Ingraham v. Wright

INGRAHAM WRIGHT et et al. al. Argued 2-3, 1976 April 19, 1977 75-6527. November Decided

No. J., opinion Court, J., delivered the in which Powell, C. Burger, JJ., joined. White, and J., filed Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist, dissenting opinion, JJ., which Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, p. joined, J., dissenting post, 683. filed a post, opinion, p. Stevens, Rogow argued petitioners.

Bruce the cause for With him Howard Dixon Siegel. on the briefs were W. and Peter M. Howard,

Frank Jr., A. argued cause and filed a brief for respondents.*

Mr. Justice opinion delivered the of the Court. Powell This presents questions case concerning use First, schools: whether paddling students as a means of maintaining discipline consti tutes cruel and unusual in violation of Amendment; and, second, to the extent that is con paddling stitutionally permissible, whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires prior op notice portunity heard.

I Ingraham Petitioners James filed the and Roosevelt Andrews complaint in January this case on in the 7, 1971, United States District for the Court Southern District of At Florida.1 the both were in time enrolled the Charles R. Drew High Junior County, School Dade Ingraham eighth grade Fla., and Andrews the complaint ninth. The three contained counts, separate depriva each for alleging a cause action tion §§ constitutional under 1981-1988. S. C. rights, damages by Counts one and two were individual for actions Ingraham paddling and Andrews based on incidents that occurred in 1970 at Drew allegedly High October Junior action declaratory School. Count three was a class and Nussbaum, Hilmer, Precup, *Michael and David Rubin Lucien Ronald G. urging Assn. curiae filed brief for National Education as amicus the reversal. by urging curiae were filed Leon Fieldman for Briefs amici affirmance by J. and Tobias Simon and Elizabeth the National School Boards Assn.: Dade, AFT, United Local du Fresne for the Teachers of AFL-CIO. Psychological brief Associa- M. Bacon filed a for the American Gertrude Rights Task on of Children and Youths as curiae. tion Force the amicus minors, complaint Ingraham and Andrews were the filed in As was mother, Everett, Ingraham, and the names of Eloise James’ Willie Roosevelt’s father. on behalf of

injunctive students relief filed all Dade County schools.2 Named as defendants all counts were Wright respondents (principal Willie J. at Drew Junior High (an School), Lemmie Deliford assistant Solomon principal), (an Barnes assistant and Edward L. principal), Whigham (superintendent County the Dade School System). presented

Petitioners their a week-long evidence at trial of petitioners’ before District Court. At the close case, respondents moved for dismissal of “on three the ground count upon facts the law no plaintiff and has shown to relief,” right (b), ruling Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. go jury evidence would insufficient on counts one and The granted two.4 Court District motion all three complaint as to and dismissed the counts, without hearing evidence behalf of App. the school authorities. on 142-150. t class, The District Cour certified under Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.

23(b)(2) (c)(1), County as follows: “'All students Dade system subject policies School who are issued County Defendant, App. Dade School Board . . . .’ ” 17. One specifically request. excepted student from the class complaint County also named the Dade Board School as a defend ant, Appeals but the held that Court the Board was not amenable to suit under U. S. C. against dismissed suit the Board §§ jurisdiction. 1976). of (CA5 for 525 F. 2d aspect want This of Appeals’ judgment the Court of is not before us. right jury had Petitioners waived their to on the claims trial for dam two, ages respondents in counts one and but had The not. District proceeded initially only three, hear evidence Court on count the claim injunctive petitioners’ case, however, relief. At the close of par for (together offered on agreed that the evidence count three ties with certain considered, testimony) purposes be of stipulated would for for motion verdict, also been offered on directed as if it had counts It one two. right respondents jury understood that reassert a trial if the was could App. were denied. motion may

Petitioners’ briefly. evidence be summarized In the year school many the 237 in County schools Dade used corporal punishment as a means of maintaining discipline pursuant legislation Florida and a local School Board regulation.5 statute then in The effect authorized limited corporal punishment by negative inference, pun proscribing ishment unduly which “degrading or severe” or which was inflicted prior without consultation with or principal the teacher in charge the school. Fla. Stat. § Ann. 232.27 (1961). 6 regulation, County Policy Dade School Board

5The many evidence does not show how actually of the schools employed corporal punishment maintaining discipline. as means of The authori practice by zation of the the School Board to 231 of the in extended schools year, 1970-1971 school but at least of those schools did not ad corporal minister punishment Id., as a policy. matter of school at 137-139. year, In the 1970-1971 provided: school 232.27 § "Each any teacher or other member of the staff of school shall assume authority such pupils may assigned by be the control to him the principal good keep and shall places order in the and in other classroom assigned which he is in charge pupils, to be but he shall not inflict corporal punishment consulting charge principal before or teacher in school, unduly punishment degrading and in no case shall such be severe its nature. . . ." July 1, 1976, Legislature governing

Effective the Florida amended law corporal punishment. 232.27 Section now reads:

“Subject board, to law and to the rules of the district each teacher authority or other member the staff of school shall have such may assigned him discipline the control and of students as principal representative keep good in the designated or his and shall order charge of places assigned to be in classroom and in other which he is necessary, corporal punishment students. If a teacher feels that is following procedures shall be followed: least approved principle “(1) The use of shall be necessary used, principal approval but for each before it specific it is used. instance in which may corporal punishment “(2) A administer principal teacher or beforehand, and in the presence adult who is informed of another punishment. for the presence, reason student’s shall, “(3) has principal who administered A teacher or explicit directions and limitations.7 The contained the recalcitrant punishment paddling consisted authorized paddle measuring flat wooden student on the buttocks with a and about less than two feet three to four inches long, wide, punishment one-half inch thick. The normal was limited resulted in paddle one to five “licks” or blows with the and request, ex upon provide pupil’s parent guardian or with a written planation punishment the other of the reason for the and the name of (codifier’s (1977) present.” who was Ann. Fla. Stat. [adult] §232.27 omitted). notation physical force Corporal punishment defined “the moderate use of now as may necessary physical principal a teacher or contact (28). discipline 228.041 The local

maintain or to enforce school rules.” § expressly adopt governing student school boards are authorized to rules discipline codes of stu conduct and and are directed to make available immunity principals given dent conduct. Teachers and §230.23 rules, “[e]xcept liability enforcing disciplinary from civil and criminal for . . .” punishment . the case of excessive force or cruel and unusual 232.275. § punish year, Policy corporal In the 5144 authorized 1970-1971 school cooperation from seeking ment where the failure of other means of necessary. princi regulation specified that its use student made necessity the stu corporal punishment, pal should determine reason for and the the seriousness of the offense dent should understand in the punishment be administered punishment, and that should to hold in circumstances not calculated presence of another adult using against regulation cautioned or ridicule. The up student to shame psychological or medical against student under punishment person administering treatment, and warned injury. physical personal liabilities” case of his own “must realize App. 15. Court, the Dade pending in the District litigation While Policy 5144 to standardize the size amended County Board School description text, proscribe with the

paddles in accordance used buttocks, on the to limit the than paddle elsewhere striking a child with elementary grades (five and intermediate permissible “licks” number of require contemporaneous grades), junior senior seven for to the student and a subse for the explanation need App. 126-128. quent parents. notification to apparent

no physical injury to the student. School authori corporal punishment ties viewed as a less drastic means of discipline suspension than or expulsion. Contrary the procedural requirements of the statute and regulation, teach paddled ers often students on own authority their without first consulting principal.8

Petitioners focused on Drew Junior High School, the school in which both Ingraham and Andrews were enrolled the fall in of 1970. In apparent reference to Court District Drew, found that instances of “[t]he which could be characterized as severe, accepting the testimony students’ as took credible, place junior one high school.” 147. App. The consisting mainly of 16 testimony stu evidence, suggests dents, the regime at exceptionally Drew was harsh. The testimony of Ingraham in support and Andrews, e of their individual claims for is damages, Becaus illustrative. respond he was slow to to his teacher’s instructions, Ingraham subjected was to more than licks with paddle being while over a principal’s held table office. The paddling was so severe that he suffered a hematoma9 requiring medical keeping attention and him days.10 out several paddled Andrews was several times for minor infractions. On two occasions he struck on his once arms, depriving him full use of his arm for a week.11 255, 248, (1974) panel

8 498 2d opinion), F. n. 7 (original vacated rehearing, (1976); 48, 138, 146; on App. 525 F. 2d Exhibits Dictionary (23d 1976)

9 Stedman’s Medical ed. defines “hematoma” localized relatively completely mass of extravasated blood or “[a] ; usually organ confined . (or within an tissue . blood clotted . clotted), and, there, partly depending long may on has how been mani- degrees organization fest decolorization.” various 18-20, App. 3-4, 68-85, 129-136. 11Id., experiences 4—5, of several students at 104-113. other similar individually Court, they in the Drew, testified District to which original panel opinion Appeals, summarized in the Court 498 F. 2d, at 257-259. made no on the findings credibility

The District Court Rather, assuming students’ testimony. their testimony credible, court found no constitutional for relief. basis respect action, con the class the court count three, With practiced cluded that authorized and generally county Id., right. schools violated no constitutional respect 149. With two, counts one and the individual damages actions, corporal pun court that while concluded Eighth Amendment, ishment could some cases violate the lawfully not find jury in this case could “the elements in terms of arbitrary unacceptability severity, infliction, contemporary gross disproportion or standards, which necessary 'punishment' to to the constitutional level bring ” Id., 143. punishment.’ ‘cruel and unusual to panel Appeals A the Court voted reverse. punish (CA5 1974). panel The concluded that the

F. 2d paid Eighth oppressive ment was so severe as to violate out procedures Fourteenth Amendments, and that Policy satisfy requirements to failed lined re the en court Upon rehearing, Process Clause. banc Due Dis judgment of jected and affirmed these conclusions full court held that 2d The trict Court. F. opportu notice an require Process did the Due Clause be heard: nity to constitutionally to

“In refuse set essence, forth, we activity which mandated, procedural standards justify on a level, constitutional enough, not substantial expended have and effort which would the time justify procedures or to adhering those school in courts into internal by federal interference further public Id., at schools.” affairs petitioners’ conten substantive rejected also court

