JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; MARI BEAN, Real Party in Interest.
No. B254739
Second Dist., Div. Five.
Sept. 16, 2014.
229 Cal. App. 4th 1083
[CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*]
Cummings McClory Davis & Acho, Sarah L. Overton; Sedgwick and Douglas J. Collodel for Petitioners.
No appearance for Respondent.
Gordon, Edelstein, Krepack, Grant, Felton & Goldstein, Roger L. Gordon and Vincent Vallin Bennett for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
TURNER, P. J.—
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendants, the Judicial Council of California (the council) and Administrative Office of the Courts, have filed a mandate petition. Defendants seek to compel the respondent court to grant their summary judgment motion. Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff, Mari Bean, failed to present a government claim to the Secretariat of the Judicial Council (the secretariat).
In this extraordinary writ proceeding, we must apply 2002 and 2010 enactments specifying the manner of presenting government claims naming defendants.
Plaintiff argues she complied with the government claims presentation requirement even though she never mailed or personally delivered it to the secretariat. Rather, she mailed her government claim naming defendants to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board. Relying on
II. THE PLEADINGS
Plaintiff alleges, in a council form complaint, she was severely injured while riding in an elevator in the Clara Shortridge Foltz Criminal Justice Center in Los Angeles; she had complied with applicable claim statutes; and defendants owned, manufactured, “and/or” operated the elevator and failed to properly maintain it. Based on these allegations, plaintiff alleges causes for negligence and a dangerous condition on public property.
III. DEFENDANTS’ UNDISPUTED FACT STATEMENT
Defendants’ separate statement asserts there are three undisputed facts: plaintiff did not present a timely government claim to the secretariat for a claim against the council; real party in interest did not present a timely claim to the secretariat for a claim against the Administrative Office of the Courts; and the secretariat never received any government claim from plaintiff. The evidence supporting these three undisputed facts consists of the declaration of Benita Downs, an employee working in the secretariat as the administrative coordinator. In addition, defendants relied upon the documents produced by plaintiff in response to a document production demand and her special interrogatory answers.
Ms. Downs‘s declaration reveals she has been employed by the Administrative Office of the Courts since 1996. She had been assigned to the secretariat unit since February 2012. In her capacity as the administrative coordinator, she maintains the official log of all documents presented or served upon the secretariat. Ms. Downs declared, “I am responsible for receiving and logging all of the government claims, summons and complaints and any other legal process presented to or served upon the [s]ecretariat . . . for claims against either the Judicial Council . . . or the Administrative Office of the Courts.” Ms. Downs describes in detail the procedures utilized to document the receipt of any form of legal process including government claims.
. . .
Ms. Downs had searched the official log of the secretariat for the years 2011 and 2012. No person with plaintiff‘s name ever filed a government claim. No person with plaintiff‘s last name ever filed a government claim with the secretariat. The only legal process involving plaintiff served on the
In addition to Ms. Downs‘s declaration, defendants rely on plaintiff‘s response to a document production demand and special interrogatory answers. Defendants submitted a production demand for plaintiff‘s timely government claim presented to the secretariat. In response, plaintiff produced a government claim form stamped “RECEIVED” on January 4, 2011, directed to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board. The government claim names the State of California and defendants. The claim, prepared by plaintiff‘s lawyer, Vincent Bennett, identifies the location where she was injured as an elevator in the Clara Shortridge Foltz Criminal Justice Center.
In addition, defendants rely on plaintiff‘s special interrogatory answers. In two special interrogatories, plaintiff was asked to identify all facts which supported her contention that she presented a timely claim to the secretariat. Plaintiff answered both special interrogatories by referring to the government claim received on January 4, 2011, by the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board. And plaintiff added in her special interrogatory answers: “See, also the trial court‘s notice of ruling concerning Defendant‘s Demurrer. The Court ruled that Plaintiff had complied with the Government Claim filing requirements.”
IV. PLAINTIFF‘S UNDISPUTED FACT STATEMENT
. . .
Plaintiff relies on a series of documents including the complaint and the government claim submitted on December 29, 2011. In addition, she cites to an Administrative Office of the Court media advisory dated June 1, 2011, which states in part: “The Clara Shortridge Foltz Criminal Justice Center in Los Angeles transitions today from the county to the Administrative Office of the Courts as managing party. [[] . . . The facility transitions from the county to the state as managing party on Wednesday, June 1, 2011. [[] . . . The transfer is part of a process set in motion by the Trial Court Facilities Act of 2002, the landmark legislation that envisioned a single, comprehensive infrastructure program for court facilities statewide as a final step in the unification of California‘s trial courts. The law authorized transfer for all California court facilities from the counties to the state, ensuring equal access to safe, secure, and adequate court[s] to the benefit of all Californians. By sharing knowledge and resources from all 58 California counties, the [Administrative Office of the Courts] applies the state‘s large-scale purchasing power to create greater efficiencies and cost savings. The Foltz facility
Also, plaintiff relied upon a January 17, 2012 letter addressed to her attorney, Mr. Bennett, from the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board. The letter indicates it was sent by the Government Claims Program on behalf of the State of California. The letter acknowledges the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board received plaintiff‘s claim on December 30, 2011. The letter further states: “To the extent the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board has jurisdiction over your claim, the claim is being rejected because the issues presented are complex and outside the scope of analysis and interpretation typically undertaken by the [California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board]. The claim has been placed on the consent agenda. The [California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board] will act on your claim at the hearing referenced below (February 16, 2012). You do not need to appear at this hearing. The [California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board‘s] rejection of your claim will allow you to initiate litigation should you wish to pursue this matter further.” Mr. Bennett, plaintiff‘s attorney, received a second letter dated February 24, 2012, from the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board, which indicates her claim had been rejected on February 16, 2012. The February 24, 2012 letter contains a warning concerning the six-month statute of limitations for filing suit after rejection of a government claim. Near the bottom of both letters is the notation: “Judicial Council, Attn: Michael Bergeisen.”
Additionally, plaintiff relies upon prior rulings in this case concerning the government claims issue. Plaintiff relies upon the February 6, 2013 reporter‘s transcript of the hearing on the demurrer. At that hearing, the respondent court ruled the government claim was properly served on the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board.
And plaintiff relies on the deposition transcript of Daniel Hutton. Mr. Hutton was designated as a person most qualified to testify on the management of the Clara Shortridge Foltz Criminal Justice Center. (
A. Summary Judgment Standard of Review
In Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493] (Aguilar), our Supreme Court described a party‘s burdens on summary judgment motions as follows: “[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. That is because of the general principle that a party who seeks a court‘s action in his favor bears the burden of persuasion thereon. [Citation.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. . . . [[] [T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. . . . A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question. [Citation.]” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851, fns. omitted; see Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 870, 878 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 158].) We review the respondent court‘s decision to deny the summary judgment motion de novo. (Coral Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 50 Cal.4th 315, 336 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 279, 235 P.3d 947]; Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 65, 67-68 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 316, 5 P.3d 874].) The respondent court‘s stated reasons for denying summary judgment are not binding on us because we review its ruling, not its rationale. (Coral Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 336; Continental Ins. Co. v. Columbus Line, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1196 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 199].) In addition, a summary judgment motion is directed to the issues framed by the pleadings. (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1252 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022]; Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 673 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 863 P.2d 207], overruled on a different point in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 527 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 327, 235 P.3d 988].) Those are the only issues a motion for summary judgment must address. (Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1249-1250 [91 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 203 P.3d 1127]; Goehring v. Chapman University (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 353, 364 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 39].)
This case involves the question of whether there has been a proper presentation of a government claim. Our Supreme Court synthesized the controlling law concerning government claims as follows: “Suits for money or damages filed against a public entity are regulated by statutes contained in division 3.6 of the
Our Supreme Court explained the role of
C. The Ambiguity in the Statutory Language Concerning Government Claims Presentation Requirements for the Judicial Branch
1. General overview of the 2002 and 2010 legislation
As noted, the present case involves the application of two enactments in 2002 and 2010, which substantially modified
The 2010 amendments principally involve the California State University trustees. (Sen. Bill No. 1046 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.).) The trustees concluded it was in the university‘s best interests to no longer be subject to the tort claims process applicable to other government agencies. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1046 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 7, 2010, pp. 1-4; Assem. Com. on Higher Education, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1046 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 7, 2010, pp. 1-3.) Thus, a separate claims and payment procedure was adopted for the California State University trustees. The 2010 claims and payment procedure adopted for the California State University trustees was similar to that enacted in 2002 for the council.
2. The 2002 and 2010 versions of section 915
As noted, the present case involves language in
In 2010, the language in
3. Section 915, subdivision (e) is ambiguous and review of legislative intent materials is therefore appropriate
Plaintiff argues that
Our Supreme Court has specified the standards of statutory construction applicable here: “‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature‘s intent so as to effectuate the law‘s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute‘s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.]’ (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387, 19 P.3d 1129].) ‘When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further.’ [Citation.] But where a statute‘s terms are unclear or ambiguous, we may ‘look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.’ (In re M.M. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 530, 536 [142 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 278 P.3d 1221].)” (People v. Harrison (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1211, 1221-1222 [164 Cal.Rptr.3d 167, 312 P.3d 88].) We construe all the provisions of a statute as a whole: “The statutory language is not read in isolation, however. Rather, we consider its terms ‘in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.’ (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 676, 101 P.3d 563].)” (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Garcia (2013) 58 Cal.4th 175, 186 [165 Cal.Rptr.3d 460, 314 P.3d 767].) And we must give meaning to every word of a statute so as to avoid a construction making any language surplusage. (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1118 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564]; Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 658 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333].)
We now turn to the language of
Second,
Third,
Before proceeding further, it is important to note how all of the foregoing four subdivisions define the same methods for presentation of a claim to the specified entities. Every enumerated method of presentation involves either the delivery or mailing of the government claim to a specified official or office. That is,
Plaintiff argues that even though the secretariat never received the claim, the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board did. Plaintiff argues the plain language of
No doubt there is something to be said for plaintiff‘s well-stated argument. However, there are other ways of looking at
. . .
Moreover,
D. Legislative Intent Materials Demonstrate the Legislature Intended That Judicial Branch Entity Claims Against Defendants Be Presented to the Secretariat, Not the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board
In 2002, the Legislature enacted new or amended provisions concerning the council‘s responsibility for resolving government claims against judicial branch entities. (Stats. 2002, ch. 1007, §§ 1-20, pp. 6343-6352.) Enactment of Assembly Bill No. 2321 was necessitated because the trial courts were no longer considered a branch of county government. The report prepared for the Assembly Committee on Judiciary explained the necessity of the legislation: “For most of the state‘s history, California‘s trial courts have been considered a branch of county government. A series of recent changes in the law have firmly established the trial courts as part of the judicial branch of state government. . . . The Legislature has also given the Judicial Council . . . ,
Both the Assembly judiciary and appropriations committee reports state Assembly Bill No. 2321 has as its purpose: “Establishes the Judicial Council rather than the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board (formerly known as the Board of Control) as the governing body authorized to act on claims and actions filed against a judicial branch entity or judge thereof.” (Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2321, supra, at p. 1; see Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2321, supra, at p. 2.) In terms of the presentation of government claims,
Further, the Assembly judiciary committee report states the State Controller is authorized to pay claims, settlements or judgments upon certification by the Administrative Director of the Courts. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2321, supra, at p. 2.) If there was a dispute over the sufficiency of funds available to pay claims, the legislation provided a mechanism for advising the Legislature. (Ibid.) Then, the report states the legislation would direct the council to adopt rules to manage litigation. (Ibid.; see Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2321, supra, at p. 1.)
After passage by the Assembly, the Senate Committee on Judiciary report reiterated much of the analysis appearing in the two Assembly reports. However, the very first paragraph in the Senate report states, “This bill would provide the proper procedure under the Tort Claims Act for the filing of claims against the judicial branch entity (court, appellate court, the Supreme Court, the Judicial Council, the Administrative Office of the Courts). . . .” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2321 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 22, 2002, p. 1.) Later, the Senate judiciary committee report, after describing the confusion concerning the proper presentation of government claims against judicial branch entities following court unification, states: “This bill would require presentation of a claim, or any amendments thereto, or an application for leave to file a late claim against a judicial branch entity, judge, court executive officer, or court employee by delivery or mailing to the specific judicial branch entity. Thus, a claim against the superior court or a judge of that court would be delivered or mailed to the court executive officer; a claim against an appellate court or a judge thereof, to the clerk of the Court of Appeal; a claim against the Supreme Court or judge thereof, to the clerk of the Supreme Court; a claim against the Judicial Council or the [Administrative Office of the Court], to the Secretariat of the Judicial Council.” (Id. at p. 6.) In addition, the Senate report reiterated the council was the entity authorized to act on government claims brought against judicial branch entities. (Id. at pp. 2-3.)
After minor amendments in the Senate, the legislation was returned to the Assembly. The analysis prepared for the full Assembly states the council
The Legislative Counsel‘s Digest for Assembly Bill No. 2321 states: “This bill would require, instead, in the case of a claim against a judicial branch entity, as defined, or a judge of one of those entities, that the Judicial Council act on the claim in accordance with the procedure that the Judicial Council would provide by rule of court. The bill would specify certain means of presentation and service of a claim against a judicial branch entity or one of its judges. The bill would authorize the Judicial Council to settle, adjust, or compromise any pending action arising out of the activities of a judicial branch entity or judge thereof, and to authorize the Controller to draw a warrant for payment of any final judgment or settlement based on claims arising out of the activities of a judicial branch entity.” (Legis. Counsel‘s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2321 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.), 6 Stats. 2002, Summary Dig., p. 450.)
E. The Legislative Intent Materials’ Resolution of the Ambiguity in Section 915
The foregoing legislative intent materials demonstrate the Legislature intended to specify where claims against defendants were to be presented. The Legislature expressly intended claims against defendants be presented to the secretariat. Assembly Bill No. 2321 was a comprehensive legislative effort establishing rules for the presentation and resolution of government claims against judicial branch entities. Thus, the ambiguity in
F. Plaintiff‘s Other Contentions**
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VI. DISPOSITION
The mandate petition is granted. Upon remittitur issuance, the summary judgment motion is to be granted. Defendants, the Judicial Council of California and Administrative Office of the Courts, are to recover their costs incurred on appeal from plaintiff, Mari Bean.
Kriegler, J., and Mink, J.,† concurred.
**See footnote, ante, page 1083.
†Retired judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.