MALLEY ET AL. v. BRIGGS ET AL.
No. 84-1586
Supreme Court of the United States
March 5, 1986
475 U.S. 335
Argued November 13, 1985
Ann M. Sheadel, Assistant Attorney General of Rhode Island, argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the brief was Arlene Violet, Attorney General.
Leonard Decof, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was John S. Foley.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Minnesota et al. by Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Catharine F. Haukedahl, Special Assistant Attorney General, Charles A. Graddick, Attorney General of Alabama, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Jim Smith, Attorney General of Florida, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia, Corinne Watanabe, Acting Attorney General of Hawaii, Jim Jones, Attorney General of Idaho, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Attorney General of Mississippi, William L. Webster, Attorney General of Missouri, Mike Greely, Attorney General of Montana, Robert M. Spire, Attorney General of Nebraska, Brian McKay, Attorney General of Nevada, Stephen E. Merrill, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Irwin I. Kimmelman, Attorney General of New Jersey, Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, David
Steven P. Lockman, Jack D. Novik, Burt Neuborne, and Lynette Labinger filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae.
This case presents the question of the degree of immunity accorded a defendant police officer in a damages action under
I
In December 1980, the Rhode Island State Police were conducting a court-authorized wiretap on the telephone of one Paul Driscoll, an acquaintance of respondents’ daughter. On December 20, the police intercepted a call to Driscoll from an unknown individual who identified himself as “Dr. Shogun.” The police logsheet summarizes the call as follows: “General conversation re. a party they went to last night . . . caller says I can‘t believe I was token [sic] in front of Jimmy Briggs—caller states he passed it to Louisa . . . Paul says Nancy was sitting in his lap rolling her thing.” App. 78.
Petitioner Edward Malley (hereafter petitioner) was the Rhode Island state trooper in charge of the investigation of Driscoll. After reviewing the logsheet for December 20, petitioner decided that the call from “Dr. Shogun” was incriminating, because in drug parlance “toking” means smoking marihuana and “rolling her thing” refers to rolling a mari
Respondents were arrested at their home shortly before six o‘clock on the morning of March 19, 1981. They were taken to a police station, booked, held for several hours, arraigned, and released. Local and statewide newspapers published the fact that respondents, who are prominent members of their community, had been arrested and charged with drug possession. The charges against repondents were subsequently dropped when the grand jury to which the case was presented did not return an indictment.
Respondents brought an action under
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that an officer who seeks an arrest warrant by submitting a complaint and supporting affidavit to a judge is not entitled to immunity unless the officer has an objectively reasonable basis for believing that the facts alleged in his affidavit are sufficient to establish probable cause. 748 F. 2d 715 (1984). We granted certiorari in order to review the First Circuit‘s application of the “objective reasonableness” standard in this context. 471 U. S. 1124 (1985). We affirm.
II
Petitioner urges reversal on two grounds: first, that in this context, he is absolutely immune from liability for damages; second, that he is at least entitled to qualified immunity in this case. We reject both propositions and address first the absolute immunity issue.
A
Our general approach to questions of immunity under
Our cases also make plain that “[f]or executive officers in general, . . . qualified immunity represents the norm.” Harlow, supra, at 807.2 Like federal officers, state officers who “seek absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that scope.” Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 506 (1978).
B
Although we have previously held that police officers sued under
Nor are we moved by petitioner‘s argument that policy considerations require absolute immunity for the officer applying for a warrant. As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. At common law, in cases where probable cause to arrest was lacking, a complaining witness’ immunity turned on the issue of malice, which was a jury question.4 Under the Harlow standard, on the other hand, an allegation of malice is not sufficient to defeat immunity if the defendant acted in an objectively reasonable manner. The Harlow standard is specifically designed to “avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment,” and we believe it sufficiently serves this goal. Defendants will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized.
C
As an alternative ground for claiming absolute immunity, petitioner draws an analogy between an officer requesting a warrant and a prosecutor who asks a grand jury to indict a suspect. Like the prosecutor, petitioner argues, the officer must exercise a discretionary judgment based on the evi
We reemphasize that our role is to interpret the intent of Congress in enacting
Even were we to overlook the fact that petitioner is inviting us to expand what was a qualified immunity at common law into an absolute immunity, we would find his analogy between himself and a prosecutor untenable. We have interpreted
In the case of the officer applying for a warrant, it is our judgment that the judicial process will on the whole benefit from a rule of qualified rather than absolute immunity. We do not believe that the Harlow standard, which gives ample room for mistaken judgments, will frequently deter an officer from submitting an affidavit when probable cause to make an arrest is present. True, an officer who knows that objectively unreasonable decisions will be actionable may be motivated to reflect, before submitting a request for a warrant, upon whether he has a reasonable basis for believing that his affidavit establishes probable cause. But such reflection is desirable, because it reduces the likelihood that the officer‘s request for a warrant will be premature. Premature requests for warrants are at best a waste of judicial resources; at worst, they lead to premature arrests, which may injure the
Furthermore, it would be incongruous to test police behavior by the “objective reasonableness” standard in a suppression hearing, see United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (1984), while exempting police conduct in applying for an arrest or search warrant from any scrutiny whatsoever in a
Accordingly, we hold that the same standard of objective reasonableness that we applied in the context of a suppression hearing in Leon, supra, defines the qualified immunity accorded an officer whose request for a warrant allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest.7 Only where the warrant
III
We also reject petitioner‘s argument that if an officer is entitled to only qualified immunity in cases like this, he is nevertheless shielded from damages liability because the act of applying for a warrant is per se objectively reasonable, provided that the officer believes that the facts alleged in his affidavit are true. Petitioner insists that he is entitled to rely on the judgment of a judicial officer in finding that probable cause exists and hence issuing the warrant. This view of objective reasonableness is at odds with our development of that concept in Harlow and Leon. In Leon, we stated that “our good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate‘s authorization.” 468 U. S., at 922, n. 23. The analogous question in this case is whether a reasonably well-trained officer in petitioner‘s position would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant.8 If such was the case, the officer‘s application for a warrant was not objectively reasonable, because it created the unnecessary danger of an unlawful arrest. It is true that in an ideal system an unreasonable request for a warrant would be harmless, because no judge would approve it. But ours is not an ideal system, and it is possible that a magistrate, working under
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Although I agree with much of the Court‘s opinion, I write separately to emphasize that substantial weight should be accorded the judge‘s finding of probable cause in determining whether petitioner state trooper (hereafter petitioner) will be personally liable for damages under
I
At the outset, I supplement the facts stated by the Court. Petitioner was supervising a wiretap in a narcotics investigation pursuant to an order by the Rhode Island Superior
On the basis of this conversation, petitioner and his partner decided to seek warrants against respondents for possessing marihuana.1 Petitioner presented the affidavits to Judge Capelli, a Rhode Island District Judge.2 Judge Capelli reviewed the affidavits, and entered an order stating:
“TO ANY AUTHORIZED OFFICER:
“Affidavit (and complaint) having been made to me under oath, and as I am satisfied that there is probable cause for the belief therein set forth that grounds for issuing an arrest warrant exists [sic], you are hereby commanded to arrest the defendant forthwith and to bring him before a judge of this court without unnecessary delay.”
The record before us does not disclose any evidence or claim that Judge Capelli failed to act in a competent judicial manner, or that he failed to exercise independent judgment in determining whether the arrest warrant should issue.
Respondents were prominent citizens in the community, and had never previously been implicated in any violation of the criminal laws. The grand jury did not return an indictment against them, and they instituted this suit under
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that liability under
I agree with the Court‘s decision that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immunity, and that the Harlow standard of qualified immunity—objective reasonableness—properly applies. In Harlow, however, the Court held that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id., at 818. Putting it differently, we also stated that a claim for qualified immunity “would be defeated [only] if an official knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].‘” Id., at 815, quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 322 (1975).
At one point in the Court‘s opinion today, it correctly recognizes that as the “qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Ante, at 341 (emphasis added). The Court also says that liability will attach “if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized.” Ibid.
I agree with the foregoing characterizations of the applicable standard when an official raises the defense of qualified immunity. I disagree, however, with the Court in two major respects. First, rather than deciding whether petitioner‘s conduct met the foregoing standard, the Court remands for trial on this issue. Yet, as the Court recognizes, unless “no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue,” ibid., petitioner should
It is undisputed that wiretaps initiated as part of a drug investigation revealed that respondents had attended a party where marihuana was being smoked, that a marihuana cigarette may have been passed to Mrs. Briggs,4 and that another party—at least inferentially of a similar type—was to be held in respondents’ home. Under the Harlow standard, we need not consider whether this information would be viewed by every reasonable officer as sufficient evidence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. Police often operate “in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation,” United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 108 (1965), and they have to make judgment calls over which reasonable officers could differ. In this case, the logs from the wiretap at least arguably implicated respondents in unlawful activities. See supra, at 347, and n. 1. Under these circumstances, an officer of reasonable competence could have believed that the wiretap provided probable cause to arrest respondents.
Second, and perhaps of greater importance, in determining whether the police officer acted with objective reasonableness, the Court apparently would give little evidentiary weight to the finding of probable cause by a magistrate or judicial officer.5 The Court quotes from United States v.
We have affirmed that the arrest warrant “should represent both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify [issuance of a warrant].” United States v. United States District Court, supra, at 316. This Court also has recognized that “the informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates . . . are to be preferred over the hurried actions of officers.” United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 464 (1932). Judicial evaluation of probable cause by a magistrate is the essential “checkpoint between the Government and the citizen.” Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204, 212 (1981). As we stated in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 759 (1979):
“The prominent place the warrant requirement is given in our decisions reflects the ‘basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through a separation of powers and division of functions among the different branches and levels of Government.’ United States v. United States District Court, supra, at 317. By requiring that conclusions concerning probable cause and the scope of a search ‘be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,’ Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948), we minimize the risk of unreasonable assertions of executive authority.”8
The police, where they have reason to believe probable cause exists, should be encouraged to submit affidavits to judicial officers.9 I therefore believe that in a suit such as this, the Court should expressly hold that the decision by the magistrate is entitled to substantial evidentiary weight. A more restrictive standard will discourage police officers from seeking warrants out of fear of litigation and possible personal liability. The specter of personal liability for a mistake in judgment may cause a prudent police officer to close his eyes to facts that should at least be brought to the attention of the judicial officer authorized to make the decision
III
This Court has long sought to divide the functions of law enforcement to impose on the magistrate the primary responsibility for determining whether a warrant will issue. It is inconsistent with this jurisprudence to imply or hold that the magistrate‘s determination of probable cause is irrelevant in this suit. A judicial officer‘s “judgment call” in determining probable cause, although not conclusive, is entitled to substantial evidentiary weight in suits seeking to impose personal liability on the police officer. In this case, in the light of the judge‘s determination and the evidence of illegal activity, I would hold that petitioner is immune from damages.
I agree with the judgment declining to accord absolute immunity to the officer seeking a warrant, but I do not join the Court‘s opinion, and I dissent from the decision to remand this case for trial on the immunity issue.
Notes
“Your affiant upon oath states that he has reason to believe and does believe that grounds for issuance of an arrest warrant exists [sic] and states the following facts on which such belief is founded:
“Persuant [sic] to a court ordered wire intercept. . . .
“On December 20, 1980, at 5:30 p.m. an incoming call was received to Paul Driscoll recorded on Reel 7, Side 1, Footage 30-48. This unidentified male calls Paul Driscoll and states, ‘This is Doctor Shotgun’ [sic]. General conversation reference to a party they went to last night. Caller states, ‘I can‘t believe I was token in front of Jimmy Briggs.’ Caller states that he passed it to Luisa [sic]. Caller and Paul talk about another party going on tonight. Paul says that Nancy was sitting in his lap rolling her thing.
“On the same date at 5:56 p.m., Reel 7, Footage 48-59. Male subject Scott calls Paul Driscoll. General conversation about a party at Jaime‘s parents’ [respondents‘] home. Also, that they went there last night. They are referring to Jaime‘s parents’ home, that is James and Luisa Briggs. Further, in regard to the conversation at 5:30 p.m. this unidentified male who called himself Doctor Shotgun [sic] stated that he was token in front of Jimmy Briggs. In your affiant‘s experience, he was smoking a marijuana cigarette in front of James Briggs. He then states that he passed it to Luisa. Luisa would be Luisa Briggs. He passed her a mari
The statement attached to the affidavit seeking a warrant for the arrest of Louisa Briggs was identical.
The Court previously has stated that “[i]f a magistrate serves merely as a ‘rubber stamp’ for the police or is unable to exercise mature judgment, closer supervision or removal provides a more effective remedy than the exclusionary rule.” United States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at 917-918, n. 18. I also believe that closer supervision or removal provides a more effective remedy than personal liability for police officers.
“We begin our analysis of [the Fourth Amendment] mindful of the fact that in this case a search was made pursuant to a search warrant. . . .
“In Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 270, this Court, strongly supporting the preference to be accorded searches under a warrant, indicated that in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, and Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610, the Court, in condemning searches by officers who invaded premises without a warrant,
Generally, the judicial officer‘s determination of probable cause has greater reliability than a police officer‘s, not only because the judicial officer is not immersed in the criminal investigation, but also because the judicial officer usually has greater time for deliberation and greater familiarity through training or education with the legal concepts concerning probable cause.