KEVIN YOUNGER v. TYRONE CROWDER
No. 21-6422
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
August 24, 2023
Argued: October 25, 2022
Before RICHARDSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and Sherri A. LYDON, United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Rushing and Judge Lydon joined.
ARGUED: Robert A. Scott, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Allen Eisner Honick, FURMAN HONICK LAW, Owings Mills, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General, Ann M. Sheridan, Assistant Attorney General, Justin E. Fine, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. David Daneman, WHITEFORD, TAYLOR & PRESTON, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge:
Kevin Younger was brutally beaten by three Maryland corrections officers because they believed he had taken part in an assault on another officer. He sued their warden, Tyrone Crowder, along with the officers who attackеd him and their direct supervisors. A federal jury awarded Younger $700,000.
Crowder appeals. He argues that this case should never have proceeded to trial because Younger failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before suing. He also believes the district court should have found that the evidence failed to support the jury‘s verdict and that he was entitled to qualified immunity. We reject his arguments and affirm the district court. Younger was not required to exhaust because no administrative remedies were available,
I. Background
Younger was a pretrial detainee at Maryland Reception Diagnostic and Classification Center. Officer Alade Ganiyu wоrked at the Center. One day, in 2013, he was supervising inmates when one began acting insubordinate. Officer Ganiyu tried to handcuff him, but several other inmates came to his aid by restraining and beating Officer Ganiyu. The assault ended only when other officers arrived to break up the scrum. Officer Ganiyu suffered severe injuries, leading to an ambulance ride to the hospital. He identified Younger as one of his assailants.1 So Younger was placed in administrative segregation away from the Center‘s general population.
Word spread fast about the incident. Crowder learned of it that day. By the next morning, new officers starting their shift were told the news. This included Officers Richard Hanna, Jemiah Green, and Kwasi Ramsey. Those three officers got the names and locations of the inmatеs allegedly involved in the assault.2 They proceeded to the Center‘s armory, picked up handcuffs and pepper spray, and then marched throughout the Center brutally attacking each alleged assailant.
The officers’ assaults were vicious. Younger‘s lasted about four minutes. He testified that the officers entered his cell, threw him off the top bunk, and began striking him with handcuffs and kicking him. They slammed his head into the side of the toilet. And they left him lying in a pool of blood on his cell‘s floor. When a medical alert for Younger came over the radio, the same attacking officers responded. They escorted Younger to the medical unit, ordering him to explain his injuries by writing “I fell off my bunk” on the medical report.
Crowder learned about the attack on Younger the day it happened. Department standards of conduct required him to inform the Intelligence and Investigative Division within two hours of learning of the incident.3 But he did not do so until the following evening. The Intelligence and Investigative Division investigated the assaults, ultimately issuing a report criticizing Crowder‘s handling of Officer Ganiyu‘s assault and its retaliatory fallout.
Younger, for his part, attempted to file administrative grievances about the attack. It is unclear exactly how many grievances Younger filed. But we know that he started Maryland‘s inmate grievance process about two months after the incident. That process has three levels. Younger engaged the first level by filing a request for administrative remedy with the warden. He also appealed to the final level, the Inmate Grievance Office. But it does not appear that Younger sought relief at the intermediate level, from the Commissioner of Corrections, as the Inmate Grievance Office dismissed his grievance for failing to appeal to the Commissioner.
II. Discussion
Crowder challenges the district court‘s denial of his post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. He first argues that Younger‘s suit is barred because Younger did not exhaust his administrative remedies. He also claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury‘s verdict and that, in any event, he was entitled to qualified immunity. We first address Crowder‘s exhaustion argument, then his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and finally his claim for qualified immunity.5 Each of Crowder‘s arguments fails.
A. Exhaustion
We first address whether Younger was required to exhaust his administrative remedies before suing. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires prisoners to exhaust all “available” administrative remedies before filing a
Before we address the merits of this argument, we must consider whether Crowder preserved it for appeal.6 Crowder raised Younger‘s purported failure to exhaust at summary judgment and on appeal, but not in a motion for judgment as a matter of law under
Though the Supreme Court expressly declined to answer this question in Dupree, it did provide us with some guidance. It explained that a purely legal issue is one that “can be resolved without reference to any disputed facts.” Id.; see also id. at 1390 (“[A] purely legal question is, by definition, one whose answer is independent of disputed facts . . . .“). While every case won‘t be this easy,7 we can resolve this case based solely on the Court‘s guidance in Dupree.
The district court rejected Crowder‘s exhaustion argument “without reference to any disputed facts.” Dupree, 143 S. Ct. at 1389. How do we know? It told us. When it denied Crowder‘s motion for summary judgment, it said: “The Court need not resolve disputes concerning Younger‘s adherence to the [administrative] process.” J.A. 460. The disputes the district court was referring to were factual disputes about whether Younger properly filed grievances and proceeded through every step of Maryland‘s system for administrative remedies. Cf. U.S. Bank Nat‘l Ass‘n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 960, 966 (2018) (explaining that factual disputes turn on “questions of who did what, when or where, how or why“).
Instead, the district court denied summary judgment because it held that administrative remedies are unavailable when the Intelligence and Investigative Division is investigating the incident underlying an inmate‘s grievance. J.A. 460. This holding is a legal conclusion, “independent of disputed facts.” Dupree, 143 S. Ct. at 1390. After all, neither party disputes that the Division investigated the attack on Younger. Thus, the district court‘s resolution of Crowder‘s exhaustion argument presents a purely legal issue under Dupree.
Considering an alternate route that the district court could have taken makes this clearer. In response to Crowder‘s motion for summary judgment, Younger argued, among other things, that administrative remedies were unavailable because prison
In essence, a straightforward reading of Dupree and the district court‘s opinion show that the district court‘s resolution of Crowder‘s exhaustion argument presents a purely legal issue. As a result, Crowder was not required to re-raise this issue in a Rule 50 motion to preserve it for appeal.9
Turning to the merits, we disagree with Crowder. An inmate need only exhaust administrative remedies that are “available.”
Understanding why requires familiarity with Maryland‘s scheme for administrative remedies in its prisons. Maryland has a three-step process for reviewing inmate grievances.
The first two steps of the process are known as the Administrative Remedy Procedure.10 An inmate initiates the Administrative Remedy Prоcedure by filing a request for administrative remedy with the warden.
Crowder‘s argument is simple. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires “proper” exhaustion, which “demands compliance with an agency‘s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83, 90–91 (2006). Younger‘s grievance was rejected by the Inmate Grievance Office on procedural grounds: The Office dismissed Younger‘s grievance because he improperly failed to appeal the denial of his request to the Commissioner of Corrections. Thus, Crowder argues, Younger cannot be said to have “properly” exhausted and so his federal claim is barred.
Yet Crowder‘s argument overlooks a critical word: available. The Act only requires an inmate to exhaust “available” remedies.
They were not. Under Maryland law, an inmate cannot successfully file an administrative grievance over an event that is the subject of an Intelligence and Investigative Division investigation. If they do, that grievance will automatically be dismissed as procedurally deficient. See
It is true that, in some cases, the Office has granted relief to inmates whose grievances were dismissed because of an Intelligence and Investigative Division investigation. Indeed, another inmate who was also attacked by these guards in retaliation for the assault on Officer Ganiyu had his grievance heard by the Office and was awarded $5,000. But to even get to the Office, that inmate had to make two frivolous filings: one to the warden that was procedurally barred and one to the Commissioner
Accordingly, when there is an Intelligence and Investigative Division investigation into an officer‘s use of force, Maryland‘s scheme for administrative remedies is unavailable. See id. When the underlying decision to dismiss a grievance as procedurally barred is rock solid, an inmate need not seek additional review of that decision in the hope that the reviewing bodies will act contrary to law. The Prison Litigation Reform Act dоes not require that inmates tilt at windmills before they can access federal court. It only requires exhausting available remedies. Because no remedies were available to Younger, the exhaustion requirement does not bar his suit.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Crowder next argues there was insufficient evidence to support the jury‘s verdict. But his argument runs headlong into the highly deferential standard of review with which we view sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges. See Burgess v. Goldstein, 997 F.3d 541, 549 (4th Cir. 2021). Keeping that standard in mind, we must reject Crowder‘s challenge, as there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Crowder violated Younger‘s Fourteenth Amendment rights.
“A court may award judgment as a matter of law only if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party.” Saunders v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 526 F.3d 142, 147 (4th Cir. 2008). Sо we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, Younger, drawing “every legitimate inference” in his favor. Id. And we will uphold the jury‘s verdict unless “the only conclusion a reasonable jury could have reached is one in favor of the moving party.” Id. (emphasis added).
The jury sided with Younger, deciding that Crowder was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk Younger would be harmed in violation of Younger‘s Fourteenth Amendment rights.11 This means they found that Crowder consciously disregarded a serious risk that Younger would be beaten by officers in retaliation for his purported role in the attack on Officer Ganiyu.12 See Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373–74, 376 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that a warden is deliberately indifferent for failing to act despite knowing of serious risk that officers would physically retaliate against inmates by beating them and spraying them with high-pressure fire hoses). To set aside that verdiсt, Crowder must show that “no rational trier of fact” could agree with it. United States v. Mallory, 988 F.3d 730, 736 (4th Cir. 2021) (“We can set aside the verdict only if ‘no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.‘” (quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011))).
Deliberate-indifference claims have both an objective and subjective element. Moss v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 624 (4th Cir. 2021). Younger must first show that he was exposed to an objectively “substantial risk of serious harm.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). He must then show that Crowder “subjectively recognized” and ignored this risk. See Moss, 19 F.4th at 624.
The evidence reflects that Younger‘s injuries qualify as objectively “serious harm.” When Younger was brought to the medical unit at the Center, he had a gash on his head and was “incoherent” from the pain. He received stitches for the head wound, spent several months receiving physical therapy, and ultimately required surgery on his right knee. We‘ve hеld that similar evidence demonstrates “serious harm” for the objective element of a deliberate indifference claim. See Odom v. S.C. Dep‘t of Corr., 349 F.3d 765, 769–70 (4th Cir. 2003).13 So Younger‘s injuries were objectively serious.
And a reasonable jury could conclude there was a “substantial risk” that this “serious harm” would occur. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (“substantial risk of serious harm“). There is ample evidence that guards at the Center often physically retaliated against inmates. Officer Hanna testified that the Center was a “fighting institution” and that he had “seen officers go hand to hand with inmates, pop a cell and actually go and fight inmates.” He supported this claim with multiple examples. J.A. 1080 (another officer had Officer Hanna watch as he beat an inmate); J.A. 1079 (Officer Hanna broke an inmate‘s
A reasonable jury could thus conclude that Younger faced a substantial risk that he would be seriously harmed by officers after Officer Ganiyu identified Younger as one of his assailants. Indeed, we held in Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984), that similar evidence established a substantial risk of harm. In Slakan, an inmate sued a warden and other prison officials after he was beaten and sprayed with a firehose in retaliation for slapping a guard on the shoulder. Id. at 371. The inmate put forth testimony of a guard that the practice of spraying inmates with firehoses “was widespread among the guards and seldom questioned by supervisors.” Id. at 374. Other evidence corroborated the guard‘s testimony. Id. at 373–74. We concluded that this was sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of harm. See id. So, just as in Slakan, the objective element of Younger‘s deliberate indifference claim is satisfied here.
But a substantial risk of serious harm, standing alone, isn‘t enough to prevail. The record also must establish that Crowder had actual knowledge of this risk and that Crowder acted inappropriately despite that knowledge. See Koon v. North Carolina, 50 F.4th 398, 406 (4th Cir. 2022). This knowledge can be established by circumstantial evidence, id. at 407, such as when the risk of an attack was “longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past” and “the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842–43. In such a case, a reasonable jury could infer that the defendant-official had actual knowledge because he “must have known” about risk of attack. See id.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Younger, a reasonable jury could conclude that Crowder “must have known” it was likely that Younger would be attacked. See id. The risk of officer assaults on inmates was “expressly noted by prison officials in the past” and brought to Crowder‘s attention. See id. Several individuals testified at trial that they warned Crowder about the specific officers who assaulted Younger. J.A. 687–88, 690 (Assistant Warden Fisher warned Crowder that Officers Green and Ramsey were appearing in use of force reports concerningly often); J.A. 781–83 (Captain Pere told Crowder that Officers Green and Ramsey needed additional use of force training); J.A. 526 (former warden Hinton warned Crowder that Officer Green was “trouble“). And Crowder reviewed all the use of force reports, over 90% of which involved Officers Green and Ramsey in the year predating the attack on Younger. As Younger‘s expert, Donald Leach, testified, this was an “early warning sign[]” for Crowder. Seе J.A. 1138. In light of this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that Crowder had actual knowledge of the risk that Younger would be assaulted in retaliation for his role in the attack on
A reasonable jury could have also concluded that Crowder was deliberately indifferent to this risk. Good-faith efforts to address a known risk can prevent a finding of deliberate indifference. Koon, 50 F.4th at 407. But Crowder made no effort at all to prevent the attack on Younger.15 He did not transfer the inmates involved in the assault on Officer Ganiyu, despite an unwritten policy authorizing transfers in such situations. He failed to make clear to his subordinates that retaliation would not be tolerated, or to order that the inmates were not to be touched. See Slakan, 737 F.2d at 376 (highlighting “the need to provide clear guidance to frontline personnel on the permissible uses of force against defenseless inmates“); J.A. 1160 (testimony from Leach that a warden must make clear to line staff that “retaliation on any level was not going to be tolerated“). The bottom line is that the record, when viewed most favorably to Younger, establishes that Crowder did not try to mitigate the known risk to Younger‘s safety.
To recap, when the evidence is viewed most favorably to Younger, it establishes that there was a substantial risk that officers would beat Younger in retaliation for his role in the attack on Officer Ganiyu. The evidence also establishes that Crowder must have known about this risk, and─despite that knowledge—did nothing to prevent the retaliatory attack from occurring. That is delibеrate indifference, and so there was a legally sufficient basis to support the jury‘s verdict.16 See Saunders, 526 F.3d at 147; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.
C. Qualified Immunity
Crowder‘s final argument is that even if he was deliberately indifferent, he is still entitled to qualified immunity. We reject this argument, as it was clearly established in 2013 that a warden with Crowder‘s knowledge, who did what Crowder did-i.e., nothing—is deliberately indifferent in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.17
Qualified immunity “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.‘” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). “To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct.‘” Cannon v. Vill. of Bald Head Island, 891 F.3d 489, 497 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)).
A right is clearly established if existing precedent has placed the constitutional question beyond debate.18 Mays, 992 F.3d at 301.
Here, the qualified immunity questiоn turns on the clearly established prong. The jury concluded that Crowder violated Younger‘s constitutional rights. And as explained in the prior section, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury‘s verdict. So the only question remaining is whether Crowder violated clearly established law.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that courts should not examine clearly established law at too high a level of generality.19 And while it‘s true we require less specificity in Eighth Amendment context, even there we must define the right “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Cox v. Quinn, 828 F.3d 227, 238 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 2004)). Deliberate indifference is a multifaceted
It was. We held in 1984 that a warden was not entitled to qualified immunity when he was deliberately indifferеnt to his officers retaliating against inmates by beating them and spraying them with high-pressure fire hoses. Slakan, 737 F.2d at 373 n.1, 376. In Slakan, the warden knew that such prisoner abuse was likely because the practice was widespread and had been brought to the warden‘s attention. Id. at 373–75. But he failed to act, and an inmate was sprayed with a firehose, tear gassed, and beaten into unconsciousness. Id. at 371, 376. We denied the warden qualified immunity because “explicit legal guideposts” showed his actions amounted to unconstitutional deliberate indifference. Id. at 376. In other words, by 1984, it was clearly established that a warden violates the Constitution if past practice warns him that his officers are likely to retaliate against and seriously injure an inmate and he does nothing about it. What was true in 1984 was true in 2013. Slakan shows that it was сlearly established in 2013 that Crowder‘s inaction amounted to unconstitutional deliberate indifference.
Crowder seeks to avoid this conclusion by recasting the issue as a right to receive a transfer. Crowder argues that Younger is claiming a constitutional right to be transferred to another facility after participating in an attack on a corrections officer. He points to our caselaw to argue that there is no clearly established right to a transfer, and so claims that he must be afforded qualified immunity. See Adams v. Ferguson, 884 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2018).
Yet Crowder misses the forest for the trees. Younger is not alleging that he had a right to be transferred to another facility; rather, he is claiming a right to be free from prison officials who know he is at high risk of being assaulted by subordinates and who take no action to prevent it. While transferring Younger might have been enough to prevent Younger‘s assault, it is not the only protective action Crowder could have taken. He could have, for example, issued an order that the inmates involved in the assault on Officer Ganiyu were not to be touched. See J.A. 1160 (testimony from Younger‘s expert on the
* * *
This case was properly tried before a jury because inmates cannot receive any relief through Maryland‘s administrative grievance proceedings when the Intelligence and Investigative Division is investigating the subject matter of the grievance. And the jury‘s role in trials is enshrined in the
AFFIRMED.