Nadine KEITH, as Administrator for the Estate of Godfrey Cook, Gary Maddox, Willetta Gray, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DEKALB COUNTY, GEORGIA, et al., Defendants, Thomas Brown, individually as DeKalb County Sheriff, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 13-11250.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
April 23, 2014.
749 F.3d 1034
To date, we have reserved prospective international comity abstention for rare (indeed often calamitous) cases in which powerful diplomatic interests of the United States and foreign sovereigns aligned in supporting dismissal. We decline to transform prospective international comity into a forum-selection tool for sovereign litigants to wield in common breach of contract actions. Because neither the United States nor Belize has a strong interest in adjudication of this matter abroad, the district court erred in applying international comity prospectively.
IV.
The district court erred in dismissing on each alternative ground. We vacate the forum non conveniens dismissal and remand to the district court so that it may determine the enforceability of the forum-selection clause and its significance to the forum non conveniens analysis. We also vacate its dismissal based on prospective international comity because that exceptional doctrine does not apply to the commercial dispute in this case.
VACATED and REMANDED.
Keishan J. Davis, Kwame Lateef Townes, Townes Davis & Associates, LLC, Tucker, GA, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Eugene Charles Reed, Jr., DeKalb County Law Department, Decatur, GA, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and RIPPLE,* Circuit Judges.
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
On January 7, 2009, Godfrey Cook, a pretrial detainee, was murdered in the DeKalb County Jail, in Decatur, Georgia, by another pretrial detainee, Saleevan Adan. Eighteen months later, Nadine Keith, the administrator of Cook‘s estate, and Cook‘s two adult children brought this action for money damages under both federal and state statutory law against DeKalb County, the DeKalb County District Attorney‘s office, the former District Attorney and two of her employees, the DeKalb County Sheriff, and several correctional officers at the Jail.1 Keith sought relief against the Sheriff, the former District Attorney and her employees, and the correctional officers under a federal Civil Rights Act,
The federal claims against all of the defendants except the Sheriff have been dismissed.3 This appeal is from the Dis
I.
The DeKalb County Jail houses over 3,000 inmates. The overwhelming majority are pretrial detainees; the rest are convicted defendants serving a short sentence or awaiting transfer to a state penitentiary.5 The Jail is divided into quadrants: Southeast (“SE“), Southwest (“SW“), Northeast (“NE“), and Northwest (“NW“). Each quadrant is divided into eight floors,6 and each floor is divided into six pods designated 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, and 600. A pod contains two levels of eight cells, for a total of sixteen cells. A floor, then, contains ninety-six cells. Depending on the pod, a cell has either one or two beds; so a pod houses somewhere between sixteen and thirty-two inmates.
The DeKalb County Jail is an indirect-observation jail, which means that the detention officers7 observe the inmates from a central tower, rather than from inside each housing area. A detention officer is on duty in the central tower at all times to open the doors to a pod and to allow officers and staff to enter pods for walk-throughs and inspections. Every cell is equipped with a call button, which an inmate can activate to alert the officer in the central tower of any concern.
When an individual is taken to the Jail for confinement, the individual is placed in a holding cell pending classification. Classification is a two-step process.8 First, a classification officer feeds the individual‘s criminal history into a computer, and the computer generates a score indicating the level of security—i.e., maximum, medium, or minimum—needed to house the person. Next, an intake nurse assesses the individual‘s medical and mental health risk; the classification officer takes that assessment into account in determining where the individual will be housed. Once classified, the individual is given an armband bearing his or her name, sex, assigned quadrant, and the numbers of the floor, pod, and cell where he or she is housed. If it becomes
The DeKalb County Sheriff‘s Office contracts out the provision of medical and mental health services at the Jail. In 2008, Correct Health had the contract for both services, although by subcontract it arranged for MHM Correctional Services Incorporated (“MHM“) to provide the mental health services.9 MHM provided those services through a staff of approximately thirty people, consisting of licensed practical nurses, registered nurses, mental health clinicians, and several psychiatrists.10 Dr. William Brickhouse, who had a Ph.D in clinical psychology, headed the staff as the director of mental health.
Inmates with mental health problems were housed in three locations at the Jail, 3SW, 7NE, and 3A.11 3SW is the third floor of the Southwest quadrant. Mental health inmates were housed there in pods 100, 200, 400, and 600.12 The cells in pods 100 and 200 were single-bed cells; the cells in pods 400 and 600 were two-bed cells. MHM staff treated pods 100, 400, and 600 as “synonymous,”13 in that the inmates housed in those pods did not present a risk of harm to themselves or other inmates. Inmates in pod 100 were let out of their cells one at a time—for exercise and other needs—and were kept isolated. Those in pods 400 and 600 were let out in groups and were permitted to interact. According to Dr. Brickhouse, inmates were assigned to pod 200 if they refused to take their medication or were placed on a precautionary suicide watch.14
7NE is the seventh floor of the Northeast quadrant. It was used to “lockdown” inmates with a variety of behavioral problems.15 Inmates who had taken overt steps to commit suicide were assigned to 3A and placed under acute suicide watch.16 Also assigned to 3A were inmates who presented an acute psychiatric disorder and required special custody. MHM staffed 3A round the clock with mental health nurses, and a psychiatrist was either on-site or on-call all hours of the day.
MHM alone decided whether an inmate should be housed in 3SW, 7NE, or 3A. If MHM decided that the inmate should be housed in 3SW or 7NE, it informed classification of the appropriate pod in which to house the inmate, and a classification officer designated the cell in which the inmate would be placed. Detention officers had the authority to move the inmate from the designated cell to another cell in the same
II.
The District Court record provides only a partial picture of Saleevan Adan‘s criminal history and interactions with the DeKalb County judicial system prior to the day he killed Godfrey Cook. However, from the DeKalb County Superior Court Online Judicial System,18 which contains a recording of the Docket Sheet for the case the State brought against Adan for murder in January 2001, and Adan‘s Inmate Record and the Jail‘s Incident Reports, which were before the District Court when it ruled on the Sheriff‘s motion for summary judgment, a more complete picture appears with respect to Adan‘s incarceration at the Jail—intermittently from January 31, 2001, to February 29, 2008, and continuously from February 29, 2008, to January 7, 2009, when Cook‘s murder occurred.
A.
On January 31, 2001, Adan was arrested for murder, and the DeKalb County Superior Court ordered that he be detained in the DeKalb County Jail. Adan was subsequently indicted, and at his arraignment on January 31, 2002, the Superior Court ordered that he be psychologically evaluated. On April 2, 2002, the court found Adan incompetent to stand trial, and turned him over to the Georgia Department of Human Resources, which sent him to Georgia Regional Hospital in Augusta for treatment and observation.
The Superior Court held competency hearings in Adan‘s case in October 2003 and in June 2004.19 Prior to each hearing, Adan was brought to the DeKalb County Jail, to be held there pending the court‘s decision. The court found him not competent on both occasions,20 and, at the Department‘s direction, he was taken to Central State Hospital in Milledgeville.21 Adan‘s mental health did not improve, so, on November 1, 2006, the Superior Court entered an order administratively closing the case.22 We infer—because the parties do not tell us, and the public records are
B.
On February 20, 2008, a forensic psychologist at the Department of Human Resources concluded that Adan had become competent to stand trial. The Superior Court therefore ordered Adan returned to Decatur, and on February 29, he was again booked into the DeKalb County Jail. He was assigned to a bed in 3A. On March 3, the Superior Court entered an order directing the DeKalb County Sheriff to hold Adan until further order of the court. Adan‘s Inmate Record has an entry dated March 3, indicating that he was to be pharmaceutically medicated. The Inmate Record reveals that after his assignment to 3A on February 29, he was moved about the Jail—to and from 3SW and 3A or 7NE—as follows.23
On March 5, Adan was moved from 3A to 3SW pod 600. On March 17, he was moved from 3SW pod 600 to 3SW pod 100. On March 18, he was moved from 3SW pod 100 to 3A. On March 21, he was moved from 3A to 3SW pod 100. Ten days later, Adan was returned to 3A for observation.24
On May 25, Adan was transferred from 3A to 3 SW pod 100. Three days later, on May 28, he was moved from 3SW pod 100 to 7NE because of a behavior problem. On June 26, he was returned to 3SW pod 100. The next day, he was transferred from 3SW to 7NE. On July 24, he was moved from 7NE to 3SW pod 100.
On August 28, the Superior Court ordered that Adan be psychologically evaluated. The next day, August 29, he was involved in a physical altercation with two other inmates, apparently over one of the other inmates defecating and urinating in a dayroom sink in pod 100.
On September 9, the Superior Court held a pretrial hearing. Although the Docket Sheet is silent as to what transpired at that hearing, we infer that it concerned Adan‘s competency to stand trial. On October 24, a psychologist with the Georgia Department of Human Resources at Georgia Regional Hospital determined that Adan was not competent to stand trial.
On November 2, Adan was moved to 3A and placed on suicide watch. The suicide watch was discontinued the next day, though he remained in 3A. On November 6, Adan was transferred from 3A to 3SW pod 400. Four days later, he was relocated to 3SW pod 200 and placed on precautionary suicide watch. On November 12, he was transferred from 3SW pod 200 to 3SW pod 600. On November 27, he was transferred from there to 3A and placed on suicide watch. On December 1, he was moved back to 3SW pod 600, and on December 2 from pod 600 to 3SW pod 200.
On December 12, 2008 the Superior Court entered an order finding Adan incompetent to stand trial. The court determined “by clear and convincing evidence that [Adan]... remains mentally ill and a danger to others,” and ordered that he be
C.
On January 6, two detention officers, Corporal Edward Mayo and Officer Royzell Lampkin, moved Adan from 3SW pod 200 to 3SW pod 600, where he was assigned to cell 610.26 Before they arrived at cell 610, Adan asked to use the telephone. The officers denied his request because the Jail was going into “lockdown.”27 Adan responded to this denial by refusing to enter cell 610; he entered cell 613 instead. Godfrey Cook, who had been booked on December 5, 2008, on charges of possession of cocaine, and had been assigned to one of the two beds in cell 613, was in the cell when Adan entered it. At this point, Corporal Mayo went to the central tower, joining Corporal Jermaine Cooper, who was on duty, and Officer Lampkin conducted a walk-through inspection of 3SW28 and then left the floor.29
At approximately 2:50 p.m., within thirty minutes after he entered cell 613, Adan broke the sprinkler, setting off an alarm and flooding pod 600. Thomas Gowdy, who was off-duty at the time,30 went to the central tower and remained there to allow Corporals Mayo and Cooper and Officer Lampkin, who had returned to the floor, to respond to the alarm and enter the pod. Corporal Mayo and Officer Lampkin went to cell 613. They found Cook face-down on floor and Adan standing in the back of the cell. They removed Adan from the cell and called for assistance. Cook was transported to Grady Hospital in Atlanta, where he was pronounced dead.
D.
After Cook‘s death, an investigator in the Office of Professional Standards, a unit of the DeKalb County Sheriff‘s Office, conducted an investigation and issued a report. The report concluded that Corporal Mayo and Officer Lampkin, in not notifying MHM and the classification officer on duty that Adan had entered cell 613, violated Jail policy.31 The report noted that inmates in 3SW were routinely relocated to cells other than the ones to which they were assigned, although some detention officers disputed that the practice was routine. In addition, the report included the statement of an inmate who was in the cell next to 613 when the killing occurred. He said that he hit his in-cell call button, but Corporal Mayo, whom he could see in the central tower, disengaged the call-button
III.
On August 18, 2010, Nadine Keith, as administrator for the estate of Godfrey Cook, and Cook‘s adult children, Gary Maddox and Willetta Gray, brought this action for damages. Her four-count amended complaint, filed on April 20, 2012, is the charging pleading before us in this appeal. It names as defendants DeKalb County, DeKalb County Sheriff Thomas E. Brown, and four officers at the Jail: Corporals Mayo, Cooper, and Gowdy, and Officer Lampkin.33 All were sued in their official as well as individual capacities.34
Count One of the amended complaint is brought against the Sheriff and the four officers pursuant to
Count Two incorporates the previous 177 paragraphs of the amended complaint, including Count One, and seeks judgment against the Sheriff under
pretrial detainees.‘” Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir.2005) (quoting Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir.1996)).
The defendants answered Keith‘s original complaint, but not the amended complaint. Instead of using the amended complaint and answers to shape the issues to be litigated, the parties used their submissions to the District Court in support of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment filed by the Sheriff, Mayo, Gowdy, and Lampkin on March 30, 2012, as the vehicles for presenting their claims and defenses.40
On February 21, 2013, the District Court ruled on the motion for summary judgment the Sheriff, Mayo, Gowdy, and Lampkin had filed on March 30, 2012. The court also dismissed from the case on the parties’ stipulation the claims against DeKalb County and the claims brought against the Sheriff, Mayo, Gowdy, and Lampkin in their official capacities.
In addressing the motion for summary judgment, the court focused its analysis on whether the movants were entitled to prevail on Count One based on the defense of qualified immunity, Counts Two and Three based on the defense of official immunity, and Count Four on the ground that the record did not support an award of punitive damages on Counts One, Two, or Three.41 The court held that Mayo, Gowdy, and Lampkin, but not the Sheriff, were entitled to summary judgment on the Count One claims because Keith failed to show that they were subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates in 3SW and that they recklessly disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to Cook.42 The court denied the Sheriff summary judgment on Count One and denied all defendants summary judgment on Counts Two and Three, finding that issues of fact on the official immunity defense precluded summary judgment. As for Count Four, the court denied the Sheriff summary judgment on the claims for punitive damages on Counts One, Two, and Three, and denied Mayo, Gowdy, and Lampkin summary judgment on the claims for punitive damages on Counts Two and Three.43
Sheriff Brown now appeals, challenging the District Court‘s decision rejecting his defense of qualified immunity with respect
IV.
“[A] district court‘s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of
A.
The first two of Keith‘s claims against Sheriff Brown—that he failed to supervise detainees and that the Jail‘s policies regarding the movement of inmates created a substantial risk of harm to Cook—implicate the same rule: “A prison official‘s deliberate indifference to a known, substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the [Fourteenth] Amendment.” Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1028 (11th Cir.2001) (en banc).44 Whether a risk of harm is substantial is an objective inquiry. See id. at 1028-29. “Deliberate indifference requires the following: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than gross negligence.” Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1250 (11th Cir.2013) (quoting Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331-32 (11th Cir.2013)). “[O]nce it is established that the official is aware of this substantial risk, the official must react to this risk in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1029.
However, “[i]t is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under
The necessary causal connection can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so. Alternatively, the causal connection may be established when a supervisor‘s custom or policy result[s] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights or when facts support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). “The deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir.1999) (internal quotation mark omitted). In short, “the standard by which a supervisor is held liable in [his] individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
It is not enough, however, for Keith to demonstrate that a genuine issue of fact exists on the merits of her claim. She must also overcome Sheriff Brown‘s assertion of qualified immunity by proving (1) that Sheriff Brown violated Keith‘s federal constitutional right, and (2) that the constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time Sheriff Brown acted. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815-16, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).45 The qualified immunity inquiry can begin with either step, neither is antecedent to the other. Id. at 236, 129 S.Ct. at 818. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable [state official] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Loftus v. Clark-Moore, 690 F.3d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir.2012) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Turning to the matter at hand, in order to prove that Sheriff Brown violated Cook‘s constitutional rights, Keith must show that the Sheriff Brown had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm to Cook and that he recklessly disregarded that risk. See Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1331-32. Keith does not allege that Sheriff Brown personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations. Therefore, if Sheriff Brown is to be held liable, he must have failed to correct a widespread pattern of constitutional violations or he must adopted a custom or policy that deprived Cook of his constitutional rights. Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360.46
We start by squeezing down Keith‘s claim. Keith cites seventeen factors, which, she argues, establish that the DeKalb County Jail presented a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates.47 Howev
For example, Keith cites the fact that Corporal Mayo was using his personal cell phone at the time Adan attacked Cook. But the evidence shows that at the time of Cook‘s death, Sheriff Brown had instituted a policy banning cell phone use by employees within the Jail. While Corporal Mayo may have acted contrary to the Jail policy, Keith presents no evidence that this was a widespread problem or that Sheriff Brown was aware that employees routinely violated the policy and that he failed to correct the problem. Cf. Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1332 (11th Cir.2007) (“Our decisions establish that supervisory liability for deliberate indifference based on the implementation of a facially constitutional policy requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of a flagrant, persistent pattern of violations.“). By not showing that Sheriff Brown was subjectively aware of this factor, Keith fails to establish the factor‘s relevance to her deliberate indifference claim.48
Keith‘s theory of liability does not square with the law. Simply put, the law does not require that Sheriff Brown ignore the determination and recommendation of MHM staff. A sheriff cannot be held liable for failing to segregate mental health inmates whom trained medical personnel have concluded do not present a risk of harm to themselves or others.51 Moreover, even if we assume that Sheriff Brown violated Cook‘s constitutional rights, Keith has not demonstrated that it is “clearly established” that a sheriff has a constitutional obligation to disregard the medical expertise of the very contractors he has hired to ensure that the inmates’ mental health is tended to. Cf. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2515, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (“For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently clear.... that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [of an official‘s actions] must be apparent.“) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The reason Keith has failed to present case law supporting her argument is because there is none.
Keith also faults Sheriff Brown for the Jail‘s policy of allowing detention officers to relocate mental health inmates to different cells within the same pod, citing evidence that since at least 2004, detention officers were trained to disregard the policy of reporting cell relocations to classification officers. However, Jail policy requiring detention officers to alert MHM staff or classification officers remained in effect, and Keith does not present evidence that Sheriff Brown was subjectively aware that the policy was
Keith argues that Jenkins v. DeKalb County, Ga., 528 F.Supp.2d 1329 (N.D.Ga. 2007), aff‘d, 307 Fed.Appx. 390 (11th Cir. 2009), demonstrates that Sheriff Brown was on notice that the Jail and practices within the Jail posed a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates. Jenkins involved facts similar to those in this case. In July 2004, a pretrial inmate at the DeKalb County Jail (Jenkins) was killed by another inmate (Smith) when the two were placed in the same cell.53 Id. at 1331-32. The killing occurred in 3SW pod 600, the same pod where Cook met his death. Jenkins was known to have a history of physical and verbal outbursts, and the evidence demonstrated that Smith was involved in an unprovoked assault within four hours of being taken to the Jail. Id. at 1331-32. From the District Court‘s opinion in Jenkins, we know Smith had attempted to escape from the intake area, and “the screening nurse [at classification] made the decision to assign Smith to housing pod 3 SW where special needs inmates were housed.” Id. at 1332. Smith had been assigned to a different cell, but “[f]or reasons which are still unclear,” he ended up in the same cell as Jenkins. Id. The Sheriff‘s Office conducted an investigation into Jenkins‘s death, as it did in Cook‘s case. The report concluded that “no evidence was obtained that suggested that [Jail personnel] were negligent in the death of inmate Jenkins.... [A]ll of the responding officers acted reasonably.... Therefore, [Jail personnel] are in compliance with the rules and regulations and did not violate any policy.” Record, no. 106-2, at 13 (Office of Professional Standards Report at 9 (2004)).
Jenkins‘s estate filed a
Seizing on Jenkins, Keith argues that Sheriff Brown was aware of and acquiesced to the substantial risk of serious harm to inmates that is created by failing to segregate mental health inmates and by allowing detention officers to move inmates in 3 SW pod 600 to different cells in the pod. We disagree. Jenkins demonstrates that in an isolated incident, the practice of moving an inmate with a known
Moreover, even if Jenkins were sufficient to put Sheriff Brown on notice, a Jail policy permitting detention officers to move a mental health inmate to a different cell, when trained medical personnel have determined that the inmate does not pose a threat to others, does not violate clearly established constitutional law. Cf. Sherrod v. Johnson, 667 F.3d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir.2012) (“For the law to be clearly established, the law must have earlier been developed in such a concrete and factually defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the defendant‘s place, that ‘what he is doing’ violates federal law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Keith fails to direct us to any case law on point, and that is because none exists.55
B.
Keith‘s alternative claim for relief—that Sheriff Brown failed to adequately train the detention officers—implicates a different, albeit very similar, rule: under
Finally, assuming that Keith has adequately established that Sheriff Brown committed a constitutional violation by failing to train the detention officers at the Jail, Keith has not established that Sheriff Brown violated clearly established law. Because it was not clearly established that failing to segregate mental health inmates violated Cook‘s constitutional rights, Sheriff Brown‘s “failure” to train detention officers to segregate such inmates did not amount to a constitutional violation. Cf. Loftus, 690 F.3d at 1204. Therefore, Sheriff Brown would be entitled qualified immunity on that ground as well.
As the Supreme Court has indicated, “[a] [supervisor‘s] culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61, 131 S.Ct. at 1359. Keith‘s claim that Sheriff Brown violated Cook‘s constitutional rights by failing to adequately train detention offi-
V.
In conclusion, Keith has failed to demonstrate that Sheriff Brown violated Cook‘s constitutional rights. Sheriff Brown is therefore entitled to summary judgment on her
REVERSED.
Notes
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
However, “the due process rights of a [pretrial detainee] are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.” City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 2983, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983). Thus, “the standard for providing basic human needs to those incarcerated or in detention is the same under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,” Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1024 n. 5 (11th Cir.2001) (en banc), and “it makes no difference whether [Cook] was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner because the applicable standard is the same, so decisional law involving prison inmates applies equally to cases involving ...
Sheriffs are liable for the misconduct of their jailers ... and persons injured by a jailer have the ... option in bringing an action on the jailer‘s bond .... provided that the sheriff shall not be liable for such misconduct and no claim or cause of action against the sheriff for such misconduct shall exist unless one of the following conditions exists: (1) The sheriff personally benefited financially from the act complained of; (2) The sheriff was personally aware of and had actual knowledge of the act complained of and had actual knowledge that the act was illegal, was contrary to law, or was the breach of a duty imposed by law and either acted to cause or failed to prevent the act complained of; or (3) The sheriff failed to exercise ordinary care and diligence to prevent the condition or act which proximately caused the injury complained of.
(a) When there is no person entitled to bring an action for the wrongful death of a decedent under Code Section 51-4-2 or 51-4-4, the administrator or executor of the decedent may bring an action for and may recover and hold the amount recovered for the benefit of the next of kin. In any such case the amount of the recovery shall be the full value of the life of the decedent. (b) When death of a human being results from a crime or from criminal or other negligence, the personal representative of the deceased person shall be entitled to recover for the funeral, medical, and other necessary expenses resulting from the injury and death of the deceased person.
It appears, however, that the our decision in Marsh to use the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments interchangeably has spurred further confusion, as pretrial detainees continue to challenge the conditions of their confinement under the incorrect amendment. We therefore refer only to the Fourteenth Amendment in analyzing Keith‘s claims. The statement quoted above includes the alteration it does—replacing Eighth with Fourteenth—in hopes that future pretrial detainees will rely on the correct amendment when challenging the conditions of their confinement.