Barry JOHNSON, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CITY OF LOMA LINDA et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Supreme Court of California.
*319 Duchrow & Barker and David J. Duchrow for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Liebert, Cassidy & Friеrson, Debra L. Bray, Brian E. Cooper, Los Angeles, and Steven M. Berliner, for Defendants and Respondents.
Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, Donna D. Melby, Marco P. Ferreira, Los Angeles, and Kirk C. Jenkins, San Francisco, for City of Glendale as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.
KENNARD, J.
In Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court (1976)
Does that holding apply to a city employee's discrimination claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)(Gov.Code, § 12900 et seq.) and under title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), when the employee fails to have the city's final adverse finding judicially reviewed and set aside? The answer is "yes" as to claims under California's FEHA but "no" as to claims under Title VII of the federal act.
We also hold that a trial court's summary judgment based on the defense of laches must be reviewed de novo.
I.
Our account of the facts is taken from the record before the trial court when it granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Flatt v. Superior Court (1994)
From January 1991 through July 1993, plaintiff Barry Johnson was the assistant city manager for defendant City of Loma Linda (the City). In 1992, City Manager John Bernardi asked plaintiff to look into a complaint of sexual discrimination made by a female senior plannеr against community development director Dan Smith. After an investigation, plaintiff concluded the allegations were well founded and, on September 8, 1992, sent Smith a letter of intent to terminate his employment. Thereafter, Smith and the City entered into a settlement, and Smith was suspended for 30 working days.
In April 1993, City Manager Bernardi announced his resignation. Over the next several months, plaintiffs authority over department heads was removed and his principal duties were reassigned.
In June 1993, Acting City Manager Peter Hills told plaintiff he was being laid off because of budgetary problems and his association with former City Manager Bernardi. Plaintiffs employment with the City ended on July 15, 1993. That same day, plaintiff filed a grievance with the City. Four days later, on July 19, 1993, the city council voted to eliminate five positions, including plaintiffs positiоn as assistant city manager.
In September 1993, the City's personnel board rejected plaintiffs grievance, finding that the City had not violated any discrimination laws in discharging plaintiff, and that plaintiffs job had been eliminated for economic reasons. On December 14, the city council upheld the board's decision.
On December 22, 1993, plaintiff filed with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH), a discrimination claim against the City, alleging his dismissal was in retaliation for opposing sexual harassment. On December 29, 1994, because his complaint had been on file for more than a year, the department gave plaintiff a "right to sue" letter.[1]
On July 14, 1995, plaintiff brought this action in superior court. The third amended complaint, the pleading at issue here, alleged causes of action for, among others, dischаrge from employment in retaliation for opposing discriminatory practices in violation of Government Code section 12940, subdivision (f), part of the FEHA, and in violation of Title VII. Joined with plaintiff's complaint was a petition for a writ of administrative mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, challenging the actions of the personnel board and the city council. Plaintiff sought reinstatement, backpay and benefits, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.
The superior court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The court ruled that the doctrine of laches barred plaintiff from pursuing his petition for writ of administrative mandate. And because plaintiff had failed to bring a timely judicial challenge to the administrative findings *321 against him, the court concluded that plaintiff was bоund by those findings.
The Court of Appeal reversed as to plaintiff's Title VII claim, but in all other respects it affirmed the trial court's judgment. It determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the doctrine of laches barred consideration of plaintiff's petition for a writ of administrative mandate. The Court of Appeal held that plaintiff's failure to timely challenge the administrative finding by the City that his dismissal was for economic reasons barred his FEHA cause of action alleging that his termination was for discriminatory reasons. As to plaintiff's Title VII claim, the Court of Appeal held that because the trial court's laches ruling was not a final judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata under California law, it was not binding as to the Title VII claim under the United States Supreme Court's decision in University of Tennessee v. Elliott (1986)
II.
Asserting that the facts are undisputed, plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeal should have reviewed de novo the trial court's determination that the defense of laches barred his petition for a writ of administrative mandate. Generally, a trial court's laches ruling will be sustained on appeal if there is substantial evidence to support the ruling. (Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980)
We disagree, however, with plaintiff that the Court of Appeal erred in affirming the trial court's laches ruling. "The defense of laches requires unreasonable delay plus either acquiescence in the act about which plaintiff complains or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay." (Conti v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners (1969)
Plaintiff waited more than 18 months before filing in the superior court his petition for writ of administrative mandate. He was notified on December 28, 1993, of the city council's rejection of his internal administrative appeal. But he did not file his petition for administrative mandate with the superior court until July 14, 1995. We note that Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6 requires that a petition for a writ of administrative mandate to obtain judicial review of a decision dismissing a city officer or employee be filed within 90 days of the date the decision becomes final if the city so notifies the employee. (Id., subds. (a), (b), (e), (f).) Although this statute is not applicable here because the City apparently did not notify plaintiff of the statutory 90-day period just mentioned, it underscores the significance of timeliness in challenging personnel decisions such as the one at issue here. Also, plaintiff failed to pursue his administrative mandate petition for more than 18 months after it was filed. He filed his petition in July 1995. Thereafter, he made no attempt *322 to have the administrative mandate matter set for a court hearing. It was not until January 1997 that the superior court held a hearing on the City's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's delay of more than three years from the time the city council upheld the persоnnel board's decision was unreasonable.
Plaintiff blames local court calendar conditions for the delay that occurred after the filing of his first and second amended complaints. He cites delays arising from the continuance of hearings on the City's demurrers, trial court delays in ruling on the demurrers including one demurrer the court held under submission for 159 days and a continuance of the trial. These delays in the trial court do not, however, justify plaintiff's failure to pursue judicial resolution of his petition for writ of administrative mandate by asking the court to set the matter for a hearing. With respect to the court's delays in ruling on the City's demurrers, the demurrers did not challenge plaintiff's petition for writ of administrative mandate, and thus did not prevent plaintiff from pursuing a court determination of his administrative mandate petition. As to the continuance of the trial date, plaintiff stipulated to that; thus, he cannot now complain about it.
A discharged employee's unreasonable delay in seeking judicial review of the discharge may prejudice the employer either "because reinstatement would require discharge of a substitute employee or because the employing agency might be compelled to incur a double payment consisting of back pay to the discharged employee and salary to his replacement." (Conti, supra,
As a result of the City's elimination of plaintiffs former position as assistant city manager, plaintiffs former duties were divided among other employees in the City's restructuring of its managerial ranks. Given plaintiffs long delay in challenging his discharge by means of a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the superior court, reinstatement at this late date would require the City to alter significantly its new management structure. An award of backpay would compel the City to make double payments: back wages to plaintiff and salaries to those employees among whom his former duties have been divided.
For the reasons set forth above, we agree with the superior court and the Court of Appeal that, given the unreasonable delay in question, the doctrine of laches bars plaintiffs petition for writ of administrative mandate brought in superior court. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot now challenge the City's administrative finding that he was laid off for economic, not discriminatory, reasons. We next consider the effect of this now-final factual finding by the City on plaintiff's FEHA causes of action.
III.
As we noted at the outset, in Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, supra,
In Westlake, supra,
Paramount to the Westlake holding were these two reasons: (1) the interest in according proper respect to an administrative agency's quasi-judicial procedures by precluding a party from circumventing the established process for judicial review of such decisions by means of a petition for administrative mandate; and (2) "providing a uniform practice of judicial, rather than jury, review of quasi-judicial administrative decisions." (Westlake, supra,
The Westlake requirement that a party exhaust judicial remedies has been applied in various state and federal decisions. (E.g., Briggs v. City of Rolling Hills Estates, supra,
Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies: He appealed to the city council the personnel board's finding that his termination was based on economic, not discriminatory, reasons. The council upheld thе board's decision. But plaintiff failed to seek timely judicial relief from the City's administrative determination. Therefore, the City's decision "has *324 achieved finality" (Briggs v. City of Rolling Hills Estates, supra,
Plaintiff's FEHA claim that his discharge was for discriminatory reasons is at odds with the preceding determination by the City that the termination was for economic reasons, a finding that, as we have explained, is now binding. Plaintiff insists to the contrary. In support, he raises three points.[3]
First, plaintiff points to certain language in previous cases in which we described the FEHA's nature and purpose. For instance, in Brown v. Superior Court (1984)
As amicus curiae City of Glendale points out, the administrative processes of many cities and the State Personnel Board provide extensive and detailed procedural protections for those challenging adverse employment actions. (See Gov. Code, §§ 19574.1, 19574.2, 19578, 19580, 19581.) Here, as we discussed earlier, the City has in place an internal review procеss of which plaintiff availed himself. Refusing to give binding effect to the findings of administrative agencies in quasi-judicial proceedings would, as the City of Glendale observes, undermine the efficacy of such proceedings, rendering them in many cases little more than rehearsals for litigation.
Plaintiff cites Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego (1992)
Plaintiffs reliance on Watson v. Department of Rehabilitation (1989)
Plaintiff's second point is that this court's plurality decision in State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra,
State Personnel, supra,
The plurality in State Personnel stressed the distinction between an employee's assertion of a рrivate right before an administrative agency and the DFEH's acting as a public prosecutor asserting a public right. In the words of the plurality: "[A]n employee complaining before the *326 Board is asserting a private right, while the DFEH is a `public prosecutor ... testfing] a public right.' [Citation.] The employee's choice to assert the former should not bar litigation of the latter right." (State Personnel, supra,
Plaintiff's third point is that the United States Supreme Court's holding in University of Tennessee v. Elliott, supra,
At issue in Elliott, supra,
There is no provision in the FEHA analogous to the Title VII language at issue in Elliott, supra,
But the reasoning of the high court in Elliott leading to its conclusion that state agency findings do have a binding effect on claims brought under section 1983 of the federal Civil Rights Act is applicable to claims brought under California's FEHA. Like the congressional history of section 1983, the legislative history of the FEHA "`does not in any clear way suggest that [the California Legislature] intended to repeal or restrict the traditional doctrine of preclusion.'" (Elliott, supra,
Plaintiff also relies on Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974)
In Alexander, supra,
Similarly unavailing is plaintiff's reliance on Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co. (9th Cir.1998)
We conclude that when, as here, a public employee pursues administrative civil service remedies, receives an adverse finding, and fails to have the finding set aside through judicial review procedures, the adverse finding is binding on discrimination claims under the FEHA.
We now аddress the City's challenge to the Court of Appeal's holding that plaintiffs *328 failure to obtain a judicial set-aside of the City's adverse administrative finding does not preclude his federal claim under Title VII.
IV.
The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court's ruling that because of the applicability of the City's defense of laches, the City's administrative finding against plaintiff had achieved finality, thus precluding plaintiff's federal claim under Title VII. The Court of Appeal explained that under California law a judgment denying a petition for writ of administrative mandate because of the defense of laches is not a judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata. Because a state court judgment bars a Title VII federal claim only if the judgment is entitled to res judicata effect under state law (Elliott, supra,
A judgment is on the merits for purposes of res judicata "if the substance of the claim is tried and determined...." (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Judgment, § 313, p. 864.) The doctrine of laches bars a cause of action when the plaintiff unreasonably delays in asserting or diligently pursuing the cause and the plaintiff has acquiesced in the act about which the plaintiff complains, or the delay has prejudiced defendant. (Conti supra,
Contrary to the City's contention, we did not hold in Keidatz v. Albany (1952)
The City notes that the doctrine of res judicata promotes the public policies of giving certainty to legal proceedings, preventing parties from being unfairly subjected to repetitive litigation, and preserving judicial resources. (See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore (1979)
Finally, we reject the City's argument that the trial court's ruling on plaintiffs FEHA claim was a ruling on the merits. That ruling was based entirely on the City's administrative findings, not on the merits of plaintiffs Title VII claim.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
GEORGE, C.J., MOSK, J., BAXTER, J., CHIN, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
*329 Concurring Opinion by WERDEGAR, J.
On the viability of plaintiff's cause of action for violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov.Code, § 12900 et seq.), I would reach the same result as the majority, but would employ a less confusing and more clearly applicable legal theory. Rather than rely on a "requirement of exhaustion of judicial remedies" (maj. opn., ante, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 322-323,
In Sims, this court dispelled the "uncertainty and confusion exist[ing] in the case law as to whether the decisiоns of an administrative agency may ever collaterally estop a later action." (Sims, supra,
Since Sims, this court and the Courts of Appeal have frequently applied its principles to decide the collateral estoppel effect of administrative findings on subsequent civil litigation. (See, e.g., Brosterhous v. State Bar (1995)
As the majority notes, plaintiff does not contend that the City of Loma Linda's (the City) administrative procedures denied him a full and fair opportunity to litigаte the motive for his termination. (Maj. opn., ante,
Plaintiff does argue that legislative policies embodied in FEHA are contrary to the result here, for which he cites statements in our own decisions, in particular State Personnel Bd, v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1985)
The plurality's observation in State Personnel Bd., and the court's similar remark in Rojo v. Kliger (1990)
Our Westlake decision, on which the majority opinion centers, is not on point. In that case, a private hospital's review committee determined the plaintiff physician's staff privileges should be revoked. After the hospital's board of directors affirmed that decision, the plaintiff, without seeking review of the decision by application for writ of mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085), sued the hospital and various committee and board members in tort. (Westlake, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 469-472, 482,
Westlake, in short, has nothing to say about the preclusive effect the findings made by a public employer's personnel board should have in a subsequent FEHA action. Because Westlake involved a private employer, questions of the existence and scope of administrative collateral estoppel, later discussed and resolved in Sims, were not at issue.[1] Because the *331 plaintiff's subsequent action was for common law tort claims, not statutory discrimination claims, the Westlake court had no occasion to address the legislative policy questions raised by application of administrative issue preclusion to FEHA actions.
The majority's reliance on a requirement of "exhaustion of judicial remedies" is confusing for two reasons. First, the phrase incorrectly suggests that plaintiff's FEHA action was properly dismissed without trial because he omitted to fulfill a procedural prerequisite to bringing such an action. In fact, as the majority opinion's procedural history reveals, plaintiff fulfilled FEHA's procedural requirements by filing a claim with the DFEH and obtaining from that agency a "right to sue" letter. (Maj. opn., ante,
Second, the "exhaustion" rationale could suggest, to a less than perfectly careful reader, that a public employee's FEHA action is barred whenever the employee has neglected to seek judicial review of the employer's adverse internal administrative decision, whether or not the requirements for collateral estoppel outlined in Sims, supra,
In Oquendo v. California Institution for Women (1989)
NOTES
[1] If the DFEH considers the claim valid, it tries to resolve the problem through conciliation and persuasion. (Gov.Code, § 12963.7.) The DFEH may also issue an accusation in its own name to be heard by the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (FEHC). (Gov.Code, §§ 12965, subd. (a), 12969.) When an accusation is issued, the DFEH performs a prosecutorial function and argues the case before the FEHC through its attorneys and agents. (Gov.Code, § 12969.) If the DFEH does not issue an accusation within 150 days after filing of the claim, or if it determines not to issue an accusation before the 150 days have elapsed, it must promptly notify the claimant that it will issue at the claimant's request a right to sue letter to enable the claimant to bring a civil action in court. (Gov.Code, § 12965, subd. (b).) When, as here, the claimant does not request a right to sue letter, the DFEH must issue such a letter no later than one year after filing of the complaint. (Ibid.)
[2] Contrary to the concurring opinion (cone, opn. of Werdegar, J., post,
Notes
[3] Plaintiff does not challenge the City's administrative finding on the ground that the City failed to afford him a full and fair opportunity to litigate. (See United States v. Utah Constr. Co. (1966)
[1] The majority incorrectly describes Westlake as addressing the binding effect of "a quasijudicial administrative agency proceeding." (Maj. opn., ante,
[2] One can see, logically, that the defect in plaintiff's action is not one of failure to exhaust judicial remedies by asking what would have happened if he had timely sought a writ of mandate, only to have it summarily denied. His exhaustion of the judicial remedy would not help him; the administrative findings would be just as final and just as preclusive of the discrimination issue as here, where no judicial review was sought.