William Maute appeals from the July 20, 1994 order dismissing this action based on application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and transfer this case to the Commonwealth Court.
Appellant instituted this action against the superintendent and other personnel in charge of the operation of the prison where he is incarcerated, the State Correctional Institution at Cresson, Pennsylvania. Defendant-appellees include Frederick Frank, individually and in his capacity as Superintendent of the facility; Sharon Stickler, individually and in her capacity as Unit Manager of D Block of the facility; Robert Booterbaugh, individually and in his capacity as Sergeant of the Guards of the facility; Rodger Palko, individually and in his capacity as a correctional officer of the facility; Donald Schreier, individually and in his capacity as Chaplain of the facility; and Robert Ramirez, individually and in his capacity as a correctional officer of the facility.
In the complaint, appellant alleges that he has been prevented from practicing his Native American religion in violation of his constitutional right of freedom of religion. Appellant requests both injunctive relief, specifically that appellees be restrained from continuing to prevent him from practicing his Native American religion, and monetary relief.
*403 This appeal followed dismissal of the entire complaint based on application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and on the trial court’s conclusion that appellant would not be able to amend his complaint to state a viable cause of action.
Appellant contends that appellees are denying him the right to use and carry “items” which he needs “to properly practice his Native American Religion and way of life” and to wear his hair of a length needed to properly practice the religion, in violation of the federal and state constitutions and of federal law applicable to Native Americans, Appellant’s brief at 4. He alleges that the items he wishes to carry or wear are neither illegal nor dangerous.
In light of these allegations, we believe that the trial court applied the doctrine of sovereign immunity too expansively in this action. To the extent that appellant seeks redress against appellees in their individual capacity and requests monetary damages against them individually, sovereign immunity does apply.
Borough of Jefferson v. Century III Associates,
60 Pa.Commw. 94,
Thus, this action also is one in the nature of mandamus.
Delaware River Port Authority v. Thornburgh,
Furthermore, since the complaint states a viable mandamus claim, we will treat that portion of the action as such, regardless of the fact that the complaint is not titled properly
*404
as one involving mandamus.
See Commonwealth ex rel. Saltzburg v. Fulcomer,
Actions in mandamus are not subject to the defense of sovereign immunity.
Madden v. Jeffes, supra,
85 Pa.Commw. 414,
The action may proceed on the mandamus claims.
1
Original jurisdiction over such actions lies in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania,
Madden v. Jeffes, supra,
85 Pa.Commw. 414,
Order reversed in part. Action transferred to the Commonwealth Court.
Notes
. We express no opinion as to the possible merits of appellant’s mandamus claims. Our decision rests solely upon the fact that the entire complaint improperly was dismissed based upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity.