{¶ 1} The single proposition of law before us states that an “intervening decision” by the Ohio Supreme Court “applies as an exception to the law of the case theory of practice and inferior courts are mandated to follow the Supreme Court’s decision.” This is, however, a longstanding statement of law. We have previously held that “[ajbsent extraordinary circumstances, such as an intervening decision by the Supreme Court, an inferior court has no discretion to disregard the mandate of a superior court in a prior appeal in the same case.” Nolan v. Nolan (1984),
{¶ 2} The parties do not contest this statement of law. The real dispute between the parties involves whether the decision of this court in Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis,
{¶ 3} Galatis created a change in the law that was inconsistent with the legal conclusion reached by the appellate court in this case. The appellate court below issued its decision in this matter two weeks after we issued Galatis but refused to reconsider its decision, stating that the law of the case precluded application of Galatis.
{¶ 4} Appellant, Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, contends that the appellate court was required to follow Galatis because it created an exception to
{¶ 5} For the reasons more fully explained below, we hold that Galatis is an intervening decision that created an exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine and that the court of appeals was obligated to follow Galatis in the case below. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the appellate court with instructions to apply Galatis and enter judgment in favor of appellant.
{¶ 6} In 1988, appellee, Jennifer Hopkins, then age 16, was injured when the bicycle she was riding was struck by a vehicle driven by Douglas Dyer. Nancy Hopkins, as mother and guardian of Jennifer Hopkins, settled with Dyer’s insurer for the $15,000 policy limits of his liability policy. She executed a release of claims against Dyer.
{¶ 7} On the date of the accident, Hopkins was a part-time employee at a fast food restaurant but was not acting within the course and scope of employment when she was injured. The restaurant had a comprehensive general liability insurance policy and a comprehensive catastrophic liability insurance policy issued by appellant, Lumbermens.
{¶ 8} In 2000, Jennifer Hopkins filed an action, Tuscarawas Common Pleas No. 2000 CV 07 0353, against Dyer and various insurance companies, not including Lumbermens, that asserted claims for underinsured motorist coverage pursuant to Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1999),
{¶ 9} The trial court awarded summary judgment to Lumbermens.
{¶ 10} The court of appeals reversed the judgment as to Lumbermens and remanded the cause to the trial court (“Hopkins /”). The appellate court concluded that Lumbermens had been obligated to offer UM7UIM coverage but failed to do so. Therefore, coverage arose by operation of law under former R.C.
{¶ 11} The court in Hopkins I remanded the cause for the trial court to decide issues of stacking, pro rata coverage, exposure, and other potential affirmative defenses that the trial court had not considered. The appellate court further stated that it would be premature to rule on whether Lumbermens suffered prejudice from the 11-year delay in notice of Hopkins’s claim, but instructed the lower court to follow Myers v. Safeco Ins. Co. (Feb. 18, 2000), Licking App. No. 99CA00083,
{¶ 12} Upon remand, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that Hopkins was insured under the Lumbermens policies and that both policies provided coverage by operation of law pursuant to Scott-Pontzer,
{¶ 13} The case was appealed for a second time. On November 17, 2003, the appellate court affirmed (“Hopkins II").
{¶ 14} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a discretionary appeal.
{¶ 15} The law of the case is a longstanding doctrine in Ohio jurisprudence. “[T]he doctrine provides that the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels.” Nolan v. Nolan,
{¶ 16} We recognized an exception to the doctrine of the law of the case in Jones v. Harmon (1930),
{¶ 17} Upon remand, the trial court in Jones complied with the appellate court’s mandate. In a second appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. However, prior to the second trial, this court issued an opinion that conflicted with the appellate court’s initial decision so that the jury instruction given at the retrial was erroneous. Although the trial court and court of appeals had dutifully adhered to the law of the case, we reversed, stating that “we are compelled to the conclusion that the trial judge was bound to take notice of the judgment of this court and to give the charge applicable under the latest decision of this court upon the facts presented at the second trial. Not to do so was reversible error, and the Court of Appeals was incorrect in affirming the judgment of the court below.” Id., 122 Ohio St. at 424,
{¶ 18} This case presents similar circumstances. Twelve days before the decision in Hopkins II, we decided Galatis,
{¶ 19} Hopkins admitted in her complaint that she was not within the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident. Therefore, as a matter of law, Hopkins does not qualify as an insured for purposes of UM/UIM coverage under her employer’s insurance policies. Galatis,
{¶ 20} Hopkins argues that Galatis should not apply because it does not conflict with Hopkins I. She contends that Hopkins I imposed underinsured motorist coverage by operation of law based on a policy issued to an individual while Galatis limited such coverage by interpreting the meaning of “you” within a corporate policy. However, when we applied Galatis to pending cases in this court, we did not distinguish the cases on any such basis. In re Uninsured & Underinsured Motorist Coverage Cases,
{¶ 21} Hopkins also argues that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies because the issue of insurance coverage was the subject of a final judgment, and res judicata bars reopening that judgment. She cites as authority Phung v. Waste Mgt., Inc. (1994),
{¶ 22} Res judicata is a substantive rule of law that applies to a final judgment, whereas the law-of-the-case doctrine is a rule of practice analogous to estoppel. Gohman v. St. Bernard (1924),
{¶ 23} Consequently, we hold that the decision in Galatis constituted extraordinary circumstances that created an exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine and that the court below was obligated to apply Galatis. We reverse the judgment of
Judgment reversed.
Notes
. This same appellate court acknowledged the intervening Galatis as an exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine and applied it to similar facts in a case decided a few months after the decision being appealed from here. Pillo v. Stricklin, Stark App. No. 2003CA00212,
. The trial court simultaneously entered judgment on behalf of other parties that also resulted in appeals. Because Lumbermens is the sole appellant in this matter, we limit the recitation of facts to matters that involve Lumbermens only.
. Myers was subsequently reversed on the authority of Davidson v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. (2001),
. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision to allow a setoff. That issue is not before us and is now moot.