The view, court’s Amendment, tions. y corporal punishment public inapplicable simpl Stressing schools. the likelihood of civil and criminal liability if petitioners’ state law, evidence were the court believed, held that administration of “[t]he whether or not schools, excessively does administered, within scope not come of Eighth protection.” Id., at 915. Nor was there any substantive violation of the Due Process Clause. The court noted “[p] addling of recalcitrant has long children been an accepted method of promoting good behavior instilling of responsi notions bility and decorum into the mischievous heads of school chil Id., dren.” at 917. The court refused to examine instances of punishment individually: think

“We a misuse judicial of our power to deter mine, for whether a teacher example, arbitrarily has acted in paddling particular child certain behavior or whether in particular instance of misconduct five licks would have been a more appropriate punishment than ten licks. . . .” Ibid. granted certiorari,

We questions limited to the of cruel and unusual procedural process. due 425 U. S. 990.12 pro In addressing scope II of the Amendment’s on has hibition cruel Court punishment, unusual and con found it useful common-law refer “[traditional (plurality Texas, cepts,” (1968) Powell 392 535 514, v. U. S. has tradi society our and which opinion), to the “attitude[s] defining require- in tionally Id., too, So, taken.” at 531. 12 petition question presented third in the denied review of a We certiorari: upon public school stu- corporal punishment “Is of severe the infliction any legitimate achieving edu- unrelated to arbitrary, capricious and

dents Clause of the Due Process violative of and therefore purpose cational Pet. for Cert. Amendment?” Fourteenth

660 process due under the Fifth and Four- of procedural

ments the Court has been attuned to what Amendments, teenth United States Bar- always land,” the law of the v. “has been “traditional of nett, 681, (1964), 692 and to ideas 376 U. S. McElroy, 474, 508 Greene S. procedure.” fair v. by examining way in which begin therefore (1959). We the use of responded have and our laws our traditions public in schools. corporal punishment country as a means in this

The use of the colonial dates back to disciplining schoolchildren primary and period.13 It has survived transformation optional on secondary from the colonials' reliance education system compulsory private present to our arrangements Despite the dependence public on schools.14 education and as a means corporal punishment general abandonment practice continues to offenders,15 criminal punishing most public in of schoolchildren in play a role education public opinion parts country.16 Professional been for more than sharply practice,17 divided on the and has 13 (1941); H. Falk, Corporal 11-48 N. Edwards & See H. Punishment (1947). Richey, in Order 115-116 The School the American Social 14 England before compulsory Public and education existed New 97-113, Revolution, 50-68, 78-81, the demand for free id., at but see country gain as a them did not momentum schools as we now know compulsory mid-1800’s, it was not until 1918 whole until Brown in all the States. See Board school attendance laws were force v. Cubberley, (1954), citing Education, 483, 489 Public n. 408-423, (1934 ed.); 563-565 cf. Wisconsin United States Education 226, Yoder, 406 U. S. n. Falk, (CA8 1968); Bishop, Jackson See F. 2d supra, at 85-88. Secondary Discipline Karpas, K. Larson & M. Effective School See (1963); Reitman, Follman, Corporal Ladd, A. J. & E. Punishment 1972). (ACLU Report the Public Schools 17 scholarly samplings opinion For on the use of schools, Reynolds, Corporal & in the see Reardon R. Punishment F.

661 century.18 Yet we can discern no trend toward its elimination.

At common law a single principle has governed the use of corporal since before the American Revolution: Teachers may impose reasonable but not excessive force to discipline a child.19 Blackstone catalogued among the “abso- lute rights of individuals” the right “to security from the corporal insults of menaces, assaults, beating, and wounding,” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *134, but he regard did not a “corporal insult” for a teacher to inflict “moderate correc- tion” on a child in his care. To the extent force was “necessary to answer purposes for which [the teacher] is employed,” Blackstone “justifiable viewed it as or lawful.” Id., id., at 3 *453; at *120. The basic doctrine has not changed. prevalent country rule in this today privileges such force as a teacher or “reasonably administrator believes necessary to be proper control, [the training, child’s] education.” Restatement (Second) of (2) (1965) ; § Torts 147 see id., (2). § 153 To the extent that the force is excessive or unreasonable, virtually educator in subject all States is possible civil and liability.20 criminal Pennsylvania 1-2, (1975); Association, National Report Education Task Corporal (1972); on James, Force Punishment Corporal K. (1963). Punishment Opinion surveys Public Schools 8-16 taken consistently majority since 1970 have shown of teachers general public favoring corporal punishment moderate use of in the lower grades. Reynolds, supra, 2, 23-26; Depart See Reardon & at Delaware Instruction, Report Corporal Survey ment of Public on the Punishment (1974); Reitman, Follman, Ladd, supra, 34-35; & National Education supra, Association, supra, 66-69; Cooper Falk, McJunkin, cf.

18 See Ind. Harper James, 3.20, pp. See F. & F. Law of Torts 288-292 § (1956); Proehl, Liability Teachers, Tort L. Rev. 734-738 Vand. (1959); Prosser, (4th 1971). W. Law of Torts ed. many See cases cited n. The criminal codes of States infra. provisions explicitly recognizing the privilege include teacher’s common-law 662 early authority the cases viewed

Although the of the from deriving parents,21 parental teacher as the concept of replaced has delegation been the view—more consonant compulsory with education may laws—that the State itself impose corporal punishment such reasonably necessary as is proper “for the education of the child and for maintenance of group discipline.” Harper 1 & Law of James, F. F. Torts 3.20, p. (1956).22 § 292 All circumstances are to of the into determining punishment taken account in whether the impor- case. most particular Among is reasonable at- offense, considerations of the tant seriousness severity the nature and past child, titude and behavior age strength child, of the punishment, means availability equally but effective of less severe Id., of Torts 290-291; (Second) Restatement discipline. c-e, p. (1965). Comments § through problem have addressed the 23 States that

Of corporal moderate use 21 have authorized legislation, fewa Of these States schools.23 g., Ann. E. Rev. Stat. punishment. corporal Ariz. to inflict reasonable (1977); Neb. Rev. 53a-18 (A) (1) Stat. (1956); Gen. Conn. § 13-246 § (McKinney (2) (1975); Y. Penal Law 35.10 N. § Stat. 28-840 § (1) (1975). 161.205 1976); Stat. Supp. Ore. Rev. § supra, 726, and Proehl, n. See parental on is conditioned Today, corporal punishment in school 1977). (West Supp. Cal. Educ. Code approval only in California. §49001 a sum held in This Court has Wood, Cf. Morrow 35 Wis. is not con approval parental mary affirmance that (1975), aff’g 395 Owen, U. S. 907 F. required. Baker stitutionally (MDNC). Supp. 294 Ann., 1977); (West Supp. Code Del. 49000-49001 Code Cal. Educ. §§ (1977); Code Ga. 1976); Fla. (Supp. Stat. Ann. § 232.27 14, § 701 Tit. Supp.), (1975 (1976); Haw. Rev. Stat. 32-835, 32-836 §§ 298-16 Ann. §§ Stat., 24-24, 34-84a 1975); Ill. c. Pamphlet Ann. (2) (Spec. §§ Code, Ann. Art. (1975); Md. (1977 Ann. Supp.); Ind. Code §20-8.1-5-2 Ann., 340.756 Comp. counties); Laws Mich. (1975) § specified 77, 98B (in § have elaborated on the common-law test of reasonableness, typically providing approval or notification of the child’s or for infliction of punishment only by the princi- parents,24 or in presence of an adult Only two pal25 witness.26 States, Massachusetts and New prohibited have Jersey, all corporal punishment public their Where the schools.27 legislatures have not acted, state courts have uniformly preserved the common-law rule permitting teachers use reasonable force in disciplining children in their charge.28

Against this background of historical and contemporary approval of reasonable punishment, we turn to the questions constitutional before us. Stat,

(1970); Codes (1971); Mont. Rev. Ann. Nev. Rev. §75-6109 (1973); (1975); 392.465 N. C. Stat. Gen. 115-146 Ohio Rev. § § Code Ann. (1972); Ann., 70, Okla. (1972); Tit. Stat. Pa. Stat. §3319.41 § 6-114 Ann., 24, (Supp. 1976); Tit. 13-1317 (1977); S. C. Code 59-63-260 S. D. § § Compiled (1975); Ann., 16, Laws Ann. 13-32-2 Stat. 1161 Vt. Tit. § § 1976); (Supp. (1973); Code,, Code Ann. Va. W. Va. 18A-5-1 § 22-231.1 § (1977); Wyo. 1975). (Supp. Stat. § 21.1-64 24 (West 1977) Cal. Educ. Supp. (requiring prior parental Code 49001 § approval writing); (1977) (3) (requiring Stat. Ann. 232.27 Fla. § explanation request); (1971) written on Mont. Codes Ann. Rev. § (requiring prior parental notification). 25 Code, 77, Md. Ann. (1975). 98B§ Art. 26 (1977); (1975 Fla. Stat. Ann. Haw. Rev. Stats. § 232.27 § 298-16 Supp.); (1971). Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 75-6109 27 Ann., 1976); 71, (Supp. Mass. Laws c. Gen. 37G N. J. Stat. Ann. § 18A: 6-1 § 28 g., Glover, 449, 260 (1954); E. Suits Ala. 71 2d 49 Frentz v. So. La v. Gallagher, 255, Berry (1969); 105 Ariz. 462 P. 2d 804 v. Arnold School 1118, Dist., (1940); Rubano, 199 Ark. 137 S. 2d 256 Andreozzi 145 W. v. 280, (1958); Kole, 1303, 141 Conn. A. 2d 639 Tinkham 252 Iowa (1961); Wright, (Ky. 1968); N. 2d 258 Carr v. 2d W. 423 S. W. Hickman, 828, (1931) ; App. 225 Mo. 2d 672 Christman v. S. W. 1, App. 119, (1973); Simms v. School Dist. No. 13 Ore. 508 P. 2d 236 Bill, (1944); Prendergast Tenn. 2d 634 Marlar v. S. W. (Tex. 1917). Masterson, App. generally Civ. See sources S. W. supra. n. cited

III bail not Eighth provides: Amendment “Excessive shall nor and unusual imposed, fines cruel required, nor excessive tradi- Bail, inflicted.” punishments fines, tionally process, been associated the criminal have with parallel the text of three to limitations subjecting the limit of those power intention to suggests An government. function of entrusted with the criminal-law deci- history of the Amendment and examination cruel proscription against construing sions this Court designed unusual confirms that long- those We adhere protect convicted crimes. limitation and hold Amendment does standing of main- apply paddling to the of children as a means discipline in schools. taining

A well known.29 history of The the of the provision from a taken, text was almost The verbatim, turn derived of of which in Rights 1776, Declaration Virginia English ver Rights the of of The English from Bill adopted of William and Mary, after the accession sion, the judges under English to curb excesses of intended the pro English of II. Historians have viewed reign James the treason “Bloody Assize,” to the as reaction vision either Jeffreys by in 1685 after conducted Chief Justice trials of Monmouth,30 of abortive rebellion Duke In year.31 of Titus Oates in the same prosecution perjury 29 (joint 153, (1976) opinion of Gregg Georgia, U. S. 428 168-173 See JJ.) (hereinafter joint opinion); Furman Stevens, and Stewart, Powell, concurring); (1972) J., Georgia, 238, S. (Marshall, 316-328 Original The Punishments Granucci, and Unusual Inflicted:” “Nor Cruel (1969). Meaning, 57 L. Rev. 839 Calif. 30 (1965). Rights 155 The Bill of Brant, I. See supra, Granucci, at 852-860. See the exclusive concern of case,

either the English version was the conduct judges enforcing law. orig criminal The inal draft introduced in the provided: House Commons

“The requiring persons excessive bail committed criminal cases and excessive imposing illegal fines, punishments, prevented.” to be

Although the reference “criminal cases” was eliminated from preservation the final draft, the of a similar reference in preamble indicates that the deletion was sub without significance. stantive Thus, Blackstone of the treated each provision’s prohibitions three bearing on criminal proceedings and judgments.34 adopted

The Americans who part of this language English Rights Bill of framing their own State Federal years Constitutions later imposition feared the torture punishments and other cruel only by judges acting beyond their but authority, lawful also legislatures engaged laws making judicial which authority would be meas States, Weems v. United ured. U. S. 371-373 principal concern of the American Framers Indeed, appears to have with legislative been definition crimes and In Kemmler, re punishments. (1890); 32Id., at 855. preamble reads in : part Second, by King

“WHEREAS late James the the assistance divers counsellors, judges, by him, employed evil did and ministers endeavor to extirpate kingdom. subvert . . . the laws and liberties of required persons committed “10. And hath been of excessive bail liberty of the cases, the criminal to elude of the laws made for the benefit subjects. imposed; illegal cruel have been and

“11. And excessive fines Perry Our Cooper, & Sources of punishments inflicted. . . .” R. J. (1959). Liberties 34 (bail), (fines other Blackstone, *379 4 Commentaries *297 W. punishments).

666 Georgia, J., (1972) (Brennan, Furman v. to provision But if was intended the American concurring). its the government broadly English model, more than restrain subject apply—the it to criminal to which was intended process—was the same. was ratification, original

At the of its Constitution time Virginia criticized Massachusetts and Conventions of provide protection persons convicted its failure to impetus for inclusion of provided crimes.36 This criticism Rights. Bill of When was Eighth Amendment debated in the First Congress, was and Unusual Punish objection met Cruel might outlawing have the effect of what ments Clause of punishments hanging, then the common criminal were of whipping, earcropping. Cong. (1789). Annals legisla objection heeded, “precisely because was not power pre had unfettered to ture would otherwise have Georgia, Furman punishments supra, at 263. for crimes.” scribe every surprising it is not find that In light B this history, whether a considering this Court decision Eighth and meaning unusual” within “cruel and punishment. has with a criminal Amendments dealt Fourteenth complained specifically of ab of Massachusetts Holmes Abraham restraining Congress power its determine “what provision sence persons convicted crimes.” punishments be inflicted on kind of shall Henry Elliot, Patrick the Federal Constitution Debates on J. mind: of the same ought not rights?—'that bail says [Virginia] excessive bill our “What punish imposed, nor cruel and unusual required, fines nor excessive to be therefore, calling gentlemen those you not, on now Are ments inflicted.’ punishments prescribe trials and define compose Congress, are to who similar they sentiments there find this control? Will without loose; you more—you depart from the do rights? You let them bill id., country. your genius of . . .” Gamble, See Estelle v. U. S. 97 (1976) (incarceration Gregg medical care); Georgia, without v. 428 U. 153 (1976) S. (execution murder); for Georgia, Furman v. supra (execution Texas, Powell murder); v. (1968) (plurality- U. S. 514 opinion) ($20 for public fine drunkenness); Robinson Cali v. fornia, 370 (incarceration 660 (1962) as criminal for addiction Dulles, to narcotics); Trop (1958) v. 356 U. 86S. (plurality opinion) (expatriation for ex desertion); Louisiana rel. Resweber, Francis v. (1947) (execution by S. 459 electrocution after a failed first attempt); Weems v. United States, supra (15 years’ imprisonment and penalties other falsifying an official Fleming, v. document); Howard 191 U. S. (1903) (10 years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to de In fraud) ; Kemmler, supra (execution re by electrocution); Utah, Wilkerson (execution v. U. S. (1879) by firing squad); Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 (1867) (fine Wall. imprisonment at hard labor for bootlegging).

These decisions recognize Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause circumscribes process the criminal in three ways: it First, limits the kinds of be can imposed on those Gamble, convicted Estelle e. v. crimes, g., supra; Trop v. Dulles, it supra; proscribes punishment second, grossly disproportionate the severity g., e. crime, States, Weems United supra; imposes and third, sub stantive limits on what can be punished made criminal and g., e. Robinson such, California, supra. We have recog nized the last limitation as applied one to be sparingly. “The primary purpose of Cruel and Unusual Punishments [the always has been considered, and properly so, Clause] directed at the method or kind of punishment imposed for the violation of Texas, criminal statutes . . . .” Powell v. supra, at (plurality opinion).

In the few cases where the Court has had occasion to con impositions front claims that outside the process criminal constituted cruel and unusual punishment, it has no had diffi culty finding Eighth inapplicable. the Amendment Thus, Fong Ting States, United Yue 149 U. S. 698 v. the (1893), Eighth inapplicable Court held the Amendment depor to the on “deportation tation of the ground pun aliens that is y. crime,” Id., Mahler Eby, 730; ishment for at see 264 U. S. Bugajewitz Adams, 32 (1924); v. (1913). S. 585 Uphaus 72 Wyman, And in 360 v. S. the Court U. (1959), judgment sustained a of civil contempt, resulting incarcera pending compliance tion with a against claim subpoena, judgment imposed that punishment. cruel and unusual “ It emphasized 'essentially that the case involved a civil remedy designed parties for benefit of other . . . exercised ” compliance judicial for centuries to secure with decrees.’ Id., States, Green v. United quoting at 356 81, U. S. 165, (1958) (dissenting opinion).36

C acknowledge Petitioners that original design Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was to limit criminal but urge prohibition nonetheless should punishments, be extended to ban paddling of schoolchildren. Observ- ing Eighth that the Framers of the Amendment could not have present system our public envisioned edu- compulsory its opportunities with cation, noncriminal punishments, petitioners contend prohibition extension of the against punishments necessary cruel greater protec- lest we afford urging Eighth In us to extend pad Amendment ban school dlings, petitioners rely many on the decisions in which this has held Court prohibition against punishments “cruel and unusual” is not “ may acquire meaning public 'fastened to obsolete but opinion be ” justice.’ Gregg enlightened Georgia, comes S., v. U. humane Trop (joint opinion); see, g., Dulles, (1958) e. v. U. S. States, opinion); Weems United 349, 373, (plurality misplaced. Eighth This reliance Our have re decisions “evolving decency,” Trop Dulles, supra, standards of ferred determining punishments whether criminal are “cruel and unusual” under the Amendment.

66? criminals than to schoolchildren. It would be anom- tion to without con- if schoolchildren could be beaten alous, they say, suffering while hardened criminals the same stitutional redress, claim jailers their have a valid beatings might at the hands of 404 F. Bishop, Amendment. See Jackson v. Eighth under the Gamble, (CA8 1968); supra. Estelle v. Whatever 2d cf. may in other we find it an in- logic settings,37 have force wrenching Amendment from its adequate basis extending disciplinary context and it to traditional historical schools. practices wholly the schoolchild stand in different prisoner by con separated the harsh facts criminal

circumstances, prisoner’s conviction entitles and incarceration. The viction classify “criminal,” him as and his incarceration the State family him of freedom “to be with and friends deprives the enduring form the other attachments normal life.” and to Brewer, (1972); 482 see Meachum Morrissey v. U. S. 471, Fano, (1976). brutality, Prison as v. U. S. “part observed in this is of the total Appeals case, the Court of subjected is for being which the individual his proper subject Eighth for Amendment is a and, such, crime protection so, at 915.38 Even the af scrutiny.” 2d, 525 F. State, may by though the not labeled “criminal” punishments, Some punishments circumstances sufficiently analogous criminal be Eighth Amend justify application the they are administered which occasion in Gault, have no In re 387 U. S. We ment. Cf. circumstances case, or under what example, to consider whether juvenile can claim involuntarily in mental or institutions confined persons Eighth Amendment. protection the of the similarly the Cruel Unusual Judge Friendly has observed manner fairly applicable to the be deemed to be Clause “can Punishments by an exe ... is carried out sentence an constitutional in which otherwise Resweber, 329 U. S. 459 . . . Francis cutioner, Louisiana ex rel. v. see may make intolerable (1947), conditions of confinement which or to cover Glick, 481 imprisonment.” Johnson v. term of an constitutional otherwise (citation (1973) (CA2), denied, cert. 1028, 1032 F. 2d omitted). by Eighth Amendment is limited. After incar forded the “ only ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of

ceration, ” Gamble, Gregg quoting pain,' S., Estelle 429 U. Georgia, S., 173, constitutes cruel and unusual by Eighth forbidden Amendment. protection has little need

The schoolchild always Eighth may attendance not Though Amendment. public open school remains institution.

voluntary, very physically Except perhaps young, when child is and at the leaving during restrained from school hours; invariably end is free to return of the school the child day, him the brings while at the child with school, home. Even support rarely from teachers family apart and friends and protest any who instances of pupils may other witness and mistreatment. openness supervision school and its kinds of

community significant safeguards against afford pris- protects from which the abuses virtually punish- every community oner. In where rein- these permitted schools, safeguards ment Public legal forced of the common law. constraints privileged and administrators are at common school teachers reasonably such corporal punishment law to inflict as is necessary proper discipline child; for the education and of the in both any going beyond privilege may result punishment the long As liability. II, supra. Part as civil and criminal See scrutiny, to is no reason to open public the are there schools effectively constraints the common-law will not believe that those in this case.39 remedy alleged deter excesses such as and irrelevant, history dissenting opinion Mr. Putting the of aside as analysis” “purposive control the argues a should that Justice White Post, support at There no Eighth Amendment. 686-688. is reach of Although decisions of this Court. approach for this whatever “punishment” the Cruel and Unusual Punish for must be imposition punishments never held that all apply, has ments the Court Clause scrutiny. 40, ap The See n. Eighth Amendment subject are infra. conclude when teachers We ad- impose disciplinary corporal punishment, ministrators inapplicable. pertinent Amendment is The constitu- Eighth question imposition is whether tional is consonant with requirements process.40 of due

plicability Eighth always original of the Amendment has turned on its meaning, by Gregg as demonstrated its historical derivation. See v. Georgia, S., (joint Georgia, at opinion); 428 U. 169-173 Furman v. concurring). J., S.,U. at 315-328 (Marshall, dissenting opinion consequence today,

The warns that as a of our decision may Post, off being teachers “cut a ear child’s for late to class.” reality presented This rhetoric bears no relation to or to the in this issues virtually every physical The case. laws of State forbid excessive punishment logic Yet the of the make the schoolchildren. dissent would judgment disciplinary punishments of which are reasonable which principle every case, excessive matter constitutional to be decided ultimately by reading this Court. The hazards such a broad Eighth always say Amendment are clear. “It is time to this Nation large, complex composed great diversity peoples is too too too one by of us have the wisdom to establish rules which local govern Americans must their local affairs. constitutional rule we are urged adopt merely revolutionary—it is departs from the ancient premise experience faith making based on the local local laws people guide themselves far the safest for a nation like ours to Texas, Powell 514, (1968) (opinion Black, follow.” 392 U. S. v. J.). scrutiny Eighth appropriate only Amendment after the has State complied guarantees traditionally with the constitutional associated with prosecutions. criminal Lovett, See United States v. 317- Troy Thus, Dulles, (1958), U. plurality S. 86 appropriately took the view that impermissible denationalization was an punishment for Eighth wartime desertion under the Amendment, because already Kennedy had desertion been established at a criminal trial. But in Mendoza-Martinez, (1963), S. 144 where the Court considered evading draft, denationalization the Court refused issue, holding to reach instead that the imposed through process. Id., 162-167, could be criminal 43. As these cases demonstrate, acquire the State n. does not punish power which with Amendment is concerned until after

IV any The Fourteenth prohibits depriva state of tion or life, property due of law. liberty, process without Application of prohibition requires two- familiar stage analysis: first ask individ We must whether the asserted ual interests Amend encompassed within the Fourteenth protection protected ment's if liberty property"; of “life, procedures interests are implicated, we then must decide what Brewer, Morrissey “due process constitute of law.” 481; Roth, S., Regents Board U. of Hearing, See Kind Friendly, Some analysis (1975). Following L. Rev. 1267 Pa. here, we find schools liberty but implicates constitutionally protected interest, fully hold that remedies are we the traditional common-law adequate process. due to afford

A proc due protected procedural range of interests “[T]he Roth, supra, at Regents v. is not infinite.” Board ess grievous notion repeatedly rejected have “the We to invoke sufficient person by upon loss visited the State Clause.” the Due Process procedural protections is required Fano, process 224. Due S.,U. Meachum v. within an interest implicates of the State when a decision de And “to Amendment. the Fourteenth protection the first apply process requirements due termine whether nature ‘weight’ but to the must look not we place, Roth, supra, at 570-571. at stake.” interest in- Amendment, Fifth later Process Clause The Due Ameri- give intended Fourteenth, into the corporated process with due guilt in accordance adjudication of formal secured a it has without such impose seeks the State of law. Where guarantee is the Due Process pertinent constitutional adjudication, Amendment. Fourteenth Clause of the

673 cans at least protection the against governmental power that they enjoyed had Englishmen against power liberty Crown. The preserved from deprivation without due process right included the “generally enjoy privileges those long recognized at common law as essential orderly pursuit of happiness by Meyer Nebraska, free men.” v. 262 U. 399 390, (1923); S. see Dent Virginia, v. West 129 U. S. 114, (1889). 123-124 Among pro- the historic liberties so right tected was a to be judicial free and to obtain from, unjustified relief for, security.41 intrusions on personal While the liberty contours of historic this interest system context of our federal government of have not been defined they precisely,42 always thought have been to encom 41 Blackstone, 1 W. See Commentaries *134. Under the 39th Article Carta, Magna deprived right individual could not be this personal security by “except legal judgment by peers his law Perry Cooper, supra, 33, By subsequent of the land.” & n. at 17. enact during III, right, protected ments of Parliament the time of Edward was except “by process deprivation Shattuck, due from of law.” See The True Meaning “Liberty,” 365, (1891). of the Term 4 Harv. L. 372-373 Rev. 42See, g., Oklahoma, 535, (steri (1942) e. Skinner v. 316 U. S. lization); Massachusetts, (1905) (vaccination); Jacobson v. U. S. Botsford, 250, (1891) (physical Union R. Co. v. 141 U. S. 251-252 Pacific examinations); Brimson, 447, (1894). ICC cf. v. 154 U. S. right security personal protected Fourth Amend also

ment, through applicable which made the Fourteenth States “implicit concept in 'the of ordered protection because its was viewed as history liberty’ and the basic constitutional docu . . . enshrined in the Colorado, 25, S. English-speaking peoples.” v. ments of Wolf its (1949). the Fourth “over has been said of It privacy dignity against un protect personal riding is to function ... California, Schmerber the State.” warranted intrusion prohibition that Amendment’s principal concern of (1966). But privacy is with intrusions on seizures searches and against unreasonable Roe, investigations. Whalen v. 429 U. S. See in the course of criminal Fourth Amend do not contend (1977). Petitioners 604 n. 32 terms, according to its applies, ment school.

pass bodily freedom from punishment. restraint and See Rochin California, U. S. 165 It is fundamental the state cannot and physically punish hold an individ ual except process with due accordance of law. constitutionally liberty protected

This interest is at stake in course, There a de is, imposition case. minimis level of with which Constitution is not concerned. But at least where school acting law, under color of authorities, state deliberately to punish decide a child for re- misconduct straining the inflicting appreciable physical child and pain, liberty we hold Fourteenth Amendment interests are implicated.43

B Morrissey process is due.” question remains what “[T]he Brewer, not the common-law supra, Were it for corporal inflict teachers to reasonable privilege permitting availability and the care, on children in their requiring ad- the case abuse, the traditional remedies But strong be indeed.44 procedural safeguards would vance that tra- punishment—paddling—within here deal we with Lopez, (1975), case does involve this U. S. 565 Unlike Goss v. purpose interest in education. property the state-created interrupting without corporal is to a child’s behavior correct case, may, have rare corporal punishment in a That his education. no affords removing from school temporarily a child effect unintended property deprives students concluding practice itself that the basis for Amendment. protected the Fourteenth liberty going interest involve state-created case Nor does bodily from protection of freedom beyond Amendment’s the Fourteenth U. S. Fano, Meachum v. punishment. corporal restraint and Cf. (1976). 225-227 punish privilege to inflict reasonable If common-law any procedure whether inapplicable, it is doubtful in school were ment require satisfy juvenile court could criminal or a trial in a short of punishment. imposition of such process for due procedural ments of Jones, 317-318; cf. Breed v. S., at Lovett, United States v. See 528-529 dition, and question is whether the common-law remedies are adequate to afford process. due process,'

“‘[D]ue unlike some legal rules, not a tech nical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. . . . Representing profound attitude of fairness . . process' . 'due is compounded of history, past reason, course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which profess. we . . ." McGrath, Anti-Fascist Comm. v. concurring). U. S. 123, (1951) (Frankfurter, J., Whether in this case the common-law remedies for excessive corporal punishment process constitute due of law must turn analysis on an of the competing interests at viewed stake, against the background of past “history, reason, [and] course of analysis decisions.” The requires consideration three distinct “First, private factors: interest that will ; affected second, . . . deprivation risk of an erroneous probable such interest . if value, any, . . and of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, [state] interest, the function and the fiscal and including involved pro- or substitute administrative burdens that the additional Eldridge, Mathews requirement cedural would entail.” v. S. Kennedy, U. 319, (1976). S. Arnett Cf. concurring). 134, 167-168 (1974) J., (Powell, liberty interest child’s history, in Because it is rooted the care of while punishment corporal in avoiding Under limitations. subject to historical school authorities is rise security gave personal of invasion common law, subsequent judicial pro- in a damages right to recover *120-121. But the Blackstone, Commentaries ceeding. 3 W. concept justification. of by the qualified recovery right of gave a teacher who recovery against no be Thus, there could Id., at To *120. child. to a correction” only “moderate extent force used was in light reasonable its pur- it was pose, wrongful, “justifiable but rather or lawful.” Ibid. concept corporal punishment that reasonable in school justifiable most recognized continues to be in the laws

States. It “the struck supra. represents See Part balance II, Ullman, (1961) country,” Poe (Harlan, per- child’s J., dissenting), between the interest security sonal and limited cor- the traditional view some poral punishment may necessary be child’s course of a in- longstanding education. Under that accommodation of deprivation rights there no as terests, can be of substantive punishment long disciplinary corporal is within the limits privilege. the common-law say procedural This is not the child’s interest disciplinary process safeguards insubstantial. The school mistaken totally accurate, unerring process, is not “a never never Goss v. 419 U. S. Lopez, and unfair. . .” . In infliction of deliberate is some purpose,

on child who is restrained for that there liberty unjustified will risk that the intrusion on the child’s In child has therefore circumstances the unlawful. these strong procedural safeguards that minimize interest wrongful provide for the resolution risk disputed questions justification. safeguards turn now that are to a consideration of

We under applicable Florida law. available strength- has indeed recognize, has

Florida continued be child not to right of the common-law statute, ened in Under school. corporal punishment to excessive subjected the school decide of principal law teacher Florida reason- is punishment corporal whether first instance discipline in order to circumstances necessary ably under a child who has misbehaved. But they must pru- exercise dence restraint. For preserved Florida has the tradi- judicial tional proceedings for determining pun- whether ishment justified. If is inflicted later found to have been reasonably excessive—not believed at the time to necessary be for the discipline child's or training—the school authorities inflicting may it be held liable in damages to the child if and, shown, malice is they may subject be criminal penalties.45

Although students have testified specific case to instances of abuse, there is every reason to believe that such mistreatment is an aberration. The uncontradicted evidence suggests corporal punishment County the Dade schools was, the exception of “[w]ith a few cases, . . unremarkable . in physical severity.” App. 147. Moreover, pad because usually dlings are response inflicted in directly to conduct supra, 655-657, statutory See at 661. prohibition against “degrad unnecessarily ing” corporal “severe” in former 232.27 has § been construed as a principle. Op. statement of the common-law See 1937 Atty. Gen., Atty. Fla. Report (1937-1938); Biennial cf. Gen. Op. Atty. Gen., Atty. Report 7, (1957- Fla. of Biennial Gen. 1958). (3) punish (1976) Florida Stat. Ann. makes malicious §827.03 felony. of App. 144, ment a child a Both Court, the District and the Appeals, 2d, 915, expressed Court 525 F. the view that the common- remedy law petitioners peti tort was available to the in this case. And punish conceded tioners in this Court that a teacher who inflicts excessive may civilly criminally on ment a child be held both liable under 11, 34; Florida law. Brief for Petitioners 33 n. Arg. Tr. of Oral 52-53. statutory adoption rule, In view common-law and the unanimity parties below, and the expressed courts the doubts dissenting opinion availability as to of tort Justice White's Mr. can viewed chimerical. The remedies Florida dissent makes “recognized” damages court has ever much the fact no Florida Post, remedy punishment. unreasonable 694 n. hardly suggests reported Florida decisions But the absence no remedy Rather, merely judg- confirms the commonsense available. exceedingly corporal punishment rare in the ment that excessive schools. child the risk that a by teachers their presence,

observed In typically insignificant. cause paddled be without is will threatens ordinary disciplinary paddling neither case, nor seriously rights to substantive condemns violate any kind.” Anti-Fascist grievous suffer loss of child “to J., McGrath, (Frankfurter, Comm. at 168 S., v. U. concurring). is contemplated,

In those cases where severe sanctions for abuse—con the available civil criminal light openness of of school environment— sidered against corporal pun significant protection unjustified afford 670. supra, ishment. and school authori See Teachers unnecessarily unlikely corporal punishment inflict ties excessively possible consequence doing when so against or criminal them.46 proceedings institution civil in liberty may It still be that the child's argued, course, protected if the common-law remedies would be better terest prior safeguards the administrative supplemented were some hearing. frequently found and a We have notice arbitrary hearing necessary guard against of prior kind by the Fourteenth Amend protected on interests impositions abuse, availability judi of established The incidence of low abuse, from this case Goss remedies in the event of cial distinguish provided down in Goss Lopez, The Ohio law struck 419 U. S. 565 “any days suspensions up from without written Id., Although Ohio law suspensions.” procedure applicable to Ann. review, Ohio Code administrative Rev. provided generally for suspensions 1973), that the short would (Supp. assumed Court 2506.01 § proceeding review, result that the review stayed pending with the be S., nor function. 419 a deterrent a remedial serve neither could authorizing circumstances, the Court held the law In these at 581 n. 10. require “that there be at least for failure suspensions unconstitutional preferably disciplinarian, student and give-and-take between an informal subsequent Id., civil suspension . . . ." at 584. prior to the affording may in this case viewed proceedings available criminal conference greater protection to the child than informal substantially mandated Goss. e. See, g.,

ment. Board Regents Roth, atS., 569- 570; v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, Wolff (1974); cf. Friendly, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 1275-1277. But where the preserved State has what “has always been the law of the land,” United Barnett, States v. 376 681 U. S. (1964), the case for administrative safeguards is significantly less compelling.47

There is a relevant analogy in the criminal Although law. the Fourth Amendment specifically proscribes “seizure” of a person without probable cause, the police risk that will act un- reasonably in arresting suspect a is not thought require an advance determination of the In facts. United States v. Wat- son, 423 U. we (1976), reaffirmed the traditional com- police rule that may mon-law officers make public warrantless probable on arrests cause. Although we observed that an advance probable determination of by magistrate cause a would be desirable, we declined judicial “to transform this preference into constitutional rule when judgment and Congress Nation has for so long been to authorize public Id., arrests on probable warrantless .” cause . . . id., 423; at 429 J., concurring). Despite see (Powell, possibility police may improperly distinct officer assess unconstitutionally the facts and thus individual of deprive an many hearings might dispensed well be with in circum 47“[P]rior conduct, adequately justified, in which the state’s if not would stances injured plaintiff in a common-law tort. This would leave the constitute procedural posture plaintiff, and this precisely the same as a common-law consequence quite harmonious with the substantive view would be encompasses the same liberties as those amendment the fourteenth “Liberty” “Property,” Monaghan, Of law.” protected the common Bonner omitted). (1977) (footnote See 405, Cornell L. Rev. banc, 2d (CA7 en 545 F. Coughlin, 1311, modified 1975), 2d F. 76-6204. (1976), pending, cert. No. supra, to decide case, in this see n. have no occasion We punishment of a circumstances or under what whether cause of action to independent federal may give child rise to Clause. Due Process rights under vindicate substantive depart we liberty, declined from the traditional rule scrutiny perception subjected judicial which officer’s depart after the fact.48 There is no reason to from more require procedural safeguards tradition and for in- advance personal security trusions on Fourth which the apply. does not safeguards

But even if procedural the need for advance incre- clear, were would whether question remain Acceptance peti- benefit justify mental could cost. claims work a law tioners’ would transformation governing corporal punishment Florida and most other formulating Given rule of impracticability States. the severity due of procedural process that with the varies particular prior hearing petitioners seek imposition,49 any precede paddling, would have to however moderate trivial. requirement signifi- a would

Such universal constitutional burden use of as a cantly disciplinary time, Hearings—even hearings—require measure. informal and a attention from personnel, diversion normal pursuits. may School authorities well choose to abandon corporal punishment rather than incur the burdens of com- requirements. properly with the plying procedural Teachers, may with maintaining authority classroom, concerned in the prefer rely disciplinary on other well measures—which they may view less than confront effective—rather 48 Terry Ohio, (1968). 392 U. S. of a also The reasonableness See subjected scrutiny may subsequent judicial be arrest warrantless against suppression the law enforcement officer or action in a civil may in the be evidence seized arrest hearing to determine whether trial. in a criminal used “ 49 by shaped in process rules are risk of error rocedural due [P] cases, applied generality truthfinding process as herent Eldridge, Mathews v. exceptions. . .” U. S. rare . not the possible disruption prior notice and hearing may entail.50 Paradoxically, such an alteration disciplinary policy likely most to occur in ordinary case where the contemplated punishment is well within the common-law privilege.51

Elimination or curtailment corporal punishment would be many welcomed as a societal advance. But when such policy may choice result from this Court's determination of right asserted to due process, rather than from the normal processes of community legislative debate and action, societal costs cannot be dismissed as insubstantial.52 We are reviewing legislative here a history rooted in judgment, reaffirmed in many the laws of States, corporal punish- important ment serves judgment educational This interests. light must be viewed in disciplinary problems common- place in the schools. noted in As Goss v. Lopez, S.,U. calling discipline at 580: “Events frequent occurrences require and sometimes immediate, effective action." As- hearing, prior If a with the publicity inevitable attendant within school, rejection recommendation, resulted in of the teacher’s the conse quent ability impairment discipline of the teacher’s to maintain classroom would insubstantial. may interposing prior procedural safeguards The effect of well be to anxiety increasing make the the child. more severe reason, County it desirable For this the school authorities Dade found possible after infraction. be inflicted as soon App. 48-49. 52 proceedings may regularity disciplinary in procedural “It true that be communication, open promotes rapport and a sense of institutional treatment, provides the and his fellow perception and offender of fair democracy [r]espect But . . . for demo at work. students a showcase they thought if too ineffectual equally dissipate cratic institutions will of order in which educational provide an environment to their students Wilkinson, Lopez: Supreme The process may . . .” Goss v. go forward. 25, Sup. Ct. 71-72. 1975 Rev. Superintendent, Court as School 53 public disciplinary problems in the Nation’s The seriousness congressional report, recent Senate in a been documented schools has Investigate Delin Judiciary, Juvenile Subcommittee Committee on for, sessment the need appropriate and the means maintaining, discipline school generally committed to the discretion subject state authorities law. “[T]he repeatedly emphasized Court has affirming the need for comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental safeguards, constitutional prescribe and control in conduct the schools.” Tinker Des v. Dist.,

Moines School (1969).54 503, U. S. “At point some safeguard the benefit of an additional the individual society affected . . . and to in of increased terms by assurance that is just, may outweighed action be the cost.” Eldridge, S., Mathews at 348. v. We point think that has been reached in this In view case. abuse, of the low openness incidence of of our schools, safeguards already the common-law exist, the risk of error may result in violation of a schoolchild’s substantive rights regarded Imposing can as minimal. additional safeguards requirement administrative as a constitutional risk might reduce that but would also entail a marginally, significant primary intrusion into area of educational re sponsibility. We conclude that the Due Process Clause does require hearing prior notice and imposition to the of cor in poral punishment schools, practice as that authorized and limited the common law.55 quency, Century: Challenge the Third Environ Education a Safe Report on the Nature and ment—Final Prevention of School Violence (Comm. Vandalism, Cong., 1977). 95th 1st Print Sess. prob The need to maintain order a trial courtroom raises similar context, recognized power In that this Court has the trial lems. summarily contemptuous judge punish hearing “to and without notice or Taylor presence in his v. conduct committed observed him.” parte 488, (1974), citing Terry, Hayes, Ex 418 U. S. 128 U. S. may imposed

(1888). so be as severe as six months Codispoti Pennsylvania, (1974); 418 U. S. prison. 513-515 See Hoffman, 422 U. S. cf. Muniz dissenting opinion manageable offers no stand Mr. Justice White’s any particular determining process is due case. The what ards V Petitioners prevail cannot on either of the theories before us in this Eighth case. The prohibition Amendment’s against cruel and punishment unusual inapplicable is to school paddlings, and the Fourteenth requirement Amendment’s procedural process due satisfied Florida’s preservation of common-law constraints and agree remedies. We therefore with the Court of Appeals petitioners’ evidence affords no basis for injunctive relief, petitioners and that cannot re- damages cover on the basis of Eighth Amendment or procedural process due violation.

Affirmed. White, Brennan, Mr. Justice with whom Justice Mr. Marshall, Mr. Justice join, Mr. Justice Stevens dissenting.

Today corporal punishment the Court holds that subject of the schools, no matter how can never be the severe, protections It also holds afforded Amendment. require, rule, only give- apparently general “an informal dissent would as a Post, disciplinarian.” at 693. But and-take between student and depart procedures”—requiring even dissent would from these “minimal witnesses, counsel, cases where the and cross-examination—in severity. Post, 18. School at n. some undefined level of reaches require degree will guess authorities are left to at process that at the additional give-and-take” and more than an “informal approach impracticality of such an constitutionally required. The may be ignoring the traditional solu hazards of self-evident, and illustrates law. tion of the common be, “if procedures will the Goss often agree the dissent that with We impose upon principal would a fair-minded anything, less than S., Goss, But 700, quoting before Post, at himself.” requirement, impose procedural the Constitution Court invokes protection effect will be afford reasonably certain should be dissenting opin- interests stake. The constitutional to the appropriate and, suggests no such result beneficial reading the Constitution ion’s existing standards. lowering constitutional invites a indeed, systems are constitu- school not that students any beatings of hearing sort before tionally entitled to a I hold- inflicted on Because believe these can be them. that of prior decisions this Court and ings are inconsistent with analysis contrary pro- to a of the constitutional reasoned I involved, respectfully visions dissent.

I

A Eighth places prohibition against a flat This re punishments.” the infliction of “cruel and unusual judgment punishments that there are some flects a societal permit and inhumane that we will not are so barbaric that opprobrious no how imposed anyone, be matter to on them California, (1962) Robinson v. offense. See If some concurring). punishments there are (Douglas, J., they imposed may so that not be that are barbaric system the designated by of our social crimes, commission thoroughly commit, acts an individual can reprehensible most may not be on fortiori, punishments imposed similar then, persons culpable acts, for less such as breaches of constitutionally impermissible if it is to discipline. Thus, of must someone’s ear the commission murder, cut off being cut off a child’s ear for late unconstitutional be off in Although case, were no ears cut this class.1 there Eighth if fear that held to There is little reason to Amendment is schoolchildren, corporal punishment paddlings, all how apply at all to Bishop, moderate, prohibited. Jackson 2d 571 would be 404 F. ever any (CA8 paddling flogging prisoners, 1968), held that convicted serving prison terms, the cruel and violated unusual crime and Bishop Eighth But from the ban of the Amendment. aside fact that theory Court, has never been embraced that was not case intrinsically excessively bodily punishments are barbaric or severe paddling prisoners “degrading punisher and to the but punished That Id., approach may acceptable alike.” at 580. justice it has system, but if

the criminal relevance little beatings record reveals if they so severe that were inflicted on a hardened criminal for the commission of a serious crime, they might pass constitutional muster. majority

Nevertheless, holds Amend designed ment “was to protect [only] those convicted of crimes,” ante, at 664, relying vague on a and inconclusive history recitation the Amendment. Yet the constitu prohibition against tional punishments; cruel and unusual is prohibition nowhere that or limited modified the lan guage of the Constitution. the Certainly, the fact Framers did not choose to the insert word “criminal” into the language of the Eighth strong Amendment is evidence that the Amendment designed prohibit or all inhumane barbaric punishments, no matter what the nature of the for punishment offense which the is imposed. deny

No one can spanking “pun- schoolchildren is any ishment” under reasonable of the the reading word, for similarities between spanking public in schools other punishment forms of are ignore. too obvious to Like other spanking forms of punishment, of schoolchildren involves an response institutionalized to the violation of some official regulation proscribing or imposed rule certain conduct and is schools, hardly it punishment for can be said that the use of discipline paddlings moderate the of children is inconsistent the with country’s evolving decency. standards of hand, punishment cruel, beating

On the other when involves severe something ear, merely chopping dignity off an more than of the given punishment is criminal individual involved. Whenever is “cruel barbaric, because it inhumane or I and unusual” is can think of no reason why it would be less inhumane or barbaric when inflicted on a school- child, punishment for as classroom misconduct. spankings

The case is public issue this whether inflicted on school breaking “punishment,” children for rules is not whether such punishment Eighth is “cruel and If the unusual.” not does spanking schools, bar moderate spanking is because moderate unusual,” “punishment” is not “cruel and not because it is not as the majority suggests. rehabilitating purpose offender, deterring

for committing like him from and others the violation offender inflicting some measure of social retribution future, harm that has been done. B society that are punishments are fortunate that in our

We enough raise to their constitutional valid severe a doubt as affording ac ity ordinarily imposed without first provided the full panoply procedural safeguards cused “every criminal has deci process.2 The effect been of this whether 'cruel considering sion Court meaning unusual' and Four within punishment.” has with a criminal teenth Amendments dealt Ante, Court have would us believe from recognized fact that is a distinction between criminal and there Eighth Amend purposes noncriminal plainly wrong. legislative ment. This a clear “[E]ven 'non-penal' classification statute not alter of a would Trop penal of a plainly fundamental nature statute.” Dulles, The rele (1958) (plurality opinion). 95 U. S. inquiry whether offense for a vant is not the which pur criminal, inflicted has labeled as but whether the is been among ordinarily is those deprivation of the associated pose suggested just spanking By is that because school no means of meaning of Cruel “punishment” is within the the and Unusual children any way disciplinary process in Clause, the school is “criminal” Punishments guarantees. procedural full subject panoply to the of criminal and therefore Ordinarily, for II, the conduct schoolchildren Part which are See infra. sufficiently opprobrious to be in punished is called “criminal” our disciplinary of society, might and even school rules that also violations subject infra, crime, process. a are not to the constitute see criminal held, Palmigiano, (1976), 425 U. S. 308 the Baxter v. where Court See prison disciplinary are not the persons that who violate rules entitled to safeguards, panoply procedural of if the rule full criminal even violation might a also constitute crime.

with punishment, such as retribution, deterr rehabilitation, Id., Kennedy ence.3 at 96. Mendoza-Martinez, Cf.

U.S. purposive If this approach present were followed in the case, it be clear would that spanking in the Florida is punishment schools within the meaning Eighth of the “[c]orporal Amendment. The p District Court found that uni sh ment is of a variety one of employed measures system for the correction of pupil behavior and the preservation order.” App. 146. correction Behavior Trop majority The cites as one of the cases that “dealt with a criminal punishment” neglects analysis but to follow the mandated decision. Trop petitioner by military In was convicted of desertion court- years labor, and sentenced to three pay martial hard of all forfeiture allowances, discharge. a dishonorable punished After he was committed, petitioner’s offense he application passport for a was turned down. Petitioner was told that he deprived had been “rights (g) citizenship” Nationality under Act of § dishonorably discharged he had because been from Armed Forces. The plurality took the view that denationalization this context was cruel and punishment prohibited Eighth unusual Amendment. majority us would have believe that determinative factor

Trop petitioner had desertion; yet been convicted of there Trop suggestion disposition military no is that the court-martial anything Instead, had to do with the in that recog decision case. while nizing punishments that the Amendment extends penal plurality nature, adopted approach a purposive determining penal. when deciding

“In penal, generally whether or not lawa this Court has based upon purpose its determination If imposes the statute. the statute disability purposes punishment—that is, for the reprimand wrongdoer, others, penal. to deter etc.—it has been considered But a nonpenal imposes disability, statute has been considered if it not to punish, accomplish legitimate governmental but to some other purpose.” S., (footnotes omitted). at 96 Although quoted passage plurality opinion the is taken from the of Mr. Warren, joined by Justices, Chief Justice three other Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring adopted approach opinion, a similar in con a cluding beyond (g) power Congress that to enact. § preservation of order purposes ordinarily associated with punishment.

Without even mentioning the purposive analysis applied the prior decisions of this majority Court, adopts a rule that turns on the given label to the offense for which the punishment is inflicted. Thus, the record in this case reveals that one student at Drew Junior High School received 50 licks with paddle a allegedly making an telephone obscene Brief call. majority Petitioners 13. The holds Eighth prohibit Amendment does not such since it was inflicted for a breach of discipline. How- ever, same conduct is punishable as a misdemeanor under law, Florida Ann. (Supp. § Fla. Stat. 365.16 1977), and there can be little doubt if “punishment” that same had been by inflicted an officer of the state courts for violation of 365.16, § it would satisfy have had to requirements Eighth Amendment.

C In as the Court fact, recognizes, Eighth Amendment has punishments.4 never been confined to criminal Nevertheless, majority its protections adheres to view that afforded by Eighth Amendment something must have to do with

4Ante, Gamble, (1976), 669. In Estelle S. 97 a case Term, decided this Court held that “deliberate to the indifference prisoners” by prison medical needs of officials constitutes cruel and Eighth punishment prohibited unusual Amendment. Such delib clearly prisoner’s erate medical indifference to needs is not crime; merely for the of a it is inflicted commission misconduct prison Similarly, Eighth whipping official. Circuit has held that prisoner strap discipline prohibited by with a in order to maintain Bishop, (1968) (Blackmun, Amendment. Jackson v. 2d 571 F. J.). Gillman, (CA8 1973) Knecht v. See also 488 F. 2d 1139-1140 (injection drugs vomit-inducing part therapy of aversion held to unusual); Scott, (CA7 1972) cruel Vann F. 2d (Stevens, J.) (Eighth runaway protects against children cruel treatment, regardless and inhumane of whether such treatment is labeled “punishment”). “rehabilitation” or it would

criminals, any exceptions therefore confine to only general punishments its rule that criminal are covered by the Eighth prisoners. abuses inflicted on Amendment to if Thus, prisoner mercilessly a is beaten of for a breach dis- he is cipline, protection Eighth entitled to the of the Amend- of ment, while a schoolchild who the same breach commits similarly discipline simply and is beaten is not covered. purported explanation anomaly of this is the assertion that schoolchildren have no need for the Amendment. Eighth open subject We are told that to institutions, schools are public adequate constant schoolchildren scrutiny; that have law;5 prisoners remedies under state and that suffer the stigma social being any labeled How as criminals. these policy got considerations into the Constitution difficult to is for discern, the Court has never considered of these determining factors in the scope Eighth of the Amendment.6 finding bodily punishment By constitutionally protected invades a liberty meaning Clause, majority interest within of the Due Process suggests might remedy that the Clause spanking also afford a for excessive independently Eighth of the case, Amendment. If this were the present Court’s practical thesis would significance. have little If rather holding than Due remedy by way Process affords Clause express Eighth Amendment, commands of majority recog would nize a cause of action under 42 deprivation U. S. C. § “liberty” flowing paddling, from an opinion merely excessive the Court’s lengthy respect word of with drafting advice complaints. of civil Petitioners in this case did process raise the substantive due in their issue petition certiorari, ante, question 659 n. but consideration of that grant was foreclosed our limited probable of certiorari. If it is protection schoolchildren would be entitled theory under some process, substantive due the Court should not judgment now affirm the below, but should grant amend the of certiorari and set this case for reargument. support policy In considerations, its cases from this Court majority cited Morrissey Brewer, (1972), Fano, Meachum (1976), S. 215 involving both prisoners’ cases rights procedural process. due argument schoolchil majority’s

The essence is that cor protection because dren do not need poral subject less abuse system.7 it is in it cannot prison However, schools than the reasonably suggested unusual just be that because cruel and punishments may frequently public scrutiny, occur less under they public will not occur mere that a at all. The fact flogging or all to see public a execution would available for it punishment would not render constitutional if were the impermissible. Similarly, majority otherwise the would minimum-security suggest prisoner placed that a who is a prison permitted family home to his on the week go to any pro Eighth ends should be entitled to Amendment less maximum-security counterpart prison. than his in a tections In if inhumane that short, a is so barbaric and it goes beyond openness the tolerance of a civilized its society, scrutiny con nothing should have do with its public to to validity. stitutional adequate may have

Nor is it answer that schoolchildren remedies other state and constitutional available them. public remedies assuming the available Even availability adequate under Florida law,8 students are coverage has been determinative of the state remedies never by the protections Eighth afforded or of Amendment. may The fact that a person reason is obvious. have corporal punishment the record that is no evidence in has been There systems prison public more often than schools. abused prisons. Indeed, corporal punishment is seldom authorized in state See (then Bishop, Judge) supra, at where Mr. Justice Jackson v. “[O]nly permit strap still use of the noted: two states [in Blacemun uniformly By relying prisons]. almost has been abolished.” Thus on two public institutions, the nature of these without its own view below, being question majority today predicates heard on evidence speculation. armchair principle on mere constitutional public the state-law doubt that remedies available to There some adequate. n. See school children infra.

state-law cause of against action official who tortures him with a thumbscrew for the commission of an antisocial act nothing has do with the fact that such official conduct is cruel and unusual prohibited by Amendment. Indeed, majority’s was implicitly view re jected Term Gamble, in Estelle (1976), U. S. 97 when the Court held that failure to provide for medical prisoners needs could punish constitute cruel and unusual ment even though malpractice a medical in tort remedy prisoners available to Id., under state law. at 107 n. 15.

D By holding the Eighth protects criminals, majority adopts the entitled view one is protections the by afforded the Eighth only if punished he is sufficiently for acts opprobrious that are society to make them “criminal.” is a holding This curious view the that culpable fact the more the offender the likely more punishment is that the dispropor will not be to offense, likely tionate and the less it is consequently, punishment that will be cruel Conversely, and unusual.9 public spanked school student who is for a mere breach of discipline may strong argument sometimes have a that punishment depending does not fit offense, upon severity of beating, it is and un therefore that cruel majority protec Yet the afford student usual. would no tion matter how the punishment no inhumane barbaric him be. might inflicted on phase issue in this of the case presented

The is limited to in public ever corporal punishment whether schools can be I Eighth Amendment. am prohibited by the therefore not Eighth with penalty be consistent For Amendment “the grossly proportion severity out to the must not Gregg Georgia, (1976) (joint opinion 428 U. S. crime.” v. JJ.). Stevens, Powell, Stewart, public that

suggesting spanking schools in every is prohibited Eighth instance My Amendment. own I it is not. take with view that issue the extreme majority corporal punishment public view of the that barbaric, no matter how schools, inhumane, severe, is never limited Amendment. punish- Where so severe to be unacceptable ment becomes a civilized I see no that it should more society, can reason become just acceptable because it is inflicted on children in the schools.

II corporal punishment majority The concedes that Due by the implicates protected an interest public schools be free of the student liberty Process Clause—the interest involving “appreciable ”bodily punishment” restraint and from state under color pain” by persons acting physical inflicted majority as the Ante, question remaining, at 674. The law. process is due. recognizes, is what provide a State requires reason the Constitution for mis individual punishes an of law” when it process

“due or mis from erroneous protect the individual conduct inflicted have the State would taken g., way. e. See, more reliable facts in a it found the had In Eldridge, 319, 335, 424 U. S. Mathews applied the Court (1975), Lopez, Goss holding disciplinary process, to the school principle heard to be opportunity informal given an must be student public school. suspended from finally he is before good in utmost although proceeding “Disciplinarians, others; advice reports act on frequently faith, nature of the conduct controlling and the facts and the error disputed. risk challenge are often under if trivial, guarded against be it should all is at prohibitive cost interference without may done with the Id., educational process.” at 580. (Emphasis added.) guard

To against this risk punishing innocent child, the Due Process Clause requires, not an “elaborate hearing” be fore neutral but party, simply “an informal give-and-take between and disciplinarian” student which gives the student “an opportunity explain his version of Id., the facts.” 580, 582, 584.

The Court now holds that these “rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken id., findings misconduct,” at 581, required are not if the punished student is “appreciable with physical pain” rather than with a suspension, though even punishments both deprive the student of a constitutionally protected Although interest. the respondent school author- provide absolutely ities process no to the student before the punishment finally inflicted, majority concludes the student given nonetheless due process because he can later sue the damages teacher and recover if was “excessive.”

This utterly tort action is inadequate protect against erroneous infliction of for two reasons.10 First, law, punished under Florida a student for an act he did not commit damages cannot recover from a teacher “proceeding

10 Here, Lopez, 565, 580-581, (1975), in Goss v. n. suggests may record that there be a risk substantial of error the disci pline by respondent Respondents administered school authorities. con petitioners punished cede that some of who were “denied misconduct” punishments may and that “in some cases the have . . .” been mistaken . panel Respondents Appeals 60-61. The Brief Court below noted innocence, punished despite numerous of students claims of instances (CA5 1974), “particularly disturbed F. 2d testimony punished were for the corporally that whole classes of students Id., majority n. To the that the misconduct of few.” extent unduly punishments, on the incidence of and remedies for severe focuses required safeguards are petitioners’ procedural claim that fails to address simply punishments that are to reduce the risk of mistaken. reports others,” advice of on the and good faith . . .

in utmost punishment all remedy at for has no 692; at the student supra, as the long at least facts, the basis mistaken on imposed the the view of point punishment was reasonable from “tra The by hearing.11 any prior uninformed disciplinarian, contrary, to me whether the it is unclear to majority’s assurances against school damages a action provides extent Florida law to what Giving majority the corporal punishment. the excessive officials for say the most doubt, I it is fair to that a student every think benefit hope for allegations can of misconduct punished of mistaken on the basis strongly But I recovery or bad-faith error. for in Florida is a unreasonable remedy not available. suspect this is that even single case decided under Florida Although majority does not cite a right sue school official to recover recognizes a student’s that law willing I to assume that such a tort damages punishment, am for excessive doubts about I nevertheless have serious exist in Florida. action does recovery simply provide because he a student whether would ever All he did commit. the cases in other punished for an offense ante, allega jurisdictions majority, n. involved cited punishment disproportionate to the misconduct with tions of which charged; suggest none of the decisions even that a student student was incorrectly by showing imposed punish the teacher could recover majority had something appears for the student not done. The ment remedy only punishment agree damages in available cases light charged. “In It unreasonable in of misconduct states: those cases punishment contemplated, where severe available civil and criminal against unjustified significant protection . afford cor sanctions for abuse . . added.) poral Ante, (Emphasis punishment.” remedy if common-law for excessive extends Even imposed is “excessive” sense that it is on facts, protected are still basis of mistaken the school authorities from liability immunity. (They personal protected by common-law statutory immunity liability enforcing disciplinary “[e]xcept rules punishment.” force or cruel case excessive unusual Fla. Stat. minimum, immunity At protect Ann. would (1976).) §232.275 damages liability from good school officials for reasonable mistakes made “Although differing emphases there have been formulations of faith. immunity common-law school officials cases of ex student pulsion suspension, generally recognized courts state have that such

ditional common-law remedies” on which the majority relies, ante, 672, thus do nothing protect from student danger that concerned the Court in Goss—the risk of reason good-faith able, mistake in the disciplinary school process. Second, and more important, even if the student could sue good-faith for error in the infliction of the law punishment, suit occurs after finally has imposed. been The physical infliction of pain is irreparable; final and cannot be undone a subsequent proceeding. There is every reason to require, Goss, as the Court did in min a few give-and-take utes of “informal between student and disci protected liability from officers should be tort good- under state law for all faith, nonmalicious action taken to fulfill their official duties.” Wood v. Strickland, (1975) 308, (adopting 318 this rule for suits 1983 § id., (footnote involving discipline) omitted); see (citing 318 n. 9 cases). applied police state Florida has this rule to a officer’s determina arrest; probable cause to damages tion the officer is not liable in for probable on reasonably an arrest not based cause if the officer believed Albro, Miami v. probable (Fla. cause existed. 120 2d So. 26 Dist. Beach, cf. Middleton v. Fort Walton App. 1960); (Fla. Ct. 2d 431 So. 1959) App. (police personally officer would Dist. for inten Ct. liable making pursuant void); tional tort of arrest to warrant he knew to be O’Neal, (Fla. Wilson v. App. 1960) (law So. 2d 101 Dist. enforce Ct. damages obtaining ment not liable in officer an arrest warrant on identification). every incorrect basis of an There reason to think that apply immunity the Florida courts would a similar hypo standard in a against damages disciplinarian. suit a school thetical remedy damages A final limitation on the student’s under Florida law personal is that the student can recover from the assets of the official; treasury absolutely protected by sovereign the school board’s McLean, Buck immunity damages agents. from torts of its (Fla. App. 1959). 115 So. 2d 764 Dist. Ct. A teacher’s limited resources may jury awarding, prevent collecting, deter the from or the student from to which he is entitled. Cf. Bonner damages the full amount of Coughlin, 1975), (CA7 banc, 517 F. 2d modified en F. n. (state-law (1976), pending, remedy 2d No. affords due cert. immunity negligence process sovereign official bars tort suit for where no guard). prison against “meaningful hedge” the erroneous as plinarian” irreparable injury. S., infliction of at 583-584.12 majority’s damages remedy conclusion for exces The that a adequate process rests on the corporal punishment sive affords with theory may punish an individual novel State any opportunity present him his side giving out a state damages from long as he can later recover story, per theory would logic if official he is innocent. one-day jail with a punished speeding mit a State that a first without to make a driver serve his sentence sentence wrongful imprisonm damages for trial and then sue to recover away finally prison a could take Similarly, the State ent.13 infractions and alleged disciplinary credits for good-time er’s eventually he was bring damages him to a suit after require authority nor does the theory, There is no for this released. process due any,14 procedural to find majority purport 338, Leasing Corp. States, v. United S. M. U. Cf. G. taxpayer’s that, levying on a assets (1977). there held The Court assessment, agents obtain a warrant jeopardy revenue must a pursuant to seizing property his searching taxpayer’s office but not before before Leasing M. privacy. thus no invasion of G. manner that involves in a (such procedural safeguards for advance principle that the case reflects probable cause) compelling magistrate’s more determination of as a injury repaired in finally cannot be inflicts an the Government when subsequent (invasion privacy) judicial proceeding than when a (seizure property). injury can be undone temporary which inflicts bodily punishment, privacy, presents The like invasion of infliction procedural safeguards. compelling most case for advance analogy majority attempts To the extent that the to find “a relevant holding probable its criminal law”—warrantless arrests on cause—to here, ante, (and infra, 697-699), wrong at 679-680 see at it has chosen the majority forthrightly applied present process analogy. If the its due anal only ysis prosecutions, police officer not could area of criminal suspect suspect but also could convict the arrest a without a warrant jail him to a short term. The accused without a trial sentence would imprisonment. get process his in a tort suit for false due prior hearing “significantly proposition For need for a decisions this Court. Those cases have “consistently held that some kind hearing is required at some time before person is finally deprived property his interests . . . [and person’s liberty is equally protected that] . . .” . Wolff McDonnell, 418 U. S. 557-558 (1974). (Emphasis added.) majority attempts support its theory by novel

drawing an analogy to probable warrantless arrests on cause, which the Court has held reasonable under the Fourth Amend ment. United Watson, States v. This analogy fails for two reasons. First, particular require ments of the Fourth Amendment, rooted in the “ancient common-law regulating police id., practices, rule[s]” must be understood in the context justice sys of the criminal tem for which that explicitly Amendment was tailored. Thus Pugh, Gerstein v. 420 U. S. 103 (1975), speaking the Court, through Powell, Mr. rejected the argument Justice procedural protections required in Goss and due process other compelling” preserved remedies,” less where the State has “common-law 679, 678, ante, majority supra, case, Coughlin, cites Bonner v. one dismissing allegation by prisoner acting a prison guards an that under color deprived of had property process state law him of without due of law negligently failing search, to close the door after a with of his cell the fore consequence panel seeable that his trial The transcript held stolen. right negligence of that the to recover state for the state em under law ployees provided prisoner process the with due of law. The decision is dis First, recovery grounds. tinguishable case on two from the instant immunity, remedy by sovereign and the state was not or official barred property.” prisoner whole for of be “made loss ensured that the would Regional Reorganization Cases, 1319, Act 2d, 23. Rail F. and n. Cf. here, course, of point The is the student that S.U. wrongful punishment. Second, whole for the infliction of cannot be made hearing where it does not intend pre-deprivation hold the State cannot a protect best can deprivation; the do the individual from inflict the provide damages remedy. act a and inadvertent is to unauthorized deprivation is 2d, at 1319 n. Here the intentional a F. prior hearing altogether feasible.

cases should be afforded criminal suspect to a arrested without a warrant.

“The the explicitly Fourth Amendment was tailored justice criminal in system, and its balance between dividual always thought interests has been define ‘process the due’ for of or person that is seizures property in criminal the cases, including detention suspects pending Moreover, . Fourth trial. . . probable is in cause determination fact stage unique jurispru of an elaborate in system, first dence, designed to safeguard rights those accused simple conduct. relatively proce criminal The civil (e. dures with g., prior interview principal before suspension) presented [procedural process] due in the concurring opinion cases cited are inapposite context criminal wholly irrelevant different justice Id., system.” (Emphasis at 125 n. 27. in last added.) sentence is not dealing perhaps with warrantless arrests

While case wholly altogether “inapposite and irrelevant different is far disciplinary process, of the school such case context” authority procedural than such process due cases weaker Lopez, (1975), depriva- deal with Goss v. U. S. 565 criminal liberty outside the context. tions n. contrary ante, to the Second, majority’s suggestion, upheld arrests the Court has the reason warrantless assess police because officer’s probable cause on “may subjected subsequent judicial facts ment against action the law enforcement officer scrutiny a civil has hearing . reason that Court suppression . .” . they warrants without arrests upheld “first procedural Ger system” of protections, an elaborate stage of 27, and that is not at 125 n. State Pugh, supra, stein v. beyond stage this first deprivation without continue free to requires provide the State Constitution The procedures. fair “a and reliable determination of probable by cause” judicial prior officer imposition to the “any significant pre trial restraint liberty” other than “a period brief of deten tion to take the steps administrative incident to [a warrantless] Id., arrest.” at 114, (Footnote 125. omitted; emphasis added.) “practical This compromise” necessary is made be “requiring cause a magistrate’s review of justifica the factual prior any tion arrest . . . would constitute an intolerable handicap legitimate id., for law at it enforcement,” 113; but probable-cause is the prior determination significant period of pretrial incarceration, rather than damages action suppression or that hearing, suspect affords the due process.

There in basis is, short, logic authority no or majority’s suggestion that an action to damages recover excessive corporal punishment substantially greater “afford [s] protection to the child than the informal conference mandated by Goss.”15 majority purports to follow the settled “ principle process what depends that of an due on 'the risk erroneous deprivation protected] interest . . and [the .

probable if value, or any, procedural additional substitute safeguards’ ”;16 Goss, it recognizes, as did the risk of error disciplinary process17 and concedes “the strong procedural child has a mini safeguards interest 676; ante, mize the of wrongful risk . . at ,”. 15 Ante, n. at 46. Eldridge, 319, Ante, Mathews 675, quoting U. S. at Goss, Ante, 676, S., at quoting at 579-580. Elsewhere insig “typically majority risk of error is opinion its asserts usually response inflicted in to conduct “paddlings are nificant” because Ante, But directly presence.” in their 677-678. observed teachers assertion, for this and there is in the record finding or evidence cites no authorizing regulations corporal punish no the statute such restriction Indeed, panel noted ante, 656 n. 7. below See at 655 ment. n. punished were an assistant in which students specific instances alleged offenses were present when the committed. principal who was 2d, F. adequately reduced concludes this risk is but somehow that by a recognized by remedy never been damages that has student unprotected Florida leaves the innocent court, that first punish punished mistake, and that allows State I agree. cannot and hear the version events later. student’s Goss, that majority emphasizes, The as did the dissenters decision “rudimentary precautions” required that even the disciplinary process. burden the school impose would some on greater no if the is rather paddled But those costs are student no punishment risk suspended; than of error into the dis smaller; significant of “a intrusion” fear ante, Goss, at 585 ciplinary process, (cf. supra, (Powell, The exaggerated. disciplinarian dissenting)), just J., “notice of the give take few minutes student need explanation charges against and, them, him if he denies an opportunity the authorities have and evidence In story.” S., at 581. present his side of “if less than requires, anything, Constitution context upon himself” principal impose would fair-minded school Id., injustice.18 order to at 583. avoid judgment

I would reverse the below. Stevens, dissenting.

Mr. Justice analysis of the

Mr. Justice White’s I persuaded I unanswerable. also that is, believe, am issue issue is correct. analysis procedural process due his holding Notwithstanding my disagreement with the Court’s 18My expressed procedures here of Goss are re minimal view liberty implicating the quired student’s for imply meant this minimum be is, would course, interest constitutionally severe the inflicted. sufficient no how matter by suggesting explicit made this reservation Goss The Court witnesses, counsel, procedures such as and cross-examina more elaborate 10-day longer than might required suspensions max tion well S., A at 583-584. similar caveat is in that case. imum involved appropriate here.

on the latter my question, respect for Mr. Justice Powell’s reasoning in Part IV-B opinion of his prompts Court these comments. prohibition constitutional of state deprivations of life,

liberty, or property without process due of law does not, its express require language, that hearing provided be before any deprivation may occur. To be sure, the timing of the process may be a critical element in determining its ade- quacy—that is, deciding in process what is due a particular context. Generally, adequate notice and a fair opportunity to heard deprivation advance of a constitutionally protected interest are essential. The Court recognized, has however, that wording of the command that there shall be deprivation no “without” due process of law is consistent with the conclusion that a postdeprivation remedy is sometimes constitutionally sufficient.1

When property an invasion of a is involved, interest there is greater damages likelihood that a award will make person completely whole when than an invasion individual’s in freedom from bodily interest restraint and punishment has property occurred. In the context, there- fore, frequently a postdeprivation remedy may state be all the process may the Fourteenth requires. It express also be I true—although do not an on the opinion point—that an adequate remedy may state for defamation satisfy process requirement the due impaired a State has when On reputation. hypothe- interest his individual’s analysis sis, today gives the Court’s rise to the thought Davis, may Paul 424 U. correctly v. S. have been decided Perhaps day on an incorrect rationale. the Court will one Leasing Co., 663; Calero-Toledo v. U. S. Pearson Yacht Fuentes v. 67, 82, 90-92; Ewing Mytinger v. Shevin, Casselberry, U. S. & 598-600; Phillips 589, 595-599; v. Commissioner, 283 U. U. S. S. 133, 140-142; S. cf. Steele, Gerstein S.U. Pugh, Lawton 103, 113-114. appraisal impor- with Mr. Justice Brennan’s

agree id., 720-723, tance of constitutional interest at stake opinion), nevertheless (dissenting conclude that an may prevent remedy every adequate state state-inflicted in- reputation from jury person’s violating to a C. 1983.2 § Coughlin, (CA7 1975), Bonner 517 F. 2d

2 Cf. banc, (1976), pending, 76-6204; en F. 2d 565 modified cert. No. see Swygert’s opinion, id., Judge thoughtful at 569-578. also

Case Details

Case Name: Ingraham v. Wright

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Apr 19, 1977

Citation: 430 U.S. 651

Docket Number: 75-6527

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS