MacFarlane v. MacFarlaneMacFarlane v. MacFarlane
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED
Marie Christine MacFarlane, pro se
29737 Schwartz Road
Westlake, Ohio 44145
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Thomas J. LaFond
Schneider, Smeltz, Ranney & LaFond
1111 Superior Avenue
Suite 1000
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court‘s decision. See
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Marie Christine Macfarlane (“wife“), appeals pro se the trial court order modifying child support payments she makes to plaintiff-appellee, William N. Macfarlane (“husband“). After reviewing the facts of the case and pertinent law, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
{¶ 2} Husband and wife divorced on July 11, 2005, after more than 14 years of marriage. The couple have four children. In the divorce proceedings, the court granted custody of the children to husband, and ordered wife to pay child support of $51 per month until January 2007. The court reasoned that minimal child support was appropriate to allow wife, who had not held a traditional job in over 14 years, “to get on her feet * * * support herself and contribute to the support of her children.” We affirmed the divorce judgment in Macfarlane v. Macfarlane, Cuyahoga App. No. 86835, 2006-Ohio-3155 (”Macfarlane I“).
{¶ 3} On January 10, 2007, husband filed a motion to modify child support. After a hearing, the magistrate madе the following findings: Husband‘s annual gross income was $103,500. Wife has a bachelor‘s degree in mechanical engineering, although she has not worked in that field since 1991. Wife was given an opportunity to update her education and seek employment; however, she failed to do this, claiming that her religious convictions obligated her to be a stay-at-home mom and home school her children. Based on these findings, the magistrate concluded that wife was voluntarily unemployed and imputed to her a
{¶ 4} Both parties filed objections to the magistrate‘s decision. Husband argued that a downward deviation in child support was inappropriate because “the disparity in the parties’ incomes is caused by [wife‘s] decisiоn not to work.” Wife, on the other hand, argued that her potential or imputed income should be closer to $20,000 annually, because her religious convictions allowed her to work part-time, at most, while still properly raising her children during scheduled visitation times.
{¶ 5} On September 12, 2007, the court overruled both parties’ objections, adopted the magistrate‘s decision, and granted husband‘s motion to modify child support, ordering wife to pay husband $323.85 per month.
{¶ 6} On May 14, 2008, wife filed a motion to modify child support due to a change in circumstances, asserting that husband‘s income had increased and her actual income was less than the income imputed to her by the court. On September 3, 2008, the court held a hearing. Evidence was presented that wife found part-time employment earning $28,200 annually. Additionally, husband testified that his annual gross income was $124,000. Using the basic child support worksheet, the magistrate calculated a monthly payment to husband of
{¶ 7} Both parties filed objections to this decision. Husband argued that it was unjust or inappropriate for the court to decrease wife‘s support obligation to the same amount it was in 2005, when she was newly divorced and unemployed. Husband further argued that wife has had three years to find full-time employment, yet she voluntarily chose to work only part-time. Husband requested that wife be ordered to pay increased child suppоrt “to help towards the extra expense of educating the four boys in private, Catholic schools.” Wife objected to the magistrate‘s decision for various reasons, ultimately requesting that husband be ordered to pay her child support.
{¶ 8} On February 9, 2009, the court sustained husband‘s objections, overruled wife‘s objections, and ordered the magistrate to issue an amended/supplemental decision.
{¶ 9} On February 19, 2009, the magistrate issued an amended decision, increasing wife‘s child support obligation to $460.70 рer month, based on “the standard that the four minor children attend private Catholic school, which both parties prefer over public school.” Husband and wife again filed objections. Husband argued that the amount should be higher to properly reflect wife‘s share of the private schooling cost. Wife objected for various reasons and again requested the court to order husband to pay her child support.
{¶ 10} On March 18, 2009, the court overruled both parties’ objections and adopted the magistrate‘s decision, ordering wife to pay husband $460.70 per month in child support. It is from this order that wife appeals, and raises six assignments of error for our review. We address assignments of error one and two together:
{¶ 11} “I. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it increased child support without sufficient factual findings supported by substantial evidence showing a change in circumstances meriting said increase; and when it disregarded both the magistrate‘s factual finding of a substantial disparity of incomе between the parents and his conclusion of law that the disparity should be minimized by lowering the amount of child support obligation of [wife].
{¶ 12} “II. The court was wrong as a matter of law and abused its discretion by ignoring statutory provisions for deviating from child support calculation considering the amount of time [wife] spends with her children, their needs, the parents’ relative financial resources, and the importance of maintaining for the children circumstances and a standard of living similar to that experienced before [husband] filed for divorce.”
{¶ 13} We first address our standard of review in the instant case. The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “[i]t is well established that a trial court‘s decision regarding child support obligations falls within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.” Pauly v. Pauly (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 386, 390, citing Booth v. Booth (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 142,
{¶ 14} Pursuant to
{¶ 15}
{¶ 16} If it is determined that the combined gross income of both parents is over $150,000,
{¶ 17} As evidenced by
{¶ 18} Although the court is not required to factor into its decision the deviation standards found in
{¶ 19} In the instant case, the combined gross income of husband and wife is $152,700,1 therefore, child support determinations fall under thе ambit of
{¶ 20} On objection, the court rejected this decision and required the magistrate to issue an amended decision.
{¶ 21} In the February 19, 2009 amended decision, the magistrate again used the basic child support computation worksheet to find that wife had an
{¶ 22} The only factor that the court took into consideration in ordering wife to pay $460.70 in child support was the “standard of living” that the children attend private school. Notably, what the court did not take into consideration was the disparity in income between husband and wife. The court found that husband‘s income was $124,000 and wife‘s income was $28,200. In other
{¶ 23} Although the court was not required to justify its decision under
{¶ 24} A central dispute between husband and wife, dating back to the original divorce proceedings, has been the issue of home sсhooling. In the July 11, 2005 divorce decree, which is 47 pages, the court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding home schooling: “[Wife], from the beginning of these discussions, was adamant that she did not want her children
{¶ 25} It seems unjust and inappropriate to require wife to pay for private schooling when enrolling the children in a traditional school, be it private or public, was clearly not her preference. Rather, the court ordered the children to be enrolled in a traditional school, and husband chose a private school involving
{¶ 26} Accordingly, the trial court erred in adopting the magistrate‘s decision, insomuch as that decision is inconsistent with the purpose of
{¶ 27} In wife‘s third assignment of error, she argues as follows:
{¶ 28} “III. The trial court erred as a matter of law when the magistrate asserted that the court was forbidden to order a residential parent to pay the non-residential parent child support.”
{¶ 29} This assignment of error is somewhat misleading as nowhere in the record does the magistrate “assert” that a residential pаrent is “forbidden” to pay child support. The magistrate noted that “the statutory child support scheme in no [way] contemplates a residential parent paying a non-residential parent child support, absent a spousal support set-off.” Furthermore, this Court has previously affirmed a child support award to a non-residential parent when the
{¶ 30} Accordingly, wife‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 31} Wife‘s fourth assignment of error states:
{¶ 32} “IV. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it failed to undertake an independent review оf objected matters; the court made no determination whether there was an error of law or other defect evident on the face of the magistrate‘s decision.”
{¶ 33} Because we found that the court abused its discretion in adopting the magistrate‘s decision, this assignment of error is moot. See
{¶ 34} Wife‘s fifth assignment of error states:
{¶ 35} “V. The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when, without good cause, it extended [husband‘s] time to file objections to [the] magistrate‘s Oct. 1, 2008 decision.”
{¶ 36} A trial court has broad discrеtion in determining whether to grant a motion for an extension of time and the court‘s decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Miller v. Lint (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 209, 213-14. In addition,
{¶ 37} In the instant case, husband filed a motion to extend time to file objections to the magistrate‘s decision on October 8, 2008, based on the availability of the transcript from the September 3, 2008 hearing. On October 16,
{¶ 38} Wife argues that additional time to obtain the transcripts does not qualify as “good cause” because a transcript is “irrelevant to filing objections.” On the contrary, objections to factual findings by a magistrate must “be supported by a transcript of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to that finding * * *.”
{¶ 39} In wife‘s sixth and final assignment of error, she argues as follows:
{¶ 40} “VI. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it prevented questioning of [husband] regarding his voluntary adherences [sic] to his religion (as shared parents and children) which included doctrines and teachings regarding both their obligations toward each other and their children.”
{¶ 41} Specifically, wife argues that there are “extraordinary obligations” that she and husband have toward their children based on their shared faith in the Catholic Church. She argues that these obligations are part of an ongoing
{¶ 42} At the September 3, 2008 hearing before the magistrate, wife attempted to establish, via testimony from husband, that as part of their family‘s religious convictions, she should not work outside the home. The magistrate ruled that evidence inadmissible, stating that generally, “matters of religious conviction are not something that this Court could inquire into.” The magistrate further noted that wife previously attempted to introduce religious issues into these proceedings, and the court previоusly ruled them inadmissible; thus, the court concluded that these issues were inadmissible in the instant case under the doctrines of res judicata and stare decisis. The standard of review for admissibility of evidence is abuse of discretion. See Peters v. Ohio State Lottery Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 296. While parents have the right to control the religious upbringing of their children, a parent‘s religious beliefs should not be a motivating factor in determining child custody issues. deLevie v. deLevie (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 531. Rather, child custody issues, similar to the child support issue central to this case, are based on what is in the best interests of the children. Put in other words, the Ninth District Court of Appeals of Ohio has held the following:
{¶ 43} “[W]hile the court may never engage in defining the contours of, or evaluating the merits of, religious doctrine, it ‘may consider the religious practice
{¶ 44} Wife argues that by excluding her husband‘s religious beliefs from the record, the court unconstitutionally restricts her right to the free exercise of religion. Wife cites various court cases to support her position. However, none of these cases are on point with the issue before us, as they involve the role of our nation‘s legal system in disputеs within or between various churches. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf (1979), 443 U.S. 595 (holding that, generally, courts have the authority to resolve church property disputes); State ex rel. Morrow v. Hill (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 74 (concerning a split within a church between a faction that remained aligned to the national organization and a faction that wished to disassociate itself from the national church); and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich (1976), 426 U.S. 696 (finding jurisdiction over a property and asset dispute between a church Diocese and a former Bishop).
{¶ 45} Furthermore, the law-of-the-case doctrine aрplies to this assignment of error. “The law of the case is a longstanding doctrine in Ohio jurisprudence.
{¶ 46} In Macfarlane I, supra, we held that “[a]ny claimed agreement resulting from the Catholic marriage ceremony” is barred by the statute of frauds, “which states that agreements ‘made upon considerаtion of marriage’ must be in writing to be enforceable” and that “absent evidence in the record that the trial court‘s custody decision was motivated by a conviction that either parent‘s religious belief was in the best interest of the child, a trial court‘s custody decision does not implicate the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or the Religious Freedom Provision of the Ohio Constitution.” Id. at ¶18 and 47.
{¶ 47} As the court‘s child support modification was a result of а subsequent proceeding at the trial level, the court was bound by the law of the case to rule evidence of the parties’ alleged religious obligations inadmissible. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion when it prevented wife from questioning husband regarding this issue, and wife‘s final assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellant and appellee share equally thе costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
JAMES J. SWEENEY, JUDGE
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., and FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR