JOSEPH v AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
Docket No. 142615
Supreme Court of Michigan
Decided May 15, 2012
491 MICH 200
Argued December 6, 2011 (Calendar No. 4)
In an opinion by Justice MARY BETH KELLY, joined by Chief Justice YOUNG and Justices MARKMAN and ZAHRA, the Supreme Court held:
The tolling provision in
1.
2. Univ of Mich Regents, which held to the contrary, was not supported by the statutory language and must be overruled. Because Univ of Mich Regents ignored the Legislature‘s clear and unambiguous directives in
Reversed and remanded for entry of partial summary disposition in defendant‘s favor.
Justice MARILYN KELLY, joined by Justices CAVANAGH and HATHAWAY, dissenting, would have reaffirmed the decision in Univ of Mich Regents, which correctly decided the issue.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - INSURANCE - NO-FAULT - REVISED JUDICATURE ACT - ONE-YEAR-BACK RULE - ACTIONS BY MINORS AND INSANE PERSONS.
The tolling provision in
Law Offices of Paul Zebrowski & Associates (by Thomas A. Biscup) for Doreen Joseph.
Siemion Huckabay, P.C. (by James W. Bodary), and Gross & Nemeth, P.L.C. (by James G. Gross), for Auto Club Insurance Association.
Amici Curiae:
Speaker Law Firm, PLLC (by Liisa R. Speaker), and Sinas, Dramis, Brake, Boughton & McIntyre, P.C. (by George T. Sinas), for the Coalition Protecting Auto No-Fault.
Plunkett Cooney (by Mary Massaron Ross and Josephine A. DeLorenzo) for the Insurance Institute of Michigan.
Dykema Gossett PLLC (by Jill M. Wheaton and Joseph Erhardt) for the Michigan Catastrophic Claims Association.
Law Offices of Ronald M. Sangster, PLLC (by Ronald M. Sangster, Jr.), for Michigan Defense Trial Counsel.
Anselmi & Mierzejewski, P.C. (by Mark D. Sowle), for Titan Insurance Company.
MARY BETH KELLY, J. We granted defendant Auto Club Insurance Association‘s bypass application for leave to appeal in this case to determine whether the minority/insanity tolling provision of
We once again hold that the minority/insanity tolling provision, which addresses only when an action may be brought, does not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule, which separately limits the amount of benefits that can be recovered. These distinctions were recognized in Michigan law both in Cameron as well as several decisions of this Court that predate Cameron. Yet this Court‘s decision in Regents conflated these distinct concepts in order to effectuate what the Regents majority believed was a broader social good served by expanding the right to recover benefits beyond those allowed by law. We recognize the necessity for, and value of, stability in the law and take no pleasure in overruling a precedent of recent vintage by this Court. But Regents itself simply
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In June 1977, then 17-year-old plaintiff, Doreen Joseph, was involved in an automobile accident in which she suffered traumatic brain injury and quadriplegia. At the time of the accident, plaintiff had automobile insurance coverage through the Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, defendant‘s predecessor. Defendant later assumed responsibility for paying plaintiff‘s personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits. Since the date of plaintiff‘s injury, defendant has paid more than $4 million in PIP benefits for plaintiff‘s care.
On February 27, 2009, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking additional PIP benefits for allegedly unpaid case-management services provided by plaintiff‘s family members. The period for which plaintiff seeks recovery dates back to the date of plaintiff‘s accident in 1977. Defendant moved for partial summary disposition pursuant to
The circuit court denied defendant‘s motion for partial summary disposition, citing Regents for the proposition that the minority/insanity tolling provision tolls the one-year-back rule and, thus, if plaintiff is determined to be “insane,” her recovery will not be limited to the year immediately preceding the filing of her complaint. Defendant filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals and then filed a bypass application for leave to appeal in this Court, arguing that the minority/insanity tolling provision does not apply to the one-year-back rule and that Regents was wrongly decided. We entered orders staying the circuit court proceedings5 and granting defendant‘s bypass application to consider whether Regents was correctly decided.6
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a circuit court‘s decision whether to grant or deny summary disposition.7 Similarly, we review de novo issues of statutory interpretation as questions of law.8 Our primary goal when interpreting statutes is to discern the intent of the Legislature.9 To do so, we focus on the best indicator of that intent, the
Defendant moved for partial summary disposition pursuant to
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE ONE-YEAR-BACK RULE AND THE MINORITY/INSANITY TOLLING PROVISION
This case requires that we again interpret the limitations on recovery of PIP benefits set forth in the no-fault act. The relevant statutory provision of the no-fault act,
An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits payable under this chapter for accidental bodily
injury may not be commenced later than 1 year after the date of the accident causing the injury unless written notice of injury as provided herein has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless the insurer has previously made a payment of personal protection insurance benefits for the injury. If the notice has been given or a payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable expense, work loss or survivor‘s loss has been incurred. However, the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced.15
As early as 1984, this Court explained that this statutory provision contains separate and distinct limitations periods that relate both to the timing in which an action may be brought and the damages that may be recovered.16 Specifically, we have noted that
contains two limitations on the time for filing suit and one limitation on the period for which benefits may be recovered:
“(1) An action for personal protection insurance [PIP] benefits must be commenced not later than one year after the date of accident, unless the insured gives written notice of injury or the insurer previously paid [PIP] benefits for the injury.
“(2) If notice has been given or payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within one year after the most recent loss was incurred.
“(3) Recovery is limited to losses incurred during the one year preceding commencement of the action.”17
The final limitation provided in
although a no-fault action to recover PIP benefits may be filed more than one year after the accident and more than one year after a particular loss has been incurred (provided that notice of injury has been given to the insurer or the insurer has previously paid PIP benefits for the injury), § 3145(1) nevertheless limits recovery in that action to those losses incurred within the one year preceding the filing of the action.18
Our Legislature has also independently established, in the Revised Judicature Act (RJA),19 a general tolling provision in order to aid those who are minors or legally insane. The minority/insanity tolling provision of
[I]f the person first entitled to make an entry or bring an action under this act is under 18 years of age or insane at the time the claim accrues, the person or those claiming under the person shall have 1 year after the disability is removed through death or otherwise, to make the entry or bring the action although the period of limitations has run.
Notably, by its unambiguous terms, this provision concerns when a minor or person suffering from insanity may “make the entry or bring the action,” and the provision is entirely silent with regard to the amount of damages recoverable once an action has been brought.21
B. CAMERON AND ITS PROGENY
We first considered the interplay between the one-year-back rule and the minority/insanity tolling provision in Cameron.22 In Cameron, the plaintiffs’ minor son sustained a closed head injury when an automobile struck his bicycle in 1996. Six years later, in 2002, the plaintiffs filed suit against their no-fault insurer to recover PIP benefits for attendant-care services rendered from 1996 to 1999. The plaintiffs argued that the minority/insanity tolling provision applied to toll the one-year-back rule, rendering recoverable the losses incurred between 1996 and 1999. We disagreed, holding that the minority/insanity tolling provision does not operate to toll the one-year-back rule. We explained in Cameron:
By its unambiguous terms,
MCL 600.5851(1) concerns when a minor or person suffering from insanity may “make the entry or bring the action.” It does not pertain to the
damages recoverable once an action has been brought.
MCL 600.5851(1) then is irrelevant to the damages-limiting one-year-back provision ofMCL 500.3145(1) .23
That is,
the minority/insanity tolling provision in
MCL 600.5851(1) , by its plain terms, only addresses when an action may be brought. Therefore, it does not apply to toll the one-year-back rule inMCL 500.3145(1) because that provision does not concern when an action may be brought but, instead, limits the amount of PIP benefits a person injured in an automobile accident may recover.24
In reaching this conclusion, we overruled the Court of Appeals’ decision in Geiger v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch,25 which held that
[W]e must assume that the thing the Legislature wants is best understood by reading what it said. Because what was said in
MCL 500.3145(1) andMCL 600.5851(1) is clear, no less clear is the policy. Damages are only allowed for one year back from the date the lawsuit is filed. We are enforcing the statutes as written. While some may question the wisdom of the Legislature‘s capping damages in this fashion, it is unquestionably a power that the Legislature has under our Constitution.28
After our decision in Cameron, the Court of Appeals in Liptow29 applied Cameron‘s reasoning to hold that separate tolling provisions for state political subdivisions30 do not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule. The panel reasoned that the plain statutory
Because such statutory language constitutes the best indicator of legislative intent, we believe that Cameron is “better reasoned.” Although we appreciate that our dissenting colleagues are free to disagree with this assessment, judgments nonetheless must be made. And we have sought to exercise our own best judgment in assessing the precedents before us.
C. REGENTS
Four years after Cameron and Liptow, in Regents, this Court again considered whether a saving provision tolling a statute of limitations similarly tolls the one-year-back rule.32 In Regents, the plaintiffs brought an action seeking payment from the defendant insurer for the full cost of medical treatment provided to the defendant‘s insured who had been treated at the university‘s hospital following an automobile accident. The circuit court held that the one-year-back rule barred the plaintiffs from recovering any portion of the loss incurred more than one year before commencement of the action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In a narrowly divided decision, this Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and overruled the recent decisions in Cameron and Liptow, holding, in part, that the minority/insanity tolling provision does, in fact, toll the one-year-back rule. The Regents Court, essentially adopting the dissenting position from Cameron, held that “the ‘action’ and ‘claim’ preserved by [the
Three justices strongly dissented from the decision to overrule Cameron and erase the long-recognized distinction between statutes of limitations and the damages-limiting provision of the no-fault statute. The dissenting justices explained that because the one-year-back rule “serves only as a limitation on the recovery of benefits” and “does not define a period within which a claimant may file a cause of action,” the one-year-back rule “lies outside the scope of what is affected by the RJA‘s minority/insanity tolling provision.”34 By holding to the contrary, the dissenting justices concluded that the majority had failed to enforce as written the unambiguous language of the one-year-back rule, and had attempted instead to “discern the purpose of the statute from something other than its actual language.”35
D. REGENTS WAS WRONGLY DECIDED
We believe that the ruling in Regents was erroneous for the simple reason that the statutory texts of
By concluding that the minority/insanity tolling provision of
[W]hen these two provisions are read together, it is clear that while a political subdivision may bring an action at any time, it cannot recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced. In other words,
MCL 600.5821(4) , which pertains only to when an action may be commenced, does not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule, which only limits how much can be recovered after the action has been commenced.36
This interpretation is merely an extension of the same legal rationale applied in Cameron, in which the Court distinguished the plain language of the one-year-back rule from the plain language of the minority/insanity tolling provision.
Again, the rules of statutory interpretation mandate that we give effect to the Legislature‘s intent, relying on the plain language of the no-fault statute itself. If the statutory language is unambiguous, we must presume that the Legislature intended the meaning it clearly expressed and further construction is neither required nor permitted.37 As is evident from its holding, the interpretation advanced by Regents superseded the Legislature‘s explicit intent that recovery of PIP benefits be limited to losses incurred within one year before the date on which an action is filed. The statutory provision containing the one-year-back rule employs plain, clear, and simple language. The minority/insanity tolling provision sets forth an equally simple concept, tolling the time in which an action may be commenced after a person‘s disability is removed. This tolling
Application of the Regents Court‘s interpretation of the one-year-back rule to this case illustrates how that decision defeats the very purpose of the rule. Under Regents, plaintiff would be permitted to recover PIP benefits for those losses incurred during the 32 years predating the filing of her action on February 27, 2009, in addition to those losses incurred after that date and continuing for the remainder of her life. Permitting recovery in that manner ignores the plain language of the one-year-back rule, which limits plaintiff‘s recovery to those losses incurred within one year before February 27, 2009, while still allowing additional recovery for all losses incurred after that date. Although the minority/insanity tolling provision may certainly toll myriad statutory provisions that contain a statute of limitations, it cannot toll the one-year-back rule of
There is no need for this Court to address the “absurd results” doctrine in this case because there is simply no result here that is absurd. Indeed, the dissent‘s argument that this construction produces an absurd result was fully considered and rejected in Cameron. As reiterated by the dissenting justices in Regents, ” ‘[i]n choosing to make no-fault insurance compulsory for all motorists, the Legislature has made the registration and operation of a motor vehicle inexorably dependent on whether no-fault insurance is available at fair and equitable rates.’ ” Regents, 487 Mich at 346-347 (MARKMAN, J., dissenting), quoting Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 599; 267 NW2d 72 (1978) (alteration in original). It therefore bears repeating that it is certainly quite possible that in a system that provides mandatory unlimited lifetime benefits, the Legislature intended to impose a limitation on recovery of no-fault benefits in order to make no-fault insurance affordable. This limitation is not only sensible, but necessary for the survival of the no-fault system.
Insofar as the dissent asserts that it “defies common sense” to think “[t]hat the Legislature wanted to grant a minor or insane person the right to prove his or her damages in a court of law while lacking any opportunity to be awarded them,” post at 225-226, we note that the statutory language plainly does not confer on a claimant a right to prove and recover an unlimited amount of damages. Instead, the plain language merely confers a right, under certain circumstances, to bring an action despite the period of limitations having expired. The dissent utterly fails to recognize that the one-year-back rule does not operate to preclude a claimant from recovering any damages; rather, a claimant will find himself or herself without any recovery as a result of the one-year-back rule‘s operation only if the claimant has not suffered any losses within the one year immediately preceding the filing of the action. Contrary to the dissent, “that this result will occur ‘only’ in some circumstances,” post at 226 n 11, hardly constitutes our only response to its claim of “absurdity.” As previously explained, it is possible that the Legislature chose to impose a limitation on the recovery of no-fault benefits to ensure the financial integrity of the no-fault system. See also Regents, 487 Mich at 346-347 (MARKMAN, J., dissenting).
E. STARE DECISIS
Having concluded that Regents was wrongly decided, we must decide whether stare decisis nevertheless compels our adherence to its holding. The test for determining whether stare decisis compels continued adherence to a precedent is set forth in Robinson v Detroit40 and calls for us to examine, among other factors, “(a) whether the earlier decision was wrongly decided, and (b) whether overruling such decision would work an undue hardship because of reliance interests or expectations that have arisen.”41
First, as discussed previously, Regents was wrongly decided for the simple reason that it ignored the Legislature‘s clear and unambiguous directives in
With regard to reliance interests, “the Court must ask whether the previous decision has become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone‘s expectations that to change it would produce not just readjustments, but practical real-world dislocations.”42 In discussing this factor, the Regents Court explained: ”Cameron is of recent vintage, having been decided a mere four years ago. Hence, reliance on its holding has been of limited duration.”43 Regents is of even more recent vintage than was Cameron, having been decided a mere 21 months ago. Certainly, Regents has not “become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone‘s expectations that to change it would produce ... practical real-world dislocations”44 such that reliance interests will be disrupted. While we view the duration of a decision from this Court as important, we believe the foremost indicator that reliance interests weigh in favor of overruling Regents is the plain language of the statutes because it is the unambiguous statutory text that guides the citizenry and their behavior. “This is the essence of the rule of law: to know in advance what the rules of society are.”45 As we have explained:
[I]f the words of the statute are clear, the actor should be able to expect, that is, rely, that they will be carried out by
Because Regents strayed considerably from the statutory language, it undermined the reliance interest that the people of this state have with regard to that language and with regard to a Court that is committed to upholding such language. As a result, it is this Court‘s duty to restore such reliance interests by restoring the law to mean what its language plainly states—a no-fault “claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced.”47
The one-year-back rule codifies an integral part of the legislative compromise that is the no-fault act, and invalidating that compromise will threaten the continued fiscal soundness of our no-fault system. Given that Michigan is the only state with a no-fault automobile-injury reparations scheme with mandatory, unlimited, lifetime medical benefits, the Legislature adopted a unique approach to defining the temporal limitations for filing suit without allowing open-ended liability or time-barring claims before they accrue. The Legislature
For these reasons, we overrule Regents and “return the law, as is our duty, to what we believe the citizens of this state reading these statutes at the time of enactment would have understood [them] to mean.”48 We are mindful of the importance of stability and continuity in the law and approach with great caution a decision to overrule precedent, but to allow the interpretation of
Because the plain and unambiguous language of
In this case, plaintiff filed her complaint on February 27, 2009, seeking recovery of PIP benefits for losses dating back 32 years. While plaintiff contends that, in light of her alleged insanity, the minority/insanity tolling provision tolls the one-year-back rule, rendering any losses incurred from the date of plaintiff‘s 1977 accident recoverable, we conclude otherwise. The minority/insanity tolling provision of
IV. CONCLUSION
The minority/insanity tolling provision in
YOUNG, C.J., and MARKMAN and ZAHRA, JJ., concurred with MARY BETH KELLY, J.
MARILYN KELLY, J. (dissenting). Today‘s decision is this Court‘s third ruling on the same issue in six years. Yet nothing accounts for its going back and forth on the issue—no new or revised legislation or social upheaval—except changes in the composition of the Court itself.
The majority overrules Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins Co1 and reinstates the rule from Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass‘n2. Cameron changed 25 years of settled law3 and held that the saving provision in
Contrary to the majority‘s conclusion,
MCL 600.5851(1) does not create its own independent cause of action. It must be read together with the statute under which the plaintiff seeks to recover. In no-fault cases, for example,MCL 600.5851(1) must be read together with
MCL 500.3145(1) . Doing so, the statutes grant infants and incompetent persons one year after their disability is removed to “bring the action” “for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits ... for accidental bodily injury....” On the basis of its language,MCL 600.5851(1) supersedes all limitations inMCL 500.3145(1) , including the one-year-back rule‘s limitation on the period of recovery.5
The majority correctly asserts that our decisions predating Cameron recognized that
The significant point is that Cameron was the first decision in which this Court recognized the distinction between the limitations in
As observed by the dissenting opinions in Cameron, the majority‘s interpretation of
The majority claims that this inquiry is not subjective because, given that Cameron focused principally on the statute‘s language, not “policy considerations,” it is objectively “better reasoned” than Geiger. Even accepting the majority‘s characterization, this assertion is flawed. An objective person reading an absurd decision that is based on a seriously strained reading of statutory language (Cameron) might reasonably find a contrary decision primarily focused on “policy considerations” (Geiger) to be “better reasoned.” The majority‘s disdain for policy considerations in favor of a focus on statutory language that it inevitably determines is “clear and unambiguous” —even when it is not — does not an objective determination make.
Finally, it appears that, unlike the majority, the Legislature did not consider Geiger to be “premised on a faulty legal analysis.” Ante at 210 n 26. It did not supersede Geiger by amending the applicable statutes from 1982 to 2006.
I dissent from the majority‘s decision to overrule Regents and reinstate the rule from Cameron that
CAVANAGH and HATHAWAY, JJ., concurred with MARILYN KELLY, J.
Notes
Actions brought in the name of... any political subdivision of the state of Michigan for the recovery of the cost of maintenance, care, and treatment of persons in hospitals ... are not subject to the statute of limitations and may be brought at any time without limitation, the provisions of any statute notwithstanding. [Emphasis added.]