Lead Opinion
We granted defendant Auto Club Insurance Association’s bypass application for leave to appeal in this case to determine whether the minority/insanity tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1) applies to toll the one-year-back rule in MCL
We once again hold that the minority/insanity tolling provision, which addresses only when an action may be brought, does not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule, which separately limits the amount of benefits that can be recovered. These distinctions were recognized in Michigan law both in Cameron as well as several decisions of this Court that predate Cameron. Yet this Court’s decision in Regents conflated these distinct concepts in order to effectuate what the Regents majority believed was a broader social good served by expanding the right to recover benefits beyond those allowed by law. We recognize the necessity for, and value of, stability in the law and take no pleasure in overruling a precedent of recent vintage by this Court. But Regents itself simply
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In June 1977, then 17-year-old plaintiff, Doreen Joseph, was involved in an automobile accident in which she suffered traumatic brain injury and quadriplegia. At the time of the accident, plaintiff had automobile insurance coverage through the Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, defendant’s predecessor. Defendant later assumed responsibility for paying plaintiffs personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits. Since the date of plaintiffs injury, defendant has paid more than $4 million in PIP benefits for plaintiffs care.
On February 27, 2009, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking additional PIP benefits for allegedly unpaid case-management services provided by plaintiffs family members. The period for which plaintiff seeks recovery dates back to the date of plaintiffs accident in 1977. Defendant moved for partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) barred plaintiffs claim with respect to benefits sought for any period more than one year before the February 27, 2009, commencement date of plaintiffs action. Plaintiff responded that her “insanity” over the
The circuit court denied defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition, citing Regents for the proposition that the minority/insanity tolling provision tolls the one-year-back rule and, thus, if plaintiff is determined to be “insane,” her recoveiy will not be limited to the year immediately preceding the filing of her complaint. Defendant filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals and then filed a bypass application for leave to appeal in this Court, arguing that the minority/insanity tolling provision does not apply to the one-year-back rule and that Regents was wrongly decided. We entered orders staying the circuit court proceedings
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a circuit court’s decision whether to grant or deny summary disposition.
Defendant moved for partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Because a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint, the circuit court must consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE ONE-YEAR-BACK RULE AND THE MINORITY/INSANITY TOLLING PROVISION
This case requires that we again interpret the limitations on recovery of PIP benefits set forth in the no-fault act. The relevant statutory provision of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3145(1), provides in pertinent part:
An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits payable under this chapter for accidental bodily*207 injury may not be commenced later than 1 year after the date of the accident causing the injury unless written notice of injury as provided herein has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless the insurer has previously made a payment of personal protection insurance benefits for the injury. If the notice has been given or a payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable expense, work loss or survivor’s loss has been incurred. However, the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced.[15]
As early as 1984, this Court explained that this statutory provision contains separate and distinct limitations periods that relate both to the timing in which an action may be brought and the damages that may be recovered.
contains two limitations on the time for filing suit and one limitation on the period for which benefits may be recovered:
“(1) An action for personal protection insurance [PIP] benefits must be commenced not later than one year after the date of accident, unless the insured gives written notice of injury or the insurer previously paid [PIP] benefits for the injury.
“(2) If notice has been given or payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within one year after the most recent loss was incurred.
“(3) Recovery is limited to losses incurred during the one year preceding commencement of the action.”[17]
The final limitation provided in MCL 500.3145(1) is the limitation on damages known as the one-year-back rule. In Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, we discussed the significance of the legislative distinction between statutes of limitations and provisions that limit damages, noting that
although a no-fault action to recover PIP benefits may be filed more than one year after the accident and more than one year after a particular loss has been incurred (provided that notice of injury has been given to the insurer or the insurer has previously paid PIP benefits for the injury), § 3145(1) nevertheless limits recovery in that action to those losses incurred within the one year preceding the filing of the action.[18]
Our Legislature has also independently established, in the Revised Judicature Act (RJA),
*209 [I]f the person first entitled to make an entry or bring an action under this act is under 18 years of age or insane at the time the claim accrues, the person or those claiming under the person shall have 1 year after the disability is removed through death or otherwise, to make the entry or bring the action although the period of limitations has run.
Notably, by its unambiguous terms, this provision concerns when a minor or person suffering from insanity may “make the entry or bring the action,” and the provision is entirely silent with regard to the amount of damages recoverable once an action has been brought.
B. CAMERON AND ITS PROGENY
We first considered the interplay between the one-year-back rule and the minority/insanity tolling provision in Cameron
By its unambiguous terms, MCL 600.5851(1) concerns when a minor or person suffering from insanity may “make the entry or bring the action.” It does not pertain to the*210 damages recoverable once an action has been brought. MCL 600.5851(1) then is irrelevant to the damages-limiting one-year-back provision of MCL 500.3145(1).[23]
That is,
the minority/insanity tolling provision in MCL 600.5851(1), by its plain terms, only addresses when an action may be brought. Therefore, it does not apply to toll the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) because that provision does not concern when an action may be brought but, instead, limits the amount of PIP benefits a person injured in an automobile accident may recover.[24]
In reaching this conclusion, we overruled the Court of Appeals’ decision in Geiger v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch,
[W]e must assume that the thing the Legislature wants is best understood by reading what it said. Because what was said in MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1) is clear, no less clear is the policy. Damages are only allowed for one year back from the date the lawsuit is filed. We are enforcing the statutes as written. While some may question the wisdom of the Legislature’s capping damages in this fashion, it is unquestionably a power that the Legislature has under our Constitution.[28]
After our decision in Cameron, the Court of Appeals in Liptow
C. REGENTS
Four years after Cameron and Liptow, in Regents, this Court again considered whether a saving provision tolling a statute of limitations similarly tolls the one-year-back rule.
Three justices strongly dissented from the decision to overrule Cameron and erase the long-recognized distinction between statutes of limitations and the damages-limiting provision of the no-fault statute. The dissenting justices explained that because the one-year-back rule “serves only as a limitation on the recovery of benefits” and “does not define a period within which a claimant may file a cause of action,” the one-year-back rule “lies outside the scope of what is affected by the RJA’s minority/insanity tolling provision.”
D. REGENTS WAS WRONGLY DECIDED
We believe that the ruling in Regents was erroneous for the simple reason that the statutory texts of MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1) plainly do not sup
By concluding that the minority/insanity tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1) operates to toll the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1), Regents failed to recognize the critical distinction between having the general right to commence an action and the limitation on the right to recover no-fault benefits for losses occurring more than one year before the filing of the action. Indeed, Regents impermissibly interpreted the phrase “bring the action” in MCL 600.5851(1) as conferring on a claimant the right to “bring the action and recover an unlimited amount of damages,” an interpretation which cannot be extracted from the plain and unambiguous statutory text. The dissenting justices in Regents recognized this distinction, contrasting the one-year-back rule, which provides that the claimant “may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced,” with MCL 600.5821(4), which provides that an action by the state or one of its political
[W]hen these two provisions are read together, it is clear that while a political subdivision may bring an action at any time, it cannot recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced. In other words, MCL 600.5821(4), which pertains only to when an action may be commenced, does not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule, which only limits how much can be recovered after the action has been commenced.[36]
This interpretation is merely an extension of the same legal rationale applied in Cameron, in which the Court distinguished the plain language of the one-year-back rule from the plain language of the minority/insanity tolling provision.
Again, the rules of statutory interpretation mandate that we give effect to the Legislature’s intent, relying on the plain language of the no-fault statute itself. If the statutory language is unambiguous, we must presume that the Legislature intended the meaning it clearly expressed and further construction is neither required nor permitted.
Application of the Regents Court’s interpretation of the one-year-back rule to this case illustrates how that decision defeats the very purpose of the rule. Under Regents, plaintiff would be permitted to recover PIP benefits for those losses incurred during the 32 years predating the filing of her action on February 27, 2009, in addition to those losses incurred after that date and continuing for the remainder of her life. Permitting recovery in that manner ignores the plain language of the one-year-back rule, which limits plaintiffs recovery to those losses incurred within one year before February 27, 2009, while still allowing additional recovery for all losses incurred after that date. Although the minority/insanity tolling provision may certainly toll myriad statutory provisions that contain a statute of limitations, it cannot toll the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145(1) because the one-year-back rule is not a statute of limitations in that it does not limit the period of time within which a claimant may file an action; rather, the one-year-back rule places a limitation on the amount of damages a claimant is entitled to recover. Furthermore, the one-year-back rule does not serve those purposes typically associated with a statute of limitations because it does not operate to cut off a claim or bar the action or the recovery; it simply limits the compensation available to the claimant.
E. STARE DECISIS
Having concluded that Regents was wrongly decided, we must decide whether stare decisis nevertheless compels our adherence to its holding. The test for determining whether stare decisis compels continued adherence to a precedent is set forth in Robinson v Detroit
First, as discussed previously, Regents was wrongly decided for the simple reason that it ignored the Legislature’s clear and unambiguous directives in MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1) by failing to enforce these statutory provisions as written. Rather than grounding its analysis on the proper and historically accepted interpretation of the one-year-back rule, the Regents decision appears to have focused on the majority’s concern that a plaintiff allowed to bring a suit under the minority/insanity tolling provision would be precluded by the one-year-back rule from recovering all the damages that might otherwise be permitted outside
With regard to reliance interests, “the Court must ask whether the previous decision has become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone’s expectations that to change it would produce not just readjustments, but practical real-world dislocations.”
[I]f the words of the statute are clear, the actor should be able to expect, that is, rely, that they will be carried out by*220 all in society, including the courts. In fact, should a court confound those legitimate citizen expectations by misreading or misconstruing a statute, it is that court itself that has disrupted the reliance interest. When that happens, a subsequent court, rather than holding to the distorted reading because of the doctrine of stare decisis, should overrule the earlier court’s misconstruction. The reason for this is that the court in distorting the statute was engaged in a form of judicial usurpation that runs counter to the bedrock principle of American constitutionalism, i.e., that the lawmaking power is reposed in the people as reflected in the work of the Legislature, and, absent a constitutional violation, the courts have no legitimacy in overruling or nullifying the people’s representatives.[46]
Because Regents strayed considerably from the statutory language, it undermined the reliance interest that the people of this state have with regard to that language and with regard to a Court that is committed to upholding such language. As a result, it is this Court’s duty to restore such reliance interests by restoring the law to mean what its language plainly states — a no-fault “claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced.”
The one-year-back rule codifies an integral part of the legislative compromise that is the no-fault act, and invalidating that compromise will threaten the continued fiscal soundness of our no-fault system. Given that Michigan is the only state with a no-fault automobile-injury reparations scheme with mandatory, unlimited, lifetime medical benefits, the Legislature adopted a unique approach to defining the temporal limitations for filing suit without allowing open-ended liability or time-barring claims before they accrue. The Legislature
For these reasons, we overrule Regents and “return the law, as is our duty, to what we believe the citizens of this state reading these statutes at the time of enactment would have understood [them] to mean.”
Because the plain and unambiguous language of MCL 500.3145(1) can only be interpreted as limiting the amount of PIP benefits recoverable to those losses incurred within one year before the date the lawsuit is filed, which was the same interpretation advanced by the Cameron majority, we reinstate our previous decision in Cameron.
In this case, plaintiff filed her complaint on February 27, 2009, seeking recovery of PIP benefits for losses dating back 32 years. While plaintiff contends that, in light of her alleged insanity, the minority/insanity tolling provision tolls the one-year-back rule, rendering any losses incurred from the date of plaintiffs 1977 accident recoverable, we conclude otherwise. The minority/insanity tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1), which concerns when an action may be commenced, does not render inoperable the one-year-back rule, which only limits how much can be recovered after the action has been commenced. Consequently, the one-year-back rule does not fall within the purview of what is intended to be tolled by the minority/insanity tolling provision. Accordingly, plaintiffs recovery is limited to losses incurred on or after February 27, 2008.
IV CONCLUSION
The minority/insanity tolling provision in MCL 600.5851(1) does not apply to toll the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) because the one-year-back rule is a damages-limiting provision and does not concern when an action may be brought. These two distinct statutory provisions serve different purposes and by their express language operate separately. Because the decision in Regents ignored the plain statutory directive, it is hereby overruled and Cameron is reinstated.
Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins Co, 487 Mich 289; 791 NW2d 897 (2010).
Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 476 Mich 55; 718 NW2d 784 (2006).
Liptow v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 272 Mich App 544; 726 NW2d 442 (2006).
The circuit court held that there exists a question of fact regarding whether plaintiff is “insane” for purposes of MCL 600.5851(1). That determination is not at issue in this appeal.
Joseph v ACIA, 802 NW2d 351 (Mich, 2011).
Joseph v ACIA, 489 Mich 924 (2011).
Nastal v Henderson & Assoc Investigations, Inc, 471 Mich 712, 720; 691 NW2d 1 (2005).
Id.
Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001).
Id.
MCL 8.3a; Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 160; 645 NW2d 643 (2002).
Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999).
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
MCR 2.116(0(10) and (G)(4); Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).
15 Emphasis added.
Welton v Carriers Ins Co, 421 Mich 571, 576; 365 NW2d 170 (1984).
17 Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 574; 702 NW2d 539 (2005), quoting Welton, 421 Mich at 576.
18 Devillers, 473 Mich at 574; see also Howard v Gen Motors Corp, 427 Mich 358, 385-387; 399 NW2d 10 (1986) (opinion by Brickley, J.).
MCL 600.101 et seq.
See Lambert v Calhoun, 394 Mich 179, 181, 192; 229 NW2d 332 (1975).
This is a point that is only relevant to statutes like the no-fault act that contain a unique one-year-hack rule, which limits the right of recovery to damages incurred during the year before commencement of the action.
Cameron, 476 Mich 55.
23 Id. at 62.
24 Id. at 72.
Geiger v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 114 Mich App 283; 318 NW2d 833 (1982).
By overruling Geiger, the dissent contends that “the Cameron majority upended 25 years of settled law . . ..” Post at 224. Aside from the fact that such “settled law” was a Court of Appeals decision and thus not binding on this Court, the dissent disregards the fundamental principle that not all precedents are deserving of equal respect. Geiger ignored the clear and unambiguous language of MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1) and was, instead, grounded on its own speculative policy considerations. Because Cameron closely analyzed the actual statutory language and did not allow policy considerations to dictate the result, it is simply deserving of more regard. Thus, Cameron did not “upend 25 years of settled law”; stated in more accurate terms, the Cameron majority was compelled to overrule nonbinding precedent premised on a faulty legal analysis.
Contrary to the dissent, our conclusion that Cameron is “better reasoned” is not an altogether subjective determination. Instead, it is based on a straightforward reading of both Cameron and Geiger, which, even the dissent can hardly deny, would lead almost any reader to conclude that Cameron is focused principally on the statutory language in dispute, while Geiger is focused principally on policy considerations.
Geiger, 114 Mich App at 291.
28 Cameron, 476 Mich at 63 (citation omitted).
Liptow, 272 Mich App 544.
See MCL 600.5821(4), which provides in pertinent part:
Actions brought in the name of. .. any political subdivision of the state of Michigan ... for the recovery of the cost of maintenance, care, and treatment of persons in hospitals ... are not subject to the statute of limitations and may be brought at any time without limitation, the provisions of any statute notwithstanding. [Emphasis added.]
Liptow, 272 Mich App at 555-556.
Regents, 487 Mich 289.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 333 (Makkman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 336.
36 Id. at 339.
Sun Valley Foods, 460 Mich at 236.
The dissent characterizes our interpretation of MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1) as “tend[ing] toward the absurd.” Post at 225.
Insofar as the dissent asserts that it “defies common sense” to think “[tjhat the Legislature wanted to grant a minor or insane person the right to prove his or her damages in a court of law while lacking any opportunity to be awarded them,” post at 225-226, we note that the statutory language plainly does not confer on a claimant a right to prove and recover an unlimited amount of damages. Instead, the plain language merely confers a right, under certain circumstances, to bring an action despite the period of limitations having expired. The dissent utterly fails to recognize that the one-year-back rule does not operate to preclude a claimant from recovering any damages; rather, a claimant will find himself or herself without any recovery as a result of the one-year-back rule’s operation only if the claimant has not suffered any losses within the one year immediately preceding the filing of the action. Contrary to the dissent, “that this result will occur ‘only’ in some circumstances,” post at 226 n 11, hardly constitutes our only response to its claim of “absurdity.” As previously explained, it is possible that the Legislature chose to impose a limitation on the recovery of no-fault benefits to ensure the financial integrity of the no-fault system. See also Regents, 487 Mich at 346-347 (Markman, J. dissenting).
See, e.g., Tebo v Havlik, 418 Mich 350, 366; 343 NW2d 181 (1984); Celina Mut Ins Co v Lake States Ins Co, 452 Mich 84, 89; 549 NW2d 834 (1996); O’Donnell v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 404 Mich 524, 547; 273 NW2d 829 (1979).
Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 464-468; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).
Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732, 757; 641 NW2d 567 (2002), citing Robinson, 462 Mich at 464-468; see also Mitchell v W T Grant Co, 416 US 600, 627-628; 94 S Ct 1895; 40 L Ed 2d 406 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
Robinson, 462 Mich at 466.
Regents, 487 Mich at 305.
Robinson, 462 Mich at 466.
Id. at 467.
46 Id.
MCL 500.3145(1).
Robinson, 462 Mich at 468.
The Regents Court overruled Liptow on the sole basis that it relied on Cameron. Because Cameron has now been reinstated, the justification for overruling Liptow is no longer controlling law.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). Today’s decision is this Court’s third ruling on the same issue in six years. Yet nothing accounts for its going back and forth on the issue — no new or revised legislation or social upheaval — except changes in the composition of the Court itself.
The majority overrules Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins Co
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, MCL 600.5851(1) is not “entirely silent with regard to the amount of damages recoverable once an action has been brought.”
MCL 600.5851(1) does not create its own independent cause of action. It must be read together with the statute under which the plaintiff seeks to recover. In no-fault cases, for example, MCL 600.5851(1) must be read together with*224 MCL 500.3145(1). Doing so, the statutes grant infants and incompetent persons one year after their disability is removed to “bring the action” “for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits ... for accidental bodily injury----” On the basis of its language, MCL 600.5851(1) supersedes all limitations in MCL 500.3145(1), including the one-year-back rule’s limitation on the period of recovery[5]
The majority correctly asserts that our decisions predating Cameron recognized that MCL 500.3145(1) contains two limitations on the time for filing suit and one limitation on the period of recovery.
The significant point is that Cameron was the first decision in which this Court recognized the distinction between the limitations in MCL 500.3145(1) and applied them differently. In so doing, the Cameron majority upended 25 years of settled law and drew a distinction that even the defendant did not initially ask it to draw.
As observed by the dissenting opinions in Cameron, the majority’s interpretation of MCL 600.5851(1) and MCL 500.3145(1) in Cameron and this case tends toward the absurd.
I dissent from the majority’s decision to overrule Regents and reinstate the rule from Cameron that MCL 600.5851(1) does not preclude application of the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1). I would hold that MCL 600.5851(1) saves a minor or insane person’s “claim,” which includes the right to recover all of his or her personal protection insurance benefits.
Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins Co, 487 Mich 289; 791 NW2d 897 (2010).
Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 476 Mich 55; 718 NW2d 784 (2006).
See Geiger v DAIIE, 114 Mich App 283; 318 NW2d 833 (1982).
Ante at 209.
5 Regents, 487 Mich at 298.
See ante at 207, citing Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 574; 702 NW2d 539 (2005), and Welton v Carrier Ins Co, 421 Mich 571, 576; 365 NW2d 170 (1984).
See Cameron, 476 Mich at 88-90 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (noting that the defendant initially argued that MCL 600.5851(1) should not apply to any of the limitations in MCL 500.3145(1), but that the defendant eventually devised the alternative argument that, even though MCL 600.5851(1) saved the plaintiffs right to file suit, the one-year-back rule nevertheless prevented the plaintiff from recovering any damages that were incurred more than a year before the date of filing suit).
Ante at 210 n 26. The majority also repeats a theme originating from Justice Markman’s concurrence in Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm,
The majority claims that this inquiry is not subjective because, given that Cameron focused principally on the statute’s language, not “policy considerations,” it is objectively “better reasoned” than Geiger. Even accepting the majority’s characterization, this assertion is flawed. An objective person reading an absurd decision that is based on a seriously strained reading of statutory language (Cameron) might reasonably find a contrary decision primarily focused on “policy considerations” (Geiger) to he “better reasoned.” The majority’s disdain for policy considerations in favor of a focus on statutory language that it inevitably determines is “clear and unambiguous” — even when it is not — does not an objective determination make.
Finally, it appears that, unlike the majority, the Legislature did not consider Geiger to be “premised on a faulty legal analysis.” Ante at 210 n 26. It did not supersede Geiger by amending the applicable statutes from 1982 to 2006.
Ante at 218.
Cameron, 476 Mich at 103 n 12 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting); id. at 109-130 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
The majority’s response to this obvious absurdity is that it wiil “only” occur if the injured person has suffered no losses in the year preceding the filing of the action. The majority’s speculation that this result will occur “only” in some circumstances does nothing to undercut its absurdity. And it will provide cold comfort for those caught in this judicially created trap.