History
  • No items yet
midpage
Tyler v. United States
705 A.2d 270
D.C.
1997
Check Treatment

*1 criteria, of which and breach we deem law, of -discretion as matter of Appellant, abuse TYLER, Mark E. thereby philosophical oxymoron creating a

by savaging notions of discre- traditional tionary STATES, powers. Appellee. UNITED Id. at 1049. No. 95-CO-183. Judge quotes approvingly, Aldisert id. Appeals. District of Columbia Court premier from “America’s federal expert,” Wright, Alan who courts Charles En Argued Banc June reversed,

wrote, “Every time a trial 23, 1997. Sept. Decided appel- every is reiterated that time belief qualified trial courts are better than late justice

judges requires, decide what public in the litigants

confidence of and impaired.

trial court will be further Under system, or our trial feasible conceivable the last in the always

courts must word eases,” Judge goes

great bulk of and Aldisert respected cite the much academic-ob-

on to

server, Rosenberg, Professor Maurice who forth, reasons, among ap-

has set other to trial courts in the

pellate courts defer during trial

exercise discretion superiority posi- her] of his nether [or It is not knows more [or she]

tion. and sis- [brothers

than his loftier [or her]

ters]; judge] more rather trial sees [the dialogue senses In the between

and more. appellate judges judge, You saying:

the former seem to be often not think would

were there. We do we did, you what but we were not

have done signifi- be unaware of we matters, record not ade-

cant for the does convey at the

quately to us all that went on Therefore, you.

trial. defer

Id. at 1049.

Accordingly, majority’s I from the dissent of artificial stan- in the instant case

creation imposition of them and criteria and

dards clearly more

upon the trial saw majority sensed than does the more majori- I think that the

upon a cold record. of liti-

ty’s impairs the confidence decision all to public in the

gants community.

the detriment *2 Gottesdiener, Service,

Eli Public Defender Klein, with whom James Public Defender Service, appellant. the brief for was on Trosman, Elizabeth Assistant United Holder, Attorney, States with whom Erie H. Jr., Attorney, R. United States and John Fisher, Spagnoletti, J. and Robert Assistant brief, Attorneys, United States were on the appellee. WAGNER, Judge, Before Chief FERREN, TERRY, STEADMAN, FARRELL, SCHWELB, KING, RUIZ REID, Judges. Associate RUIZ, hearing, the Judge: gov- At the Associate ernment relied on the indictment estab- presents ques us with the This lishing probable cause that committed tion District Columbia Bail the offenses of which was indicted. (1996), Act, pro Reform D.C.Code 28-1322 offered further evidence of *3 person sought pre vides to a be detained underlying turned, charged the offenses and present right challeng trial the evidence instead, Tyler to offer evidence that was government’s ing charged the of evidence the dangerous and should be detained because of government offense. The contends that once prior for his convictions similar offenses grand a has cause suffi jury found against young girls and the fact that he was indictment, cient to the return probation prior on on the convictions the right charged present has no evidence the charged time of offenses.4 charged concerning the offense unless the The trial court first ruled that once the government relying itself on circumstances probable cause —in had shown surrounding charged the offense as a reason case, through the this indictment —and had that, for detention. We hold not proffered any of not additional evidence the by withstanding the return of an indictment dangerous- underlying charges to establish grand jury, express provisions the ness, Tyler challenge govern- not could 23-1322(e)(l) entitle a charged ment’s evidence of the offenses. Al- charged awith crime to evidence subsequently the trial court altered “nature about the and circumstances of position a so its and allowed continuance that weight “the offense” and evidence Tyler subpoena could witnesses conduct against” purpose pro him or her for charged into investigation further of- viding information that the court must fenses, eventually the trial court returned to making consider in an individualized determi original ruling requesting after further its nation should be parties. briefing on the issue from both In a pretrial. February order written dated trial court concluded that the deten- I. Facts the Case presen- hearing “the tion would limited to presented Tyler Mark on of evidence on the issue of defendant’s was arrested tation showing may January dangerousness, a warrant on on a one- but not be through a complaint knowledge relating count carnal made weak- government requested preven- minor.1 The ness of case.” pursuant expressed tive to D.C.Code 23- concern that a de- 1322(b), February for used hearing hearing and a was set tention not be date, 7,1997.2 days hearing underlying trial on or as Five “as a indictment potential getting discovery for from grand jury against a an indictment a method returned minor, permitted charging Tyler was Tyler for his conduct with a witnesses.” presented he knowledge him with one count of carnal evidence relevant whether community,5 was sodomy.3 danger to the he one count of but application approved possession was to distribute. 1. The a warrant cocaine intent addition, Attorney’s Tyler States December been twice in the United office on had arrested Tyler 1994. It was reviewed and issued warrant late 1980’s for child sexual abuse. was on January on The warrant probation 1995. for the four convictions of carnal days was executed 10 later. knowledge at time he arrested on the was underlying charge in this case. Tyler right his to have the detention 2. waived presentment. held within three 5.Tyler explained employed, and that he is was a Department who officer had former Corrections charge sodomy 3. The was dismissed two months discharge Army. from the an honorable received later, request government, because at the argued evidence that he that there He in the had misunderstood the detective was unable to control himself from what he complainant's description of the incident. passing preferential fancy” young ‘‘a termed girls, that been Tyler prior attempted and that the fact he had sen- had four convictions of probation prior attempted with his knowledge and tenced to in connection carnal a conviction of permitted to proffered, Tyler guilty plea, introduce evidence he formed had entered witnesses, through testimony argue Ty- that the continues to complainant charges appeal had fabricated the ler’s should be dismissed as moot. against Thus, him.6 Tyler’s The trial court ordered that consider first whether pretrial, be detained concluding guilty plea and conviction renders this there was convincing non-justiciable. clear and evidence of dangerousness grounds: on alternative A case moot if is considered charges “based on which been expectation “there is no reasonable conjunction indicted in prior with these con- alleged violation ... will recur and interim solely prior victions” and based on his convic- completely relief or events have and irrevoca (“frankly, tions without even consideration of bly eradicated the effects of the violation.” ... talking we’re about an Morris, In re 482 A2d *4 very period individual within a short of time Davis, (quoting County Angeles Los convictions”). who has five 625, 631, 1379, 1383, U.S. 59 L.Ed.2d Tyler promptly appealed the trial court’s (1979)) (internal quotation marks and detention summary order and moved for re- omitted). citations There is doubt that 5, 1995, May versal. On this court denied Tyler if prevail even were to on the merits of for summary motion reversal and af- appeal, impact his the result would have no appeal, on firmed order with one dissent. him longer on in this case because he is no 8,1995, May On three before the sched- being pretrial, serving detained but is date, Tyler plea uled trial guilty entered a imposed guilty sentence as a result of his enticing a minor child under D.C.Code However, plea. apply we do not a strict rule 22-4110; government agreed to dis- mootness dismiss a case because it no charge miss the knowledge. indicted of carnal longer particular appellant, affects if it 18, 1995, July Tyler On was sentenced to a presents importance likely a matter of that is split twenty sentence of years, months to five recur, yet respect evade review with suspended with year, execution of all but a similarly Lynch others situated. v. United and a trial court recommendation for work States, 580, (D.C.1989); contra, 557 A.2d halfway-house release in program. The Hunt, 478, 482, 102 Murphy v. S.Ct. placed Tyler trial court also probation on 1181, 1183-84, (1982). Spe L.Ed.2d 353 years, five with the first six months under cifically as arising pre concerns issues from supervision, including intensive reporting, detention, notwithstanding the defen employment, continued participation in treat- right expedited dant’s consideration ment for his prob- alcohol abuse and sexual reversal, way of a summary motion for we requirement lems and a that he not be alone recognized altogether probable have that it is young girls.

with period during that the limited which a may be pretrial expire could granted Tyler’s

We petition for rehearing appeal an is heard on the merits. See Unit 12, 1996, en banc on March and vacated our Edwards, ed States v. 430 A.2d 1324 n. May order of affirming the trial (D.C.1981) (en bane). particularly That is court’s order of detention. case, so where the was first II. Mootness denied a motions division of the but granted Even petition we subsequently the full court to hear decided for rehearing en banc after we were in- the matter en banc.7 Tyler; complainant convictions indicated that he had not been con- and that the said had danger community. sidered a bring charge she would a false of sexual miscon- against Tyler’s duct another man who lived in Tyler proffered

6. that he had several witnesses apartment building because he had her a called questions who would raise serious about the "bitch.” complainant's Specifically, Tyler truthfulness. proffered complainant By argument Ty- had told her cous- the time this court heard on engaged Tyler; summary in that she had not in sex with ler’s motion for reversal and issued its complainant previously opinion affirming der, that the proffered had said to the the trial court’s detention or- already witnesses that she wanted sex had been in detention banc, specific By deciding considering the case Before stat to hear en pause utory language, we to consider the that the case raises an issue of have indicated initially A matter in context. comes R. “exceptional importance.” D.C.App. justice system as a within the criminal result 40(e)(2). Tyler’s This is not limited to issue arrest, Typ of an cause.8 based case; rule, applied per se ically, upon complaint pre arrest criminal considering statutory require- without The Fifth Amendment re cedes indictment. every apply case of ments d quires “trie that a -can 23-1322(b). under presentment [felony] only on a or indictment government dissenting opinion ar- The jury.” Wooley a grand v. United precise sequence gue events (D.C;1997) (quoting 697 A.2d U.S. Tyler’s unlikely unusual and to recur. Const, V). jury A grand amend. recurrence, however, The likelihood of represents independent assessment government more within the control of the representatives community, in a albeit than the deter- defendant. context, proba that there non-adversarial presentment timing mines the of the ble the defendant committed a grand jury case to the and the return specified offense. See v. Man United States indictment, specifically, whether indictment dujano, preventive occurs before or after a (1976).' grand 48 L.Ed.2d 212 hearing. also determines *5 jury’s probable cause suffi determination exclusively on rely prior whether it will crim- proceed government to cient to authorize prove dangerousness. inal conduct to This prosecution charge with its of the indicted appellate process, that the demonstrates to answer require and to delay, may not with its inherent be effective indictment, Notwithstanding charge at trial. prevent be- prolonged to detention however, to be a defendant continues entitled appellate there can en banc review of fore be presumption to until innocence presented Finally, the issue here. this unless the meets its burden of briefing by have full case we the benefit of beyond proof guilt a reasonable doubt. Attorney’s the U.S. Office and the Public 358, 363, Winship, See 90 In re 397 U.S. Service, represent Defender who interests 1068, 1072, (1970); 25 368 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. will to in fu- continue be controverted Jury Criminal Instructions for the District of Therefore, we that we ture cases. conclude (4th ed.1993). Columbia, No. 2.08 Punish appeal. consider should and decide may imposed ment for crime not be unless first meets that burden. See Right III. The Present Evidence 520, 16, Wolfish, Bell 441 535 m 99 U.S. Challenging an Indicted Offense at (1979). 16, 1861, 1872 447 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 60 Hearing a Detention Pretrial recognized Supreme The has Court now turn to the raised We compelling governmental that the interests right, appeal: whether a defendant has the at ensuring appearance a defendant’s trial hearing, present at a detention safety may justify preventive and community challenging evi- cases, evidence Thus, pre in appropriate detention. dence that or she committed an indicted constitutionally permissi trial is a detention temporary offense. We hold that defendant does regulatory provide ble vehicle right, provided plain such period during person with a 1992, Reform even language the Bail Act serious crime (4) 23-1322(d)(3) (e)(2). person’s guilt has not been established D.C.Code begin evaluation that there is 90 and was scheduled to officer’s on-the-scene for over States, days. probable person v. United. 601 in six See McClain that the has believe 80, (D.C.1992). 83 Pugh, A.2d a crime. See Gerstein v. 420 committed 113-14, 854, 862-63, 103, 43 U.S. person may sup- on a 8. A be arrested warrant (1975); California, 374 U.S. L.Ed.2d 54 23, Ker v. Const, ported by cause. U.S. amend. 1623, (1963). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 726 83 IQ 96, 223, IV; Ohio, S.Ct. Beck v. 379 U.S. 85 (1964), 13 or based on an L.Ed.2d 142

275 (citing States v. A.2d beyond a reasonable doubt. United 581-82).9 Salerno, 739, 748-50, 107 The Lynch, 557 A.2d at supra, S.Ct. (1987). determination, however, Because the L.Ed.2d 697 can be trial court’s stake, charged person’s liberty interest is at hearing “pursuant only made after however, process (d)” due requires substantive provision subsection of D.C.Code procedural safeguards. Id. at standards § 23-1322. 2101; S.Ct. at Stack v. see also 23-1322(d) perti- provides 1, 6,

Boyle, 342 U.S. L.Ed. 3 part: nent (1951) (“To infer from the fact of (2) hearing, person has the At unusually high alone a need for bail in an and, if represented by right to counsel an meet] amount cannot [that rep- financially adequate unable to obtain act.”). arbitrary Supreme Court resentation, appointed. to have counsel Act, determined federal Bail Reform (3) oppor- person shall be an afforded (1994), based on U.S.C. which is testify.... tunity to District statute of the Columbia, oppor- pro satisfies due shall be constitutional afforded Salerno, witnesses, requirements. supra, tunity cess to cross-exam- 751-52, 107 at appear hearing, S.Ct. at 2103-04. who ine witnesses at the or proffer and to information comprehen- The District of Columbia has a concerning otherwise. The rules admissi- statutory permits pretrial sive scheme that bility criminal trials do subject certain individuals presentation apply to the and consideration express procedural safeguards. D.C.Code hearing. of information (1996). §§ Generally, to -1325 23-1321 liberty pre- is entitled to remain at that the trial con- The matters court must upon person’s promise appear sider at are also in the set out appear- trial or execution of an unsecured statute: *6 ance in an bond amount set the trial (e) shall, in judicial The officer determin- judicial “unless the officer determines ing there are conditions of release reasonably that the release will not assure reasonably appearance that assure the will appearance the person required of the or as person required safety as 'of of the and the endanger safety any person will the of other any person community, and the take other 23-1321(b). community.” or § the D.C.Code into account information available concern- determination, In the absence of that the ing: person trial court must release the under the (1) the The nature and circumstances of least designed restrictive conditions to en- charged, including of- offense whether the person’s appearance sure the at and the crime of dangerous fense is a violence or safety persons of other community. and the § these terms are in 23- crime as defined 23-1321(e)(l). § only if D.C.Code It there 1331, justice or involves obstruction of as probable cause to believe that the defen- 22-722; §in defined dant has committed certain identified serious (2) weight of the against The the evidence determines, “by crimes and court person; evidence,” convincing clear and of that set history and characteristics of the The of release will appearance conditions ensure including: person, person required safety of the as or the of (A) persons character, community, physical other and the that and person’s may condition, ties, pretrial family trial court employment, order detention. mental 23-1322(b); resources, § in length D.C.Code of Scott v. United financial residence trial, presumption pending 9. The creates a or or statute rebuttable while armed while on release reasonably of no set conditions will assure engaged attempts justice. violent to obstruct any person safety of the ty other and the communi- 23-1322(c); § § D.C.Code D.C.Code 23-1325 judicial if officer "substantial finds (first armed). degree while That murder rebutta- probability” person charged that the has commit- presumption did not ble arise this case. specified dangerous ted crimes certain or violent ties, community, past solely on fact of the indictment-and community con- based duct, history drug history. or relating prior alcohol his criminal abuse, history, record con- criminal and argument unpersuaded are We cerning appearance proceedings; court at permit that to evi and [govern ‘¿weightof the challenging dence (B) Whether, at the time of current evidence” there been an ment’s] where arrest, proba- person was on offense or challenging the is tantamount indictment tion, parole, pending or on other release itself, of indictment contravention estab trial, sentencing, appeal, completion or case law that an indictment lished conclusive local, state, sentence for offense under probable ly determines the existence cause law; or federal and See, Scott, e.g.,. purposes detention. (4) The nature and of the dan- seriousness (citing supra, 633 Gerstein v. A.2d at community any person ger to or the Pugh, 420 U.S. 117 n. posed by person’s would be release. (1975)).- argu This L.Ed.2d 23-1322(e).10 D.C.Code the-, statutory misses thrust of ment precise presented by ignores plain language scheme and is whether at which Here, statute. relied Tyler was ordered to be detained upon by the trial court as “conclusive requirements of D.C.Code 23- satisfied Ty “probable cause” that determination” 1322(d) (e). that it did We conclude offenses, ler had committed the permitted, pursuant was not because requirements two that must be met first of proffer,11 “to witnesses” that his detained, pretrial.12 explored would have the “nature and circum probable requirement is constitu charged” and stances of the offense chal tional, cause a probable for without “weight against” lenged the trial, even be over for much may not bound him, plain expressly provided by the or guilt before his her less detained statutory language. meaning Gerstein, supra, proven at trial. 1322(d)(4) (e)(1) (2). 23— (holding 95 S.Ct. at 868-69 expressly provides The statute “a fair reli requires Fourth Amendment “shall, determining whether there able determination of cause as reasonably conditions of release that will are any significant condition restraint person as re appearance assure the liberty, must and this determination safety and the other quired *7 judicial made a officer either before or community, the take into account infor and arrest”). promptly after concerning” such mation available matters. statute, however, imposes 23-1322(e) added). The additional (emphasis § D.C.Code process due requirements, consistent with court This the trial did not do. trial considerations, may person a be de “prefer[red] before expressed the that it court view an prived liberty pretrial of extended anything ... not to know about case” probable Tyler pretrial period time. Once the baseline ordered to be detained of and plea guilty, disposition Tyler’s we hearing, of trial of our and 10. If the after the determines certify convincing Tyler’s no set deny clear and evidence that of the sealed as moot motion charged of release will assure the conditions documents to this court. appearance safety person’s of other at trial or charged per- community, persons or the then the may do the trial attach 12.We not hold that case, may pretrial. be detained In such trial son evidentiary jury’s significance grand expedited, must be and be commenced within cause; infirmity finding of of the person date was first detained of the ruling respect danger 'of judge’s to the issue with 23-1322(h). Upon § after arrest. D.C.Code jury’s finding grand was to ousness make shown, may allow good court an the trial Tyler dispositive on committed the days. period up of of additional detention offense, offering charged first without him Id. challenge evi opportunity to proffered Tyler requested he that the evidence dence. 11. light possible appeal. on be sealed for review concerning speci cause determination has been made a assessment of information or, here, judicial supplied by officer pertain charged, fied items that to the crime jury indictment, grand statute does not history person, of the and characteristics “probable use the term cause” at all. Rath may posed danger and the to others er, being much because more than held an Here, person if the is released. for a swerable crime at trial at stake at a prior criminal Tyler’s court considered histo pretrial hearing, detention the statute re ry danger and the his demonstrated quires convincing “clear and of the evidence” proclivities might pose to sexual the com expressed “no standard that condition or plainant youngsters in the commu and other reasonably will combination conditions as nity if he released. But were to be appearance sure of the as re flatly Tyler’s prof court consider refused to quired, safety any and the other concerning fered evidence “nature and community.” § and D.C.Code 23- charged circumstances” of the offenses and 1322(b)(2); Lynch, supra, 557 A.2d at cf. “weight against” him.14 evidence (requiring convincing clear and expressly required Consideration of both dangerousness charged by the statute the trial court not did first-degree may murder detained disregard have discretion to them.15 See limit).13 pretrial, prescribed without a time Salerno, 742, 107 supra, at at statutory increasingly scheme creates 2098-99. heightened elaborate mechanisms and stan attempt not We do dictate as the person’s liberty dards is re § trial courts the details of how 23-1322 strained, resulting, ultimately, de hearings managed. are to be As with statutory tention. The language scheme and other situation re clear that where court make the trial court’s determina quired hearing, to hold a it is within the trial convincing tion that there is “clear and evi dangerousness ap court’s justifying pretrial dence” sound discretion determine the propriate scope evidentiary to be based on an extent individualized express statutory language requiring presumption statutory the different that exists convincing superseded "clear evidence” has under District not at issue law is in this case. Second, open Lynch, supra, left A.2d in Williams the did not focus requires express requirements as to whether Salerno clear statute concern- convincing dangerousness ing evidence of as a trial court factors that the must take into Act, process person may matter of due before a account under the federal Bail Reform 23-1322(b). 3142(g), essentially § under U.S.C. are the same law, as under Columbia District of Therefore, 23-1322(e). may even we 14. The trial court relied on United States v. persuasive interpretation find court’s federal Williams, (D.D.C.1992) F.Supp. law, District of Columbia or of similar federal proposition could evi- do not read statement Williams’ that a defendant charges. dence about the indicted Williams is not, hearing, at a "launch First, inapposite. dealt Williams with the defen- generalized attack on the indictment” as that attempt presumption dant’s to defeat a rebuttable judgment statutory court’s considered on the is- dangerousness federal under the Bail Reform arising sue under District Columbia law that Act, 3142(e), 18 U.S.C. in cases where there is *8 we address in this case. that cause to believe the defendant punishable by committed a narcotics a offense argues imprisonment years maximum term of of ten or that the trial 15.The Tyler’s proffered Id. at 35. more. The trial court refused to allow could decide not to hear evi- complainant’s testimony the defendant to of the dence that the attack the conclusiveness was establishing probable indictment as the fabrication "irrelevant" because the as trial statutory any particularities purpose raising pre- of the rebuttable did not of the consider present charged evaluating Tyler’s dangerous- sumption, but allowed the defendant to offense in ness, supported by proba- rebutting presumption danger- other than that was evidence the of it noted, however, option Id. at ble cause. was not the ousness. 36. The court That available to terms, court; statute, extraordinary "in trial its that circumstances which are the defines what evaluating dangerousness, present may develop here the ei- is relevant in includ- not defendant testimony ing circumstances” the ther extrinsic evidence or that the de- the "nature and of charged "weight was crime or offense and of the evidence fendant not connected with the the the against” person. simply charged 23- was as it relates to the D.C.Code in error 1322(e). supra Id. at 36 at note him.” n. 1. As noted cross-examination, light I. presentations and in proffer made court’s pre- to general procedures applicable developed the of the evidence assessment hearings forth in ventive detention are set efficiency hearing. judicial of Considerations 23~1322(d) (1996).2 Subsection pretrial' against permitting caution deten- (3) provision that states that the defendant to turn into a trial of indict- hearing tion the opportunity testify. to shall be afforded discovery. ed or a means of offense Cf. alia, that provides, inter he Subsection Gerstein, supra, 420 at 122 present opportunity to shall be afforded an the at 867 n. 23. clear mandate of in witnesses. There is no restriction Section statute, however, permit does not the 1322(d) as respect with to issues to completely forego to consider- court either 23— may testify or defendant specific ation of the items which the statute account, statutory I discern no prohibit into or to witnesses. therefore requires be taken procedural position using from that basis for pro- safeguards expressly that presentation exculpatory statute must evidence vides.16 dangerousness to the issue of confined go question defendant’s may not appeal from an order of detention On we. guilt offense. or innocence supported pro- if “is affirm the order sup- not ceedings If so below. the order To construe the statute may ported, the court remand case for fly in of com- the face does seems me hearing, further or .... order the dangerous how mon sense. No matter 23-1324(b). Because released.” D.C.Code . be, may many no how defendant and matter Tyler’s pretrial not did committed, previous may crimes he statutory comport requirements, the tri- surely preventively detained if he cannot be “supported” al court’s is not detention order proof important the most evidence all— In proceedings. light required collapses. Sup- probably that he “did it”-— plea, we Tyler’s subsequent guilty do not beyond per- pose establish that could release, Tyler’s but remand the case or order in Papua that or Peru or adventure vacate the detention order. It prison when crime was committed. ordered. So exculpatory inconceivable to me such may excluded. Yet the trial evidence SCHWELB, Judge, Associate with whom detention, Tyler’s judge, ordering stated FERREN, joins, Judge, Associate “prefer[red] any- ... not to know that she concurring: case,” ruling thing about and her thus join judgment pleased I am question relevant excluded evidence opinion separately, court. I write preventive detention was warranted. however, emphasize point not addressed right my opinion, In the defendant’s opinion, namely, Tyler’s Judge Ruiz’ that he did not commit the his right present exculpatory evidence at charged crime fundamental there indepen- is so preventive hearing exists august canons of dangerousness1 should be need invoke dently appar- statutory Since others any way to that issue. construction. is not restricted appear disposition court as light defendant not re- of our based on the 16. statutory express comply with quired. court’s failure to Tyler's requirements, argu- we do address rights as a was entitled to the same ment that he 23-1322(e) sets forth the consider- Section process. *9 Saler- matter no, constitutional due See judge’s applicable determination ations to supra, at S.Ct. 2101- 481 U.S. at conditions, preventive there are short (Ferren, J., 04; Lynch, supra, at 584-87 557 A.2d detention, reasonably safety that assure will dissenting part); concurring part in Ed- in and appear- community and the defendant’s wards, supra, 430 A.2d at 1333-39. entirely Judge agree Ruiz' ance in court. I with provision. discussion this dangerousness, using the word I include 1. In community danger danger both ently however, disagree, I right testify note Chief Justice has a and call witnesses and apt liberty in which his Rehnquist’s fundamental interests are reminder that our soci- “[i]n directly at stake. ety, norm, liberty prior is the and detention carefully

to trial is the exception.” limited If a defendant who did not commit the Salerno, 739, 755, United States v. 481 U.S. detained, preventively subsequent crime is 2095, 2105, (1987); 95 L.Ed.2d 697 finding give that he innocent cannot him Covington see also spent United in A.2d back the time detention. He must Salerno). given opportunity therefore be (quoting show his innocence before a detention order is Preventive detention statutes restrict lib- entered. citizen, erty of the they strictly must be

construed to ensure that defendants are not II. detained without bond “unless the lawmaker Judge King judges join and the who him clearly they has said that should [be].” persuasive proposition make a case for the Bass, 336, 348, United States v. precise presented situation here 515, 523, (1971) (cita- S.Ct. 30 L.Ed.2d 488 frequently. does not arise I do not think omitted). 23-1322(d) tions Section contains showing, however, that it follows from that provision clearly precluding the defendant appeal should dismissed as moot. presenting type from exculpatory evi- view, my position by govern- taken judge excluded, dence that the trial and the adopted by ment and has government’s position contrary prin- implications go beyond partic- that well these ciple enunciated Bass. judge’s ular facts. The trial order Moreover, construed, statutes should be if case, panel affirmed aby divided of this reasonably possible, to avoid doubt as to court, contrary principle to the basic their constitutionality. Umana v. Swidler & preventively no defendant Berlin, Chartered, (D.C. being A.2d 723-24 without given opportunity first 1995). try to possible interpre- “[A]s between two show that he did not commit the crime with which he has statute, charged. tations of been If we were one of it which would moot, to dismiss the govern- valid, be unconstitutional and the other one, position my ment’s fallacious plain our duty adopt is to that one which will —a viable, view—would remain govern- and the save the act. Even to avoid a serious doubt again ment could invoke it in the future. the rule is the same.” NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin circumstances, Corp., In most we should decide (1937) (citations omitted). no more than Judge we have to decide. As L.Ed. 893 out, however, points preventive Ruiz deten- interpretation 23-1322(d)(3) An of Section necessarily tion cases such as this one move which would restrict fast, they tend evade review. An from presenting evidence that he did not appellate rarely preven- court can decide would, commit the least, offense very tive controversy detention issue while the raise serious questions, constitutional and we I agree Judge still live. therefore with Ruiz reject should therefore such a construction. that, discretion, in the exercise of our that, contends because should decide the merits of the case rather grand jury probable found cause that dismissing Tyler’s appeal. than offense, committed the I am reinforced that view the fact preventive detention hearing should con- banc, ago go that we voted some time en cern itself with evidence that the defendant proceeded and that we have now to consider did not it.” “do Like I disagree. parties contentions of the on the merits Tyler had no opportunity to be heard before (as mootness). respect well as Both grand jury. finding represented by sides are excellent counsel. following was made a non-adversarial Notwithstanding Tyler’s guilty plea, the Pub- proceeding in which the defendant could not every lic Defender Service has incentive to present exculpatory evidence. Such a deter- argue vigorously posi- on behalf of his initial mination cannot control disposition of an fought tion. The hard as adversarial in which the defendant well.

280 Supp.), court has the en bane decided argument that we should not decide per panel on the merits was in its most a motions

this case reverse a decision prior to posture our vote on suasive days became moot three after that decision petition rehearing en at that for banc. Even the defendant entered a was issued when time, grant majority of the court voted to plea pur- guilty was thereafter detained proceed petition. Now that the case has statutory provision. suant a different incongru I point, this think it would be ed to has chosen this course even en banc court step backwards and to rule on ous to decline it reverses was an un- the decision I agree issue. with Chief the substantive precedential published no val- judgment with Rehnquist that “once this court Justice Moreover, beyond ue this case.1 because case, a consideration of a an ex undertaken for judgment on cross-motions was decided ception principle is war [the mootness] affirmance/reversal, summary language Doe, Honig v. 484 ranted.” U.S. judgment cryptic is so contained in the 592, 609, 98 686 L.Ed.2d pressed is hard uninformative that one accord, Melton, (concurring opinion); re law, if any, was exactly discern what rule banc). (D.C.1991) (en 892, 908 n. 32 597 A.2d laid down.2 here, where, especially true as This is has had the benefit of a first-rate ad court said, en- Finally, as I defendant presentation. versarial guilty three after the plea tered carry If we the doctrine of mootness too judgment entered the division. Once was area, particular re- far this then effective guilty he was pled defendant curtailing liberty of orders fundamental view (1996 23-1325(b) § pursuant to D.C.Code irretrievably impaired. I interests will be Repl.). the order Therefore join rejecting gov- therefore the court' 23-1322(b), pursuant § which was the or- position that we dismiss the ernment’s should division, by the motions der affirmed appeal as moot. longer in effect. KING, Judge, Associate with whom undisputed It mat essentially is this TERRY Judges STEADMAN Associate in the federal courts be ter would moot join, dissenting: expectation that cause there is no reasonable subjected to the same defendant will appeal In this order of detention Hunt, 23-1322(b) (1997 Murphy v. 455 U.S. pursuant again. to D.C.Code See action doing directly, namely, to IX D District of Court of he is barred from 1. See Rule Columbia Procedures; Appeals Operating supporting Internal D.C. Ct. challenge the indict the evidence Pearson, 94, 28(h); States, 72, App 98 n. 8 R. In re 628 A.2d 633 73 Scott v. United A.2d ment. 1993) (D.C. ("unpublished ... cannot be decision (D.C. 1993); v. see Lawn United States 355 precedent”); Scott v. District Co invoked 311, 317-18, 339, 2 321] L.Ed.2d 349 S.Ct [78 lumbia, 319, ("u npu 493 A.2d 322 5 States, (1958); v. Costello United [trial] not be decisions cited blished 397] 100 L.Ed. [76 counsel"); Angarano see also v. court United States, (1956); Coppedge v. United (D.C.1974) (en banc) States, 329 A.2d 79, 82-83, U.S.App.D.C. F.2d 131- ruling ("perfunctory on motion ... could Williams, (1962); v. United States might be and did not bind future divisions which (D.D.C.1992). It is F.Supp. therefore motions.”) to decide similar asked appellant’s motion for sum- ORDERED that stated; mary It is reversal is denied. point division's order on this 2. The appellee's mo ORDERED that FURTHER for oral This matter came the court granted summary be tion affirmance is summary appellant’s argument on motion "supported trial court cause the order summary appellee's motion for reversal 23-1324(b) proceedings below.” D.C.Code The court concludes that affirmance. States, (19 89); v. see Ireland United sufficiently weight of the considered "the [defendant],” (D.C.1979). against It A.2d 23-1322(e)(2) (1994 Supp.), when it took and ADJUDGEDthat ORDERED FURTHER indictment, is, be, the existence of the into account hereby and it AF- the order on * * * conclusively probable cause. established FIRMED. seeking to court further concludes that in (D.C. filed 95-CO-183 No. United case, strength contest appellant 5, 1995). May attempting indirectly what do *11 1181, 1188-84, be said in this case. tions. The same cannot 71 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. (1982). be said in the case Although we are not bound Id. at 82. It also cannot gener precedent, mootness we do not federal before the court here. by those ally stray from the course set out respect, the chance of recurrence With compelling there is a rea authorities unless First, is slim. presented here the events example, although For we have son to do so. only arise where deten these circumstances

previously question addressed the of moot 23-1322(b).3 § sought pursuant tion is appeals pretrial in deten ness a number of Second, only recur events would the identical the defendant had either tion orders where cases where an indict infrequent in those during pleaded guilty guilty or been found hearing. the detention ment is issued before appeal, exer pendency we have Moreover, repeat would the circumstances of a our discretion “to reach the merits cised only rarer instances where in those even controversy”, seemingly moot McClain v. is so extensive criminal record defendant’s States, 601 A.2d United court will be able to determine that the trial (citation omitted), only two occasions. dangerousness without consideration “seemingly we In both moot” cases where pending charges. In its brief the facts of the important reached the merits we decided an court, the en banc every pretrial issue that affected future de only that it was aware of two other informs applicable tention case under the statute. instances and in neither case did the such Edwards, example, in For United States v. evid defendant seek to additional (D.C.1981) (en banc), 430 A.2d 1321 cert. Further, so as can be deter ence.4 far denied, mined, precise circumstances of this case (1982), L.Ed.2d 141 we the constitu decided this court or have never been before either tionality pursuant appellant does not claim 23-1322(a)(l) (1973), prede § sum, In has become otherwise.. provision ap cessor of the one under which appellant’s plea guilty moot virtue of pellant originally in here was detained. And that the same and there little likelihood (D.C. Lynch v. United 557 A.2d 580 circumstances will recur. Therefore 1989) (en banc), upon we were called to de by declining to should exercise our discretion proof applied cide what burden of dispute presents decide the merits of a which dangerousness determination for de very need close and difficult 23-1325(a) pursuant tention to D.C.Code not, stated, for the reasons be decided either (1988 Supp.), persons charged with first by any of the court. en banc or division short, degree murder. we exercised our discretion and reached the merits those every

cases because our decision affected detention case would arise respective

the future under the McClain,

provisions. supra, As we said in underlying

where we declined decide affecting only circumstances

issue under cases,

small number of we reached the merits Lynch

in Edwards and because both cases overarching important to the

“involved issues

resolution of an entire class of future deten 23-1325(a), 23-1322(b) 1,410 pursuant cases in cal- For detention was ordered probability there is a year court must find substantial endar 1996. If the correct committed offense. only where the its estimate of two other cases Therefore, in this case circumstances nearly duplicated, the circumstances here were pursuant could not arise for determination in less number such instances would occur that section. pretrial detention than of the cases where 0.2% 23-1322(b) pursuant sought. §to provided by the Ser- 4. Statistical data Pretrial pursuant Agency vices shows that detention

Case Details

Case Name: Tyler v. United States
Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Date Published: Sep 23, 1997
Citation: 705 A.2d 270
Docket Number: 95-CO-183
Court Abbreviation: D.C.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.