the statute would change if the term “previously” is removed. It does not change at all. Every preceding murder that would be considered to have been committed “previously” would have to be considered by the sentencing court because that murder was committed “at any time.” By refusing to recognize the redundancy, and, hence, the ambiguity, the Majority renders the term “previously” nothing more that surplusage.
In another attempt to justify its misinterpretation, the Majority leans upon this Court‘s decision in Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 753 A.2d 807 (Pa. 2000),14 a decision wholly distinguishable and inapplicable here. In that case, the mandatory sentencing statute was triggered “if at the time of sentencing the defendant has been convicted of another drug trafficking offense.”15 The statute at issue in Vasquez did not contain the terms “previously” or “at any time.” Because our interpretive task here requires us to consider only the plain meaning of the terms used in the statute being challenged, and because the terms here do not appear in the statute challenged in Vasquez, that precedent has no application whatsoever in this case. We interpreted entirely different statutory terms. The apples to oranges comparison is entirely inapt in a plain language analysis.16 There is another compelling reason to reject the Majority‘s conclusion that no ambiguity exists within the terms of this statute: its interpretation conflicts directly with subsection (b) of
In that subsection, the General Assembly outlined precisely what must occur before a trial court is bound to apply the mandatory life sentence. In no uncertain terms, the General Assembly stated that “prior to imposing sentence on an offender under subsection (a),” the court “shall have a complete record of the previous convictions of the offender.”21 The Majority finds that Coleman had “previously” been convicted, even though this predicate murder occurred at the same time and was tried in the same proceeding as the murder for which the Commonwealth sought the life sentence. Yet, at the same time, the Majority finds inapplicable a provision that requires the court to have a complete record of the “previous convictions.” If, as the Majority deems it to be, Coleman‘s conviction in this case counts as “previous” for subsection (a), then it must also be “previous” for subsection (b). It cannot be any other way.
Needless to say, the Majority is forced to take this inconsistent approach because, otherwise, its preferred interpretation quickly collapses upon itself. Disregarding subsection (b) creates a logical and practical impossibility. A court cannot have a “complete record” of the “previous conviction” if that record is still being created. At the very minimum, a “complete record” would contain a final judgment of sentence. Here, however, Coleman was issued one consolidated judgment of sentence, and that order was being generated as sentencing progressed. The record was not, and could not have been, a “complete record” of the conviction for purposes of subsection (b).
There also is no support for the Majority‘s claim that subsection (b)‘s “complete record” requirement “includ[es] but [is] not limited to those outside of the particular
Seemingly recognizing that the ordinary understanding of the term “complete record” does not comport with its conclusion, and ignoring our obligation to assign terms their ordinary meaning, the Majority instead chooses to give the term an entirely new and more convenient meaning. For the first time ever, the term “complete record” now is said to require only a “finding of guilt.”24 To my knowledge, and according to my research, never before in Pennsylvania has the record in a case referred only to the jury‘s determination of guilt.25 When an appellate court requires
Every time that the enhancement is pursued, the General Assembly requires, at sentencing, the court to review “a complete record of the previous convictions.” That did not occur here, because it could not occur here. By holding steadfast to its conclusion that no ambiguity exists in this statute, the Majority effectively writes subsection (b) right out of the statute, despite its own recognition that we are required to interpret a statute by considering all of its provisions and how those provisions work together to complete a workable statutory scheme. Subsection (b) is an important, and mandatory, aspect of that scheme. Giving that section its due, it is clear that the Majority‘s interpretation cannot stand as the only reasonable one.
By giving full effect to the term “previously,” the statute also can be interpreted to require proof of a conviction from an entirely separate case, one involving different facts, a different trial, and a different judgment of sentence. There is also a third option. In its amicus brief, the Defender Association of Philadelphia argues that “at any time” refers not to when the prior conviction occurred in relation to the conviction for which the defendant is being sentenced, but instead refers to the remoteness (or lack thereof) of the previous conviction.27 In other words, “at any time” was meant by the General Assembly to preclude any claim that the prior conviction was too remote in time to be counted as the predicate murder for purposes of
In my view, the Majority‘s cursory analysis of the key statutory language does not suffice to tease out the ambiguity inherent in the phrase at issue. Because there are multiple, reasonable interpretations that can result from the common understandings of these terms, the term is ambiguous.
Where statutory or regulatory language is ambiguous, this Court may resolve the ambiguity by considering, inter alia, the following: the occasion and necessity for the statute or regulation; the circumstances under which it was enacted; the mischief to be remedied; the object to be attained; the former law, if any, including other statutes or regulations upon the same or similar subjects; the consequences of a particular interpretation; and administrative interpretations of such statute.28
As such, our interpretive goal shifts from implementation of plain language to discernment of legislative intent.
It is clear that the General Assembly aimed
The Majority‘s interpretation conflicts directly with the anti-recidivist philosophy of this provision. Instead of punishing repeat offenders as intended, the Majority construes the statute to apply to those third-degree murderers whose convictions occur all at once, and who have never had the opportunity to demonstrate that they will not reoffend. In Commonwealth v. Dickerson, we spoke to the dangers of misinterpreting anti-recidivist statutes in this way:
It was not intended that the heavier penalty prescribed for the commission of a second offense should descend upon anyone, except the incorrigible one, who after being reproved, “still hardeneth his neck.” If the heavier penalty prescribed for the second violation is visited upon the one who has not had the benefit of the reproof of a first conviction, then the purpose of the statute is lost.”31
We emphasized that the “point of sentence enhancement is to punish more severely offenders who have persevered in criminal activity despite the theoretically beneficial effects of penal discipline.”32 The Majority‘s interpretation allows courts to engage in nothing more than a counting exercise, tallying up the total number of convictions, but paying no mind whatsoever to the anti-recidivist intent of the statute.
The only interpretation that is consistent with that philosophy—and with the rule of lenity, which requires ambiguous penal statutes to be construed in favor of the accused,33—requires that the predicate murder conviction be separate and apart from the conviction upon which the defendant is being sentenced. That means that the two (or more) convictions must arise from a separate legal case that preceded the current one. No other interpretation comports with the provisions of the Act.
Because the Majority finds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.