Lewis v. Government of the District of ColumbiaLewis v. Government of the District of Columbia
Douglas Stuart Rosenbloom, Fernando Amarillas, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
REGGIE B. WALTON, United States District Judge
Kayla Dionne Lewis and Felton Hill, the named plaintiffs in this civil suit, bring this putative class action against the defendant, the District of Columbia (District or defendant), pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs assert the following in their Amended Complaint. Plaintiff Hill was detained on Tuesday, July 8, 2014, at about 1:10 [A.M.,] when he was arrested by the [Metropolitan Police Department] for suspicion of DUI (driving while impaired). Am. Compl. ¶ 56. Plaintiff Hill was taken before the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (Superior Court) for his presentment and a detention hearing later that same day, id. ¶ 57, supported by the submission of a Gerstein affidavit2 sеtting forth the factual basis for his arrest, id. ¶ 58. During that hearing, the Magistrate Judge noted that the affidavit‘s narrative at times identified plaintiff Hill as Mr. Ramsey. Def.‘s Mem., Exhibit (Ex.) H (Transcript of July 8, 2014 Superior Court of the District of Columbia Proceedings in the Matter of District of Columbia v. Hill (Hill Transcript)) at 4.3 Based on these inconsistencies, the Magistrate Judge continued the hearing until the next day so that the District could perfect the affidavit. Id. at 5; Am. Compl. ¶ 61.
The District then transported plaintiff Hill to the District of Columbia Jail, where he was subjected to a strip search as part of the intake process. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 62-63. The next day, Wednesday, July 9, 2014, the District returned plaintiff Hill to the Superior Court, id. ¶ 65, and the Magistrate Judge concluded that the District did not perfect the [G]erstein affidavit and ordered [plaintiff] Hill released, id. ¶¶ 66-67.
On Saturday, November 1, 2014, the Metropolitan Police Department arrested plaintiff Lewis for suspicion of DUI (driving while impaired). Id. ¶ 43. She was brought before the Superior Court for her presentment and a detention hearing on Monday, November 3, 2014, id. ¶ 44, supported by the submission of a Gerstein affidavit setting forth the factual basis for her arrest, id. ¶ 45. The Magistrate Judge who presided over the hearing noted that the Gerstein affidavit referred to plaintiff Lewis in some places as Ms. Jones, and in other places as Mr. Jones. Def.‘s Mem., Ex. G (Nov. 3, 2014 Superior Court for the District of Columbia Proceedings in the Matter of District of Columbia v. Lewis (Lewis Transcript)) at 3. As a result of thesе defects, the Magistrate Judge continued the detention hearing until Tuesday, November 4, 2014, to permit the District an opportunity to perfect the
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
III. ANALYSIS
A claim brought pursuant to
In assessing whether the plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint satisfies this second prong, [t]he court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged an affirmative link, such that a municipal policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Id. There are a number of ways a municipality can adopt a policy or custom that might create liability, Brown v. District of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008), including:
the explicit setting of a policy by the government that violates the Constitution; the action of a policy maker within the government; the adoption through a knowing failure to act by a policy maker of actions by his subordinates that are so consistent that they have become custom; or the failure of the government to respond to a need (for example, training of employees) in such a manner as to show deliberate indifference to the risk that not addressing the need will result in constitutional violations, Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306.
A. Claims Pertaining to the Length of the Plaintiffs’ Detentions (Claims I, II, and III)
The plaintiffs assert a number of claims against the District regarding the length of their detentions. First, they allege that the District violated the Fourth Amendment by continuing to detain them even after a judicial finding of no probable cause. Am. Compl. ¶ 69. Similarly, plaintiff Lewis alleges that the District violated the Fourth Amendment by holding [her for] more than [forty-eight] hours after [her] arrest without a finding of probable cause by a judicial officer. Id. ¶ 73. Lastly, both plaintiffs claim that [t]he District violated their Eighth Amendment rights by holding them without probable cause after the administrative steps incident to their arrest had been completed without holding a bail hearing. Id. ¶ 78.
While a policeman‘s on-the-scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justification for arresting a person suspected of crime, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1975), the Fourth Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, id. at 126. [A] jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within [forty-eight] hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein. Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). And where the arrested individual is detained for more than forty-eight hours without a judicial determination of probable cause, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. Id. at 57; see also Cherrington v. Skeeter, 344 F.3d 631, 644 (6th Cir. 2003) ([T]he undisputed record establishes a violation of Cty. of Riverside‘s [forty-eight]-hour rule, and [the] [d]efendants have failed to identify any emergency or other extraordinary circumstance that might take this case outside of the general rule.).
Under Gerstein, jurisdictions may choose to combine probable cause determinations with other pretrial proceedings, such as bail hearings and ar-
1. The Duration of Plaintiff Hill‘s Detention
Based on the foregoing state of the law, the first three claims as to plaintiff Hill do not pass muster. The Amended Complaint explains that he was arrested on July 8, 2014, Am. Compl. ¶ 56, and released the following day, id. ¶ 67. As Hill was released within forty-eight hours of his arrest, the District is immune from systemic challenges, and Hill carries the burden to prove that [his] probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably, such as for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay‘s sake. Riverside, 500 U.S. at 56. The only reason proffered by plaintiff Hill for the Court to find an unreasonable delay is that the judicial officer affirmatively concluded at his initial appearance that the government lacked probable cause to effect the arrest. Am. Compl. ¶ 60 (The judicial officer held that the Gerstein [affidavit] did not establish probable cause.). But plaintiff Hill‘s assertion is belied by thе transcript of that proceeding. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge presiding over his initial appearance received an oral request from the government to continue the hearing for [twenty-four] hours to perfect the Gerstein [affidavit], and granted the request, simply stating Okay, back tomorrow for Gerstein perfection. Def.‘s Mem., Ex. H (Hill Transcript) at 5. It is apparent
2. The Duration of Plaintiff Lewis‘s Detention
With respect to plaintiff Lewis, the District concedes that it held her for more than forty-eight hours without a judicial finding of probable cause, Def.‘s Mem. at 8 (Lewis‘s final probable cause determination, while greater thаn [forty-eight] hours, was reasonable under the circumstances.), and ultimately acknowledges that it was ordered to release Lewis after failing to submit evidence substantiating probable cause, id. at 12 (The government was unable to submit a corrected affidavit by the time the hearing was held on November 4, which resulted in Lewis‘s prompt release that same day.). As an initial matter, these concessions alone are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiff Lewis‘s claims pertaining to the length of her detention. E.g., Long v. Gaines, 167 F. Supp. 2d 75, 82 (D.D.C. 2001) (concluding that plaintiffs clearly state[d] a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to
First, the District argues that Lewis was arrested on Saturday evening and there are no adult arraignments on Sundays in D.C. Superior Court. Def.‘s Mem. at 8. While it is true that Riverside contemplated circumstances under which it would be permissible for a judicial determination or bail heаring to take place outside of a forty-eight hour period, the justification must rise to the level of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. Riverside, 500 U.S. at 57. And Riverside made clear that intervening weekends and holidays do not excuse a failure to observe Riverside‘s requirements of promptness. Riverside, 500 U.S. at 57 (intervening weekends do not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance).
Second, the District claims that Lewis‘s detention was lawful pursuant to
order the detention of a person charged with an offense for a period of not more than [five] days ... if the judicial officer determines that the person charged with an offense ... [w]as at the time the offense was committed, on ... [r]elease pending trial for a felony or misdemeanor ... under local, state, or federal law.
Third, the District asserts that the probable cause hearings comported with Rule 5 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs initial court proceedings following an arrest in the District, and therefore plaintiff Lewis‘s detention was lawful. Def.‘s Mem. at 11-13. Rule 5 does not specify how soon an arrestee must first appear before a judicial officer, but does require the District to take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the Court.
Finally, the District contends that even if plaintiff Lewis‘s detention amounted to a constitutional deprivation, her first three claims must be dismissed because she has failed to allege a custom, policy, or practice on the part of the District that caused the purported violations. Def.‘s Mem. at 21-22. But the Magistrate Judge presiding over Lewis‘s initial hearing indicated to the contrary. In denying the request of defense counsel that Lewis be released while the government sought to pеrfect its Gerstein affidavit, the Magistrate Judge responded: If [the District] ask[s] for the [twenty-four] hours, they get it .... I‘ve read the statute, been here five years, been trained and .... [t]he bottom line is they get the [twenty-four] hours. Def.‘s Mem., Ex. G (Lewis Transcript) at 3-4. [E]ven a single decision by [municipal policymakers] unquestionably constitutes an act of official government policy. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). While it is unclear what particular statute or training the Magistrate Judge was referencing during the hearing, the Court must afford the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged, Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276, and thus, finds plaintiff Lewis‘s allegations sufficient to survive the defendant‘s motion to dismiss, cf. Barnes v. District of Columbia, 793 F. Supp. 2d 260, 282 (D.D.C. 2011) (Overdetentions caused by the Distriсt‘s ordinance are clearly constitutional violations executed in accordance with District policy officially adopted and promulgated by the Council.). The defendant having failed to present any persuasive arguments to find otherwise, the Court must deny the defendant‘s motion with respect to plaintiff Lewis‘s first three claims.
B. The Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment Claim (Claim IV)
The Amended Complaint asserts that the District violated the Fifth Amendment by denying a bail hearing to arrestees like [the plaintiffs] who contest probable cause after a judicial officer has made a finding of no probable cause[,] but granting a bail hearing to arrestees who concede probable cause after a judicial officer has mаde a finding of no probable [cause]. Am. Compl. ¶ 82. The District has moved to dismiss this claim, contending that it fails to establish a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the circumstances of the plaintiffs’ detentions do not amount to punishment, Def.‘s Mem. at 17-18 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538-39 (1979)), and fails to state a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because they have not alleged that the decision-makers in their particular cases
The plaintiffs’ opposition fails to address any of the District‘s arguments with respect to their Fifth Amendment claim. Accordingly, the Court will treat the District‘s arguments as conceded and dismiss this claim. See Lewis v. District оf Columbia, No. 10-5275, 2011 WL 321711, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 2, 2011) (It is well understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded. (citation omitted)).
C. The Plaintiffs’ Claims Pertaining to Blanket Strip Searches (Claim V)
The plaintiffs’ final claim alleges that the defendant violated their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by subject-ing them to blanket strip[]searches at the [District of Columbia] Jail after presentment. Am. Compl. ¶ 84. Historically, the Supreme Court has recognized [t]he difficulties of operating a detention center and explained that a regulation impinging on an inmate‘s constitutional rights must bе upheld ‘if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’ Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1515 (2012) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987)). In its seminal case on Fourth Amendment challenges to strip search detention policies, the Court acknowledged that:
A detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious security dangers. Smuggling of money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband is all too common an occurrence. And inmate attempts to secrete these items into the facility by concealing them in body cavities are documented in this record ... and in other cases.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. The Court went on to articulate the framework for analyzing such challenges as follows:
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.
Id. Subsequently, in Florence, the Supreme Court ruled that security imperatives involved in jail supervision override the assertion that some detainees must be exempt from the more invasive search procedures at issue absent reasonable suspicion of a concealed weapon or other contraband. Florence, 566 U.S. 318, 132 S. Ct. at 1518. Thus, every detainee who will be admitted to the general population [of a jail] may be required to undergo a close visual inspection while undressed. Id. at 1513.
The Justices who composed the majority in Florence did not agree with all aspects of the majority opinion: Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court with Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Alito joining in full, and Justice Thomas joining the opinion except with respect to Part IV. Id. at 1510. Part IV limited Florence‘s holding, explaining that there may be circumstances in which such search policies could be unreasonable. Id. at 1522-23. Part IV noted that the facts of Florence did not require the Court to consider situations
the Court does not hold that it is always reasonable to conduct a full strip search of an arrestee whose detention has not been reviewed by a judicial officer and who could be held in available facilities apart from the general population. Most of those arrested for minor offenses are not dangerous, and most are released from custody prior to or at the time of their initial appearance before a magistrate. In some cases, the charges are dropped. In others, arrestees are released either on their own recognizance or on minimal bail. In the end, few are sentenced to incarceration. For these persons, admission to the general jail population, with the concomitant humiliation of a strip search, may not be reasonable, particularly if an alternative procedure is feasible.
Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Breyer issued a dissent in Florence, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, wherein he reasoned that:
a search of an individual arrested for a minor offense that does not involve drugs or violence—say a traffic offense, a regulatory offense, an essentially civil matter, or any other such misdemeanor—is an unreasonable searc[h] forbidden by the Fourth Amendment, unless prison authorities have reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual possesses drugs or other contraband.
Id. at 1525 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
One member of this Circuit has afforded particular weight to the exceptions articulated in Florence, remarking that six Justices of the Supreme Court have expressed unease with the type of indiscriminate strip searching ... that is challenged here. Johnson v. District of Columbia, 734 F.3d 1194, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Rogers, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (challenge to District of Columbia Superior Court cellblock‘s policy of subjecting all incoming detainees to strip search, including pre-presentment arrestees charged with nonviolent, non-drug offenses). In the present case, the plaintiffs allege that the judicial officer hаd made a
The Third Circuit has also relied on Part IV of Florence to distinguish circumstances where the challenged strip search involves physical contact with the detainee. See Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep‘t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 231 (3d Cir. 2015). As that Circuit explained,
the strip searches in Florence involved only the visual inspection of detainees’ body cavities, and there [we]re no allegations that the detainees ... were tоuched in any way as part of the searches. Indeed, in response to an amici‘s concerns about instances of officers engaging in intentional humiliation and other abusive practices, the Court recognized that there may be legitimate concerns about the invasiveness of searches that involve the touching of detainees. Thus, Florence does not govern here.
Id. (quoting Florence, 566 U.S. 318, 132 S. Ct. at 1515, 1523 (Part IV)); see also Florence, 566 U.S. 318, 132 S. Ct. at 1514 (Apparently without touching the detainees, an officer looked at their ears, nose, mouth, hair, scalp, fingers, hands, arms, armpits, and other body openings.); id. at 1515 (There are no allegations that the detainees here were touched in any way as part of the searches.). And here, the plaintiffs аllege that after a detainee takes all his clothes off during the strip search, [t]he guards rifle the hair, pull the ears back, and then open the mouth wide and lift the corners with their hands so that the guard can see left or right in the mouth. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-38.
For these reasons, the Court disagrees with the District‘s contentions that Florence requires dismissal of the plaintiff‘s allegations. Indeed, Bell instructs the Court to avoid mechanical application of Fourth Amendment challenges to detainee strip searches, and requires a balancing of the parties’ respective interests [i]n each case. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. Thus, the plaintiffs should at least be afforded an opportunity to engage in factual discovery in оrder to demonstrate that the District‘s specific response to the situation is exaggerated. See Florence, 566 U.S. 318, 132 S. Ct. at 1518. This comports with the jurisprudence of this Court; as Judge Royce Lamberth has observed, courts have declined to dismiss claims based on blanket strip search policies, whether or not the detention is justified. Barnes v. District of Columbia, 242 F.R.D. 113, 119 (D.D.C. 2007) (denying motion filed pursuant to
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that it must grant in part and deny in part the defendant‘s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, claims I, II, and III
SO ORDERED this 27th day of June, 2016.10
REGGIE B. WALTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE